




STRATEGIC CULTURE AND REGIONAL SECURITY GOVERNANCE: 
THE AGENCY OF REGIONAL SECONDARY POWERS IN THE 







A thesis submitted to 
The University of Birmingham 
for the degree of 








Department of Politics and International Studies 
School of Government and Society 
College of Social Sciences 
















This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 






This thesis investigates the roles Argentina, Chile, and Colombia played in the creation 
of the South American Defence Council (SADC), resorting to the conceptual framework of 
Strategic Culture to tap into the meanings and motives behind state behaviour. By doing 
this, it brings forward an aspect often neglected by the existing literature, emphasizing 
the role of agents in shaping the social structure within which they interact.  
The SADC, one of the first sectorial councils created within the Union of South 
American States (UNASUR, in Spanish), is an innovative governance mechanism in South 
America devoted to fostering dialogue, policy coordination, and cooperation in the 
defence sector. The significance of its creation cannot be overstated, bringing together a 
dozen countries with diverse security and defence concerns, material capabilities, 
ideational commitments, and diverging political agendas. However, the existing research 
on its creation has almost exclusively resorted to (sub)systemic approaches that examine 
structural incentives and constrains present at the moment of its creation. 
The argument of this thesis is that, in order to understand regional security dynamics 
in a more nuanced and comprehensive way, it is necessary to escape the temptation of 
approaching the topic exclusively from a regional-level perspective. Instead, the present 
research proposes a way by which the creation of the SADC can be studied in terms of the 
impact that the agency of individual states has had in shaping the South American 
security environment. In order to do this, it engages with different elements of the 
constructivist research agenda, particularly so with the notion that agents and structures 
are permanently immersed in a process of mutual co-constitution. 
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General considerations and goal of the research project 
 
The purpose of this research is to fill a gap in the currently available knowledge 
regarding the processes that led to creation of the South American Defence Council 
(SADC), the first organization in this region specifically devoted to multilateral 
consultation, policy coordination, and cooperation in the defence sector. More specifically, 
it seeks to contribute to the field focusing on how the agency of South American secondary 
powers was informed by their respective cultural background, determining their 
negotiating agendas for the SADC treaty and affecting the evolution of regional security 
governance1 mechanisms. In this way, the present research will not focus on the actual 
work of the SADC, but rather on domestic drivers behind the divergent approaches shown 
by these countries in the negotiations, as well as on how they affected the outcome by 
                                                        
1 The notion of governance is used here primarily as a descriptive label, pointing towards an understanding 
that acknowledges the roles various actors have in managing international affairs. Governance approaches 
to international security do not challenge the central role states have, but rather add extra layers of analysis 
by considering the roles of non-state actors in the equation (Krahmann 2003, 5–6). Also, governance studies 
focus on “emergent political institutions and practices that are less territorially focused than their statal 
counterparts” (Jessop 2016, 2). The present research focuses on “state actors”, but it does so trying to avoid 
their reification and opening up the “black box” to look at how intra-elite understandings and disagreements 
affect state behaviour. 
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pushing for their respective preferences on regional security management, 
institutionalization, and cooperation. In doing so, it seeks to produce an agent-level 
constructivist approach that will complement the regional-level analyses that currently 
dominate the debate. 
 
Brief description of the SADC 
Before moving forward with other specifics, it is important to provide some details 
regarding the nature and relevance of the SADC in order to contextualize the research. 
This organization, whose constitutive treaty was finalized in December 2008 (Appendix 
1), was among the first sectorial councils formed within the framework of the Union of 
South American Nations (UNASUR, in Spanish). The UNASUR represented a breaking 
point with previous forms of regional cooperation, not only because it set aside the trade 
liberalization agendas that defined past regionalist projects (see Chapter 2), but also 
because it adopted an approach of segmented institutionalization by sector. In terms of 
the model of regional governance advanced, it has been described as  
“[…] a space above the state for debate, knowledge-sharing and the promotion of new 
practices and methods of regional policy formation, and to provide democratically 
elected governments with some external support mechanism to which they can turn 
when faced with internal and external critics. In this new register, regional governance 
is taking shape in a less spectacular way than in the past and it is proceeding in parts, 
rather than in response to a comprehensive road map set out in advance.” (Riggirozzi 
and Grugel 2015, 781–82) 
 
The UNASUR, and the SADC by extension, can also be described as a multilateral 
approach to governance, explicitly rejecting the creation of a supranational entity. Yet, the 
case remains that this sectorial, seemingly unambitious, effort established the first basic 
security governance mechanisms at the South American level. Moreover, it represents the 
3 
 
only instance to date in which the Ministries of Defence (rather than the leaders of the 
Armed Forces) of the region agreed on a set of principles to strengthen mutual trust and 
the regional Zone of Peace, advancing cooperation and policy coordination agendas 
inspired primarily by successful cases of rapprochement seen in the region. This makes 
the SADC a relevant instance of political coordination and cooperation, able to respond 
speedily to crises as well as to steadily advance regional understandings during more 
stable times. The organization embodies a joint governance effort to manage the dynamics 
of the South American security environment focusing on the development of shared 
understandings and common goals (Silva Barros 2016, 240–42; Weiffen, Wehner, and 
Nolte 2013) which, according to Jorge Battaglino, 
“[…] can contribute to the development and institutionalization of dynamics that 
facilitate [conflict] prevention and management through the political coordination 
among South American countries.” (Battaglino 2012, 92) 
 
Bilateral instances of policy cooperation aiming to achieve precisely these goals existed 
in the region at least since the early 1990s, though they mostly focused on strengthening 
the relationship between the respective Armed Forces rather than on increasing the 
contact between civil servants and high-ranking civilians working at the Ministries of 
Defence. Similarly, a defence dialogue forum was created in the late 1990s inside the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)2. However, despite promising initial steps, it 
failed to develop an proper work agenda, and the defence sector remained a very minor 
topic among MERCOSUR activities. The creation of the SADC, on the contrary, represents 
a significant change of pace and scale for the region in terms of promoting defence 
                                                        
2 A free trade bloc formed in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Venezuela was accepted as 
a full member in 2012, but remains suspended as of 2016 due to “democratic concerns”. Bolivia was 
accepted as a full member in 2015, with its accession process still ongoing. Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
and Suriname participate as associated countries. 
4 
 
cooperation and policy coordination in the area, even if it does not respond to “a 
comprehensive roadmap set out in advance”. 
As other UNASUR sectorial councils, the SADC is an inter-ministerial cooperation 
arrangement. It´s institutional structure is formed by the Ministers of Defence, Deputy-
Ministers of Defence, and national working groups (UNASUR 2008b, Arts. 6-8), who meet 
twice a year to coordinate activities and take stock of ongoing actions. In a region 
characterized by “presidential diplomacy”, institutionalizing an organization to actively 
work at the ministerial level seeking to alter the regional order would have seemed 
unlikely only few years before. 
The core of what this organization is expected to achieve can be found in its three main 
objectives (UNASUR 2008b, Art. 4): a) Consolidate South America as a Zone of Peace, a 
condition sine qua non to protect democratic stability and development; b) Move towards 
the construction of a regional defence identity, acknowledging existing differences; and, 
c) Enable the development of mutual understandings to foster cooperation. 
Many relevant conclusions can be drawn from these main objectives, which will 
resonate with the analysis of the case studies. First, the key argument for the creation of 
the SADC is that active regional efforts are necessary to maintain the long-lasting South 
American peace (Kacowicz 1998), which can no longer rely on the good will of individual 
actors, bilateral agreements, nor lax sub-regional arrangements. More importantly, 
however relevant peaceful inter-state relations are, this objective is also conceived as 
essential in contributing towards the more pressing issues of democratic stability and 
socio-economic development. Linking regional and international efforts to the prospect 
of furthering domestic development and stability is by no means a game-changing 
narrative. Neither is establishing a relation between the defence sector and development, 
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particularly so in countries like Argentina and Brazil, who went through developmentalist 
phases between the 1950s-1970s, a period marked by dictatorships that often favoured 
industrialization in the defence sector to reduce external vulnerabilities. However, what 
is indeed a novelty for the region is the notion that a regional cooperation organization 
focused on the defence sector could contribute towards strengthening not only inter-state 
peace, but also socio-economic development and domestic political stability. This reflects 
the shared concerns of various South American governments, who no longer understood 
development, stability, and autonomy as matters to be left for the Ministers of Economy 
to sort, but rather as goals towards which all policy areas could contribute. 
Objective b) and c) are good examples of the diametrically different perspectives on 
regionalism that separate UNASUR/SADC´s agenda from previous experiences that 
focused primarily on economic and trade integration. MERCOSUR´s main treaties and 
protocols3, for example, consistently mention the challenges coming from the 
international context, converging economic interests, and a compatible institutionality as 
the key ingredients facilitating regional economic integration. As a consequence, the main 
objectives of that integration project was creating a common market that would allegedly 
foster economic growth. The UNASUR framework maintains the imperative of fostering 
economic development in the region, as the previous paragraph explains. Yet, the task is 
approached with a view about what makes regional cooperation relevant that is 
diametrically different from that of MERCOSUR and other trade integration projects, 
incorporating a broader policy agenda that explicitly avoids discussing trade and 
economic integration, as well as the discourse of shared identities and history. 
                                                        
3 Constitutive Treaty of MERCOSUR – Asunción Treaty (1991); Ouro Preto Protocol (1994); Ushuaia 
Protocol (1998); Constitutive Protocol of the MERCOSUR Parliament (2005) 
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As Jorge Battaglino points out  (2012, 84), the creation of the SADC cannot be fully 
explained without attributing a central role to shared ideational factors contributing to 
the development of a community in South America. The starting point for this 
organization is, then, that enough mutual understandings about the defence sector exist 
that make South America a distinct security region, something that will be discussed at 
more length in Chapter 3. More importantly, objectives b) and c) incorporate the notion 
that fostering the creation and strengthening of inter-subjective agreements about the 
defence sector is conducive to maintaining inter-state peace and facilitating cooperation. 
It should be noted that, while these innovations by no means hinder the co-existence of 
MERCOSUR and UNASUR/SADC, nor the possibility of the odd convergent efforts, a more 
meaningful mutual complementation seems difficult at the moment due to radically 
different perspectives on the political economy of development that persist. 
These three main objectives are further broken down into eleven “specific objectives” 
(UNASUR 2008b, Art. 5)4. The main tasks listed there can be summarized as: identify and 
analyse existing common grounds; exchange information; form stronger trust ties; and, 
explore new avenues of cooperation and policy coordination. Crucially, records of the 
negotiations show that the formation of a Collective Security arrangement and similar 
provisions for pooling military forces were vigorously rejected by a majority of countries 
involved (Grupo de Trabajo del SADC 2009; UNASUR 2009), going directly against a 
Venezuelan proposal that called for the creation of a “NATO of the South”5 (Otálvora 2006, 
                                                        
4 a) Identify and analyse common elements in the respective approaches to the defence sector; b) Promote 
a more fluid exchange of information and the joint analysis of issues; c) Contribute to the articulation of 
joint positions in multilateral fora; d) Move forward in the construction of shared perceptions; e) 
Strengthen mutual confidence measures; f) Promote cooperation among defence industries; g) Foster 
training, educational, and academic exchanges; h) Share experiences obtained in humanitarian missions 
and facilitate coordinated actions in them; i) Share experiences obtained in Peacekeeping Operations; j) 
Share experiences regarding processes of modernization of the respective Ministries of Defence and Armed 
Forces; and, k) Promote gender perspectives in the defence sector. 
5 A proposal of Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez, whom spoke publicly about this possibility at the XX 
Anniversary of the Andean Pact, in 1999, and reiterated his stance over the years. 
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1; de Pádua and Mathias 2010, 58–59). In the end, however novel an institution the SADC 
was for the region, its design and objectives are comfortably grounded in the Latin 
American tradition of defending strong sovereign rights and engaging in multilateral fora, 
seeking to find the “greatest common denominator” so that the principle of unanimity in 
the decision-making process is preserved (Ruz 2011a, 4–5). 
In sum, the objectives given to the SADC set a regional security agenda that emphasizes 
the relevance of developing shared understandings and perceptions about regional 
security, common threats, and norms informing the use of the defence apparatus; as well 
as creating routines to handle issues of mutual interest, developing coordinated defence 
agendas, and, institutionalizing regional security governance mechanisms (Briceño-Ruiz 
and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2015; Sanahuja 2012). 
Designed to avoid a bureaucratically-heavy organization, the SADC´s structure and 
work agenda were designed to make the most with the limited resources available. This 
meant that the initial stages of institution-building were devoted to incentivizing a nearly 
costless flow of ideas and information, trust-building processes, and building capacities 
within the organization. These would form a base on which incrementally ambitious and 
intrusive initiatives could be designed and implemented in later stages, and hence 
contribute with the organization´s main and specific goals. Given the mandate to maintain 
the bureaucratic structure to a minimum, there is no permanent personnel working for 
the SADC, except for the few people working at the Centre for Strategic Defence Studies 
(CEED, in Spanish) and the South American Defence School (ESUDE, in Spanish), both 
devoted to advancing main objectives b) and c). All other responsibilities, including the 
primary organizational and coordination duties, rotate yearly following the Pro Tempore 
Presidency of UNASUR. 
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Expected contribution, working propositions, and research question 
As will be discussed in more length in Chapter 2, the literature on the creation of the 
UNASUR and the SADC has focused primarily on (sub)systemic factors and processes. One 
of the dominant lines of research has forcefully argued that the decision to create this 
organization is related to the emergence of a regionalist agenda known as “Post-
hegemonic regionalism” (Legler 2013; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012b) from the early-2000s 
onwards. The key argument here is that the political success of this agenda requires the 
reconceptualization of shared regional understandings and goals, as well as of the 
cooperation arrangements needed to pursue them (Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann 
2015). Authors in this line of enquiry see the “post-hegemonic” as hybrid regionalism, 
combining native innovations conducive to increasing autonomy with elements of 
“hegemonic regionalism” (heavily influenced by the history, agendas, institutional design, 
and normative preferences of the liberal North, and primarily based on the European 
experience). These conditions contributed to the emergence of novel regional 
organizations focused on cooperation agendas closer to the concerns of the Global South 
(development and autonomy, to name just two among many others) than to the forms of 
economic liberalization promoted by northern powers and international organizations. 
The line of enquiry promoted by post-hegemonic regionalism and other similar 
perspectives has produced relevant knowledge about the ideational, political, and 
strategic choices involved in the creation of UNASUR and the SADC. However, it has done 
far less to explain what the role of individual agents has been in that process, let alone 
identify sources of divergence and contestation to the emerging regional agenda. 
A second line of analysis interprets the creation of the UNASUR and the SADC as direct 
result of Brazilian global interests, seeking to advance a regional arrangement designed 
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to cement its “sphere of influence” (Spektor 2011, 59). From this perspective, the creation 
of the UNASUR/SADC is seen as a strategy designed to manufacture consent around the 
idea of a distinct South American region organized around Brazilian leadership, thus 
excluding potential competition from Mexico (in a Latin American setting) and the US (in 
a hemispheric setting). All indicators traditionally considered relevant to establish a 
country´s international power share underpin the argument that Brazil is the primary 
power in the region (Appendix 4). Moreover, it is likely that Brazil indeed had an interest 
in the UNASUR, among other things, because it stood to gain international prestige and a 
stronger footing as “global player”. Yet, considering the several instances in which 
secondary powers have contradicted Brazilian core foreign policy goals without 
noticeable consequences for them, their decision to join the negotiations cannot be fully 
explained by exclusively focusing on power distribution in the region. 
 
The effects of these (sub)systemic factors will not to be dismissed here. On the 
contrary, the presence of shared ideational commitments at the South American level and 
the role Brazilian leadership are acknowledged as crucial aspects shaping the regional 
security environment. Yet, the starting point for the present research is that authors have 
approached the creation of the SADC focusing exclusively on the regional structure6 and 
its characteristics, leaving aside the role played by agents shaping regional arrangements 
despite the constructivist argument that structure and agency are intertwined in a 
process of mutual co-constitution (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 3; Onuf 1998, 58; Wendt 1987). 
                                                        
6 The term “structure” is used in the sense that Constructivist thinking does, i.e. referring to “historically 
constructed normative structures” (Alderson and Hurrell 2000, 27). These behave as structures in the sense 
that they create long-term incentives and constraints, influencing the behaviour of actors. But, since they 
ultimately are the result of social constructions, structures are also susceptible to change over time due to 
the agency and interactions of the actors they influence. 
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This Thesis proposes an agent-centred approach to the regional security governance 
arrangement created with the SADC. Given that this research comes to fill a gap in the 
knowledge for which no information is readily available, an exploratory research design 
has been chose. This means that, rather than a hypothesis, the starting point for this 
research are the following working propositions: 
1. Studying the behaviour of secondary powers is crucial to understand the role agency 
has in the construction of regional social arrangements, such as the SADC; and, 
2. The characteristics given to this security governance mechanism are intimately related 
with the agency shown by secondary regional powers. 
 
This propositions are based, as will become evident in the following sections, on the 
theoretical and epistemological commitments of constructivist IR theory.  
Seeming contradictions and a multiplicity of positions expressed during the 
negotiations notwithstanding, the SADC agreement was successfully finalized after only 
four rounds of negotiation hosted by Chile over the second half of 2008. However, the 
diverging positions represented in the negotiations and how they influenced the creation 
of the SADC have rarely been analysed. In order to fill this gap I will resort to the 
conceptual framework of “Strategic Culture” (Chapter 4), looking into how social norms 
regarding the use of the defence apparatus defined a path-dependent set of perceptions 
and understandings about the regional security environment. These, in turn, largely 
explain the negotiating agendas brought by secondary powers and the trade-offs 
countries were willing to make, and provide insights into how common ground was found 
in spite of diverging “Strategic Cultures”. 
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To sum up and crystalize the key concern driving this research, the central question 
this Thesis is seeking to answer is: How did the agency of secondary regional powers 
affect the regional security governance mechanisms created with the SADC? 
Appropriately answering this question requires that subsidiary questions are also 
tackled: What are the relevant domestic roots of state agency7 in the defence sector? How 
did normative priors influence the perception of the region and of the SADC initiative? 
How did that relate to the negotiating agendas brought by secondary powers? How did 
secondary powers deploy their agency during the negotiations? What role can be 
attributed to their agendas in the regional security governance mechanisms created? 
What does all this mean in terms of understanding the process of mutual constitution 
between agents and structure theorized by Constructivist IR? 
 
The expectation is to provide a detailed and theoretically-informed account of the 
agency deployed by secondary powers when participating in the negotiations, 
highlighting not only how they impacted the design given to the SADC, but also the role 
agents have in shaping the regional social structure and governance mechanisms. 
 
 
                                                        
7 While there are references to “the state”, “state behaviour”, and “state agency” throughout the Thesis, it is 
not my intention to reify these abstractions. The analytical concept of Strategic Culture (Chapter 4) makes 
reference to social constructs that emanate from a specific subset of domestic actors and is, more often than 
not, contested by other groups within the same country. In other words, rather than reifying the state, this 
research looks at how the cultural constructs shared by a specific group of individuals dominates local 
perspectives on defence to such extent that it becomes crystalized in norms and affects the international 
actions of the collective referred to as “the state”. References to “the state”, “state agency”, and “state 





The first task of the present research is to analyse the effects domestic cultural 
constructions or normative priors have on a state´s international behaviour, and how this 
can affects the international/regional security environment. More specifically, it has to 
identify and analyse the roles dominant Strategic Cultures had in shaping perceptions on, 
agendas for, and approaches to the SADC negotiations, and explain why this is 
consequential for the social construction of international/regional security dynamics. 
Some methodological clarifications are necessary before moving forward. Given the 
relative lack of systematic analysis on the agency of secondary regional powers, the 
chosen research design is an exploratory study engaging with separate case studies. The 
cases are approached with an analytical toolbox formed of a constructivist and 
interpretivist understanding of international relations, resorting to the concept of 
Strategic Culture to understand the development of state agency in the defence sector. 
 
Epistemological commitments, data collection and interpretation 
Following Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2011), a priori definitions about “scientific 
credentials” based on criteria of “objectivity” and “methodological rigour” are considered 
a poor choice to properly asses social inquiry. In Jackson´s view, 
“The methodological principle is that we should regard positions on the character and 
conduct of science as resting on provisional commitments —wagers— about matters 
of philosophical ontology that can really never be settled definitively. […] commitments 
of this sort undergird every instance of scientific research, implicitly shaping what the 
goals of such research are thought to be and how the research goes about trying to 




These commitments “constitute worlds” in that they set a frame that will highlight or 
downplay theoretical and empirical questions, thus becoming foundations of research 
(Suganami 2012). Arguably, this means different parameters should be used to evaluate 
the legitimacy of knowledge-production and academic practices that differ in their basic 
epistemological and ontological commitments. 
This research seeks to identify and analyse the intersubjective meanings (normative 
priors, norms, and culture broadly speaking) informing the actions of defence and foreign 
policy elites, equated here with “the agency of the state”, to understand how they were 
consequential in the creation of the SADC. An interpretivist epistemology is an adequate 
fit to engage with such topics (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 765–69; Sil and Katzenstein 
2010, 417), placing “the events [interpretivists] describe in an intelligible context within 
which the meaning of actions becomes explicable.” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 36). 
Moreover, within the realm of interpretivism, Constructivism develops analytical tools 
that shed light on aspects of international relations that are crucial for the present 
research, primarily: 
- The effects social institutions have on agency and the development of other social 
arrangements (Hall 2010; Onuf 2013, 7–8);  
- The dynamic of mutual constitutions that exists between agents and structure; and,  
- Various levels of aggregation (domestic, state, regional, inter-regional, global) in which 
interactions between arrangements and agents take place (Kubálková 1998, 52–53).  
 
In other words, the epistemological commitments of interpretivism and constructivism 
provide a thoroughly discussed approach to engage with matters such as: how South 
American institutions and security dynamics influenced the perceptions states had of the 
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region and, more crucially, of the SADC initiative; how these interacted with historically 
contingent domestic cultural constructions, explaining both a degree of path dependence 
and the ability for change in the agency of states; and, finally, the effects the agency of 
secondary powers had in shaping regional intersubjective meanings and arrangements. 
Crucially, the present research is expected to shed light not only on the specific forms 
of agency and influence deployed during the SADC negotiations, but also on the dynamics 
of agent-structure co-constitution more broadly. Hopefully, the analysis conducted here 
will help better comprehend the ways in which agents influence the development of 
regional social arrangements and norms other than merely “constituting” them by 
repeating legitimized forms of behaviour over time. 
 
In addition to the above, it is also crucial to mention that the research design used is 
exploratory. Since no existing research has applied a systematic account for state agency 
in relation to the creation of the SADC, a detailed analysis of each case is necessary to 
establish a starting point for future studies. There are, therefore, no theory- nor 
hypothesis-testing motivations behind the case studies. 
The chosen design involves engaging with three distinct case studies, rather than with 
a strict comparative methodology, in order to obtain an in-depth understanding of the 
specific domestic features of their agency. Though the cases will be repeatedly contrasted 
one against the other, this should be seen only as a heuristic device to bring forward the 
specificity of each case. This type of cross-case comparisons are useful to better assess the 
distinctive characteristics of each case, drawing preliminary conclusions as to what the 
relevant variables in the study may be. In Alexander George and Andrew Bennett´s words, 
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“[…] the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a 
combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study 
or research program” (George and Bennett 2005, 67) 
 
The key methodological choices in this research are informed by the concept of 
“Strategic Culture”, also in line with the constructivist research agenda (see Chapter 4), 
used to engage with the agency of individual states in the process of negotiation of the 
SADC. Suffice it to say at this point that cultural factors are considered to be at the root of 
key systems of meaning, establishing parameters to evaluate processes of path 
dependence and change with regards to the perception of the regional environment, the 
actions of other players, and the range of actions considered viable and legitimate. 
The impact of Strategic Cultures on the positions presented during the SADC 
negotiations can be analysed interpreting the practices that define the respective defence 
sectors, observable resorting to a combination of archival work, legal analysis, and in-
depth interviews with members of the relevant elites. A basic assumption of this research 
is that Strategic Cultures involve understandings about the role and reach of the defence 
sector, influencing perceptions of the regional environment and the logic of interaction 
deployed in the SADC negotiations. This follows what Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch argue 
about the constructivist approach to security and defence studies: 
“Constructivists see ´security´ as a relationship historically conditioned by culture 
rather than an objective characteristic determined by the distribution of military 
capabilities. Consequently, we favor methodologies that acknowledge contingency and 
context.”(Klotz and Lynch 2007, 17 italics added) 
 
With the above in mind, it is important to address the two main primary sources of 
information to be used in this research: archives (primarily local legislation for the 
defence sector and diplomatic communications), and in-depth elite interviews. One of the 
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problems in resorting to archive material was its availability and ease of access. This was 
not an issue with regards to the domestic legislation, but obtaining diplomatic 
communications and other ministerial documents related to the negotiations proved 
challenging in various instances. This aspect will be discussed case by case in the 
following sub-section, but it is important to point out that the differences between the 
three cases in this respect would have made it impossible to conduct a formal comparison. 
A second problem is that these sources tend to contain only an official account of the 
facts, done with the often standardized and formulaic language of state bureaucracies. 
Nevertheless, this obstacle can be avoided by contextualizing the sources, resorting to 
analyses of the actual practices of the actors, using data obtained in interviews to compare 
and obtain a more nuanced understanding, and contrasting with secondary sources. 
With regards to the interviews, the subjects were mostly members of the Foreign Policy 
and Defence elites, including career officials, political appointees, expert consultants, 
negotiators, and academics (Appendix 2). Given the in-depth knowledge of the 
negotiations the interviewees were expected to have, the tool chosen was a semi-
structured questionnaire with a set of 6-8 basic questions, upon which the researcher 
could expand and formulate follow-up questions. The questions included in the 
questionnaire (Appendix 3) were thought to tackle conceptually-relevant aspects 
regarding the relation between the dominant Strategic Culture and state behaviour, while 
also giving room for the interviewees to expand on relevant features and allow the 
interviewer to explore unexpected lines of questioning. Additionally, this form of 
interview allowed to include questions based on information provided by previous 
respondents (making sure to keep their anonymity), thus triangulating among them to try 




Ideally, a project of this nature should be able to engage with the historical, social, and 
cultural specificities of each of the countries involved in the creation of the SADC, as this 
would allow obtaining a nuanced understanding of the variety of diverging agendas that 
converged in the creation of this organization. However, limited resources and space for 
such endeavour mean that selection criteria are necessary to identify the cases expected 
to provide a more meaningful understanding. A degree of arbitrariness is unavoidable in 
such selections. However, a consistent logic was applied in defining the selection criteria 
used in this research, which sought to account for the main arguments that currently 
dominate the knowledge on the creation of the SADC. 
 
Secondary regional powers 
The first selection criterion put forward to narrow down the constellation of available 
cases is that this research will focus on the agency displayed by secondary regional 
powers. In this instance, the concept of “secondary regional power” is defined exclusively 
in terms of the distribution of material power, both military and economic (Huntington 
1999). Though the literature is vague regarding how the distinction between primary, 
secondary, and minor regional powers should be determined, it can be argued that the 
empirical characteristics of the power distribution in South America make this conceptual 
vagueness less concerning. As can be seen in Appendix 4, assigning each of the region´s 
countries to one of these categories should be fairly easy, with Brazil as the only primary 
regional power; Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela confidently in the 
“secondary regional power” group; and Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Surinam, and 
Uruguay among the minor powers. 
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More nuanced concepts like “regional middle power” involve not only sheer power 
distribution, but also ideational, behavioural, and societal aspects of a state´s position in 
the region (Nolte 2010, 891–92). Though this is certainly a richer approach in some 
respects, the present research does not call for such features since the focus on “secondary 
regional powers” responds to their material ability to resist pressures coming from the 
primus inter pares, something that minor powers would find more challenging and costly 
(Jesse et al. 2012). This criterion controls for the argument that the Brazilian material 
power is the main cause for the creation of UNASUR/SADC, focusing exclusively on the 
degree of autonomy secondary powers are expected to have in their international 
behaviour thanks to their position in the regional distribution of power. 
The relevance of Brazil in South American regional relations is in no way disputed, nor 
is this country´s very active role in the creation of the SADC. On the contrary, both the 
existing literature and the testimonies collected in the interviews coincide in assigning it 
a central role in the process. For example, different sources identify the 2008 region-wide 
tour of Brazilian Defence Minister, Nelson Jobim, as a turning point to obtain unanimous 
support for its creation (Grupo de Trabajo del SADC 2009; Moreira 2008). However, this 
research aims to transcend one-dimensional explanations, contributing to a more 
encompassing analysis of the events by taking into consideration not only the regional 
context but also the agency of secondary powers. 
Contrary to the notion that alleged Brazilian hegemonic intentions can explain the 
creation of this organization on their own (Buyé Grau 2011; García 2008; Mijares 2011; 
Spektor 2009; Varas 2008), I argue that secondary powers did in fact exercise a high 
degree of agency, presenting a number of demands/alterations to the project that 
substantially influenced the characteristics given to the SADC. Such positions responded 
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to the perceived regional-level incentives and constraints (within which the Brazilian 
leadership/hegemony and shared ideational commitments fall) as much as to unit-level 
motivations. 
Indeed, the five states listed above as “secondary regional powers” displayed distinct 
(and often times diverging) voices during the SADC negotiations. However, since studying 
five cases in depth is still beyond the means of this research, a second criterion is 
necessary to further narrow down the case selection. 
 
Expected ideational compatibility with the SADC project 
As already mentioned, the second key line of research about the creation of the SADC 
argues that it can be explained looking at the rise of a distinct regionalist agenda shared 
by the leading countries in the region (Battaglino 2012; Benítez Manaut, Celi, and Diamint 
2009; Colombo and Roark 2012; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012b; Sanahuja 2012). This 
argument often relates the development of the post-hegemonic regional agenda with the 
political coincidences during South America´s “left turn” in the 2000s. 
Addressing this argument means that some form of ideational and political distinction 
between the five secondary powers is necessary to identify the more interesting cases 
available and further narrow down the selection. As Alan Jacobs rightly points out, there 
is a difficulty in studying the effect of ideational elements that does not exist when the 
focus is put on material forces. Jacobs attributes the difficulties of conceiving ideas as 
independent variables to two main reasons: they are hard to measure8; and, they “are 
often highly correlated with other plausible causes of political outcomes.” (Jacobs 2014, 
                                                        
8 The question of “measuring” in Social Sciences remains tied to a rather positivist way to understand social 
inquiry. Nevertheless, producing solid evidence based on ideational mechanisms is more difficult and 
disputed than doing so with material factors, regardless of the epistemological position of the researcher. 
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1). I would add to Jacobs´s appreciation that ideational causality in IR is also in 
disadvantage because of an under-development of the methodological tools available to 
properly identify and study the consequences of ideational factors in this discipline. 
With this in mind, and acknowledging the undoubtedly problematic aspects of its 
application, the second criterion used for case selection can be loosely defined as 
“expected ideational compatibility” with the idea of creating the SADC. Selecting cases 
based on their expected position in relation to the characteristics of the broader class of 
events is a well-documented approach (Gerring 2007). This criterion is crucial in that, if 
the new regionalist project is indeed related to the “left turn”, then the position each of 
these cases has in the left-right political spectrum should say something about their 
predisposition to engage in the SADC negotiations and their regional governance agendas 
(Flemes, Nolte, and Wehner 2011, 115). I propose that engaging with one country in each 
extreme of the political spectrum and with one middle-ground example should provide 
enough variety and relevant insights about the relevance of political/ideational factors in 
the decision-making process each actor followed. 
Being the only secondary power indisputably leaned towards the right end of the 
political spectrum, Colombia is perhaps one of the more interesting cases available. 
Moreover, this country´s decision to join becomes more puzzling knowing that its own 
actions accelerated the creation of the SADC9 and that President Alvaro Uribe´s 
administration openly expressed its discontent with the initiative. A regional outlier, 
Colombia explicitly opposed the “populism” of left-of-centre governments, showing more 
interest in strengthening its bilateral relations with the US than in engaging in South 
                                                        
9 The rolling out of the SADC initiative was accelerated by the Colombian bombing of a FARC campsite in 
the Angostura region, Ecuador. The violation of Ecuadorian territorial sovereignty led to escalation of 
tensions between Colombia, on one side, and Ecuador and Venezuela, on the other. Brazilian authorities 
saw this as proof that the region needed an organization to promote trust and govern tensions. 
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American cooperation initiatives (Tickner 2007). Based on these characteristics, the 
Colombian decision to join the SADC may even sound counterintuitive, making the 
analysis of the intricacies of this case a necessary task that may help qualify the role 
attributed by the literature to shared understandings and ideational commitments. 
Argentina and Venezuela can arguably be found among the secondary powers in the 
left-of-centre end of the political spectrum, albeit with marked differences. Venezuela 
represents one of the more extreme positions with regards to its commitment to Latin 
American regionalism, consistently proposing the creation of integration mechanisms 
significantly more ambitious than those advanced with the UNSAUR/SADC framework. 
Such was President Chavez´s support for Latin American regionalism that the Venezuelan 
support to the SADC was not weakened even when its entire agenda and negotiating 
position was blocked by actors defending far less intrusive approaches (Serbín 2009, 
151–52). Argentina was also permeable to regional cooperation processes from the onset, 
as well as an advocate of defence cooperation for over a decade before the SADC was even 
an idea. However, unconvinced by the “Brazilian intentions”, this country initially showed 
less enthusiasm about the SADC than would have been expected based on its historical 
position on the topic. Only after pro-SADC Defence elites won President Cristina 
Fernández ´s favour and “defeated” the more conservative position of Foreign Policy 
elites, did Argentina take a more decisive stance in favour of the organization. Hence, 
while Venezuela is arguably the better representative of ideational commitments 
consistently coinciding with the SADC; Argentina constitutes a more complex, nuanced, 
and interesting case, presenting an inter-ministerial contestation between commitment 
with the SADC project and caution about Brazilian intentions. This characteristic makes 
the case more interesting, in that the answers to why the country joined the negotiations 
and what agenda it brought are far less linear than in the Venezuelan case. 
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Finally, the middle-ground position could be easily filled by either Chile or Peru. Both 
countries have consistently showed a strong commitment with neoliberal practices and 
economics, as well as with the less intrusive “Open Regionalist” approach to cooperation 
(see Chapter 6). Moreover, at the moment of the negotiations, Chile had been governed by 
a social-democrat coalition for almost 18 years (Roberts 2011), while Peru was timidly 
joining the “left turn” with a centre-left government (Cameron 2011). All of the above puts 
both countries in a comfortable position to represent a middle-ground position. 
The decision to favour Chile over Peru is based on two key points. On the one hand, 
Chile is arguably the stronger and regionally more influential of the two, making it a better 
choice with regards to the first criterion. On the other hand, and despite its initial doubts 
about the UNASUR/SADC framework, this country had a central role in the negotiations 
due to its position of Pro Tempore president of the group during 2008. This somehow 
forced Chilean elites to develop a comprehensive regional agenda that allowed the 
country to exercise great influence in the goals and shape given to the SADC despite long-
term suspicion among Chilean elites about South American regionalist projects. 
 
To summarize, while five cases fall within the category of secondary regional powers 
by all relevant measures of “power”, a case selection of three is more viable in face of the 
in-depth analysis sought and the resources available for this research. Using a broadly 
defined criterion of “expected ideational commitment” the case selection was narrowed 
down to include Argentina (left), Chile (middle ground), and Colombia (right). 
Each of the three cases has consistently shown ability to deploy autonomous foreign 
and defence policies, as well as influence regional politics (sometimes even explicitly 
against Brazilian interests) despite the power imbalance in the region (Schenoni 2015, 5, 
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2017). In other words, none of the cases selected has been so vulnerable to Brazilian 
pressures that they could not oppose the SADC initiative, had they wanted to. This 
resonates with Gian Luca Gardini´s view that “[…] in Latin America, regionalism, although 
meant to be an expression of unity and solidarity, has become a stark reflection of Latin 
American diversity and heterogeneity.” (Gardini 2011, 235). 
It is also important to highlight that there is no expectation that the cases selected will 
be representative of other countries, and no generalizable conclusions nor typologies will 
result from their analysis. However, in showing the spectrum of diverging starting 
positions, this research seeks to show the wide variety of trajectories that lead to the 
converging decision to create the SADC, which by no means was as evident an outcome as 
some structural-level approaches may suggest. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
Some considerations about the data collected during the field work are necessary in 
order to address the fact that different sources of information have been used in each of 
the cases. Following Norman Denzin, I understand that  
“The combination of multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, 
perspectives, and observers in a single study is best understood as a strategy that adds 
rigor, breadth complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry” (Denzin 2012, 82) 
 
The first primary source involved interviewing members of the defence elites (civilian 
and military) who participate of the dominant Strategic Culture, considered key subjects 
in this research. In some cases, such as with public servants and high-ranking political 
appointees, the decisions and actions of these defence elites embody what is perceived as 
“state behaviour” itself. Hence, them sharing the meanings attached to the Strategic 
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Culture and behaving accordingly during the SADC negotiations means that the agenda of 
“the state” could believably be considered the result of dominant cultural constructions. 
This makes the causal link (understood in the broadest sense) between the cultural 
framework associated with the defence sector and state behaviour during the 
negotiations more credible. 
It is important, though, to highlight that Strategic Cultures are not “national”, in the 
sense that there is not just one set of understandings and norms that corresponds 
perfectly with how a given country should relate to its defence apparatus and the use of 
force. Rather, they reflect the dominant set of meanings and representations regarding 
the topic, while alternative perspectives constantly contest their definitions. This will be 
further discussed in Chapter 4, but suffice it to say at this point that, given the low public 
profile of this policy area, the features of a Strategic Culture are predominantly the result 
of intra-elite debates, explaining the focus on domestic elites. 
Available records of the negotiation rounds (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile 
2009, 139–45) were particularly useful to identify relevant subjects to interview among 
the members of the respective negotiating teams. The majority of the interviewees in each 
country were either negotiators themselves, or high-ranking officials at the ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Defence with direct involvement at different stages of the 
negotiations. Members of the defence epistemic community were also interviewed, 
including academics, diplomats, civil servants, and military officials with relevant 
expertise. Finally, a minority of the interviews were arranged thanks to a snowballing 
process, whereby interviewees helped identify other relevant subjects that for different 
reasons might have gone unnoticed during the initial sampling. 
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The subjects identified were initially approached by email in order to arrange a 
personal interview. In both instances of contact, the subjects were presented with a 
summary of the research project, research questions and objectives, and brief comments 
on the purpose of the interview. An in-depth, semi-structured design was used to engage 
with these elites, including a relatively short questionnaire that provided ample room to 
inquire about emergent topics/narratives/dynamics identified by the interviewees. 
These interviews provided crucial insights into the way in which defence elites in each 
country perceive and understand the defence sector and the regional security 
environment. More importantly so, the repetition of terms and representations by 
different interviews allowed to identify key sets of meanings embedded in the local 
Strategic Culture. Triangulating this data with other interviews and with the archive 
material gathered, the emergent narratives identified are understood here as evidence of 
a dominant Strategic Culture. 
 
Another type of primary sources used were official archives. Given the different 
institutional restrictions regarding access to these and varying levels of implementation 
of transparency policies, there is unequal archival support for the case studies. The sub-
sections below discuss the specificities of each case in this regard. 
The documents used are part of official state archives, with the only exception of 
classified diplomatic memos regarding secret negotiations between the Colombian and 
US governments unveiled by Wikileaks10. This has implications in terms of what and how 
                                                        
10 Given that neither the Colombian nor the US governments have denied the veracity of the memos 
released, and that Colombian President Álvaro Uribe discussed the secret negotiations with other South 
American leaders after they became public, documents made available by Wikileaks will be treated here as 




the documents say, as well as regarding their use as sources. Official archives are to be 
understood as formalized records of the state bureaucracy, and thus social constructions 
created with the intention to favour the preservation of specific versions of and 
perspectives on events over others. In that sense, archives  
“[…] have been about power - about maintaining power, about the power of the present 
to control what is, and will be, known about the past, about the power of remembering 
over forgetting.” (Schwartz and Cook 2002, 3). 
 
As a result, official archives seldom reflect internal conflicts, dissenting voices, and 
“disqualified” or “inappropriate” knowledge (Stoler 2009, 20), to mention but a few of the 
problems associated with this type of source. 
Nevertheless, official archives do allow to tap into the way a country perceives, 
rationalizes, and frames its actions. This, in turn allows identifying whether or not there 
is a narrative working as a running thread in these official accounts, which opens the 
possibility to identify and analyse underlying meanings attached to the decisions adopted. 
In the case of IR and Foreign Policy studies, official diplomatic documents, legal 
frameworks, and ministerial reports can shed light on the perceptions of the self and the 
others in the international arena that inform the political agendas and interactions with 
other states. This opens a window to glimpse at the meanings embedded in the 
bureaucracy´s language and practices, an entry point to the dominant culture in the area. 
Secondary sources are mostly comprised of academic and public debates on the 
respective defence policies, mainly in the form of published articles and reports. Where 
available, data from elite surveys is used as a means to extract and re-signify information 
about understandings, values, norms and behaviours shared by sets of relevant domestic 
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actors associated with the policy area in one way or another, shaping the dominant 
ideational commitments in that regard. 
 
Information obtained from primary and secondary sources was triangulated, seeking 
an in-depth understanding of running narratives and representations that would have 
otherwise been difficult to identify. Similarly, this method is useful to bring forward 
disagreements and contested concepts, either because they are not readily evident to the 
researcher or because they have been omitted from the official archives. As Howard Lune 
and Bruce Berg point out, 
 “[…] real-life experiences and memories of people cannot so easily or so thoroughly be 
omitted, edited, erased, shredded, or swept away. At any rate, collections of individual 
narratives cannot be filtered by institutions or media.” (Lune and Berg 2017, 168) 
 
The method involves the simultaneous evaluation of a variety of data sources on the 
same topic, which is used here as a technique to unveil a deeper understanding of the 
cases rather than as a device to obtain “objective” knowledge about them (Denzin 2012). 
In fact, given the constructivist-interpretivist frame of understanding used in this 
research, the very notion that obtaining objective knowledge about the social world is 
impossible. 
Both between-methods and within-methods triangulations are used (Flick 2007, 81). 
The former refers to instances in which data obtained using different methods is 
compared looking for verification, contradictions, and nuance. Such is the case of the 
example described above, where interviews and documents are put one against the other 
in order to complement and problematize the details provided by each of them. The latter 
refers to the triangulation of data obtained using the same method. This was used 
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primarily to engage with the interviews, aiming to distil the core features and cracks in 
the running meanings, narratives and normative preferences upheld by defence elites. 
Follow-up questions and the comparison of answers fall in this category of triangulation. 
In both types of triangulation, the method is used as “a source of extra knowledge about 
the issue in question and not just as a way to confirm what is already known from the first 
approach (convergence of findings).” (Flick 2018, 786). 
 
Argentina 
Primary sources used in the analysis of the Argentine case include the relevant 
legislation for the defence sector and elite interviews. 
Formal requests to access official documents and reports related to the SADC 
negotiations were presented at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMFA) and at the Ministry 
of Defence (AMoD), obtaining unsatisfactory answers in both cases. Upon informal 
discussions on the matter with a high-ranking official of the Office for International 
Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs (DIGAN, in Spanish), the AMFA area thematically 
related to the SADC negotiations, it was confirmed that no archives were available due to 
the AMoD centralizing all coordination and negotiation duties. Though open to 
researchers, the AMFA General Archive provided no relevant information due to 
restrictions in the access to the material for the relevant dates. 
The AMoD, on the other hand, issued an official response to the request for information 
explaining that no official archives existed on the SADC negotiations. This was informally 
confirmed by the Head of Expert Advisors at the Office of International Affairs, Leonardo 
Hekimian. Archives compiled by the negotiators existed at his office, but the potential 
presence of unvetted sensitive information made them unavailable for researchers. 
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As a result, the main source of information on the perceptions, agenda, strategy, and 
interests of this case study come from in-depth interviews with members of the local 
defence and foreign policy elites. Almost the entire negotiating team was interviewed, 
with the only exception of AMFA’s representative in the negotiations, Ambassador Rafael 
Grossi. Additionally, the information obtained from the people directly involved in the 
definition of the negotiating strategy was complemented with high-ranking officials from 
both ministries, allowing to trace the decision-making processes and inter-ministerial 
dynamics. Finally, academics with proven expertise on relevant areas for this study were 
also interviewed in order to develop a more contextualized and informed interpretation 
of the information provided by ministerial employees. 
 
Chile 
Primary sources for the Chilean case include this country´s legislation for the defence 
area; archives retrieved from Chile´s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ChMFA); and, interviews 
with local Defence and Foreign Policy elites. 
Chile was the only country out of the three that granted full access to diplomatic 
communications between its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its embassies, including telex, 
memos, and notes labelled “Reserved” and “Secret”. As a result, the available information 
about Chile´s coordination role is substantial, allowing to tap onto the perceptions, 
motivations, and narratives informing its position; offering insights into the its overall 
relation with the region; and unveiling concerns discussed with other countries. 
The archives show a close relationship with Colombia, as well as the intense work done 
to address its concerns over regional security; debates and political coordination with 
Brazil; efforts to appease Ecuador after the Colombian attack; and, attempts to moderate 
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Venezuela´s expectations. Only the communications with embassies located in countries 
with which Chile shares borders (Argentina, Bolivia and Peru) remain confidential. 
Lacking the files from the embassy in Buenos Aires is particularly challenging, since this 
thwarts the ability to assess bilateral coordination. However, this is compensated by the 
abundant information available on the bilateral relation, as well as by the fact that a large 
number of negotiators interviewed from both sides provided detailed and consistent 
accounts of the coordinated efforts made during the negotiations. 
The interviews, on the other hand, help relate the above with the country´s perception 
of its own position, role, and primary goals in the region. That there was a significant 
overlap between the accounts provided by the archives and the views expressed by the 
interviewees is understood as evidence of consistent narrative underlying the behaviour 
of the local Defence and Foreign Policy elites.  
The country´s positions as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
are almost exclusively left to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to define. Yet, considering the 
high degree of coordination between it and the Ministry of Defence during the SADC 
negotiations, analysing the perspectives defended at this UN body may provide relevant 
insights into the elements that make up the country´s Strategic Norms. 
Evaluating these primary sources helps identify the underlying Strategic Culture 
informing the decision to join and take a leading role in the SADC negotiations. 
 
Colombia 
As already explained, Colombia is perhaps the most interesting and puzzling of the 
three cases analysed. Yet, it is also important to mention some of the difficulties and 
challenges found in this country to gather the necessary data for analysis. 
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The only formal representative the Ministry of Defence (CoMoD) had in the 
negotiations was Admiral (r) David René Moreno, Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and lead 
SADC negotiator through 2008. Interviewing Admiral Moreno granted me access to 
essential information about this Ministry´s involvement and position in the negotiations. 
Due to his role as a military officer and his high rank in the Colombian Armed Forces, 
together with his direct involvement in the negotiations, Admiral Moreno was able to 
provide crucial insights into the CoMoD´s perspectives and negotiating agenda, as well as 
his views on the relation between them and the country´s Strategic Culture. Attempts 
made to secure a second interview with Defence elites to obtain additional information 
and clarify the points made by Admiral Moreno were not successful. The other key actors 
involved on behalf of the CoMoD (then Deputy Minister of Defence for International 
Affairs, Sergio Jaramillo Caro, and then Minister of Defence, Juan Manuel Santos –now 
President of Colombia) were either unable or unwilling to participate. Mr. Jaramillo Caro 
would have been able to provide particularly relevant insights for this research, 
considering that the area of the CoMoD under his control had incumbency over the 
negotiations. However, his prominent role in the peace negotiations between the 
Colombian state and the FARC (2012-2016) made him unavailable for interviewing. 
In any case, the Colombian negotiating team was mostly comprised of civil servants 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CoMFA), where I was able to interview people at 
both ends of the ministerial hierarchy. Paola Lugari, who was in charge of handling every-
day matters related to the SADC negotiations, was able to provide detailed information 
about the proceedings, specifics of the Colombian agenda, and key points of contention 
with other delegations. On the opposite extreme of the institutional ladder, then-Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Bermúdez, and then-Deputy Minister, Camilo Reyes, were able to 
provide relevant insights about the decision-making processes, interests, perceptions of 
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regional politics, and views on defence cooperation that informed Colombia´s 
participation. Two mid-ranking diplomats involved in the negotiations, Sergio Restrepo 
and Nicolás Rivas, were unable to participate in the interviews. Nevertheless, sufficient 
information was collected from other interviews in the CoMFA and with Colombian 
academics that a sufficiently accurate understanding is still possible. 
The main challenge found in Colombia was the impossibility to obtain access to 
archives. All documents related to inter-ministerial coordination, the conformation of the 
Colombian negotiating agenda, or the country´s actions during the negotiating rounds 
remain classified. A high degree of secrecy and lack of transparency seems to surround 
these and other public records related to the Defence Policy of the country. Formal 
requests for public information were submitted to the pertinent authorities at the CoMoD 
and the CoMFA. However, they were either left unanswered or the answers provided were 
unsatisfactory. As a result, no official archival evidence is available. 
The matter was partially remedied using documentation found in alternative sources. 
Documents obtained at the ChMFA make reference to the views of high-ranking 
Colombian officials, including Minister Santos, during meetings in Bogota with 
Ambassador Gabriel Gaspar. The limitations of this archival source are many, since the 
information is mediated not only by the interpretation of the Chilean diplomacy but also 
by the intentioned words used by Colombian officials when discussing matters of National 
Defence with members of a foreign diplomatic corps. This means that ideas put in the 
mouth of Colombian officials must be scrutinized with a particularly critical eye. However, 
to the extent that many of the opinions expressed coincide with data gathered in the 
interviews, that the documents were stamped as reserved or secret, that the SADC 
negotiations were not closely related to the core interests of Colombia, and that Chile is 
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seen by Colombia as a close and like-minded ally, there is no ground to suspect that either 
side intended to be deceitful. If nothing else, these documents provide additional 
confirmation to the claims made by the interviewees, a general understanding regarding 
the administration´s perception of the region, and insights into the decision-making 
process by which Colombia decided to join the SADC negotiations. 
Similar considerations can be made about documents obtained from Wikileaks 
referring to meetings between Colombian and US officials in which regional security 
issues were discussed. These leaked documents provide crucial insights into the 
Colombian agenda for the secret bilateral negotiations to sign a bilateral Defence 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA), in 2009. Though this took place after the SADC was 
created, the way Colombian officials addressed their interest in the DCA and their 
concerns about other South American countries shed light on the country´s regional 
Defence agenda and Strategic Culture. These documents also confirm the arguments 
presented by Tickner (Tickner 2007) and Méndez (Méndez 2012) about the active 
Colombian agency in securing a bigger US military involvement in its domestic conflict. 
Moreover, it provides an almost simultaneous counterpoint between Colombia´s 
discourse regarding regional security at the SADC negotiations and the views expressed 
in secret negotiations with the country´s closest extra-regional partner. Finally, these 
leaked documents are also crucial to understand the existing divide between Colombia´s 
perception of US presence in the region (a result of self-interested and autonomous 
agency on its side) and the views other regional powers have of this (proof of US 




Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 analyses the merits and shortcomings of existing literature regarding the 
creation of the SADC. Two lines of argumentation are covered there: one focused on 
Brazilian leadership and interests; and, another discussing the role regional 
commonalities had making South America permeable to a proposal like the SADC. With a 
majority of currently existing studies adopting system-level approaches, this chapter 
highlights the need to complement the existing knowledge with agent-level analyses. 
Chapter 3 discusses the characteristics of the regional security environment. Though 
the main contribution of this research is the empirical exploration of the three case 
studies mentioned above, it is nevertheless crucial to have a good understanding of the 
social conditions under which the SADC was created. This is necessary under the 
understanding that adopting the constructivist notion of mutual co-constitution of 
structure and agency requires engaging with both to properly comprehend the recursive 
dynamics that emerge, even if the argument focuses on one more than the other. This 
chapter seeks to bring forward and analyse the normative commitments that, “based on 
a shared system of codes and symbols, of languages, life-worlds, social practices.” 
(Checkel 1998, 159–60), define the way actors interpret material and social conditions in 
the region. 
Chapter 4 discusses the conceptual framework with which the agency of the three case 
studies will be analysed. The key concept discussed in this chapter is that of “Strategic 
Culture”, facilitating a systematic engagement with aspects of state agency (perceptions, 
understandings, and meaningful behaviour) specific for the defence sectors. This 
conceptual framework also establishes a dialogue with the constructivist regional-level 
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analyses discussed in Chapter 3, allowing both to feed off each other. The chapter puts 
forward that the concept of “Strategic Culture” is an appropriate fit to engage with the 
specificity of state agency in relation to how the defence apparatus is understood and used 
by a given society, what is the history behind such constructions, understand how they 
relates to the agendas brought by each country to the SADC negotiations, and explain how 
all that is consequential for the regional security governance mechanisms created. 
Chapter 5 to 7 provide a detailed, theory-informed, and historically-rooted analysis of 
each of the three case studies. The first goal of these empirical chapters is to provide a 
detailed and nuanced understanding of the historical, social, political, and international 
elements involved in the development of each country´s Strategic Culture. Given the 
complexity each case study presents in that respect, this analysis takes up roughly half of 
each empirical chapter. Once this is covered, the second step is to analyse the roles the 
respective Strategic Cultures of the case studies had in influencing the agendas and 
performance of each country during the SADC negotiations, and what was their impact in 
defining the regional security governance mechanisms embedded in the SADC. 
Chapter 8 provides an overall conclusion to the different arguments discussed in the 
preceding chapters, seeking to draw some general conclusions regarding the relevance of 
engaging with an agent-level analysis to explain the creation of the SADC. This chapter 
summarizes and combines the conclusions of previous chapters, seeking both to re-
evaluate their respective relevance and implications for the existing knowledge about the 
creation of the SADC, but also to put consider them in terms of their potential impact on 






Chapter 2. Literature Review 









Due to its novel approach to regional governance, the creation of organizations like the 
UNASUR and the SADC has attracted the attention of academics working on Latin/South 
American dynamics, institutions, and governance. The existing research is largely focused 
on four general areas, often times touching on two or more of them to provide nuanced 
understandings of the processes involved: a. the regional and systemic contextual 
conditions that allowed the emergence of the UNASUR/SADC; b. the Brazilian interests 
involved in advancing this initiative; c. the organizations´ objectives and institutional 
design; and, d. the expected reach and impact that these institutions could have on 
regional dynamics. 
Given the focus of the present research on reasons behind the creation of the SADC and 
their impact on the final form given to the regional organization, rather than on its actual 
working, this chapter will eminently engage with the first and second of the above 
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research areas. At least two main lines of enquiry have dominated the research on these 
topics: those authors who emphasize the role of Brazil as its instigator and main 
beneficiary, on the one hand; and those who attribute the bulk of the responsibility to the 
presence of shared ideational factors (norms, political inclinations, identities, etc.) at the 
regional level, on the other. The present chapter will analyse in detail the two, identifying 
the key arguments advanced to analyse their merits and shortcomings. 
Authors focusing on the role of Brazilian leadership and interests take the creation of 
the SADC as the direct result of a regional balance of power favourable to that country´s 
quest to become a regional leader and a global player. According to them, Brazil´s 
condition of primus inter pares created incentives for its diplomacy to engage in the 
institution-building process that would eventually become the UNASUR/SADC 
framework, seen exclusively in utilitarian terms as a “stepping stone” to become a leader 
and rule-maker in the region. In other words, this strand of researchers engage primarily 
with the a power distribution analysis at the (sub)systemic-level. 
Authors studying the shared ideational elements at play at the regional level and how 
they facilitated the creation of these organizations have also adopted a structural 
approach to the question. They emphasize how shared ideational features (political 
ideologies and agendas; identity markers; understandings of the goals and reach of 
regional cooperation/integration processes; international norms; etc.) have shaped 
perceptions and understandings of the regional security environment among South 
American states, and hence conceives these factors to be unavoidable pre-requisites to 
explain how the SADC came to being. 
In addition to the above, inter- and extra-regional factors have also been identified as 
contributing towards the creation of the SADC. Olivier Dabène argues that the expansion 
39 
 
of the US-led “War on Terror” to the Andean North of South America is one of the key 
contextual factors driving the inclusion of the defence sector in the UNASUR institutional 
framework (Dabène 2013, 3). This resonates with authors highlighting the permanent 
influence (in actuality or potentiality) the US has had over regional politics in the past 
century, which stresses the inherently open nature of regional systems, in general, and 
the penetrated nature of the South American region, in particular (see Chapter 3). 
However, it is worth mentioning that, while the effect this penetration has in the South 
American security environment is indeed one of its defining features, it is by no means a 
novelty of the post-2001 World and hence cannot explain on its own the apparently 
“sudden” inclusion of the defence sector in the regionalization process. 
It has also been argued that an intervening factor was the alleged decrease in the US´s 
involvement in South American regional dynamics, creating a condition of possibility for 
a more autonomous regional agenda as a result of the attention and resources demanded 
from the US by the “War on Terror” (Colombo and Roark 2012). Jorge Battaglino has aptly 
challenged this explanation, arguing that it clashes with the fact that “rather than 
abandoning the region, the US has renewed its presence through a military deployment 
that South America had not experienced since the World War II” (Battaglino 2012, 87). 
This increasing military deployment in the region can be seen more prominently in the 
deployment of military cooperation programmes in the context of the “War on Drugs” and, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 7, the “War on Terror”; and, in the re-instauration of the 
IV Fleet of the US Navy in 2008, which effectively contributed to the expansion in the size 
and responsibilities of US Southern Command11 (Battaglino 2009a, 33). It could also be 
argued that, even in times of the Cold War with the US focused on its global rivalry with 
                                                        
11 Branch of the US Ministry of Defence devoted to the Latin American and Caribbean regions. 
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the USSR, penetration in Latin America was more prominent than ever before, challenging 
the notion that a global primary focus and regional penetration are mutually exclusive.  
Perhaps Barry Buzan and Ole Waever´s evaluation of the inter-regional dynamics at 
play can help clarify this point. According to these authors, 
“US preponderance makes the relationship highly asymmetrical and the United States 
a major factor in security calculations in the region –for good and for bad. But the US 
engagement is not constant and the United States neither ‘rules’ the region nor even 
generally shapes it.” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 309) 
 
The above seems to suggest that it is probably wise not assume the disappearance of 
US interest and involvement in South American security dynamics during the period 
immediately before the creation of the SADC. However, neither was this country able to 
contain the development of an institutional framework that explicitly sought to increase 
the levels of regional autonomy from extra-regional influences on the governance of 
international security and defence matters. This suggests that, whatever relevance we can 
attribute to the US penetration in the period, it does not seem to be a determining factor 
in the creation of the SADC. This is not to say that US penetration in South America is 
irrelevant for the evaluation of the regional security environment, as shown by Brazilian 
Minister of Defence Nelson Jobim visiting Washington in early 2008 to discuss the SADC 
proposal (Saint-Pierre and Castro 2008, 1). Rather, the above discussion indicates that 
this factor may only be secondary to understand the conditions allowing the regional 
governance innovation discussed in this research. 
 
This chapter will engage with the existing literature on the conditions, processes, and 
events that led to the Brazilian proposal to create the SADC, as well as those that may have 
41 
 
influenced the successful negotiations conducted in Santiago de Chile during 2008. In 
order to do so, the chapter will be broken down into two sections, the first one analysing 
the key arguments centred on the Brazilian role and the second one discussing the 
research focused on the ideational aspects of the process. 
By the end of this chapter it should become evident that, however insightful and 
relevant these approaches are, the agency of individual actors other than Brazil has been 
left under-researched. This created the illusion that regional players were simply in 
agreement with the creation of the SADC, either due to them sharing in the understanding 
that it was a necessary development, or perceiving the Brazilian bid for regional 
leadership as legitimate. The present research seeks to problematize the two 
assumptions, focusing on the agency secondary powers and how it affected the regional 
governance mechanisms embedded in the SADC.  
 
The role of Brazilian leadership in the creation of the SADC 
 
As a result of a prolonged process of economic growth and power accumulation, by the 
turn of the 21st century Brazil had undoubtedly become the only real pole in South 
America (Benítez Manaut, Celi, and Diamint 2009; Schenoni 2015; Sediq 2013). Brazil 
currently represents half of the region by all relevant measures of power (Appendix 4): 
its landmass covers half of the region´s total surface; it concentrates half of the region´s 
population; its economy represents half the region´s GDP; half of the regional military 
power is in Brazil´s hands; and, though there has been a relative decline recently, Brazil 
still represents half of the annual military expenditures.  This is not to say, as Luis 
Schenoni rightly points out (2014, 143–44), that Brazil can be considered a hegemonic 
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actor (in the realist, power-political sense of the term), since it has not yet managed to 
create any considerable technological gap with neighbours and its continental size means 
that resources are spread across massive extensions of land. 
Yet, as Sean Burges notes (2008), Brazil´s approach to leadership/hegemony has not 
been based on brute force (neither political, economic, nor military strong-arming are in 
its usual repertoire), but rather is more reliant on the construction of a multilateral 
consensus based on ideas and concerns relatable to its partners. In Burges´s words,  
“The imperative was not to subsume other regional states to Brazilian will, but instead 
to cycle the region-forming process through Brazil and position the country’s 
propositions and prerogatives as the central unifying factor of a potential South 
American region.” (Burges 2008, 75).  
 
This “consensual hegemony” strategy responds to a large extent to the inability of the 
Brazilian state (and the likely opposition of the Brazilian people) to face the substantial 
economic commitments related to region-building and materially-enforced hegemony. In 
fact, in a later article reviewing the strategy of consensual hegemony deployed by 
Brazilian governments since the 1990s, Burges comes to the conclusion that this can only 
be a “temporary phase”, since followers will soon demand returns in the form of “concrete 
leadership goods provision” for the confidence given to the hegemon (Burges 2015, 204). 
Nevertheless, the “Brazilian touch” is undeniable in the inspiration behind the creation 
of the SADC. As early as 2004, the Strategic Affairs Nucleus released an Annex (NAE 
2004b) to the oft-cited Projeto Brasil 3 Tempos policy paper (NAE 2004a). The Annex 
contained a list of 50 “Strategic Issues” identified as key guides for the long-term integral 
development of the country. Items 19 and 39 listed in the document are relevant to 
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understand the long-term regional policy that Brazil would try to implement, including 
the explicit possibility of developing “collective defence”12 mechanisms by the year 2061: 
 
Table 1. Strategic issues related to Brazil’s regional policy 
19 Political-Economic 
Block of South 
America 
The implementation of new foreign policies can create an 
“integrated economic space” in South America. Under 
Brazilian initiative, the economic, social, cultural, political, and 
security aspirations and obligations resulting of this process 
must be taken into consideration. 
39 National Defence 
System 
The improvement of the defence policy can result in the 
strengthening of Brazilian defence capabilities, either in 
isolation or as part of a collective defence system with 
neighbouring countries, to face new threats and challenges, 
guarantee the protection of its territory, and provide backing 
the country´s stance in international negotiations. 
Source: Projeto Brasil 3 Tempos. 50 Temas Estratégicos (NAE 2004b, 5–7). Original in Portuguese. Own translation. 
 
The wording of these two items is general enough as to allow a variety of measures to 
be adopted. However, they do show the Brazilian preference for the development of fprms 
of regionalism that have come to be known as post-liberal (Sanahuja 2012) or post-
hegemonic (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012b). Also, though the publication of this document 
does not necessarily imply that the Brazilian government would adopt active diplomatic 
efforts to advance a regional “collective defence” arrangement in the short term,  it did 
explicitly bring the defence and security cooperation agendas to the region. Moreover, it 
                                                        
12 Neither the Brazil 3 Tempos policy paper nor its Annex provide clues as to what is meant by “collective 
defence”. As mentioned in footnote 5, page 6, the option of a NATO-like collective security organization had 
been advanced by Venezuela, but was openly and vigorously rejected by most South American states. The 
inclusion of this term should, therefore, be understood as a long-term, vague goal subject to alterations. It 
is, nevertheless, relevant to take into consideration, helping explain the active Brazilian advocacy for the 
creation of the SADC as part of a long-term strategy. 
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is not a secret that the proposal to create the SADC was put forward to the region by 
Minister Jobim in a highly publicized tour after tensions started to escalate between 
Venezuela-Ecuador and Colombia (Saint-Pierre and Castro 2008). 
It is not surprising that, given the above conditions, the argument has been advanced 
that shifting the focus from Latin to South America would facilitate Brazil´s quest for 
regional leadership (Colombo and Roark 2012; Malamud 2010, 74–76; Serbín 2009, 151–
52). Indeed, a series of projects were fostered by this country with the aim of cementing 
the notion that South American countries shared a set of values, needs, interests, and 
perceptions distinct from those of other Latin American countries. This allegedly sought 
to expand the reach of the “bloc identity” developed in the MERCOSUR13 area (Rivarola 
Puntigliano 2007, 98) to the whole region. Consequently, a substantial portion of the 
debate regarding the creation of the UNASUR framework, in general, and of the SADC, in 
particular, has emphasized the Brazilian role and interests in this institutional 
development. 
 
Brazil and South America: The region as a global trampoline? 
There are no doubts that Brazil became heavily invested in advancing the notion of a 
distinct South American grouping, at least since it organized the First Summit of South 
American Presidents, in September 2000 (Burges 2008; Cviic 2000; Espinosa 2014, 40; 
Gratius 2008, 4). It is in this period, for example, that Brazil “took” the proposal for the 
                                                        
13 Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market), a trade integration scheme created in 1991 by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. By 1995, the four countries had achieved a level of integration 
close to becoming a trade union, and further institutional and normative innovations were incorporated 
(including democratic clauses, the creation of a political branch, a structural convergence fund, formalized 
contacts between lawmakers of each member country, etc.). In 2012, Venezuela´s incorporation to the 
treaty as a full member was unanimously approved. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru are part of 
the organization as Associated States, but do not have full membership as of 2017. 
45 
 
creation of the IIRSA14 from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the 
Andean Community, turning it into a scheme almost entirely funded by the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES). This would not only mean that the transport links and trade 
routes with neighbouring countries were to become more efficient (for Brazilian 
purposes), but also that the contractors participating in major infrastructure projects 
across the region would be Brazilian firms (Burges 2008, 76; Gomes Saraiva 2010, 161). 
More importantly, this initiative seems to show that the country was becoming willing to 
provide common goods to regional partners with the aim of obtaining recognition (if 
tacitly) as a legitimate regional leader (Gomes Saraiva 2010). Moreover, given the projects 
selected for development and the characteristics of South American geography, the 
resulting infrastructure network looked like “a spider’s web, with Brazil filling its centre” 
(Burges 2008, 76). Suzanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva eloquently add that 
“Brazil perceives regional integration not only as a goal in itself but also as an 
instrument for autonomy and ‘soft-balancing’ the United States. Thus, its attitude 
towards integration is not free of self-interest. Apart from common regional goals, the 
country also seeks to implement a neighbourhood policy that serves Brazil’s power 
aspirations in South America and the Americas.” (Gratius and Gomes Saraiva 2013, 8) 
 
Federico Merke further argues that the Brazilian aspirations to become a more relevant 
global player is in no way a novelty, but rather “a fundamental dimension of its 
international identity” (2014, 181). Instead, what he identifies as a novelty is the “double 
movement” of the Brazilian diplomacy to spearhead the construction of a South American 
institutional framework and, then, present itself globally as a “natural leader”, an 
“interpreter”, or even a “representative” of the region (Merke 2014, 181–82). In this way, 
                                                        
14 The “Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure” (Iniciativa para la 
Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana) was created to foster the integration of regional 
transport and energy infrastructure in South America, aiming to incentivize economic development and 
connectedness throughout the region. 
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the Brazilian regional project is as closely related to the development of better regional 
relations per se as it is to advancing this country´s global aspirations (Gratius 2008, 3–4; 
Schenoni 2017; Soares de Lima 2007, 172–74; Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, 30–31). 
This would mean that the shift in regional cooperation from Latin American and 
hemispheric approaches to a South American project could essentially be interpreted as 
a Brazilian “geopolitical design”, excluding Mexico and the US in order to bolster its own 
position (Malamud 2011a, 6; Sanahuja 2010b, 47; Schenoni 2014, 144). 
According to Jorge Battaglino (2012), this became particularly relevant with the above 
mentioned re-militarization of the US approach to Latin America, via military cooperation 
efforts with local partners; the re-activation of the IV Fleet; and, as was found in 2009, the 
secret agreement negotiated with the Uribe administration to increase the number of 
troops deployed in the Colombian territory. This shift from the “free-trade and 
democracy” liberal agenda of the Clinton era to a more militarized approach inaugurated 
by the George W. Bush administration, together with the tensions created by the 
ideological divide between the more vocal representatives of the left- and right-wing 
governments in the region (Venezuela-Ecuador and Colombia, respectively) forced Brazil 
to step up and respond. 
“Brazilian diplomats and academics alike have long regarded regional leadership as a 
springboard to global recognition and influence. Brazil’s elites consider this sub-region 
to be within its natural sphere of influence. In this way, South America instability is 
perceived by Brazilian elites as an obstacle to international aspirations. […] Similarly, 
Lula sharply criticized the US-Colombia basing deal signed in 2009, […] concerned that 
Colombian bases would be used as a platform to increase US military control over the 
region.” (Battaglino 2012, 90–91) 
 
This line of argumentation maintains that contextual conditions heavily influenced the 
Brazilian strategy, creating incentives to accelerate the launching of the SADC initiative in 
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order to protect regional and international interests via institutional innovations 
(Battaglino 2009b, 79–80). Hence, the SADC was expected to fulfil an instrumental role, 
allowing Brazil become a regional leader by taking a more prominent role in maintaining 
the South American Zone of Peace through the organization of joint responses to shared 
threats, coordination of common positions in international fora, creation of confidence 
building measures, and management of a (so far hypothetical) joint participation in 
Peacekeeping Operations (Benítez Manaut, Celi, and Diamint 2009). 
 
Defence Industries and developmentalism 
It has also been argued that the SADC initiative sought to favour Brazil’ s Defence 
Industries, creating a scale economy and helping increase their market share in the 
region. Under this light, the creation of the SADC could be interpreted as a regional leg of 
the domestic developmentalist/industrialist policies that characterized the 2000s in 
Brazil (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006). This type of policies has traditionally been framed 
within the narrative of autonomy, particularly so when applied in relation to the Defence 
sector. Since the 1950s, Brazilian elites sought to incentivize the development of a local 
military complex with the goals of reducing its vulnerability to foreign suppliers, gaining 
more autonomy, incentivizing local production, and fostering the creation of Research & 
Development centres (Saint-Pierre and Zague 2017, 298). According to Barry Buzan 
(1987, 45–48), being a late-comer in the Defence Industry sector, by the 1970s Brazil was 
able to self-supply some of its military needs and had started to participate in the 
international defence market. By the mid-1980s, it was well in the way to develop the only 
“broadly-based” military industry in the region able to compete internationally. 
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In fact, interviewees agreed with the claim that one of the key driving forces behind the 
initiative was securing “priority access” for the Brazilian Defence Industries to the South 
American arms market, something to be achieved by advancing cooperative projects in 
which development and production of new military equipment would involve suppliers 
from various member (Benítez Manaut, Celi, and Diamint 2009). Minister Jobim, 
acknowledged this interest, both before and after the creation of the SADC, and linked it 
to his country´s developmentalist economic programme as well as to the region´s 
continuous quest for autonomy (Infobae 2009; Jobim 2008). 
Attempts at this had been made before, in particular in partnership with Argentina15, 
but the SADC would provide a platform to bring this notion to the regional level (UNASUR 
2008 Art. 5, f.). This arguably made assessing the respective industrial capacities of and 
potential complementarity among member states´ Defence Industries one of the 
organization´s early priorities (Grupo de Trabajo del CDS 2009, 23), materialized in the 
organization´s first Action Plan (SADC 2009 Section 3). 
 
Shortcomings of Brazil-centred explanations to the creation of the SADC 
All the above arguments led experts to perceive the UNASUR framework and its 
immediate predecessors (particularly MERCOSUR and IIRSA) as attempts to create 
institutional frameworks shaped to Brazil´s convenience and interests (Gardini 2011; 
Rivarola Puntigliano 2007; Silva Pedroso 2014, 80–81). The evidence suggests that these 
                                                        
15 The two key examples are the Gaucho, an “Airborne and General Purpose” 4x4 vehicle jointly developed 
between Argentina and Brazil; and, the Embraer KC-390, a medium-size military transport aircraft designed 
by Brazil that included the Argentine FAdeA as one of its key suppliers. The UNASUR I, a basic pilot training 
aircraft aimed to address the needs of South American air forces, is the first project developed within the 
SADC cooperation framework, but has not yet been able to leave the design table. 
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intentions and interests were indeed present. However, it is also important to bear in 
mind something that Gian Luca Gardini points out, 
“[…] the fact that it is the product of Brazilian initiative provides the bloc with a 
designated, or self-designated, leader, with an obvious interest in a return from the 
success of the organization. At the same time, Brazilian preponderance generates 
resistance and makes the success of the group over-dependent on Brazil´s own 
domestic and international preferences.” (Gardini 2011) 
 
This resistance to recognize a Brazilian leadership can be clearly identified in the three 
case studies. Argentina consistently revelled against acknowledging any superiority to its 
neighbour, not only in the regional arena but also in international fora (Malamud 2011b; 
Vieira and Alden 2011; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). Chile maintained a distant relation 
with the region since the early 1970s, and even participated in the creation of an 
alternative grouping (the Pacific Alliance) immediately after the creation of UNASUR. 
Finally, Colombia vocally showed its discontent with the notion of a SADC, threatening not 
to join in the negotiations, and simultaneously negotiated in secret an enhanced military 
cooperation agreement with the US. 
Suzanne Gratius (2008, 3–4) has argued that one of the possible aspects feeding this 
resistance is related to a duality embedded in the SADC initiative. In her analysis, this 
resulted from the “ambivalent leadership” shown by Brazil, moving back and forth 
between its ambition to become a global player and its attempts to lead the region in a 
collective project. Indeed, as Gratius points out, this ambivalence can be seen more clearly 
in instances when High-Ranking officials (including President da Silva) placed the 
creation of the SADC and the Brazilian bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC 
in close proximity (Orozco Restrepo 2016, 16). Hector Saint-Pierre adds that the lack of 
transparency about the Brazilian intentions and military planning may have also 
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generated doubts among its regional partners, something that was only partially 
remedied with the publication of the document National Defence Strategy, in 2008 (Saint-
Pierre 2009, 15–17). 
 
The relative resistance to Brazilian leadership, combined with the economic 
impossibility to muster the resources necessary to build and distribute regional common 
goods, has led to a situation labelled by Andrés Malamud (2011a) as one of a “leader 
without followers”. He argues that the above circumstances hindered Brazil´s ability to 
build a leadership legitimized by regional partners, despite it being classified as an 
emergent global power due to resource accumulation and international performance. In 
his view, the key paradox in this situation is that  
“By playing the regional card to achieve global aims, Brazil has ended up in an 
unexpected situation: while its regional leadership has grown on paper, in practice it 
has met growing resistance. Yet the country has gained increasing global recognition.” 
(Malamud 2011a, 19) 
 
This can be put in direct contrast with the regional bid made by Venezuelan President, 
Hugo Chávez, who was able to start a relatively successful sub-regional grouping with the 
ALBA, in 2004. This was done despite Venezuela having none of the material conditions 
discussed in the Brazilian case, having traditionally been peripheral to South American 
regional dynamics, and facing increasing international backlash against its openly anti-US 
rhetoric. This was arguably related to its ability to articulate an autonomist collective 
identity (something that Brazil also did, albeit in a less confrontational way), and 
distribute material and symbolic common goods to partner countries (which Brazil was 
unwilling to do). Though this institutional framework has become increasingly irrelevant 
after the demise of President Chávez, in March 2013, and the sudden drop of crude oil 
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prices, in June 2014, the fact remains that Venezuela was able to momentarily advance its 
own regional project against all odds. One of the possible explanations for this success 
story resides in the fact that President Chávez was willing to back his regional agenda by 
committing his country to asymmetrically assume the costs of creating and distributing 
common goods to an extent that Brazilian elites were not willing to. 
The above explains why many interviewees maintained that the SADC project 
presented by Brazil looked like an “empty shell” to be filled through negotiations. In their 
view, the key Brazilian interest was the creation of this regional organization itself, and 
not so much being able to determine every specific aspect of the agreement. This strategy 
allowed UNASUR sectorial councils, in general, and the SADC, in particular, to be perceived 
as the result of a broad multilateral consensus rather than as a hegemonic imposition. 
This perception meant, for example, that negotiating the inclusion of clauses that served 
the interests of Brazilian Defence Industries was far easier than it would have been under 
different circumstances. More importantly, in the eyes of Brazilian elites this approach 
meant that the notion of a distinct South American “regionality” could be advanced 
reducing the need to assume responsibilities for its working asymmetrically. 
However, highlighting the disputed condition of the Brazilian regional leadership is 
also important in the context of this research since it problematizes the notion that the 
accumulation of resources, relative power, and geopolitical interests can explain the 
construction of the SADC on their own. In fact, both the Composite Index of National 
Capability (CINC) and the SIPRI Milex data index (Appendix 4) show Brazil has 
consistently held half of the region´s power resources at least since the 1980s. In other 
words, though Brazil has grown its power resources in absolute terms over the last 
decades, so have the other countries in the region (and almost at the same rate in 
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average). This is not to deny the central role played by Brazil in the creation of the SADC, 
but to point out that its share of regional power does not seem to have radically changed 
in the years leading to it. This means that there must be other factors that also need to be 
taken into consideration to have a more complete understanding of the agendas and 
processes involved in this institutional innovation and region-building process. 
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, the other factor usually considered by 
the literature as central to understand the conditions that allowed the creation of the 
SADC is the presence of shared ideational commitments among South American States. 
Hence, the following section will focus on these elements to try and understand what their 
contribution was. 
 
Ideational commonalities in the creation of the SADC 
 
The second line of research that this Literature Review needs to engage with focuses 
on the role of shared ideational features among South American states to explain the 
conditions of possibility for the creation of the SADC. The large majority of academics 
advancing this line of argumentation rely on a variety of constructivist  approaches to 
understand the role ideas play in processes of regionalization, closely related to what 
Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum (2000) have called New Regionalism Theory (NRT). 
According to these two authors, one of the key pursues of NRT is “[…] to emphasise the 
reality of regionalisation behind the fetishism of formal regional organisations.” (Hettne 
and Söderbaum 2000, 460), a goal to be achieved by analysing the actual ideational and 
behavioural characteristics of a geographically contiguous grouping of states (i.e., the 
“regionnness” of this grouping). 
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The argument that the UNASUR and the SADC are the result of a pre-existing 
“regionness” at the ideational level can be found not only in academic pieces analysing the 
process of their creation, but also in a number of official documents and statements issued 
in the years leading to the SADC negotiations (as briefly explained in Chapter 1, pp. 4-5). 
For example, the final communiqué issued after the 2000 Brasilia Presidential Summit 
(First South American Presidents´ Summit 2000) makes special reference to the presence 
of common values as one of the central reasons justifying the region-building initiative. 
Similarly, subsequent Presidential summits (Third South American Presidents´ Summit 
2004), agreements (Comunidad Suramericana de Naciones 2006), and the respective 
UNASUR and SADC statutes (UNASUR 2008a, 2008b) consistently refer to cultural 
commonalities, shared historical experiences, and the collective quest to construct a 
South American identity as some of the central reasons validating the idea of building new 
ways of regional cooperation and policy coordination. 
Though there are differences among the authors ascribing to this approach, they all 
share in identifying immaterial factors as central to understanding the context that 
explains this institutional innovation. For purposes of clarity alone, in this section I will 
group authors into two general branches, whose arguments are nevertheless intertwined 
and overlapping: first, those who emphasize the role the regional “turn to the left” and 
recent social learning processes in shaping a new form of South American regionalism; 
and, secondly, those authors that highlight long-term cultural continuities to explain the 




The SADC as a result of a common regional agenda 
For over two decades, between the mid-1970s and the late-1990s, right-of-centre 
governments dominated South American politics advancing neoliberal economic reforms 
in line with the “Washington Consensus”16. During this time, regional integration projects 
focused primarily on setting up free trade areas (Mellado 2013, 140). 
This tendency started to change, however, in the early-2000s. Canonically, the 1998 
electoral victory of Hugo Chávez for the Presidency of Venezuela is identified as the 
beginning of what came to be called the “Latin American left turn” (Levitsky and Roberts 
2011), which is also closely associated with the rise of new forms of regional cooperation. 
By 2008, when the statutes of the UNASUR and the SADC were under negotiation, eight 
out of the twelve countries in the region (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela) had left-of-centre administrations in power. Pía 
Riggirozzi sums up this argument, 
“In Latin America, real regional spaces for alternative policy-making have taken shape 
since the early 2000s as part of a new political climate of social mobilisation and 
political motivations embraced across the region by new Left of Centre governments, 
in a move that is often characterised as post-neoliberalism.” (Riggirozzi 2012, 425) 
 
The specific position each of these governments had in the left-right political spectrum 
has been a matter of debate (Arditi 2008; Rivarola Puntigliano 2008, 41–42), to the extent 
that authors have challenged the notion of grouping them under the label of “the left” 
altogether (Puello-Socarrás 2015, 31–33). Indeed, something similar could be argued 
                                                        
16 “After the severe economic, political and social crises of the 1970s and the 1980s, economic liberalization 
seemed to offer a route to overcoming their problems. […] These reforms form the core of the neoliberal 
reformation and were summed up in 1990 in a list of 10 policy items by John Williamson and labelled the 
Washington Consensus, since they expressed the common sense of the multilateral agencies headquartered 
in Washington DC and of the US administration.” (Kirby 2003, 55–56) 
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about the neoliberal regional agenda advanced in previous decades, where authors have 
identified differences and contradictions among different countries in terms of their 
preferred strands of neoliberalism and choice of strategies for implementation 
(Etchemendy 2011, 126–49; Puello-Socarrás 2015). 
There is widespread agreement among researchers working on Latin American 
regionalism that one of the key developments resulting from this pendulum towards the 
left was the emergence of a new dominant perspective on the role and preferred forms of 
regional cooperation (Beasley-Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg 2009; Colombo and 
Roark 2012; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Moraña 2008; da Motta Veiga and Ríos 2007; 
Panizza 2009; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012a; Rivarola Puntigliano et al. 2008; Sanahuja 
2007; Tussie 2014). Steven Levitsky and Kenneth Roberts (2011) have argued that, in 
addition to other ideational features, at least two crucial goals were shared among South 
American countries: escaping the limits to economic policy imposed by the “Washington 
Consensus” in order to advance an agenda more focused on development and 
redistribution; and, seeking to diversify their international insertion strategies. In 
addition, most of the market reforms undergone in the preceding decade and the 
democratic credentials obtained since the 1980s had to be maintained while pursuing 
these goals. The regional dynamics resulting from the implementation of these agendas 
became a key defining feature of South American politics, revitalizing the autonomic 
elements of the Latin American regionalist tradition (Colombo and Roark 2012).  
Accordingly, authors have taken the “turn to the left” to represent one of the key 
necessary conditions to understand and explain the emergence of new perspectives on 
and projects for cooperation at the regional level. Perhaps the two more interesting ways 
in which this has been theorised is through the notions of “post-liberal” regionalism 
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(Gardini 2011; da Motta Veiga and Ríos 2007; Sanahuja 2009; Serbín, Martínez, and 
Ramanzini Jr. 2012) and “post-hegemonic” regionalism (Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro 
Hoffmann 2015; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012a). Though the two share in many relevant 
aspects regarding the conceptualization of this regional process, there are crucial 
differences between them, particularly with regards to what each perceives as the central 
political agenda driving the emergence of new regionalist efforts. 
 
SADC and the concept of Post-liberal regionalism  
Authors using the “post-liberal” label to describe the regionalist processes embodied 
by the UNASUR and the SADC have focused primarily on the efforts made by these 
organizations (together with the other sectorial councils, as well as the Venezuela-led 
ALBA) to advance regional agendas different to trade liberalization. The central argument 
is that post-liberal regionalist efforts resulted not only from a Brazilian interest in 
changing the geographical delimitation of the region, nor exclusively from a shared 
conviction among member states about the benefits of coordinating policies in new areas, 
but also from a generalized reluctance to continue advancing with the trade-liberalizing 
projects that dominated the regional environment throughout the 1990s (Sanahuja 
2010a, 88). According to Pedro da Motta Veiga and Sandra Ríos (2007), such 
developments are not limited to South America, and relate to a widespread backlash 
against the effects of globalization leading to the resurgence of economic nationalism and 
the development of heterogeneous models of international insertion. 
José Antonio Sanahuja, one of the prime proponents of this approach to understand the 
creation of the UNASUR identifies the following features as common to all post-liberal 
regionalist efforts in South America (Sanahuja 2012, 7–8): 
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• A generalized rejection to the neoliberal agenda of the “Washington Consensus”; 
• A return of the autonomy agenda to the foreign policies of member countries, particularly 
regarding the influence of the US over their policies and over regional developments; 
• A re-politicization of development policies, challenging the dogmas of trade liberalization 
and free-market economics, and bringing state planning and intervention in the economy 
back to the menu; 
• The rise of wider regional agendas, explicitly involving matters of regional governance and 
the resolution of “development bottlenecks” (particularly those related with lack of 
transport and energy infrastructure); 
• Concern with resolving socio-economic asymmetries, addressing structural 
developmental imbalances across the region by relating the process of regional 
cooperation with efforts to address poverty and inequality; 
• More openness to the involvement of non-state actors in different stages of the process, as 
well as efforts to socially legitimize the drive towards regionalization. 
 
In short, as has already been mentioned, Sanahuja sees efforts to build a new 
regionalization project to be primarily concerned with re-politicizing dimensions of 
regional relations left aside during the heyday of the Washington Consensus. These 
include the social, development, infrastructure, and international defence/security, 
among others, explicitly omitting free trade and economic liberalization (Dabène 2012). 
Even the few projects advanced during this time related to the advancement of economic 
cooperation (the “Banco del Sur” or “Bank of the South”, and bilateral agreements to trade 
in local currencies instead of resorting to the dollar or the Euro) were also related to 
gaining more autonomy from extra-regional financial institutions and actors. 
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One of the reasons that explains the correlation between left-of-centre governments 
and this new strand in South American regionalism is their interest in protecting local 
labour and production, in opposition to the de-industrialization caused by neoliberal 
policies (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012). On the other hand, but also closely related to the 
characterization made by Sanahuja, social movements and civil society organizations had 
a central role in the rise of anti-/post-liberal agendas, as well as in the incorporation of 
notions of “solidarity” and a sense of “common fate” in the regional projects of the 2000s. 
For example, Sandra Colombo and Mariano Roark (2012) relate the emergence of this 
South American regionalist process to the backlash against neoliberalism and free trade 
agreements seen in the international arena, dating back to events like the demonstrations 
against the 1999 WTO Summit in Seattle and to the 2001 World Social Forum. They also 
identify the hostile reactions to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) 
proposal, presented by the US during the 2005 IV Americas Summit, as a key moment 
showing that the post-liberal agenda had become a prominent feature of South American 
regional politics. 
 
Yet, in spite of the undeniable relevance of this line of enquiry, it is also important to 
highlight some of its limitations. One of the main shortcomings presented by using the 
“post-liberal” label to engage with the creation of the SADC is that it provides too wide of 
a lens for the analysis to be actually meaningful. Though this approach can certainly help 
explain the fall from grace of trade liberalization in South America, it provides too little 
explanatory power regarding the specific regionalization agendas that emerged 
afterwards. In other words, it could be said that, while the turn to the left can certainly be 
associated with the weakening of neoliberal regionalism and the resurgence of 
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developmentalist policies, the “post-liberal” label does little to explain the specificities of 
the new regional project embodied by the UNASUR and the SADC. 
Moreover, Andrés Malamud  (2008) challenges, or at the very least qualifies, the notion 
that it was post-liberal ideational agreements and volitive actions by left-of-centre 
governments that explain the weakening of liberal regionalism and the emergence of non-
commercial forms of regional cooperation. His analysis agrees with the arguments of 
other authors in maintaining that MERCOSUR intra-bloc interdependence could no longer 
expand after having peaked in 1999 given the similarity in the exports of member states 
(Burges 2005; Gómez Mera 2005, 121–23; Malamud 2008). As a result, maintaining the 
region as a viable locus of foreign policy interests for South American countries required 
that the cooperation agenda was widened beyond merely commercial agreements. And, 
indeed, even before the creation of the UNASUR/SADC was in the agenda, an expansion of 
MERCOSUR´s areas of interest took place. The 1998 Ushuaia Protocol is a good example 
of this, establishing a democratic clause and declaring the organization a Zone of Peace, 
decisively moving towards other-than-commercial facets of regional cooperation (Flemes 
and Radseck 2012, 222; Herz 2010, 607). 
Finally, though trade liberalization and liberal regional organizations clearly lost their 
primacy as the driving forces of South American integration, it is important to bear in 
mind that they did not vanish. For example, one of the more fervent proponents of the 
post-liberal approach to regionalization, President Hugo Chávez, also devoted substantial 
diplomatic efforts to secure entry to MERCOSUR for his country. Arguably, Venezuela´s 
strategy was one pursuing a “full integration” with South America (González Urrutia 2007, 
4–6), meaning that the liberal aspects of regional cooperation were not entirely 
dismissed, but neither were they the more salient aspect in its international insertion 
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strategy. Moreover, the hard negotiations between Argentina and Brazil, on the one hand, 
and Paraguay and Uruguay, on the other, over the acceptance of the Venezuelan bid 
(promoted by the former and resisted by the latter) show that by no means did the 
creation of UNASUR uproot the pre-existing expressions of liberal regionalism, nor did it 
render them completely irrelevant. It is also interesting to highlight that in the early-
2000s Brazil did briefly propose the creation of a South American Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA), conceived as an expansion of MERCOSUR to the entire region (Gómez Mera 
2005). Together with the above, the creation of the Pacific Alliance (Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru) in 2011 proves that liberal regionalism was still a relevant feature of 
this period, albeit not the more prominent nor publicized one. 
In other words, using the “post-liberal” label highlights efforts to create a new layer of 
regional institutions that broke with the hegemony of “Open Regionalism”, but without 
supplanting it (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012b, 10). The coexistence of neoliberal and post-
liberal organizations added layers of complexity to the regional landscape (Briceño-Ruiz 
2013; Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2015; da Motta Veiga and Ríos 2007), 
highlighting the sustained interest of South American countries in advancing regional 
cooperation and policy coordination. However, as with the Brazil-centric approach, one 
of the main shortcoming this approach presents is that it tells us little about the new 
agendas advanced by the UNASUR framework, in general, and in the SADC, in particular. 
 
The SADC as a Post-hegemonic regional project 
Pía Riggirozzi and Diana Tussie introduced the understanding of UNASUR and its 
sectorial councils as expressions of “post-hegemonic” in their edited volume The Rise of 
Post-hegemonic Regionalism. The case of Latin America (2012a). Unlike Amitav Acharya, 
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who defines post-hegemonic orders merely as those that come “after hegemony” 
(Acharya 2008, 8), Riggirozzi and Tussie define the concept in the following way: 
“By post-hegemonic we mean regional structures characterized by hybrid practices as 
a result of a partial displacement of dominant forms of US-led neoliberal governance in 
the acknowledgement of other political forms of organization and economic 
management of regional (common) goods.” (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012b, 12) 
 
Arguably, what makes these orders post-hegemonic is the “displacement of dominant 
forms of US-led neoliberal governance” in favour of alternative approaches to the 
creation, management, and distribution of common goods. However, its qualification as 
“partial” is a crucial characteristic that should not be left forgotten, accounting not only 
for the changes but also for the continuities of neoliberal regionalist projects. 
Following the above definition, José Briceño-Ruiz and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffman  (2015) 
understand this approach to be in line with a Coxian understanding of hegemony: 
“[…] a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates 
a whole system of states and non-state entities. In a hegemonic order these values and 
understandings are relatively stable and unquestioned. […] Hegemony derives from 
the ways of doing and thinking of the dominant social strata of the dominant state or 
states […]. These social practices and the ideologies that explain and legitimize them 
constitute the foundation of hegemonic order.” (Cox 1992, 140) 
 
More importantly still, Cox engages with post-hegemonic orders, claiming they imply 
a “[…] doubt as to the likelihood that a new hegemony can be constructed to replace a 
declining hegemony.” (Cox 1992). This is crucial, since it means that understanding the 
creation of the UNASUR and the SADC as expressions of post-hegemonic regionalism 
would counter the interpretation that they are the embodiment of a new hegemonic order 
articulated by the Brazilian dominant social strata. 
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Also, following this understanding of hegemony and post-hegemony accentuates the 
discursive relation built between commercial forms of regionalism, on the one hand, and 
the process of neoliberal globalization, on the other (Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann 
2015). Globalization is thus presented as a “structure of constraints” that creates 
pressures towards the formation of liberal regional processes (Fawcett 2008, 2). Regional 
organizations are promoted as means to ease the integration to the global market, act as 
stepping stones between the local and the global, defend local economies against the 
potentially negative impacts of generalized liberalization, and even help strengthen the 
negotiating positions of relatively small countries by pooling resources and presenting 
more attractive regional markets to extra-regional economic actors.  
Post-hegemonic regionalism, on the other hand, supplanted this with a new 
perspective that no longer focused on the economic dimensions of regionalization. 
Riggirozzi and Tussie are, nonetheless, aware of the hybridity that defines the new South 
American regional landscape, gestating novel forms of non-economic regional 
cooperation while also maintaining the organizations that epitomized neoliberal 
regionalism in the 1990s in a “partial displacement”. They argue that  
“the current wave of regionalism represents a hybrid model, expressive of an 
alternative continental strategy for growth and social justice, representative of a more 
political and confident ‘Latin’ America, suspicious of US leadership yet still largely in 
tune with the need for open markets.” (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012b, 11–12).  
 
This understanding shows more nuance than the post-liberal one in the sense that it 
accommodates both for the continuities and the innovations seen in the period, 
challenging the view that the UNASUR and other regional organizations created at the 
time can be defined exclusively as “[…] a space for contestation and resistance vis-à-vis 
neo-liberalism” (Briceño-Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2015, 53). As discussed above, 
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characterizing this new perspective on regionalism as post-hegemonic implies that it did 
not take the form of a new hegemonic discourse and narrative to supplant the previous 
one, which may help explain the difficulties faced by authors trying to pinpoint a single 
overarching logic to it other than a general claim to expand the margins of international 
autonomy for member countries. As already mentioned, at least one of the reasons why 
this process did not take the form of a new hegemonic order under Brazilian leadership 
is because of this country´s inability to create such an order given its reluctance to 
asymmetrically assume the costs of region-building (Burges 2008, 75). 
Another important feature of this new trend of regionalism in South America is that it 
maintained the strong regional commitment with the notion of national sovereignty, as 
can be seen in the reiteration of clauses of non-intervention, consensual decision-making, 
and respect for territorial integrity (Rojas Aravena 2012, 22–23). According to Thomas 
Legler (2013, 334), two motives explain the resilience of traditional sovereignty in these 
post-hegemonic frameworks: a. The goal of “bringing back the state” in order to regain 
space lost to the market under the neoliberal hegemony, facilitating the enforcement of 
developmentalist strategies; and, b. the goal of redefining the relationship between the 
US and many Latin American countries after the collapse of the “Washington Consensus” 
became a priority that required bringing back a strong sense of external security. As will 
be seen in more detail the case studies, the latter even led some South American countries 
to securitize the systemic level, and particularly the actors that became identified with 
neoliberal reforms, like the IMF and the US government (Simonoff 2015, 6–7). 
Sean Burges (2008) also argues that the agenda of “strong sovereignty” was of 
particular interest for the Brazilian diplomacy, which was nevertheless unable to advance 
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the issue unilaterally. Given its inability or unwillingness to establish a new hegemonic 
order around its own agendas, 
“Itamaraty’s response was to extend its long-standing focus on sovereignty and 
autonomy to the continental level, wrapping it around core regional concerns. The 
focus was thus placed on the protection of democracy, the interpretation of liberal 
economics in a manner that would facilitate rapid economic growth, and regionalized 
responses to the challenges of globalization. These factors were woven together to 
present national development and democratic consolidation as being […] grounded in 
the regional and global context.” (Burges 2008, 75) 
 
Finally, an element that should also be considered to analyse the persistence of national 
sovereignty as a key element in the SADC is the strong ideational commitment shared by 
the elites in most South American countries towards this principle. Battaglino presents 
this insight in the following way, 
“[…] the establishment of the SADC is a regional response to a new defense context 
characterized by an increased global asymmetry in the distribution of military power 
and militarization of the US security agenda towards the region, but at the same time 
as a consequence of a revival of long political and intellectual regional traditions that 
has never abandoned the goal of Latin American integration.” (Battaglino 2012, 82) 
 
With all the above considerations in mind, it is possible to see that the post-hegemonic 
understanding of the creation of the SADC not only brings forward the role played in the 
process by negative perceptions of the US agenda for the region, but also elements of 
agency and identity involved in giving shape to new forms of regional cooperation. This 
reinforces the distinction between the “context dependent” regionalism of the 1990s (i.e. 
a response to the purely external situation of neoliberal globalization), and the post-
hegemonic regionalism of the 2000s, understood as a hybrid between old and new, 
regional and global (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012b, 11–12). 
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In order to advance this understanding of the creation of the SADC, Battaglino engages 
simultaneously with the continuities and changes at the material and ideational 
dimensions. In his perspective, while material changes (such as the rise of Brazil and the 
militarization of the US approach to the region) are relevant aspects to factor in, it is the 
ideational that explains the more specific aspect of the SADC (Battaglino 2012, 84–85). 
Moreover, while he acknowledges that ideational continuities are essential to understand 
the way South American countries approached the initiative, his analysis pays special 
attention to the innovations seen in relation to “development of a regional consensus 
regarding how to deal with defence challenges.” (Battaglino 2012, 83).  
Indeed, the construction of a broader base of shared understandings throughout the 
region regarding the defence policy area is at the heart of the three general and specific 
goals given to the SADC (UNASUR 2008b, Art. 4-5), as already discussed in the previous 
chapter. Following the post-hegemonic rationale, these goals seek to contribute to the 
development of an autonomous approach to the issue of defence, taking the emphasis 
away from militarized responses and helping advance new areas of mutual understanding 
between the member states. 
More importantly, Battaglino´s understandings of the rationale behind the creation of 
the SADC and its role in regional governance are based on the notion that it is 
“A hybrid combination of realpolitik responses and redefinition of what defence is for 
in a region that is re-writing the rules of engagement and practices beyond trade and 
beyond hegemonic competition.”  (Battaglino 2012, 85).  
 
The implications he derives from this for regional governance associate the creation of 
the SADC with the expansion of the defence policy area to other-than-military responses 
to the concerns of the sector, focusing particularly on the development agenda; on efforts 
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devoted to the re-definition of identities, interests, and perceptions; and on opening new 
possibilities for cooperation and policy coordination in an area in which Latin American 
states had not be willing to discuss in much depth before. 
As the case studies will show, this is not to say that there were no disagreements among 
SADC members regarding the actual chances of achieving meaningful cooperation in the 
area, nor about the topics that should be included under the banner of a “Defence Council”. 
In fact, examples can be found in the records of the negotiations (UNASUR 2009) of 
countries seeking a collective defence agreement and some degree of operational 
integration between the Armed Forces of the region (Venezuela), while others saw the 
whole effort as futile and ideologically-driven (Colombia). 
More interestingly, the question of what “Defence” involves was contested, with 
Southern Cone countries (primarily Argentina and Chile) defending the strict doctrinal 
separation between Defence (external) and Security (internal), and countries like 
Colombia advancing the position that domestic conflicts, terrorism, and drugs should also 
fall within the interests of this sector. Yet, the fact that the SADC was successfully created 
despite these relevant disagreements shows that a consensus could be found. This was 
done not by re-shaping what each country understands by defence domestically, but 
rather by painstakingly identifying the maximum common denominators that would 
allow taking the first steps towards developing a more cooperative approach to the 
question of governing South American security. 
 
Shared regional identity 
One final set of arguments advanced to understand the creation of the SADC is that this 
initiative came to fruition due to a pre-existing Latin/South American regional identity. 
67 
 
The overlap with the arguments discussed in the previous sub-section is vast, and the two 
have certainly been combined in different accounts. Yet, however arbitrary the distinction 
between the two may be, there is a strong case to present them as analytically diverse. 
The arguments in the previous sub-section engaged with the regionalist agenda that 
became dominant after the rise of left-of-centre governments, whose quest to develop 
more autonomous and diversified foreign policies in support of their development goals 
were in conflict with some aspects of the trade liberalization goals that drove neoliberal 
regionalism. Those arguments are somehow context-dependent, in that their role in the 
emergence of new models of regionalism is intimately related with the political, economic, 
and social conditions seen in South America in the aftermath of the crises that resulted 
from the neoliberal reforms of the 1970s-1990s. This sub-section engages, instead, with 
the role long term ideational characteristics of Latin American states may have had in the 
creation of the SADC, making little (if any) reference to the more recent political context.  
To be sure, the arguments discussed in the previous sub-section and the ones that will 
be discussed here are compatible with each other. In fact, left on their own both points of 
view have severe shortcomings. Without some consideration for the specific political 
context of the 2000s the perspective to be discussed in this sub-section faces problems 
making sense of the particular timing in which the SADC was created. Similarly, the 
arguments of the previous sub-section would lack depth of understanding if no relation 
was established with the rich regional ideational context and its influence on formation 
of the post-hegemonic regional agenda. 
Battaglino made an explicit effort to put the two in direct dialogue, maintaining that 
deeply-rooted understandings of regional cooperation informed the way left-of-centre 
governments approached the issue of defence cooperation, but also that the SADC became 
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a new landmark in the evolution of the regional collective identity. According to him, the 
SADC incorporates two elements to the regional identity: a shared understanding about 
what issues are to be considered part of the Defence sector; and a de-militarized approach 
to regional defence governance (Battaglino 2012, 84). Though his analysis is primarily 
focused on the process of social learning the organization was designed to trigger, rather 
than on the role of pre-existing shared identities, Battaglino´s remains the most complete 
approximation to explaining the creation of the SADC from a multi-causal systemic view. 
The notion that a set of identity markers, cultural features, and ideas about how to 
relate to each other are shared by Latin/South American states is by no means new. One 
of the theoretical perspectives that has been more convincingly used to advance this idea 
is the English School (Hurrell 2004; Jones 2008; Kacowicz 2005b; Merke 2011). Generally 
speaking, the starting point for this approach is that shared institutions and norms, 
common values and goals, and the related appropriate practices and preferred outcomes 
that are socially valued by the group, are all essential to understand the international 
behaviour of states. Though no attempts have been made to use this specific approach to 
understand the creation of the SADC, and only Charles Jones´s paper (2008) has identified 
South America as an international society separate from Latin America, a general 
argument could be fleshed out with relative ease based on the existing characterizations 
of the Latin American Society of States.  
An argument along these lines would maintain that, to better understand and explain 
the context that allowed the creation of the SADC, one should focus on identifying the role 
shared institutions and norms had in shaping the regional order. In an attempt to identify 
which primary institutions of the dominant international order (Bull 2002, 95–222) are 
better at explaining inter-state interactions in the Latin American Society of States, 
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Federico Merke (2011) identified diplomacy and international law as most relevant, 
playing down the importance institutions like war, great power management, and balance 
of power have in defining regional dynamics. Moreover, Merke agrees with Arie Kacowicz 
(2005b) in identifying the specificity of this region´s society of states in breaking those 
two institutions into principles like multilateralism; sovereignty and equality of states; uti 
possidetis17 and territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; confidence building 
and arms controls; legalism; and, respect for Human Rights and  democracy. In this 
context, the creation of the SADC could be understood as a historically-contingent 
development resulting from the influence long-held institutions have had in a re-
democratized South America. 
Though she uses a constructivist approach rather than an English School one, Marina 
Vitelli (2011) comes the closest to explaining the creation of the SADC from the 
perspective of long-term system-level ideational structure. Her conclusion is that a 
regional ideational structure based on the principles of peaceful and collective resolution 
of controversies are the key starting points that allowed the creation of the SADC (Vitelli 
2011, 57–59). María Inés Ruz´s research (2011a) closely resembles these argument, 
maintaining that the strong commitment in the region with the peaceful resolution of 
controversies, the social learning process resulting from the recent history of cooperation, 
and the political will to foster a “culture of regional peace” are all essential to understand 
how and why the SADC came to being. José Antonio Sanahuja also engages with this 
constructivist approach, but argues that the influence of shared identities, culture, and 
traditions on the region´s different integration processes have been conflicting. In his 
                                                        
17 This institution refers to one of the legal principle used by Latin American states to assert their 
sovereignty after becoming independent from Spain. It holds that the newly formed political units are 
natural successors to the Spanish crown in the American continent, hence inheriting sovereign rights over 
the territories under their administration. 
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view, the characteristics and contradictions seen in the UNASUR framework can be 
related to what he calls a “permanent trilemma” between three long-term values of Latin 
American countries (Sanahuja 2012, 1): defending the nation-state and national 
sovereignty; a drive towards “unionism” and integration; and, the quest for increasing 
degrees of autonomy. More importantly, he qualifies the relevance of the alleged 
ideational commonalities at the South American level in the creation of the UNASUR 
framework by stating that 
“Does this mean that this newfound ´South American´ or ´Unasurian´ discourse and/or 
identity are a constitutive element of UNASUR? Probably not, but rather a redefinition 
of the Latin American unionist narrative has emerged, linking itself with the 
developments of UNASUR.” (Sanahuja 2012, 9) 
 
Focusing primarily on the first element listed by Sanahuja, authors like Gabriel Orozco 
Restrepo (2016) have problematized the role and impact of the so called South American 
identity. In his view, identifying a finite set of shared goals that define a “South American 
identity” lacks rigour and explanatory power, suggesting that this identity should instead 
be sought in the actual patterns of interaction (relations of amity and enmity) that have 
developed within the region over time. As a result, though he acknowledges shared goals 
and values have a role and may lead to more stable patterns of interaction, Orozco 
Restrepo argues that the South American identity is defined as much by tensions and 
conflicts as they are by cooperation, peaceful resolution of conflicts, common ideas, and 
shared perceptions. Following from this, he maintains that the SADC will not have the 
expected implications (i.e. a common regional approach to defence) as long as 
sovereignty, old territorial disputes, and rivalries remain relevant factors affecting 
interactions between South American states (Orozco Restrepo 2016). 
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The tendency to escalate tensions and mobilize military forces based on nationalistic 
discourses is by no means new. In fact, this form of interaction has been discussed in detail 
by geopolitical authors like Jack Child (1985), Philip Kelly (1997) and David Mares (2001). 
These authors agree that “violent peace” and “militarized bargaining” are as defining of 
the South American identity/society as the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts, 
the preference for multilateral mechanisms, or the respect for international law. 
Researchers at the German Institute for Global and Area studies (GIGA) Daniel Flemes, 
Detlef Nolte, and Leslie Wehner argue that the remaining influence of territorial and 
nationalistic disputes, together with the diverging interests of regional powers, should be 
blamed for hindering cooperation in the defence sector until the creation of the SADC 
(Flemes, Nolte, and Wehner 2011, 107–8). Their argument is that the ideational 
conditions necessary for the emergence of a shared understanding about the coordination 
of defence and regional security agendas had been present for a long time, referring to 
Andrew Hurrell´s argument (1998) that South America was a proto-Security Community 
since the 1990s. Paradoxically, though, they identify the border tensions between 
Colombia and Venezuela-Ecuador, as well as the attempted coup in Bolivia in 2008, as the 
critical junctures that triggered this institutional innovation. In their view, these critical 
instances gave momentum to what Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998a, 30) call 
an “ascending phase” in the consolidation of a tightly-coupled South American Security 
Community. Flemes, Nolte and Wehner consider that that stage would be achieved 
through coordination mechanisms that fostered the creation of institutionalized routines 
for the governance of common security and defence issues. In addition, the authors 
identify three mutually complementing aspects that coincided in this period and aided in 
the creation of the SADC (Flemes, Nolte, and Wehner 2011, 123): the political need to 
isolate the region from the OAS (i.e. the US) in matters of regional governance; the quest 
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to create regional instances of political dialogue and coordination with legitimacy to 
mediate in future crises; and, the identity-driven discourses related to the othering of non-
members in terms of security and defence matters.  
The article by Flemes, Nolte and Wehner addresses one of the potential problems faced 
by approaches based on overarching cultural and ideational commonalities: Since these 
conditions had been present for several years, why was the SADC only created in 2008? 
Yet, the risk remains that such approach may “essentialize” the regionness of South 
American, attributing its shared identity and common cultural features explanatory 
power over the entirety of regional interaction. In addition, as explained before, focusing 
exclusively on systemic level elements (whether material or ideational) to explain the 
creation of the SADC runs the risk of obscuring the agency of the various actors involved; 





South America´s polarity has been slowly shifting towards an increasingly evident 
unipolar distribution of power for decades now (Schenoni 2014. See also Appendix 4). 
However, as will be discussed in more detail in the regional context chapter, the 
concentration of military, economic and diplomatic power in Brazil are not yet significant 
enough to fully dominate the regional security environment, let alone allow this country 
to behave as a hegemonic power imposing its interests upon secondary regional powers. 
In addition, the open nature of regional environments (Buzan and Waever 2003; 
Katzenstein 2005; Prys 2010) means that the implications of power distribution are 
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exponentially more difficult to predict than at the systemic level, in part due to the 
penetration of extra-regional powers and alliance formations between said powers and 
regional players being a concrete possibility. This further weakens the assumption that 
the creation of the SADC could be explained exclusively in terms of Brazilian hegemony. 
South American states have incentivized offshore balancing from extra-regional powers 
as a way to gather external support (political, economic, or military) in trying to fulfil 
“their national interests” (Hirst 2005; Kelly 1990; Sheinin 2006; Tickner 2007), reducing 
the relative weight of regional powers. This implies that regional polarity is perhaps of 
less relevance to predict state behaviour than systemic theories would predict. This 
reinforces the conclusions reached by Merke regarding the lack of explanatory power 
shown by the institution of great power management to understand South American 
dynamics (Merke 2011, 16–21). 
Luis Schenoni (2014, 143–44) provides further arguments to disregard the notion that 
Brazilian power and interests alone can explain the creation of the UNASUR/SADC by 
highlighting that this country was given no preferential position nor especial voting 
rights, and that the creation of these organizations can be understood as a way for its 
neighbours to bind their larger partner and advance the Argentine-Chilean defence 
doctrine at the regional level. 
Similarly, this chapter discussed approaches to the creation of the SADC based on the 
role the Latin American “turn to the left” had in the creation of an institutional framework 
that reflected the rise of new regional agendas (whether defined as post-liberal or post-
hegemonic). These approaches certainly help better contextualize and interpret the goals 
given to this organization, and will be useful in qualifying the individual positions of 
secondary powers when faced with this Brazilian proposal. However, as with the other 
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(sub)system-level explanations explored in this chapter, an approach of this nature 
usually fails to account for the individual positions of regional actors regarding the SADC 
initiative, as well as for their negotiating agendas once the decision to move forward had 
been made. As will be explored in more detail in the case studies, the diverging political 
agendas of “centre-left Argentina”, “middle-ground Chile”, and “conservative Colombia” 
converged in the decision to create the SADC. More interestingly perhaps, regardless of 
their respective position in the political spectrum and ultimate perception of regional 
cooperation, all three were initially concerned with the initiative and rejected the more 
potentially disruptive expressions of the integrationist agenda, represented by the 
Venezuela-led ALBA. The above highlights the importance of exploring the individual 
approaches to the creation of the SADC and negotiating agendas of these three regional 
secondary powers, since such research can provide necessary nuance to the existing 
analyses and help understand how countries with diverse (even contradictory) agendas 
came to a converging outcome. 
Something similar can be said about the literature focusing on the role of a common 
South American identity (or other forms of shared ideational features in the region) in the 
creation of the UNASUR/SADC framework. Arguments like those advanced by Vitelli 
(2011) and Ruz (Ruz 2011a) provide a strong backing to the idea that a regional 
preference for principles like the peaceful resolution of controversies and multilateralism 
had a prominent role in facilitating the creation of the SADC. Yet, on its own, this line of 
argumentation fails to explain the reasons why an organization like the SADC was 
successfully created in 2008 and not before despite similar proposals being advanced 
since the 1990s (see Chapter 5). The paper co-authored by Flemes, Nolte and Wehner 
(2011) partially remedies this by identifying the tensions seen in 2008 as a critical 
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juncture that, given the shared ideational context, allowed for the start of an ascending 
phase in the consolidation of a tightly-coupled Security Community in South America. 
However, this should not obscure that the existence and independence of such thing as 
a South American identity has been put into question, describing UNASUR-related 
regionalist discourses as “a redefinition of the Latin American unionist narrative” 
(Sanahuja 2012, 9). Perhaps more importantly, Gabriel Orozco Restrepo  (Orozco 
Restrepo 2016) has highlighted that evaluating the role of a regional identity in this 
institution-building process should not be restricted to ideational features. Rather, he 
proposes including long-term practices, territorial disputes, and tensions in the mix. The 
result is a more complex and ambivalent regional identity, which further complicates 
understanding the creation of the SADC exclusively in ideational terms. 
To summarize, the above discussed (sub)systemic approaches provide relevant 
insights to understand the creation of the SADC in a context of Brazilian primacy; a shared 
regionalist agenda related to goals like obtaining more autonomy from extra-regional 
forces and the implementation of developmentalist economic policies that partially 
subverted neoliberal discourses; and, common ideational features and identity markers. 
As already mentioned, Jorge Battaglino´s (2012) analysis provides one of the more 
balanced approaches to this institutional and political innovation, combining all of the 
above factors to provide a nuanced understanding of the contextual conditions that 
allowed the negotiations to reach a successful outcome. These are by no means minor 
elements to explain the creation of the SADC, and indeed the following chapter will engage 
directly with defining in more detail the regional context. As explained in the introduction, 
assuming a constructivist perspective implies adhering to the notion that structure and 
agents are permanently engaged in a process of mutual co-constitution. Hence, even if the 
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main empirical contribution of this research comes from an agential perspective about 
the creation of the SADC, defining how the regional structure influenced the agents as well 




Chapter 3. Regional security environment 









This chapter aims to identify and analyse the key elements that characterize the 
current South American security environment, providing a better contextualization to 
understand regional-level stimuli on the behaviour of the three case studies. As will be 
discussed at length in the following chapter, (Strategic) culture translates and helps 
interpret these regional inputs, passing them through the lens of deep-rooted meanings 
that mediate their relationship with action(s) adopted as response. Hence, the relevance 
of this chapter is that it provides a necessary understanding of the incentives, constraints, 
pressures, and opportunities coming from regional security environment into South 
American states. 
 
Federico Merke (2011) correctly points out that South America has usually been 
portrayed as either some sort of “anomaly” (Buzan and Waever 2003; Holsti 1996; Martín 
2006) or as a “microcosm” in international politics, allegedly presenting characteristics 
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so unique that it could serve as a “laboratory” for International Relations (Jones 2008; 
Mares 2001, xi). I would argue that these characterizations, while based on the 
observation of actual regional dynamics, are essentially based on an othering of non-
Western patterns of behaviour. In other words, I do not intend to say that South American 
relations are not distinctive. Rather, the argument here is the contrary: understood under 
the light of a Constructivist framework, all regional formation will show both unique 
features and some shared characteristics. In fact, post-colonial scholarship has 
convincingly argued that the patterns of interaction and norms developed in the West18 
should not escape this provincialization (Chakrabarty 2000, 2008), thus countering 
discourses attempting to portray them as the “globalized normality” against which the 
local dynamics of peripheral regions should be contrasted. 
Perceiving regions as part of a larger pattern of international relations (to which South 
America apparently does not conform) implies contrasting actual regional interactions 
and the behaviour of regional players against the backdrop of an idealized “normal” 
behaviour (Prys 2010), i.e. Westphalian-type interactions as described by mainstream IR 
theory. Though, indeed, there are understandings shared by a majority of states and 
regions, it is also important to notice region-specific variations and specificities (South 
America´s low record of inter-state wars in a context of “violent peace”, presidential 
diplomacy, and domestic violence and instability; Western Europe´s supra-national 
organizations and institutionalist approach to post-WWII peace-building; the Middle 
East´s long-standing conflict formation and complex networks of transnational 
                                                        
18 Though contested, the notion of “the West” makes reference here to the set of countries/cultures that 
have dominated the production of knowledge in the Social Sciences, and whose visions of society, politics, 
institutions, normative approaches, identities, and national interest have been labelled as “global” by 
various IR scholars. 
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solidarities; and, ASEAN´s stable inter-state peace in a context of either undemocratic or 
illiberal regimes; just to mention a few). 
In order to provide such regional-level contextualization for South America in a 
theoretically informed way that is compatible with the Constructivist epistemology of this 
research, this chapter is informed by the insights of the English School (ES) and Regional 
Security Complex Theory (RSCT). There are, at least, three key reasons for following these 
two theories before others. Firstly, both the ES and RSCT frameworks show a high degree 
of compatibility with the constructivist approach, at the core of the epistemological 
assumptions informing this research. This will prove useful when drawing conclusions 
about the influence of regional-level dynamics on the agency of actors, and vice versa. 
Secondly, the ES provides a well-developed theoretical perspective with which to 
analyse the role of historically-contingent shared institutions, goals, and values at the 
regional level. This is particularly relevant in order to explore the role of shared ideational 
and normative features present in South America, helping determine whether there is any 
strength to the claim that this regional cluster is indeed different from the rest of Latin 
America and the World. In addition, as Linda Quayle points out, one of the ES´s most 
relevant contributions resides in its “big picture” analysis and consistent quest to occupy 
a “productive middle ground”, 
“Its holism enables it to bring very different actors into the same conversation, while 
its ability to recognize, defend and validate conceptual “in between” spaces makes it a 
natural bridge between realist and constructivist, statist and liberal, and structural and 
agential interpretations.” (Quayle 2011, 2) 
 
RSCT, on the other hand, provides the analytical leverage of a theoretical approach 
focused specifically on security dynamics at the regional level, accounting both for the in-
group logics of interaction and for the intrinsically open nature of regional systems. This 
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theory also provides a relevant analytical differentiation between the sectorial dynamics 
of regional security and other forms of regional interaction, challenging the notion that 
the same geographical region can be equally relevant across all policy areas. 
Hence, the ES approach will be used here to engage with the idea that there exists a 
regional society of states in South America, while the RSCT will provide a specialized 
toolbox to discuss whether this society also works as an independent security cluster. In 
doing so, this chapter seeks to contextualize and historicize the emergence of the post-
hegemonic regionalist project discussed in the previous chapter, placing the creation of 
the SADC in its larger social contexts. Hopefully, this will provide sufficient understanding 
of the (sub)systemic factors constituting South American powers, their identities and 
perception of the regional security environment, influencing their agency when the SADC 
initiative was proposed by Brazil in 2008. 
In the context of a Thesis devoted to the study of state agency, engaging with such 
regional contextualization is relevant in order to take seriously of the Constructivist 
argument that agency and structure (or, social arrangements, in Nicholas Onuf´s terms) 
are embedded in a process of continuous mutual constitution. Doing so requires that at 
least the central characteristics of the South American security environment are 
discussed, including the dynamics and ideas that define its identity, and how it relates 
with the rest of the world.  
In order to fulfil the objectives set out for this chapter, the first section will be devoted 
to putting forward a historicized account of the patterns of interaction that allow 
perceiving South America as sub-global International Society. In order to do so, a general 
understanding of how the ES approach helps understand regional societies will be briefly 
discussed, expanding on the points made in the previous chapter about the influence 
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shared institutions and ideational features have in regional dynamics. The resulting 
analysis will provide a necessary overview of the social and historical conditions that gave 
place to the long-term regional order in which the SADC was created. 
The second section of the chapter will discuss the nature of the South American 
Security Complex (SASC). By identifying and explaining the core security practices and 
dynamics that have marked the recent evolution of regional interactions, this section 
offers a nuanced understanding of the conditions that facilitated the creation of the SADC. 
The obvious starting point for this section is Buzan and Waever´s chapter about this 
regional security complex (Buzan and Waever 2003, 304–40), perhaps the most detailed 
analysis of the region to date using the RSCT approach. I will then proceed to discuss and 
update the insights advanced by these authors, devoting some attention to discussing the 
creation of the South American Defence Council within RSCT´s framework. 
In short, this chapter should offer convincing arguments regarding the saliency of 
South America as a regional society and a security region, separate from the rest of the 
Americas by its recent historical record and the development of shared understandings 
and practices. In doing so, it will evidence both the need enrich the Brazil-centred 
understanding of recent regional initiatives, and set a common starting point for the study 
the three case studies to be conducted in the following chapters. 
 
South America as an International Society 
 
The ES approach has at least two key strengths that make it a relevant theoretical 
approach to conceptualize international relations (Quayle 2011, 13–17): A. it provides a 
big-picture analysis, acknowledging multiple spheres of international activity and 
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contextualizing them within larger historical and societal processes; and, B. ES authors 
make an active effort to position themselves in a “productive middle ground” (Ayson 
2008), weighing the relevant contributions of dominant theoretical approaches and 
seeking to combine their strengths in a coherent manner. 
However, though the theory is fully compatible with the analysis of sub-global societies 
of states, such approach has remained relatively unexplored (Bellamy 2005, 18; Buzan 
2004, 205–217, 2012; Zhang 2002, 6–7). In fact, the volume compiled by Barry Buzan and 
Ana González-Pelaez (2009) on the Middle Eastern Society, Arie Kacowicz´s (2005b) 
study of the Latin American international society, and Linda Quayle´s (2013) case study 
on Southeast Asia, are among the few in-depth studies of regional societies using the ES 
framework. Given this situation, it is worth reviewing how the ES framework applies to 
the analysis of regional-level societies before engaging with the study of the South 
American regional society. 
 
A case for using the ES approach to study Regional Societies 
Though there are a variety of conceptualizations and normative positions associated 
with the ES framework, there is some consensus about the basic elements that make up 
this approach (Buzan 2004; Dunne 1998; Suganami 1983; Wilson 1989). One of its key 
contributions is understanding international politics through the concept of “Society of 
States” or “International Society”, seen as the result of stable (though mutable) patterns 
of behaviour and interaction that result in shared values, institutions, and norms. Once 
these institutions and norms are perceived as legitimate and socially valued features of 
the international environment, they reinforce particular types of international orders in 
what is otherwise an anarchic system. 
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In addition to this, the ES approach contemplates two other spheres of international 
activity, the international system (devoid of social norms ruling interstate behaviour, 
closely resembling the neorealist anarchic system) and world society (where non-state 
international relations take place). Finally, the ES has consistently shown a dismissive 
view of “scientificist” (positivist) approaches to IR (Bull 1966), defending a pluralism of 
methods that allows to produce a historically and socially contextualized analysis. 
It is important to point out that the ES has been labelled at times as either “morally 
backwards” (Keal 2003), “Eurocentric” (Hobson 2012), or plainly “imperialist” (Kayaoğlu 
2010; Seth 2011). Critics point out that this tradition has kept the values and interests of 
the world´s rule-takers hidden, if not straightforwardly oppressed, portraying the 
Westphalian order as a “standard of civilization” (or, at least, the most positively valued 
arrangement). Moreover, early ES authors have traditionally understood the adoption of 
“European” patterns of behaviour by post-colonial states as a passive acceptance of the 
values and goals that lay behind them. Such has been one of the more prevalent narratives 
about the formation of the Latin American Society of States, and it is only recently that 
colonialism, decolonization, and the role peripheral agents in the constitution of the so 
called “European International Society” have started to show more prominence in the 
analyses of authors working with this theory (Keal 2003; Keene 2004). 
A closer analysis of this issue is beyond the reach of this chapter, but suffice it to say 
that I consider the above to be a problem more closely related with the normative 
preferences of particular authors than with the general principles of interpretation 
provided by the theory itself. In other words, the historical and interpretive approach of 
the ES is perfectly capable of incorporating non-western perspectives and historical 
accounts to interpret the emergence, evolution, meanings, and consequences of 
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international patterns of behaviour. Moreover, the definition of international order as a 
social construct resulting from stable patterns of interaction is more than able to identify 
the informal hierarchies that exist in international politics, recognizing the effects these 
inequalities entail for international politics. In doing so, it can be said that the ES presents 
a conservative view of international politics, but not necessarily a Eurocentric one. 
The possibility of using this theory to study Regional Societies is proof of the above. 
Understanding regional formations as entities with historically-contingent and path-
dependent institutions, different from those that shape behaviour at the global level and 
in other regional settings, allows analysing the specificities without the need to impose a 
normative preference for any particular outcome. Looking at the current international 
order as structured in a core-periphery form (with a set of dominant institutions at the 
core and a variety of regional institutions simultaneously at play), Buzan discusses how 
the above would allow telling a “less West-centric story”: 
“[…] there is still a thin global international society that is partly based on genuinely 
shared primary institutions […] and partly a reflection of ongoing western hegemony. 
[…] This view of international society is partly global and partly hegemonic, and it 
leaves more room for regional social structures within it.” (Buzan 2012, 25) 
 
A centre-periphery approach makes a relevant contribution to the ES, enabling the 
analysis of interactions between global-level institutions and post-colonial regions 
(mostly at the fringe of the global balance of power). The image it creates is one of a 
partitioned international environment with institutions of different reach, rather than 
one of a homogeneous structure for global behaviour. Such situation is one where 
common global institutions and norms still form a shallow International Society, but also 
incorporates to the analysis the distinct patterns of interaction of sub-global clusters of 
states. This approach provides arguments to understand regional differentiations in the 
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degree of socialization and implementation of “genuinely shared primary institutions”, as 
well as the presence of entirely regional institutions and norms. Moreover, it is also 
relevant in that it advances a perspective that not only relies on processes of socialization, 
but also on dynamics of hegemonic pressure and regional resistance, helping avoid a 
Euro-centric perspective and incorporating elements of regional agency and contestation. 
Hence, paraphrasing the classical ES definition of International Society19, a Regional 
Society is defined here as: 
Group of geographically proximate states that, conscious of certain common values 
and interests, conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules and share 
in the working of common institutions that are distinct from those at work at the 
global level. 
 
The geographical limitation included helps differentiate Regional Societies, expected 
to show more intense patterns of interaction across a wider variety of topics, from other 
types of sub-global groupings. Discussing Alan James´s position on the emergence of 
shared rules20, Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami highlight that a “matter of logical 
necessity” is involved in the creation of norms and institutions at the regional level 
(Linklater and Suganami 2006, 27). Since no other sub-global factor forces a regular 
engagement among agents as strongly as geography does, regions seem to be paramount 
                                                        
19 “group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely 
form a system […] but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the 
conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.” (Bull 
and Watson 1984) 
20 “[…] when independent political units come into regular contact with each other certain requirements 
present themselves, almost as a matter of logical necessity: some rules are necessary for the regulation of 
their intercourse and also, therefore, some agreement on how these rules are to be established or identified; 
[…] and, if the collective of units is deemed to form a society, this carries with it the concept of membership, 
and hence the necessity for some criterion whereby this political unit is identified as a member and that 
not. ” (James 1986, 466) 
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cases in which to expect the emergence of sustained patterns of behaviour that would 
indicate a practical need for common institutions and norms. 
The above means that, to accurately understand a regional order and its security 
environment, it is necessary to identify the goals and values shared by the agents involved 
in them. The contextual conditions that allowed for the creation of the SADC can be 
analysed under this light by looking at the common regional institutions and norms of the 
South American society, seeking to understand how they may have affected the agency of 
secondary regional powers. This would also open a clear line of contact with RSCT and 
Social Constructivism, which conceive international/regional orders to be socially 
constructed and historically contingent, and yet stable enough as to perceive them as 
structural elements. 
 
The South American regional society: Key institutions and regional order 
Only few attempts have been made to explain the South American regional order using 
ES approach (Hurrell 2004; Jones 2008; Kacowicz 2005b; Merke 2011). This sub-section 
will engage with them, seeking to distil a clear image of the institutions that define this 
society of states and how they affect the regional security environment. 
The first academic piece using the ES framework to discuss the participation of the 
Americas in the International Society was Adam Watson´s “New States in the Americas” 
(Watson 1984), a chapter in the edited volume The Expansion of International Society (Bull 
and Watson 1984). As the title of the book suggests, the aim was not to explore the 
specificity and evolution of alternative international societies but to analyse the way non-
European territories fitted in the globalization of the European Society of States. The 
narrative that transpires from the book is one of European superiority in economic, 
87 
 
military, institutional, and normative terms, as well as a passive acceptance of the 
Westphalian order by peripheral regions. In referring to the Americas, Watson notes 
“The broad picture is of a whole hemisphere of new states developing from European 
colonization and on European lines which by the end of the eighteenth century were 
ready for independent statehood and capable of asserting it. […] the states they formed 
were accepted members of the European society – rather boorish, and provincial 
members, perhaps, but that was no great matter.” (Watson 1984, 139).  
 
This is a good example of the general attitude towards peripheral regions that can be 
perceived in early ES works. However, this need not be the case. Arguably, one of the 
characteristics of the South American order is that some of the primary European 
institutions did in fact become quickly socialized, either because of the desire of regional 
powers to be accepted as legitimate interlocutors or because their Europe-educated elites 
valued these institutions and norms (or, most probably, a combination of both). More 
importantly, however, over time these institutions and norms became constitutive part of 
the self-images of South American states, being interpreted and implemented accordingly 
with the perceptions and interests of regional units. As a result, for example, South 
American states have historically championed the further development of pluralistic 
institution like International Law and Sovereignty, using them in their own interest, while 
denouncing the notion of Great Power management and advancing short-of-war conflict 
resolution methods (Hurrell 2004; Merke 2011). In other words, acknowledging that the 
South American regional society “imported” many of the institutions from the European 
order does not mean it did so a-critically, nor passively. The peripheral, post-colonial 
condition of this region is central to understand the ways in which this process took place. 
Though many points raised by Watson may have some explanatory power, the overall 
way he reads the international insertion of newly independent states is unequivocally 
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Euro-centric. The processes by which American states obtained independence are 
described as “negotiated”, disregarding the bloody wars against colonial powers that 
ended up draining valuable resources, claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, and 
delaying the process of state formation in the region. Moreover, Watson´s “negotiation” 
perspective actually gives the central role to the former European colonial powers in the 
process of “accepting” American states to the international society, rather than to the 
agency of these American states in gaining independence and finding a place for 
themselves in international politics. 
 
Institutions of the South American Regional Society 
Contemporary ES authors studying the region have listed a number of core institutions 
that regulate state behaviour in the Latin/South American society (Jones 2008; Kacowicz 




• International Law 
• Uti Possidetis and territorial integrity 
• Peaceful resolution of conflicts and diplomacy 
• “Concertación” 
• Domestic balancing 
 
Some of the principal institutions of the globalized European Society (Bull 2002, 95–
222) make it into the list (Sovereignty, International Law, and Diplomacy), while others 
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(war and Great Power management) do not. It could be argued that war and other forms 
of interstate violence were part of the accepted forms of behaviour throughout the first 
century of Latin American independence, and only ceased to be part of the South 
American institutions at some point in the first third of the 20th century (Oelsner 2005a). 
Yet, authors challenge the notion that South America is a peaceful region, qualifying the 
use of “foreign” criteria used to identify conflictive relations by favouring an analysis of 
inter-state conflicts more common and relevant to the region (Centeno 2002; Domíngues 
et al. 2003; Kelly 1997; Mares 2001; Mares and Bernstein 1998; Martín 2006). 
Of the institutions listed above, the first three are intimately related and have remained 
at the core of the region´s international identity since the time of independence struggles, 
in the early-19th century. This highlights the highly pluralistic identity of this regional 
society, despite the wide array of values and interests shared. Latin American states 
understood early on that their recognition as equal-standing agents depended on the 
adoption of forms of statehood, governance, and international behaviour deemed 
“acceptable” by European Great Powers (Kacowicz 2005a, 5). In this sense, upholding the 
institution of sovereignty, as well as the principles of non-intervention and autonomy, was 
a question of survival in the international system rather than the attribution of an intrinsic 
superiority to them over other institutions. 
As has been made sufficiently clear throughout the last 200 years of anti- and post-
colonial struggle, “sovereignty” is not an unequivocal concept (Krasner 1999). In order to 
secure their position as sovereign units, Latin American states developed a corpus of 
practices, legal doctrines, norms, and institutions around the concepts of non-
intervention and autonomy specific to the region. As a result, these elements became 
more prominent in Latin American thinking than they ever were in Europe, where they 
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remained subordinate to sovereignty. The long-lasting impact of these historical 
developments on the identity of the South American society cannot be overstated. Until 
today, regional powers are reluctant to violate either of these three institutions/norms, 
even in cases of humanitarian interventions (Herz 2010, 609). Even the limits to the 
defence of democracy, incorporated in the form of democratic clauses in the majority of 
regional regimes and institutions, remains controversial and works primarily as an “anti 
coup” clause, protecting the incumbent against non-democratic seize of power but failing 
to problematize non-democratic actions by said incumbent.  
Securing spaces of autonomous action usually remains one of their sustained policy 
goals. The first principle listed in the SADC statute reflects this, stating that the 
organization will “Always respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of 
states, the non-intervention in their domestic affairs, and the self-determination of the 
peoples”21 (UNASUR 2008b, Art. 3 a.) 
Thought the increased participation of Latin American states in UN-sponsored 
peacekeeping missions since the 1990s seems to contradict the above, this may simply be 
a superficial analysis. The region has consistently rejected contributing troops to 
international interventions in countries with ongoing internal conflicts and, more 
importantly, it has only participated in interventions where the legitimate leadership of 
the country has actively expressed agreement with the mission. 
According to Monica Herz, South American elites have been driven to adhere so 
strongly to the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, territorial integrity, and 
autonomy primarily due to their quest to “[…] preserve state jurisdiction and attributes, 
                                                        
21 Own translation. Original in Spanish reads: “Repeto de manera irrestricta a la soberanía, integridad e 
inviolabilidad territorial de los Estados, la no intervención en sus asuntos internos y la autodeterminación 
de los pueblos”. 
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fearing greater control by the United States and other powers of various aspects of 
domestic and international politics in the region.” (Herz 2010, 609). In addition, she 
argues that the historical preference for a legalistic, multilateral, institutionalized 
approach to their respective foreign policies relates to remaining fears that Great Powers 
(specifically the US) could resume interventionist practices. 
Despite the recent and intense processes of regional cooperation, the influence these 
three institutions maintain on the South American society can arguably be related to the 
pivotal role they have had in the formation of its identity as a peripheral, post-colonial 
region. The slow pace at which these institutions have changed despite (still incipient) 
behavioural changes in some regional powers comes to highlight their structural 
condition in the regional environment. 
It could be even argued that this is one of the obstacles preventing South American 
countries from forming a mature Security Community, which would imply the acceptance 
of some sort of supra-national security governance scheme and collective security 
mechanisms. As a result, it seems likely that the region will remain within the category of 
“ascendant”22 Security Community for the foreseeable future, despite signs of change in 
the last two decades23. The above also provides relevant information regarding some of 
the reasons behind the opposition to the Venezuelan proposal to create a collective 
security organization, while cooperation and policy coordination that in no way implied 
a supra-national institutionality nor weakened state sovereignty were more acceptable 
                                                        
22 The names assigned by Adler and Barnett  (1998b) to the different types of Security Communities 
(“nascent”, “ascendant”, and “mature”) convey the misleading idea that movement from one type to the 
other is necessary and linear, as if it was part of an evolutionary process. However, Security Communities 
are as capable of following this path as they are of stagnating indefinitely or even spiralling down.  
23 As can be seen in the Argentine participation in the desert storm/deserts shield operations; the 
MINUSTAH; the regional mobilization against attempted “soft” coups in Bolivia, Paraguay, Venezuela and 
Ecuador; and, the suspension of Paraguay and Venezuela from different regional organizations over 
concerns regarding their democratic status. 
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(Sanahuja 2012, 18). In fact, the SADC statute explicitly excludes the possibility of this 
organization becoming a NATO-like collective security mechanism, and no recent 
developments in its working nor in the more general regional security environment hint 
relevant changes in that sense. 
 
In a similar vein, the Latin American regional society has traditionally shown high 
regard for institutions like International Law and related principles such as Uti Possidetis 
Juri, territorial integrity, peaceful resolution of conflicts, (presidential) diplomacy, and 
“Concertación” (Hurrell 1998, 2004; Kacowicz 2005a, 8). Arguably, the relevance of 
international law as a primary institution of the South American society resides in its 
ability to mediate asymmetrical engagement with extra-regional powers in a predictable 
way. Similarly, the adherence to the principle of Uti Possideti Juri can be related to the 
need of former colonies to expedite the formation of a general consensus regarding 
mutual borders, simplified by adopting the administrative delimitations established by 
the Spanish crown (Kacowicz 2005a, 5). 
Of particular interest are the institutions of peaceful resolution of conflicts and 
“Concertación”, which refers to the systematic use of a principle of consensus as the key 
decision-making mechanism in regional-level instances (Kacowicz 2005a, 5–6). 
Interviewees in the three countries analysed highlight the alleged role their respective 
negotiating teams had in upholding the institution of “Concertación” against the 
Venezuelan proposal to incorporate a majority decision-making mechanism. At its core, 
this institution implies that all states, regardless of their relative size and power share, 
have veto power over regional-level decisions. Though compromises are certainly made, 
and more flexibility is often expected from smaller powers than it is from larger ones, the 
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lack of majority decisions-making processes means that even the weaker states in the 
region are able to veto initiatives with which their positions cannot be reconciled. 
This means that members of the South American society not only challenge the 
European institution of Great Power management by actively seeking conditions for 
higher degrees of international autonomy, but also by upholding an institution that 
actively counters the narrative that stronger states have a “natural” claim to lead. As 
discussed in the Literature Review chapter, this has meant that even Brazil has been 
unable to impose its preferred outcomes upon regional partners, and continues to face 
severe difficulties in its attempts to become a legitimized regional leader. 
 
Finally, two primary institutions of the international system, War and Great Power 
management, have tended not to be as prominent in the South American regional society 
(Hurrell 2004, 2). The record of interstate wars in the region has been significantly lower 
than in the majority of other regions across the world24, at least since the end of the War 
of the Pacific, 1879-188325 (Kacowicz 2005b). With only few exceptions (Brazil, in the 2nd 
World War; Colombia, in the Korean War; Argentina, in the first Gulf War) South American 
states have also avoided taking part in extra-regional military confrontations. As 
explained above, the case is even more evident with regards to the institution of Great 
Power management, which has been challenged, resisted, and contested on numerous 
occasions, and presented generally in direct opposition to the principle of autonomy and 
the institution of sovereignty. 
 
                                                        
24 See Table 2. South American wars, page 103 
25 The key exceptions being the War of the Chaco (1932-1935), and the different confrontations and 
skirmishes between Ecuador and Peru over the delimitation of their mutual Amazonian border. 
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South America as a Security Complex 
 
The objective of this section is to discuss which features characterize the South 
American Security Complex and how they have evolved in recent years, contextualizing 
the characteristics of the regional security environment in which the Strategic Cultures of 
the three case studies evolved. 
As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the relevance of using RSCT to 
understand the South American security environment resides in its ability to 
appropriately characterise regional groupings based on the criteria of sustained security 
interactions among its member states. This creates a framing that convincingly analyses 
regions formed around shared security concerns and behaviours, leaving aside 
essentialist views of what each region “should” look like based on criteria that often do 
not reflect the actual characteristics of the security environment. This theory also 
provides vast analytical leverage due to its ability to account for the intrinsic openness 
and complexity of regional systems; differentiate between situations of penetration and 
overlay26; provide a believable explanation for changes in membership; account for the 
effects of internal polarity; and, understand the particular position of insulator states. 
More importantly, though these strengths seem to point to a theory overly concerned with 
material capabilities and power relations, it actually incorporates these elements into a 
perspective that focuses on the analysis of actual behaviour in order to extrapolate 
socially constructed roles and social arrangements from it. In addition, while Buzan and 
Waever oppose considering “self identification” as a relevant parameter to evaluate the 
                                                        
26 Penetration takes place when extra-regional powers participate in the security dynamics of RSCs by 
making alignments with one of the sides in a regional dispute. Overlay, on the other hand, takes place when 
the interests of Great Powers completely dominate the security dynamics of a RSC, to the point that 
autonomously generated patterns of security relations cease to exist. 
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membership of a regional security complex, they by no means reject the idea that cultural 
commonalities have an effect on the development of the security dynamics. 
In addition to the above, another key reason to favour this approach over the more 
commonly used Security Communities literature (Adler and Barnett 1998b; Adler and 
Greve 2009; Bellamy 2004; Diamint 2010; Flemes 2005; Nathan 2006; Pouliot 2008) is 
that RSCT engages specifically with security regions (clusters of geographically proximate 
units formed around common security concerns and dynamics), rather than with generic 
sub-global “clubs” of states grouped to pursue shared interests. Security Communities 
emerge in a context of shared ideational commitments and interests, limiting the analysis 
of this approach to instances where cooperative interactions have already emerged. 
Moreover, it is sometimes difficult to tell apart Security Communities from the 
international organizations that embody them. RSCT, on the other hand, provides a 
framework that can not only identify and study such cases, but also security regions in 
contexts of indifferent or conflictive relations. This establishes a clearer analytical 
differentiation between a security complex, per se, and the international organizations 
that may exist around security issues. This results in a broader scope of analysis, more 
nuanced argumentation, and more analytical rigour for the study of security regions. 
RSCT also establishes a stricter analytical framework in that it associates the presence 
of shared dynamics between member states with their core security dynamics, resulting 
from a set of material and social conditions that shape their perception of threats and 
opportunities. The intensity of these shared dynamics and their effect on the international 
behaviour of states means that membership to multiple security complexes is ruled out, 
while multiple and overlapping memberships to different “clubs” is allowed in the 
Security Communities literature. In other words, the clusters analysed by RSCT form 
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around stronger shared social dynamics than those of Security Communities, which rest 
primarily on the volition of the member states to band together. 
 
A Regional Security Complex is defined as a functional region, structured around 
patterns of security interactions that emerge among a group of geographically proximate 
states. Security practices are, thus, the key element in the analysis of RSCs (Buzan and 
Waever 2003, 48). The development of security interdependence among geographically 
proximate players requires the construction of group-specific patterns of security 
interactions. This further distances Buzan and Waever from approaches like David Lake 
and Patrick Morgan´s (1997), which focuses on dimensions such as the self-perception of 
the units, regionalist discourses, or the presence of shared cultural or ideational features. 
Retaining geography as a relevant variable also means RSCT keeps the theoretical 
specificity of regions vis a vis other forms of sub-global groupings. Geographical proximity 
generates incentives for more assiduous, intense, and varied interactions in the field of 
security, across a wider range of sectors (Buzan and Waever 2003, 45–46). Keeping the 
geographical criterion allows Buzan and Waever to establish a clearer distinction 
between regional, sub-global, and systemic analyses. This generates an analytical leverage 
that helps understand regional security interdependence in its own terms, rather than as 
an undifferentiated sub-group of sub-global groupings. RSCT also allows for the study of 
interactions between the systemic, inter-regional, and regional levels (Buzan and Waever 
2003, 81). Yet, however central geography is in creating the conditions for stronger 
interactions between contiguous states, it remains only a facilitating factor rather than 
the sole element at play. 
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For example, as will be discussed in the coming sub-section, South America can be 
characterized as a security complex regularly penetrated by the US and European powers. 
But, unlike Central America and the Caribbean (whose security dynamics have been so 
consistently overlaid by the US that they have come to form part of the North American 
Security Complex), South America has not seen such situation and remains a clearly 
independent security complex.  
It is important to highlight that, based on this understanding of regions, belonging to a 
security complex is a condition that cannot be changed solely out of the volition of 
particular states. It is, rather, the result of sustained and meaningful interactions with a 
set of neighbouring states. Changes in the membership of regions is accounted for in RSCT, 
precisely because focusing on the social aspect of security allows recognizing shifts in the 
reach of and participation on processes that characterize different regions. However, 
these patterns of interaction and long-term processes affect the security identity of the 
units, turning regional setups into relatively stable formations. 
Finally, the concept of insulator states is another relevant feature of the theory, and 
one that has implications for the Colombian case. An insulator is a state located at the 
edges of two different security complexes. The difference between this concept and the 
traditional notion of buffer states is that the latter is a unit located at the very centre of 
strong patterns of mutual securitization, while the former refers to a unit located at the 
edges of two different regions it does not fully belong to and that do not necessarily see 
each other in negative terms. An interesting question to answer in the Colombian case 
study is if this country can be considered an insulator state between the North and South 
American security complexes, or if it is has full membership in either of the two. 
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This framework also provides analytical tools to classify regions based on their 
polarity, something that Security Communities literature does not pay much attention to. 
But, unlike materialist accounts of international politics, RSCT also considers the effects 
patterns of amity and enmity have on regional interactions. These are classified in a scale 
that goes from conflict formation, through security regimes, to security communities, 
incorporating this category as a sub-group among other possible forms of security regions 
(Buzan and Waever 2003, 53–54). RSCs can also be classed differently depending on a 
variety of socially constructed features, classifying the interactions between agents as 
structured or non-structured, centred or standard. Discussing the intricacies of each of 
these classifications is beyond the interest of this chapter, but it is nevertheless important 
to highlight the multiple dimensions used by RSCT to engage with security regions. 
 
In the case of the SASC, the region is portrayed as a standard, unipolar region, showing 
the general characteristics of a security regime. In other words, South America is defined 
by the presence of a primus inter pares (Brazil) that is, nevertheless, unable to determine 
unilaterally the regional security agenda and practices, which show structured patterns 
but have not yet developed into a Security Community (and may never do). 
 
RSCT. Theory and practice in the South American case 
Barry Buzan and Ole Waever´s chapter (2003, 304–42) on the South American Security 
Complex is a useful starting point for discussion. This section seeks to update and provide 




One of the central differences I would establish with Buzan and Waever´s chapter is the 
timeframe of the analysis. With good judgement, they assert that the modern foundations 
of the SASC should not be traced back to the pre-colonial nor colonial eras, but rather to 
the post-independence history of the region (Buzan and Waever 2003, 305). Arguably, 
however, this timeframe is no longer the most relevant to understand currently dominant 
security dynamics in the region. Instead, a timeframe starting with the radical changes 
undergone in the region since the 1980s has more explanatory power on the current 
characteristics of the SASC. 
Perhaps with the only exception of the Colombian case, whose particular features will 
be discussed in Chapter 7, the evolution of the regional security environment shows the 
1980s to be a crucial breaking point. This does not mean that all previous patterns of 
interaction were discarded, nor that a “clean slate” for regional relations was established 
in that decade. However, it is precisely in this moment in history that regional rivalries 
and geographical barriers that had largely defined the interactions between regional 
powers cease to be relevant features of regional security almost simultaneously, leaving 
room for the emergence of cooperative practices never before seen in the region. My 
argument is that the 1980s should represent a landmark in the periodization of South 
American history due to a series of intertwined (though analytically independent) 
processes: 
- Democratization; 
- The establishment of regional mechanisms to secure political stability; 
- The defusing of military tensions throughout the region; 




With the only exception of Chile, all South American countries that were subject to 
dictatorial regimes held elections and proclaimed democratically elected governments 
between 1979 and 1985 (Huntington 1991, 22). Chile joined this trend in 1990. Thus, in 
little over a decade, the entire region shifted from military elites imposing their 
perceptions of international security and commanding state interactions to democratic 
regimes more open to regional cooperation. Initially, this was seen primarily as a way of 
cementing democratic stability through regional solidarity. Democratizing the state, its 
norms, bureaucracies, and practices marked the political agenda of following decades 
(Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005).  
The above has had an impact on regional patterns of interaction, affected by the still 
ongoing modification of domestic Strategic Cultures, bureaucratic structures, military 
doctrines, threat perceptions, and objects of securitization. In this context, the region 
went from a precarious type of negative peace towards a more stable positive peace 
defined by the presence of mutual confidence and higher trust levels than ever before 
(Oelsner 2007). Some of the most relevant processes of peaceful dispute settlement and 
rapprochement between former regional rivals ever developed in the region  (Argentina-
Brazil, Argentina-Chile, Chile-Peru) emerged since the 1980s, and can be directly related 
to the process of democratization. 
 
Another relevant feature of the post-1980s SASC is closely related to the above. Seeking 
to stabilize democracy and prevent the emergence of a new wave of non-democratic 
regimes, South American states proceeded to the joint securitization of the issue. 
Arguably, the “extraordinary measures” adopted henceforth work along the lines of 
raising the costs for domestic factions seeking to seize power undemocratically, 
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delegitimizing their expectations to rule through a network of mutual support embodied 
in regional democratic norms. As briefly mentioned before, these democratic clauses 
work primarily to protect the incumbent, rather than as a broader defence of democracy. 
This can be seen in the regional interventions seen in the democratic crises in Bolivia27, 
Paraguay28 and Ecuador29. Moreover, the inability of the region to articulate coherent 
responses to cases of humanitarian crises in the context of democratically elected 
regimes, like in Colombia during the early 2000s and in Venezuela in the last few years, 
highlights the remaining pervasiveness of pluralist institutions. Nonetheless, these norms 
have become such a salient feature of the SASC that it is undeniable that the principle of 
non-intervention has undergone a process of (partial) revision. 
The dynamics by which pre-1980s military tensions were diffused are central as well, 
and have had an all-encompassing impact throughout the region. Though Buzan and 
Weaver (2003, 322–23) do identify the structural effect that the rapprochement between 
Argentina and Brazil had on regional security relations, they fail to highlight the relevance 
of similar processes taking place among other South American states roughly at the same 
time. Arguably, the Argentine-Brazilian case represents the more consequential of these 
cases, but it is worth mentioning that by no means did it stand alone. During the late-
1980s and 1990s a slow process of desecuritization of inter-state relations swept the 
                                                        
27 In 2008, a series of escalating domestic conflicts between the central government and the oil-rich 
provinces located in the East of the country put at serious risk the continuity of President Evo Morales. An 
emergency UNASUR Presidential Summit led to the unanimous regional support for Morales’s continuity, 
shifting the balance in favour of the his administration and helping put an end to the conflict. 
28 The Paraguayan case is largely perceived as a failure of regional organizations to protect democracy, since 
they could not prevent the Congressional opposition from illegitimately deposing President Fernando Lugo  
(IACHR 2012). However, this is still a good example of the role these organizations can have in cases of 
“institutional coups”, since both the UNASUR and the MERCOSUR suspended the Paraguayan membership 
until free elections were held. 
29 On September 30, 2010, police and other security forces with support from sectors of the Air Force staged 
a rebellion against President Rafael Correa (de la Torre 2011). UNASUR member states promptly issued a 
joint communiqué and agreed to have their Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet in Quito within the week in 
support of Correa´s claim to power and delegitimizing any government resulting from a coup d´État. 
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region, redefining crucial aspects of the dynamics observed in the SASC. Except for the 
1995 low-intensity confrontation between Peru and Ecuador, and the recent standoffs 
between Colombia and Venezuela, in no other occasion during the last three decades have 
there been even remote chances of military conflicts. 
 
Interestingly, the arguments that South America constitutes an “anomaly” in 
international relations usually fail to properly weigh the changes introduced by the 
democratization process. They make reference to the relatively low amount of intra-
regional wars in comparison with other regional environments, which extends way 
beyond the post-1980s context and involves an array of security practices ranging from 
pacific methods of conflict resolution, to arms races, and militarized bargaining30. 
A couple of caveats are necessary before explaining how recent changes affected this 
long/standing characteristic of the SASC. On the one hand, what apparently sets South 
America apart are not the patterns of behaviour observed, but rather the intensity with 
which they are used. The above mentioned practices are common to most regional 
environments, which means that qualifying South America as an “anomaly” only makes 
sense when compared with an external referent for “normalcy” of their expected rate of 
occurrence. Such place is often granted to European or “Western” patterns of behaviour. 
Additionally, the region can only be considered “under-conflictual” if the perspective 
adopted is strictly international. In contrast with the peace seen in inter-state relations, 
domestic conflicts and instability have consistently concern South American states 
                                                        
30 “International politics is largely a bargaining situation: two or more actors, with common and competing 
interests, interact with each other in addressing, directly or tacitly, the terms of their relationship. […] Under 
some circumstances, however, state leaders draw upon their military capabilities to influence the terms of 
their international relationships. […] These uses of a state’s military capabilities represent militarized 
bargaining.” (Mares 2001, 7–8). 
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(Buchanan 1996; Buzan and Waever 2003; Jones 2008; Kacowicz 1998, 78–81), showing 
levels of internal violence unparalleled in the world (Rojas Aravena 2010, 13–14). This 
contextualizes regional patterns of interaction and breaks with the myth that the absence 
of inter-state confrontations can be equated with generalized peace. 
 
Table 2. South American wars 
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Source: The Correlates of War (CoW) Project32  
Three further conclusions can be drawn from the data shown in Table 2: 1. Even when 
international conflicts broke in the region, no rival dyads were ever repeated, insinuating 
that only circumstantial disputes were the causes of the wars and no Hobbesian culture 
developed; 2. Except for the two major conflicts in the region´s history, the Triple Alliance 
                                                        
31 Though the CoW Project lists this military confrontation as an inter-state war, and the Brazilian official 
narrative describes it as such as well, this classification is contentious. Argentina sees this as part of a 
domestic conflict between the provinces and the central government, in which the Brazilian military 
intervened by request the former to overthrow the caudillo of Buenos Aires  (Hurrell 1998, 230). 




and the Chaco wars, no other intra-regional war is comparable in number of military 
casualties to those seen during the same period in other regions (particularly so in 
Europe33); and, 3. There have been no intra-regional wars since 1930s34. 
Buzan and Waever identify a number of long-standing features responsible for this: 
domestic concerns (mostly social, economic, and political instability); geographical 
barriers; rivalries, leading powers like Argentina and Brazil to turn the back on each 
other; unilateral handling of transnational conflicts; and, US interventionism and 
penetration, acting as an offshore balancer and arbitrating regional relations. 
The democratization and desecuritization processes that started in the 1980s affected 
particularly the impact of geographical barriers and regional rivalries, which in turn 
opened the door for transnational issues to be handled cooperatively. The case of 
Argentine-Brazilian bilateral relation is a good example of how these have become less 
relevant as constraints to interaction over the last decades. These countries incentivized 
wide-reaching rapprochement policies, mitigating the insulating effects of geographical 
barriers35, creating incentives for further cooperation, and deactivating the mutual 
                                                        
33 The Correlates of War (CoW) Project, lists 16 intra-regional wars took place during the “long European 
peace” of the 19th century, leaving 1,100,000 military casualties. South America registered “only” 5 intra-
regional wars between 1851 and 1932, with 418,961 casualties in total. 
34 There have been a number of conflicts between Peru and Ecuador over their Amazonian border, the last 
of which took place in 1995. However, these have been low-scale, low-intensity confrontations, keeping 
them outside CoW´s criteria. Yet, were they to be included in the record, the overall image of South America 
as a relatively peaceful region would not be affected. The Malvinas/Falklands war of 1982, on the other 
hand, has been excluded due to the fact that it cannot be considered intra-regional, and thus the security 
practices and the identity of the South American Security Complex were of little relevance in it. 
35 The border between the two countries is over 1200 km long, and for the vast majority of its extension 
follows the path of the River Uruguay. On the Argentine side, the area is separated from the rest of the 
national territory by one of the biggest rivers in South America, the Paraná. In order to impose higher costs 
to the logistical chain of a hypothetical Brazilian invasion, Argentina historically kept these provinces 
largely disconnected from the rest of its territory. Transit from the border area towards Buenos Aires 
remained tortuous until the 1990s. Brazil, on the other hand, stationed its Armed Forces close to the border. 
However, these policies have been reversed since the 1980s, involving the construction the necessary 
infrastructure to support tighter trade relations and the development of a strong agenda of bilateral 
cooperation. Brazilian troops were moved away from the border and focused on the defence of Amazon 
regions, four international bridges over the Uruguay River were inaugurated in the period 1985-1997 
(when only one had existed between 1940s-1980s), and the border provinces of Argentina received the 
necessary infrastructure to connect them to the rest of the country´s territory. 
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rivalry. Similarly, between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, Argentina and Chile solved 
most of their remaining border disputes by peaceful means (chiefly via arbitration), 
increased the number of international crossing points, started a de-mining program in the 
southern Andes that continues until today, and instated a series of confidence building 
measures that radically changed their mutual perceptions. 
Regional rivalries that structured a large part of the security practices in the region 
(Argentina-Brazil, Argentina-Chile, Chile-Peru, Peru-Ecuador) have been in constant 
decay for well over 30 years. Only the Colombian-Venezuelan and the Chilean-Bolivian 
borders remain somehow “hot”, if only intermittently and with little to no expectation that 
a war could actually break between these countries. As a result, not only has sustained 
cooperation become a concrete possibility, but it has actually become a full-fledged reality 
incarnated in organizations, regimes, norms and institutions that dominate the regional 
landscape. Relevant efforts have also been made to build the infrastructure required to 
solve the relative isolation created by geographical barriers, either through bilateral 
efforts or in regional-level initiatives such as the IIRSA (Initiative for the Integration of 
the Regional Infrastructure of South America) and projects funded by the IADB (Inter-
American Development Bank). 
In other words, at least two of the five long-lasting features listed by Buzan and Waever 
to explain the “South American anomaly” have either disappeared or weakened to such 
extent that they no longer affect regional security practices in any meaningful way. Yet, 
rather than weakening the regional inter-state peace, the disappearance of these 
conditions has led to the development of a proto-Security Community (Hurrell 1998). 
The last regional feature that developed in since the 1980s is the spread of drug-related 
transnational crime. The spill-over of transnational conflicts resulting from organized 
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crime activities related to drug traffic followed a southward direction, spreading from the 
Andean North to the Southern Cone. One of the key problems that this has raised is that 
most South American states have proved unable to deal with an “enemy” that is 
transnational, highly mobile, and difficult to detect. 
Though this has generated only limited inter-state tensions so far, organized crime has 
nonetheless altered regional patterns of interaction. The realization that the issue needs 
to be tackled regionally rather than unilaterally has surfaced among countries who openly 
reject the agenda and methods of the Washington-backed “war on drugs”, cooperating to 
create a different model to counter drug production and traffic (Carlsen 2013). However, 
no agreement is even close to being reached in this respect, primarily due to extremely 
different perceptions of the problem across the region. A sectorial council was created in 
2009 within the UNASUR framework to discuss the issue, seeking to share experiences 
and bring closer the existing doctrines to fight the problem. However, activities halted 
almost immediately after they begun, either due to the lack of interest by the members or 
because of the sheer differences in the approaches used. 
In one way or another, the post-1980s features described above had been identified by 
Buzan and Waever. However, in analysing the present and future of the SASC, they gave 
more relevance to the stability of the MERCOSUR and the developments in the Colombian 
chapter of the “war on drugs” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 305), assuming that the biggest 
risk was the splitting up of the region into two along those lines. This was not the case. 
MERCOSUR has yet to recover from the stagnation period it fell in after the Brazilian and 
Argentinian crises of the late-90s and early-2000s, from which these countries emerged 
having revisited their previous commitment to free trade regionalism. The organization 
has shown resilience and continues to arbitrate some relevant aspects of the bilateral 
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trade between Argentina and Brazil, even in a situation of seeming paralysis. On the other 
hand, the “war on drugs” has indeed defined an important portion of regional security 
dynamics, but not in the way Buzan and Waever thought. Instead, drug-related 
transnational organized crime spread throughout the region, generating new areas of 
shared security dynamics and increasingly similar interests. This last example is crucial 
to show the analytical leverage provided by RSCT. Even in a context of negative security 
dynamics emerging in the region with no form whatsoever of inter-state cooperation in 
the horizon, RSCT is able to make sense of the issue and incorporate it into the 
characteristics that define the SASC. Other academic literatures devoted to the study of 
sub-global or regional security, particularly those focused on positive interactions 
between states and institutional building processes, would struggle to do so or would 
consider it a factor debilitating the region. 
In addition, one of the key aspects Buzan and Waever failed to notice is the crucial role 
the securitization of democratic stability has played, leading Southern Cone players to 
construct regional-level organizations and mechanisms of peaceful resolution of conflicts 
in order to neutralise as many sources of international tensions as possible. The aim was 
to strip the respective Armed Forces of external excuses to justify attempts to topple 
democratically elected governments, forcing them to redefine their roles as tools of 
democratic governance. 
 
Regional security dynamics 
Buzan and Waever identified four key security dynamics in the SASC (Buzan and 
Waever 2003, 309–10): 
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A) A pattern of checker-board alignments36 defining the region since the early 19th 
century. Though relatively stable, these never became formal military alliances and only 
responded to defensive geopolitical considerations (Buzan and Waever 2003, 309). 
Buzan and Waever seem to have contradicting ideas regarding this dynamic and its 
role within the regional security environment. On the one hand, they argue that it 
continues to form part of the regional complex. On the other hand, they follow Andrew 
Hurrell (1998) in identifying the emergence of an embryonic security community forming 
in the Southern Cone, and even maintain that “The old geopolitical thinking that created 
threatening scenarios among the South American states has been largely abandoned” 
(Buzan and Waever 2003, 338). They propose no solution to this contradiction, but an 
analysis of the regional security environment points towards the conclusion that 
checkerboard alignments no longer are a relevant pattern of interaction. 
Graph 1. Checkerboard alignments in South American relations 
 
Source: (Kacowicz 1998, fig. 3.2, p. 93) 
                                                        
36 Phillip Kelly (1997) uses this term to refer to the balancing strategies present in the region, where 
regional powers balanced their immediate neighbours by aligning with their respective enemies. This 
created patterns of interaction that roughly resembled the image of crossed alliances. 
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Andrea Oelsner (2005a) points out that the steps taken since the 1980s to defuse 
bilateral military tensions and negative perceptions between Argentina and Brazil (the 
key rivalry guiding the logic of checkerboard alignments) have helped desecuritize a large 
portion of intra-regional interactions. This is in line with Buzan and Waever´s argument 
that “this rapprochement is, in RSCT, a structural change in the Southern Cone 
subcomplex” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 323), altering larger patterns of amity and enmity 
in the region. They understand this as the cornerstone in the changes to securitizing 
discourses that eventually allowed the construction of regional organizations and regimes 
during the 1990s, such as MERCOSUR and the ABACC37 (Buzan and Waever 2003, 325–
27). This argument has an important explanatory weight and may provide good grounds 
to understand part of the political rationale behind later processes of regional 
cooperation. Combined with Oelsner´s regional desecuritization argument, the 
generalized disarticulation of long-standing checkerboard alignments in the region 
becomes more evident. No longer do Brazil and Chile threaten Argentina on two flanks, 
and neither does Argentina side with Peru and Bolivia to keep Chile on check. In fact, 
Argentina and Chile nowadays share one of the most extensive confidence building 
programmes in the region, which inspired many of the confidence building initiatives 
advanced by the SADC. 
 
B) The second dynamic is the existence of strong transnational flows (legal and illegal) of 
people, goods, capital, and political ideas. Cultural and historical similarities facilitate the 
                                                        
37 The Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, “the only binational 
safeguards organization in the world and the first binational organization created by Argentina and Brazil. 
[…] its main goal is guaranteeing Argentina, Brazil and the international community that all the nuclear 
materials are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.” (ABACC n.d.). Its inspections of Argentinian and 
Brazilian nuclear sites are accredited by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), thus limiting extra-
regional oversight to a minimum (Tulliu and Schmalberger 2003, 203–4). 
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flow of political ideas (“ideational spillover”), intellectual elites, and labour, while the 
porosity of South American borders continues to make possible the presence of illegal 
flows of goods, money, and people. Not all these illegal transnational flows have been 
securitized, but the capabilities of states to enforce local laws and police borders are 
constantly challenged by private actors nonetheless. As a result, at least some of these 
transnational flows are bound to constitute security concerns. 
During the 1970s and early-1980s, for example, the only transnational flow that was 
widely (and jointly) securitized by the ruling military dictatorships was the presence of 
left-wing activists escaping from persecution in their respective countries and forming 
regional solidarity networks. In an unprecedented example of regional-level cooperation, 
the “Operación Cóndor” was put in place to facilitate the illegal deportation and 
assassination of activists (Cuya 1993; A. Paredes 2004). However, transnational flows 
need not belong the realm of security threats. Human Rights advocacy, transitional justice 
processes, and Truth Commissions that followed the democratization process of the 
1980s were also highly influenced by the emergence of strong regional solidarity 
networks (Ropp and Sikkink 1999, 175–76; Sikkink 1997). 
Arguably, the most salient transnational security concern at the moment of the creation 
of the SADC was organized crime related to drug production and trafficking. Though 
widely securitized, and in some cases even militarized38, South American countries have 
so far dealt with the issue individually. The largest cocaine producers, located in the 
Andes, accepted US-sponsored, highly militarized, and individualized Coca leaf 
eradication programmes at a great domestic cost (Bradley and Millington 2008; Dávalos 
                                                        
38 Largely due to the US-led discourse about the eroding effects of drug traffic on democratic rule. Moreover, 
since the mid-1980s the US considers drug-related transnational flows as a “national security threat” 
(Carpenter 2003, 29), and has poured vast lobby, economic, and military resources in South America to 
sway local elites in addressing the issue according to their preference. 
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et al. 2011; Young 1996), while Southern Cone countries have openly rejected militarizing 
the conflict and largely avoided paying much attention to the problem, at least until 
recently. Nevertheless, what in the 1990s was an almost exclusive concern of the northern 
Andean states, has slowly spread throughout the region (Benítez Manaut, Celi, and 
Diamint 2009). Argentina and Brazil, who traditionally played minor parts in the flow of 
drugs from the Andes to Europe, have now become more relevant in terms of production 
and consumption. Moreover, they have seen either the development of native drug cartels 
or became bases of operation for gangs expanding from Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. 
Buzan and Waever clearly identified the security effects of drug traffic as the defining 
feature of the Andean sub-complex, but their concern was that the differences between 
the Southern Cone and the Andean North could break up the SASC, giving place to two 
clearly differentiated regional complexes. Empirical observations show that the actual 
development of these issues turned out to be quite the opposite, with the negative 
transnational spillovers related to the “war on drugs” now affecting the entire region. 
Together with the active role that Brazil played in regional politics during the Lula years, 
the image of the regional Security Complex is now one of a more cohesive region rather 
than a more fragmented one. 
 
C) The third security dynamic identified by Buzan and Waever is the intervention by 
extra-regional powers. South America is, as other peripheral areas, a penetrated region. 
However, the SASC has not suffered a complete overlay of its security dynamics by foreign 
powers, allowing it to develop autonomous patterns of security interactions that either 
regional or extra-regional powers could exploit (Russell and Calle 2010; Tickner 2007).  
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Empirical records show that various factors determine whether the activities of extra-
regional powers in South America are perceived as existential threats or not. In the 
instances in which this was the case, the key reasons for this framing of penetration are 
chiefly related to it being perceived as having limiting effects on autonomy levels, 
sovereignty, or stability. The cases of Venezuela and Brazil are good examples of this. 
Brazil has consistently voiced its concern over the potential interest of the US in the 
Amazon rainforest and basin in order to control its natural resources (Dabène 2013; 
Rivarola Puntigliano 2011). As a result, and thanks to the thorough desecuritization of the 
relationship with Argentina, military personnel and equipment historically deployed to 
the Southern border has been moved to different areas of the Brazilian Amazon, rising the 
number of ground troops in the area to an all-time high, and there are even reports of 
guerrilla warfare training being provided by the Army to native tribes in the Amazon 
(Phillips 2006). Venezuela, on the other hand, has maintained a strong anti-
imperialist/anti-American rhetoric for over a decade, aimed primarily against the 
presence of the US in the region (Rivas 2006). The Venezuelan government claims to have 
identified US support to attempted coups and destabilization strategies against President 
Chávez. Moreover, a defensive military exercise that mobilized 80.000 troops and 
equipment was conducted in response to President Obama labelling Venezuela as a 
“National Security Threat”. 
US activities in the region have also been perceived as threatening by a wider group 
states. Despite not having necessarily securitized the US, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina 
have used strong anti-American rhetoric in the past. In 2009, Ecuador decided not to 
renew the lease the US had on the Manta military air base (Donadio and Tibiletti 2010, 
76). Bolivia´s President, Evo Morales, accused USAID of supporting dissidents, conducting 
illegal intelligence activities, and conspiring against the national government, which led 
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to the agency being expelled from the country (BBC 2013); Argentina reacted to US 
activities in the region with equally strong declarations, and was one of the main 
advocates for the 2009 UNASUR/SADC emergency meeting where President Uribe came 
under fire in relation to the Colombia-US military agreement. 
That being said, there are a number of countries that have welcomed the US, 
understanding its presence in terms of “cooperation” rather than “intervention”. These 
countries include Chile, Colombia, and Peru (with Paraguay adopting a middle ground). 
Far from securitizing the presence of extra-regional powers in the region, these countries 
may very well be identified as a sub-regional grouping sharing a positive perception of 
the US. Interestingly, there seems to be a strong correlation between this stance regarding 
the activities of extra-regional powers in the region and an overall weaker commitment 
towards “post-hegemonic” regionalism. 
 
D) The forth dynamic described by Buzan and Waever is related to cultural factors, 
particularly a Brazilian “fear of encirclement” by Spanish-speaking countries (McCann 
1983). In the same way that checkerboard alignments no longer inform regional 
interactions, currently there are no signs of polarisation along this line. On the contrary, 
in the last decades Brazil has managed to position itself as the “essential player” in the 
region, establishing an active diplomacy and ever-tighter relations with its neighbours. 
That being said, it is relevant to highlight possible areas in which cultural frameworks 
can still inform intra- and inter-regional relations. The divide between the traditions of 
Latin-Americanism (“Bolivarianism”, for some) and Pan-Americanism may very well be 
one such area. Indeed, Arie Kacowicz (2005b, 52) and Federico Merke (2011) point out 
that cultural, ideational, and identity factors uphold these two traditions. They associate 
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Pan-Americanism with the idea of cooperation and the creation of solidarist norms 
between liberal republics, while describing Latin-Americanism as structured around the 
idea of nationalist identities aligned along cultural lines and pluralist norms.  
However, there are some elements that render these definitions unconvincing. On the 
one hand, Latin American states have repeatedly resisted the Pan-American tradition on 
the grounds that it was perceived as an extension of US hegemonic attempts to control the 
region, not because they were opposed to the idea of hemispheric cooperation, political 
liberalism, and solidarity per se. Moreover, it could be argued that the power harnessed 
by Washington turns hemispheric relations eminently asymmetrical, alienating many 
Latin American states and hindering the ability of Pan-American efforts to produce truly 
solidarist relations. Also, such characterization hides the fact that Pan-American 
initiatives have been fostered throughout the independent history of the continent, 
regardless of how liberal or illiberal the domestic politics of Latin American countries 
were at any given moment. Incorporating the element of “liberal republicanism” into the 
alleged corpus of the Pan-American tradition is a modern development, and one that is 
also shared by current Latin-Americanist positions39. 
On the other hand, the Latin-American tradition usually bred from the idea that 
cooperative relations among culturally and economically similar units could underpin 
their quest for development and autonomy in the international sphere, two of the key 
goals shared by the membership of the South American regional society. As a result, 
despite this tradition having historically led to pluralist relations and norms, the shared 
                                                        
39 Most South American cooperation organizations currently include a “democratic clause”: e.g. 




traits of the actors involved could eventually allow for the development of more solidarist 
relations among Latin American countries (if slow, incremental, and consensual). 
 
In sum, the main regional security dynamics that can currently be observed in the 
South American security complex include: 1. Strong transnational flows of people, goods, 
and ideas (both legal and ilegal), amongst which drug traffic might be the most relevant 
at the moment the SADC was created; 2. Partial securitization of the activities in South 
America of extra-regional actors; and, 3. A pendulum between Pan-Americanist and Latin-
Americanist traditions. As discussed above, neither the checkerboard alliances system, 
nor the Brazilian fear of encirclement, are currently relevant to understand regional 
security dynamics in South America. 
The implications of these dynamics to the regional security environment and how it 
influences the agency of individual actors are vast. Firstly, and underpinning the idea that 
despite advances made in the last decades a consolidated Security Community is still far 
from being attainable in the region, the transnational flows mentioned have tended to be 
read negatively by political elites. This is so not only in the case of drug traffic and guerrilla 
groups (in the Colombian case), which has seen different governments accusing each 
other of either not policing appropriately the mutual borders or even harbouring these 
“groups outside the law” (to use SADC´s terminology). “Ideological flows” have also been 
perceived as detrimental and even securitized to a certain extent, with Colombia and 
other countries consistently denouncing the “Chavization” of South American politics and 
the negative domestic influence the propagation of these ideas has had. Yet, the opposite 
perception regarding the flow of ideas across borders also exists, with governments and 
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civil society groups highlighting the regional character of many debates due to the cultural 
and material similarities that exist, and benefiting or even incentivizing such exchanges. 
In short, the impact of transnational flows on the behaviour of states is certainly 
dependent and mediated by domestic cultural constructions that inform how they are 
perceived and narrows down the possible forms of legitimized reaction. Given this 
situation, and considering the deeply-rooted concern over maintaining sovereignty and 
autonomy from foreign influence, cooperation and policy coordination to tackle these 
issues has remained relatively limited and mostly circumscribed to the bilateral level. In 
fact, these have been the slowest moving agendas in the UNASUR framework since its 
inception. More detailed analysis about specific instances in which transnational flows 
were relevant to the international behaviour of agents will be discussed in the case 
studies, but it was nonetheless necessary addressing the issue in more general terms at 
this stage in order to properly understand the structural nature they have over regional 
politics. 
The second dynamic listed can be read in at least two ways, both complementary to 
each other. One the one hand, it could be understood in terms of the rift that exists in the 
region between those countries that have welcomed and even incentivized the presence 
of extra-regional powers (Colombia, Peru, Chile), and those that have securitized it as a 
potential threat (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil). There are obviously 
degrees in both camps, which should actually be read as extremes in a spectrum; but they 
nevertheless are good describers of a key fault line that separates the position of South 
American countries with regards to a central aspect of the regional security environment. 
On the other hand, looking at the more structural level rather than to how the individual 
states are grouped in the spectrum, the element of “partial securitization” is relevant to 
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understand why the region is penetrated and not overlaid. Foreign powers (primarily the 
US) have traditionally exploited this rift, influencing regional security dynamics by getting 
through the cracks created by the different perceptions that coexist in the region on this 
issue. This means that, even in periods of extensive cooperation and in the heyday of post-
hegemonic cooperation, extra-regional penetration never ceased to be a concern for some 
and an opportunity for others. As with the previous dynamic, how this was translated into 
action by the different agents will be discussed at more length in the empirical chapters. 
Finally, the pendulum between Pan-Americanism and Latin-Americanism has 
consistently been exploited politically by regional powers. In general, these two options 
have been favoured by states not for their intrinsic value, since all could find arguments 
and deep-rooted ideational features to justify their preference for either of the two, but 
rather for political reasons related to their international insertion and balancing 
strategies at different moments. The Argentine case is revealing of this, showing different 
factions defending one or the other right before the country decided to join the SADC 
negotiations. Actually, something similar can be said about the previous two dynamics as 
well, since the local perception of them and their consequent impact on state behaviour 
depend not on “national cultures”, but on contested cultural constructions that alternate 
in their dominant influence over state agency. 
As mentioned before, the detailed description and analysis of these three dynamics at 
this stage is important in order to understand their structural power, thus challenging the 
notion that they exist exclusively as subjective perceptions by individual agents. They 
have crucial effects over regional politics by creating opportunities, constraints, and 
incentives for behaviour. However, as already mentioned, it is only by looking at how they 
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are interpreted by local defence elites that participate in the dominant Strategic Cultures 
that the actual impact they have on the behaviour of agents can be properly understood. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has engaged with two different theoretical approaches to characterize 
South America, the ES and RSCT. The goal of doing so is related with providing different 
theoretically-informed perspectives on the factors at play in the regional security 
environment. Yet, the two provide approaches to the issue that are arguably compatible 
with each other, and with the overall constructivist framework of this research. The result 
of combining both perspectives in the study of the South American security region brings 
forward both the actual patterns of interaction that currently characterize the region, and 
the historical process through which such interactions emerged and developed over time. 
This combination provides a strong analytical leverage to study regional dynamics, 
accounting for how institutionalized practices become stable elements in the regional 
environment and affect the conformation of new patterns of interaction. 
Despite efforts to create a regional “security identity” through the UNASUR/SADC 
framework and the presence of a “unifying discourse” around gaining autonomy from the 
US, diverging material and ideological interests among key players have hindered further 
cooperation (Flemes, Nolte, and Wehner 2011, 107–8). In this same vein, Gabriel Orozco 
Restrepo (2016) highlights that a “South American identity” cannot be exclusively 
understood in terms of a clearly defined set of shared goals or values, but should also take 
into consideration the existing patterns of amity and rivalry that have shaped regional 
relations since independence from colonial rule. Yet, as discussed in this chapter, the 
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relevance of dynamics like the pattern of checkerboard alliances, regional rivalries, and 
militarized bargaining have been in decline and no longer help understand the SASC. 
Due to their sub-global nature, regions are intrinsically porous (Katzenstein 2005) or 
open systems (Buzan and Waever 2003; Prys 2010). As a result, even in a clearly unipolar 
region as South America is (Schenoni 2014), the effects of power distribution at the 
regional level are far more complex than systemic theories would expect. For example, 
Colombia has been able to incentivize offshore balancing from extra-regional powers as a 
way to fulfil its interests (Hirst 2005; Kelly 1990; Sheinin 2006; Tickner 2007), thus 
reducing the relative weight of regional powers. 
Still, penetration by extra-regional powers during the 2000s seemed less relevant than 
in previous decades. The end of “Plan Colombia”, the Brazilian ascent, and the 
securitization of US activities in region might help explain increasing rhetorical hostility. 
Similarly, there are global factors that could explain the seeming US “retreat” from the 
region, such as the enormous amounts of resources devoted to the “war on terror”, the 
prolongation of the conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East, the international 
financial crisis of 2008, and increasing contestation and great-power politics involving the 
rise of players like Russia and China. However, the decisive influence that the US can still 
exercise in South America and the recent organizational boost to the SOUTHCOM 
demonstrate that the region remains to be a penetrated one (Battaglino 2009a). A good 
example of this is that US pressure to militarize anti-drug policy continues to influence 
various South American countries, and has done so ever since President Ronald Reagan 




South America has been defined as a penetrated, unipolar, standard RSC with some 
shared security concerns. It was also discussed that sub-regional divisions of the past 
have weakened, but that an incipient axis between Chile-Colombia-Peru may be gathering 
strength while Brazil consolidates its place as regional primus inter pares. Cultural 
differences between Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries are no longer source of 
concerns, to a large extent thanks to the confidence building measures that emerged out 
of the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil. Divisions along the lines of Pan-
Americanist and Latin-Americanist traditions re-surfaced with the FTAA fiasco, with the 
latter becoming the preferred alternative by key South American states. However, since 
Central American and Caribbean states, together with Mexico, largely favoured their close 
ties with the US instead of supporting a Latin American alternative, in practical terms the 
division turned out to be one between a South-Americanist position and the Pan-
Americanist tradition40. Also, the geographical isolation that had characterized the region 
begun to be reduced since the 1980s via new infrastructure projects that underpinned 
successful integration processes. As a result, at the time when the SADC was created, the 
South American Security Complex showed a tendency towards increasingly intense 
interactions, constituting a fully structured complex whose members continued to be 
marked by domestic instability and social unrest. 
Finally, the positive peace that Buzan and Waever identified in the Southern Cone as 
by-product of interactions within MERCOSUR has slowly become more widely 
regionalized thanks to initiatives such as the UNASUR and the SADC. That being said, the 
SASC remains to be an ascendant Security Community, at best, with little chances of 
                                                        
40 The fact that Argentina actively joined the South American group instead of supporting Pan-Americanism, 
as its long-standing foreign policy tradition would have dictated  (Sheinin 2006), is telling of the extent to 
which South American cooperation in the last decades has altered former patterns of behaviour. 
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becoming a mature (let alone a tightly coupled) one. This apparent paradox might be 
better understood with the ES insight that nationalism, sovereignty, non-intervention, 
and autonomy remain to be crucial institutions of the South American regional society. 
The above discussion by no means settles the debate about what constitute the basic 
characteristics of the South American security environment. Yet, the goal of this chapter 
was not to do so. Instead, it aims to provide a theoretically-informed understandings of 
different incentives and constraints to behaviour present at the (sub)systemic level. This 
was done by covering aspects related to the institutions and values that set South America 
aside from the rest of the International Society, on the one hand, and the practices and 
dynamics that distinguish the SASC from other regional security formations, on the other. 
In doing so, this chapter engages with the arguments advanced by authors that have 
sought to explain the creation of the SADC from the perspective of regional-level 
processes. More importantly, this understanding allows to engage now with the elements 
of agency in the three case studies in a more contextualized way, acknowledging the 







Chapter 4. Conceptual framework 










This chapter aims to build a concise and useful framework to analyse the three case 
studies, establishing conceptual foundations able to engage with the agency of 
international actors resulting from the interplay between domestic cultures and 
international social arrangements. It will be put forward here that embedding such 
concepts in the Constructivist analytical framework is the best option to answer the 
questions this Thesis set out to answer. 
Ever since the constructivist turn in International Relations, scholars have 
problematized how mainstream theories understand the processes underlying interest 
formation (Checkel 1998, 324). Neorealism and neoliberalism have traditionally 
understood interests as intrinsic, often using game-theoretical, rational choice 
approaches derived from the field of Economy to define them as the result of gain-
maximizing “rationality” in an exogenously given environment over which agents have no 
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influence (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 40–43; Jervis 1988; Kratochwil and 
Ruggie 1986, 762–63; Nye 1987; Onuf 1989, 237–47; Wendt 1992, 392–93). In opposition 
to this, Constructivist authors understand interests as historically-contingent, path 
dependent, and socially constructed, resulting from processes of interaction between 
agents embedded in socio-cultural environments both at the domestic and international 
levels (Klotz 1995, 17–19; Weldes 1996, 279–84). Therefore, a constructivist approach to 
interests, motivations, and agency tackles questions like: How does the relation between 
agents and structure affect the formation of identities and interests? What is the relation 
between these constructions and the behaviour of agents? How do interests and identities 
change over time? And, Is there a differential role for domestic and international forces in 
the process of interest formation? 
This chapter will engage with constructivist approaches to IR, and more specifically 
with the branch that Ted Hopf has labelled social constructivism41, “which relies on 
domestic socio-cognitive roots to state identity” (2002, 278), to understand the behaviour 
of international agents. In doing so, it sheds light on the processes by which domestic 
culture and norms influence interest formation, and how that can inform the behaviour 
of agents and affect international social arrangements. In this way, the conceptual 
framework discussed in this chapter aims to establish the analytical independence of the 
agency of international actors42. 
                                                        
41 Hopf distinguishes this strand of constructivism from normative constructivism (socialization processes 
involved in individuals´ adherence to norms) and systemic constructivism (construction and effects of 
collective identities at the interstate level), suggesting that the three are not mutually exclusive and can be 
combined in more comprehensive constructivist accounts (Hopf 2002). 
42 Margaret Archer (1996) argues that structuration theory central to IR constructivism forces the Cultural 
System level and the Social Practice level to “lose [independent] status when inserted into the matrix and 
'cross-referenced' with the totality of elements.”. She calls this a “central conflation” of the two levels of 
analysis. Archer identifies two other directional types of conflation, “downwards conflation” (top-down 
approaches) and “upwards conflation” (bottom-up approaches) (Archer 1995). The main consequence of 
conflation is that two supposedly independent levels of analysis become either fully dependent one on the 
other or analytically undistinguishable due to theories being unable to properly incorporate temporality. In 
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To scrutinize the construction of identity, interests, and agendas focusing on the 
influence of domestic factors rather than systemic social forces, this chapter develops a 
detailed understanding of a well-established body of literature centred on the concept of 
“Strategic Culture”. As will be explained, a general consensus among authors about the 
exact definition of this concept is lacking and the concept remains contested (Longhurst 
2004, 22). However, I will argue that authors that understand Strategic Culture as the 
social context informing the relation states create with the use of force (Gray 1999; 
Longhurst 2004; Meyer 2006; Poore 2003) provide the best approach to the issue. 
I differ from this position in one crucial point, though: I will put forward that the 
concept needs not be limited exclusively to a society’s relation with “the use of force”. It 
could, instead, encompass a broader set of aspects related to how defence elites perceive 
the position of the country in its international security environment and what they 
understand as legitimate tools and actions to defend the country. Working with a 
conceptual framework that understands Strategic Culture in this way facilitates studying 
the cultural factors informing decision-making processes and strategic behaviour with 
regards to the use of the entire defence apparatus, which I argue are key to understand 
the characteristics given to the SADC.  
A framework focused on the influence of culture on these issues seemingly implies a 
trade-off: it offers nuance and richness of understanding at the expense of “scientific” 
rigour, understood in a positivist sense (Longhurst 2000, 17). However, as discussed 
before (see pages 12-16), the social scientific worth of a constructivist account of 
                                                        
the case of structuration theory, this precludes the proper identification and analysis of the two-way 
interplay (co-constitution) despite it being the mantra of IR constructivism. 
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international politics should be evaluated on the grounds of its own epistemology, rather 
than on allegedly “objective” principles for scientific inquiry. 
 
The first section of this chapter will briefly discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the 
main contenders to engage with the domestic roots of a state´s international behaviour, 
namely Neoclassical Realism, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Constructivism, arguing that 
the latter provides the best option. The second section engages specifically with the 
question of agency and how Strategic Culture fits in the constructivist agency-structure 
debate. The third section discusses in detail the concept of Strategic Culture, its various 
definitions and interpretations, and ways in which it has been operationalized. The key 
goal of this section is to produce a substantiated account of how cognitive and 
institutional social constructions (culture and norms43) can shape the foreign and defence 
policies of states. The last section of this chapter will delve on the way culture relates to 
norms, how the latter can be identified, and how they relate to behaviour and decision-
making processes. The expectation is that these debates will end in a solid conceptual 
framework to coherently understand the domestic roots of the Argentine, Chilean and 
Colombian negotiating agendas, as well as enable the analysis of how their agency affected 
the regional security environment. 
 
                                                        
43 Though not strictly accurate, the terms Strategic Culture and Strategic Norms are used interchangeably 
in some instances of this research. Culture (webs of meanings) is a wider construct that limits the universe 
of possible norms (standards of appropriateness) and informs their content. However, appreciating the 
content and characteristics of a Strategic Culture requires engaging with it indirectly, analysing its more 
visible expressions to try and infer from them how the culture in which they are embedded looks like. This 
will always be problematic, but it is also unavoidable, given the impossibility to engage with an abstraction 
like culture in a direct and unmediated way. 
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Main theoretical approaches to the study of agency 
 
The definition of how “agency” affects international politics is highly dependent on the 
theoretical approach chosen. Martin Hollis and Steven Smith posit in their well-known 
Explaining and understanding International Relations (1991, 8–9) that three distinct 
agent-structure debates can be identified in IR theory,  each engaging with different levels 
of analysis (systemic, unit level, and individuals). Arguably, a complete picture of any 
event under scrutiny would necessarily combine these debates and levels of analysis. 
However, more often than not authors focus on just one of them, either for purposes of 
clarity in the argumentation or due to space constrains (or, most likely, both). It is 
necessary, then, to start the discussion about the available approaches to study agency by 
weighing the strengths and weaknesses each level of analysis entails. This will be done by 
carefully discussing theories that emphasize the systemic and state levels, and later 
considering the benefits of a theoretical perspective able to mitigate this strong 
separation by establishing a way to understand inter-level dynamics. 
Approaches based on the analysis of how the individual and interpersonal level affect 
international politics have a long tradition, and have recently made a comeback with the 
overlap between international studies and disciplines like psychology or neuroscience 
(Hymans 2006, 2012; R. McDermott 2004; Rathbun 2009, 2011; Wheeler 2018). This 
perspective has proven its worth, particularly so when analysing the roles leaders and 
their mutual relations have played in the development of critical junctures. Using such 
approach would certainly identify crucial individual and interpersonal traits in South 
American leaders during the 2000s, which surely facilitated the construction of the joint 
regional project embodied by UNASUR. However, this level of analysis will not be 
considered at length here, primarily because the focus of the present research is not on 
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the actions/perceptions of few individuals steering the agency of the state apparatus. 
Rather, it seeks to shed light on how path dependent cultural (and, hence, collective) 
constructions at the domestic level influence the perception of international 
developments, shape the menu of legitimized responses, and inform the behaviour of 
international actors. 
Three relevant approaches could in principle fulfil the above task, albeit emphasizing 
the relevance of different levels of analysis and thus resulting in quite different 
arguments: Neoclassical Realism; Foreign Policy Analysis; and, Constructivism. 
 
Neoclassical realism (NCR) 
NCR developed a distinct research agenda and became a recognised branch of the 
realist tradition during the 1990s. Its proponents sought to combine the strengths of 
Neorealism and Classical Realism, aiming for a more encompassing and thorough realist 
explanation of the connection between systemic conditions and the actions of the units. 
They are “Neo” in that they follow Kenneth Waltz´s (1979) argument that the systemic 
level takes primacy to explain international politics , arguing that “the scope and ambition 
of a country's foreign policy is driven first and fore most by its place in the international 
system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities.” (Rose 1998, 146). Yet, 
they are also “classical”, since they seek to enrich this structural perspective with the 
insights developed by Classical Realists like Hans Morgenthau (1948) regarding the 
relevance of domestic factors to determine the specifics of a states´ foreign and defence 
policies. They posit that the main causal relation that explains international politics in the 
long term remains to be the distribution of power capabilities among the actors in the 
system, which establishes material limits to the international behaviour of 
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undifferentiated units (states). However, they challenge the notion of assuming the state 
as a “black box” with exogenously given interests, complementing the structural approach 
of Neorealism with the insight that translating power distribution into actual foreign 
policy entails an intricate and often imperfect process. This means that domestic factors 
(perceptions of power distribution; societal and political constraints to resource 
allocation; dominant ideologies; elite cohesion; development level; political, social, 
economic, and institutional stability; etc.) need to be incorporated into the analysis to 
more systematically explain this relation when states fail to behave as perfectly rational, 
coherent actors (Lobell 2009, 43–44; Rose 1998, 146–47; Schweller 2004, 161).  
According to Brian Rathburn (2008, 296), “Neoclassical realism in particular can be 
defended as having a coherent logic that incorporates ideas and domestic politics in the 
way we would expect structural realism to do so.”. His argument is that NCR is a “natural 
outgrowth” of Waltz´s theory, filling relevant gaps left by neorealism in two aspects: 
improving its understanding of how states manage to mobilize resources; and, providing 
better explanations for those cases in which states do not behave according to the 
constrains imposed by the international distribution of material capabilities. Power 
politics remains at the centre of NCR´s analysis, but is now informed by a more nuanced 
understanding of domestic conditions that may affect the rationality they “impose”. Tom 
Dyson (2010, 124) explains quite succinctly how this tension has been resolved by some 
NCR authors, stating that factors like “nationalism, ideology and organisational culture 
[are relegated] to the second tier of intervening variables”, understood as resources 
policy-makers can exploit (albeit not without difficulties). 
Such parsimonious complementarity is, however, challenged even by other proponents 
of NCR. Benjamin Fordham (2009, 251–52), for example, argues that one of the main 
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problems with this model is that it simply adds an extra layer of analysis seeking to 
explain cases that do not follow Neorealism´s expected outcomes, but fails to properly 
understand and weigh the role of domestic preferences. In its place, he proposes “an 
interactive model that considers how the interaction between domestic interests and the 
international political environment determines foreign security policy choices” (Fordham 
2009, 251). He argues that the interactions between the international context and 
domestic actors should be taken into consideration, analysing how foreign and defence 
policies result from policy-makers bargaining their preferences regarding how to best 
respond to external forces. 
The question remains, however, as to the relevance of Fordham´s model of limited, one-
directional interaction between the international and the domestic. Arguably, its key 
worth is the attempt to rescue NCR from irrelevance, had it maintained interests as 
exogenously given. But, it remains the case that Fordham falls victim of the same two 
errors that characterise the realist tradition across the board: a. remaining oblivious to 
the contributions made by disciplines like (but not limited to) anthropology, sociology 
and political science regarding the cultural, historical and normative roots of domestic 
actors´ world views; and, b. failing to realize that the distinction between international 
and domestic realms is but an analytical one, not an actual separation between 
independent fields. Point a. is of particular relevance for this Thesis, since the theory´s 
inability to engage with the normative priors and historical developments influencing 
state behaviour puts NCR at odds with the concept of Strategic Culture. 
The alternative to this additive model, which claims an unproblematic 
complementarity between neorealism and NCR, would entail openly challenging the 
former. Adam Quinn clearly explains the issue with such response: 
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“Under this view, neoclassical realists could argue that these divergences between 
systemic imperatives and state behaviour are not merely anomalous occurrences, but 
rather are regular, consistent and lasting patterns of state behaviour that we cannot 
expect to see socialised or selected out of existence even over the long term. […] This 
latter approach…would put NCR starkly at odds with the limits Waltz sought to place 
on what a theory of international politics can or should contain.” (Quinn 2013, 160) 
 
As Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik have argued (1999, 7–8), this understanding 
of NCR would take realism away from all its core assumptions, depleting it from any 
“theoretical distinctiveness” as a result. Shiping Tang (2009, 799–802) further identifies 
a number of omissions and problems with this NCR approach. Firstly, he points out that 
NCR maintains realism´s bias against considering cooperation as a rational outcome in 
international politics, thus creating an unsurmountable blind spot for the theory. 
Secondly, the incorporation of domestic politics into the realist framework is fragmented 
and superficial, missing any coherent understanding of the actual processes involved in 
policy making and implementation. Finally, he maintains that the assumption that states´ 
interests are only defined in terms of power politics depletes all explanatory power from 
the theory, rendering it utterly useless to understand actual state behaviour. 
 
Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
FPA refers to a set of theoretical approaches to decision-making in the field of foreign 
policy, which can include areas such as diplomacy, defence, intelligence, trade, and 
cultural exchanges to name but a few (Alden and Aran 2017, 3). Whether or not these 
approaches offer a coherent set of concepts, assumptions, and expectations is a matter of 
debate, but they do share the goal of presenting an alternative to mainstream IR theories 
excessively focused on the role of systemic forces to discuss international politics. 
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In order to fulfil this goal, authors within FPA seek to connect political processes at the 
state level with its international behaviour, thus opening the “black box” and analysing 
the endogenous sources of interests, decisions, institutions, policy-making, and actions. 
This clearly challenges the assumption of mainstream IR theories, most notably 
Neorealism, regarding the primacy of the systemic level in explaining the international 
behaviour of “most states, most of the time”. In Chris Alden and Amnon Arat´s terms, 
“At the heart of the field is an investigation into decision making, the individual 
decision makers, processes and conditions that affect foreign policy and the outcomes 
of these decisions.” (Alden and Aran 2017, 3) 
 
They also add that FPA has sought to systematize the understanding of state behaviour 
inductively, building “generalizable theories and concepts” to identify the roots of states´ 
international behaviour through case studies  (Alden and Aran 2017, 2). This shows a 
stark contrast with Neorealism´s deductive approach, which starts with general 
hypotheses (the international system is anarchic; and, power distribution determines the 
role a state will have in the international system) from which conclusions are then 
“logically” derived and applied to analyse international politics. 
Contrary to what psychological approaches to decision making do, FPA does not focus 
on the personal inclinations of individual political leaders or members of the elite. Instead, 
it focuses on the role state bureaucracies play in shaping what could be called “national 
interests” and the associated public policies put in place to achieve them. This does not 
mean that they leave the influence of politically relevant individuals entirely out of the 
picture, as the above quote shows; but FPA would look primarily at the institutional level 
to understand how the preferences of said individuals play within a given organizational 
setting that imposes goals, resource constrains and standardized procedures, among 
other conditions. In doing this, the FPA approach stresses the role of organizational 
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outputs and politics (preferences, debate, power) in the expressions of state agency 
(Hilsman 1992). Following this understanding means “[…] financial constraints, pressure 
group lobbying, inter-service and departmental rivalries, matters of organisational 
survival or bureaucratic momentum play an influential, even decisive role in the 
formulation and execution of policies.” (Longhurst 2000, 25). 
Valerie Hudson argues that if just one contribution of FPA to IR theory had to be singled 
out as the most relevant, it would be identifying “the point of theoretical intersection 
between […] material and ideational factors.” (Hudson 2014, 8) determining state 
behaviour. Moreover, she further clarifies that said point of intersection resides not in the 
state but in decision-makers, individuals placed in relevant positions in different 
organizational structures (state and non-state) that wield the power to influence the 
state´s foreign policy. This insight brings forward not only the politics of policy making, 
but also opens the door for change in terms of international behaviour, thus enriching the 
field of IR theory as a whole by bringing humans into the mix. This also highlights that 
rather than policy outcomes, FPA scholar have focused on the process of policy making by 
analysing the interactions between the organizational landscape, decisional structures, 
main actors and their motivations, and the broader social/political context that affect the 
formulation of foreign policy (Alden and Aran 2017). In the broader context of IR 
theorizing, this means that FPA authors have primarily discussed state agency and the 
domestic factors that explain it. 
This has crucial consequences for how FPA engages with the study of international 
politics. Firstly, and most importantly, it fails to dispute the stark division between the 
domestic and international levels of analysis present in the field of IR. Secondly, as a direct 
result of the above, FPA scholars have settled for a subsidiary role in IR theory, seeking to 
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shed light on the gaps left by systemic theories like Neorealism rather than challenging 
their assumptions and hypothesis by introducing a bottom-up perspective on the 
international system. Finally, by leaving the international system untouched, FPA authors 
have largely accepted (though most times tacitly) the materialist and rationalist 
foundations advanced by Neorealism (Longhurst 2000, 31–32). As mentioned above, 
Valerie Hudson would likely dispute the last point with her claim about FPA finding the 
point of intersection between the material and the ideational. However, even if this was 
true at the domestic level, authors within this tradition have left the systemic level aside, 
thus failing to contest the mainstream understanding about international politics. 
In the same way that NCR provides an insufficient analytical framework for the analysis 
this Thesis expects to put forward due to the primacy it gives to structural phenomena 
over domestic conditions, FPA does not seem like a good fit due to its exclusive interest in 
domestic policy making and disregard for the international. Let´s look now at 
Constructivism´s perspective to see how it manages to combine the two levels of analysis 
in a single theoretical framework. 
 
Constructivism 
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the key contributions Constructivism has 
made to the field of IR theory is providing an analytical framework able to analyse the 
effects of both domestic and systemic factors on international politics, breaking with the 
stark (and artificial) division between the two that mainstream IR theories had imposed 
before. Focusing on the socialization and social learning processes by which interactions 
among agents construct social arrangements (norms, institutions, roles, order), which in 
turn constitute the agents themselves, this theory also breaks with the dominant 
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materialist understanding of international politics introducing an analysis of socially 
constructed intersubjective agreements. 
The above means that Constructivism´s epistemological framework allows studying 
the systemic and state levels as having constant effects on each other, without giving a 
priori primacy to any of the two. Moreover, these mutual effects are in no way related to 
the distribution of material capabilities in the international system, but rather the 
contrary. In other words, the materially-motivated forms of behaviour described by 
Realism are indeed possible under this understanding of international politics. However, 
they only dominate the rationale of the international system in instances where the key 
social arrangements are constructed around concerns over power distribution, 
expectations of power/security maximizing behaviour, and perceptions of enmity/rivalry 
as key shared understandings (Wendt 1999, 20, 249). Constructivism argues that, despite 
the relatively common occurrence of such arrangement, it is by no means natural nor 
unchangeable. Alternative forms of social order are not only possible, but have already 
emerged in different settings over the centuries and involving a large variety of agents. 
This exemplifies one of the key strengths of the Constructivist framework, providing 
flexibility and nuance to account for the specificities of different “cultures of anarchy” 
(Wendt 1999, 254–59), allowing it to understand the international system theorized by 
Realism as one among many possible social arrangements. This incorporates other 
possibilities into the mix without erroneously labelling them “anomalies”, which closes 
the debate and prevents the theory from properly understanding international politics. 
As will be discussed in further detail in the coming section, most Constructivist authors 
have tended to focus on either agents or on the social structure, often studying one-
directional relations instead of the circular co-constitution Constructivism theorizes. 
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They still acknowledge that the relation is mutual and constant, but either their specific 
research questions or the need for clarity lead them to focus exclusively on just one of its 
legs. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that even in those cases, a Constructivist 
epistemology establishes that any division between the two levels is nothing but an 
analytical distinction to make sense of the social world that it should not be reified as an 
actual description of reality. 
As stated above, Constructivism looks at the processes by which agents constitute 
social arrangements (structure), and vice versa. This entails looking into the roles of 
shared values, understandings, world views, and identities, which mediate between the 
material context and agents´ behaviour, breaking with the materialist and rationalist 
fixation of the mainstream IR perspectives that dominated the field until the 1990s. 
Crucially, the co-constitution of structure and agency not only exists in the study of 
international politics, but also at the domestic level. This means states can be understood 
as social arrangements that interact with agents (state agencies, political parties, sectorial 
elites, epistemic communities, pressure groups, NGOs, etc.) at the domestic level, and as 
(collective) agents interacting with each other and with the social arrangements that 
define the context of international politics. Despite being largely a state-centric theory, 
Constructivism heavily criticizes the notion of the state being a unitary, perfectly rational 
actors following a resource maximizing logic. It provides the tools to critically understand 
domestic interest formation as a result of negotiated ideational commitments.  
Together with the blurring of boundaries between levels of analysis, the last point 
makes the Constructivist approach a highly useful framework to combine with the 
concept of Strategic Culture, understood as a socially constructed set of long-term 
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premises and normative commitments regarding the use of the defence apparatus. Kerry 
Longhurst goes beyond this, stating that 
“Strategic culture's intellectual home clearly lies within the broad 
constructivist/reflectivist school. […] Constructivism's emphasis upon process, critical 
junctures and the formation and reformation of interests and identities corresponds 
with the breakdown of the existing strategic culture […]” (Longhurst 2000, 33) 
 
It is worth mentioning that Constructivism provides few clues, if any, regarding how 
the concept of Strategic Culture could be operationalized. This is a crucial point, and will 
be covered in more detail in the coming pages. 
 
Structure and agency in constructivism: An asymmetrical relation 
 
As has already been established, using sociological and interpretivist approaches44, 
constructivist authors have subjected the pillars of rational-choice theory to continued 
and effective criticism. They did so by showing that intersubjective knowledge mediates 
between the material “reality” studied by mainstream IR theories and the understanding 
that actors have of said “reality”, effectively shaping the context on which they interact 
with each other (Wendt 1992). 
Despite a lack of agreement between strands of constructivism about how to define it, 
the notion of mutual constitution of agents and structure is central to this theory and one 
of the key insights it has contributed to the field of IR (Adler 1997, 330–37; Guzzini 2000; 
Klotz 2006). One of the first IR authors to forcefully defend this concept was Alexander 
Wendt (1987, 1992, 1999). Rooting Constructivism in the philosophy of scientific realism, 
Wendt attempts a break with the empiricist-rationalist stance of mainstream IR theories, 
                                                        
44 See (Guzzini 2000) 
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establishing strong ontological grounds to incorporate the analysis of intersubjective, 
immaterial social constructions and their effects on the behaviour of actors to the field of 
IR theory (Wendt 1999, 47–91). The need to develop such approach had been previously 
identified by Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie (1986). 
More importantly, Wendt resorts to the conceptual apparatus and epistemology of 
Anthony Giddens´ structuration theory to advance one of the central contributions of his 
approach, the notion that 
“Agents are inseparable from social structures in the sense that their action is 
possible only in virtue of those structures, and social structures cannot have causal 
significance except insofar as they are instantiated by agents.” (Wendt 1987, 365) 
 
Audie Klotz (1995) would take this definition even further, stating that if we grant any 
credibility to the argument that interests are shaped by the international social structure, 
then the premise that states can behave in a fully autonomous way in the exercise of their 
agency should be discarded altogether. Instead, Klotz looks at agency through the lens of 
the constraints imposed by the social structures within which actors are socialized. Just 
like Wendt, she focuses primarily on system-level social constructions. They differ, 
however, in that the latter is more interested in addressing the constraints that shared 
understandings and norms45 impose on the behaviour of states (normative 
constructivism), while the former´s work addresses more directly the construction of 
collective identities and culture themselves (systemic constructivism). 
                                                        
45 It is not uncommon for authors in the normative constructivist research agenda to conflate the effects of 
domestic and international social constructions, focusing primarily on the influence external norms have 
on state behaviour while subordinating the role of domestic culture in that process. Though, generally 
speaking, the basic process by which social structures influence actors´ behaviour, and vice versa, is 
essentially the same at both levels of analysis, the different dynamics and causal relations in each level are 
relevant s to establish a clearer analytical distinction between the two.  
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Given the influence that these two strands of constructivism have had on the research 
agenda of IR theory, it is important to identify their shortcomings. Of particular 
importance to this thesis, the conceptual apparatus and epistemology of structuration has 
been accused of leading authors to “conflate levels of analysis” (Archer 1996, 25–100). 
The main consequence of this conflation was briefly mentioned in the previous section, it 
being that the relation between structure and agency is turned into one of unidirectional 
causation despite the mantra of co-constitution. The majority of the constructivist 
research agenda has gravitated towards downwards conflation (how systemic social 
structures constitute agents, most common in normative constructivists) and central 
conflation (how social structures are constructed, blurring the lines between agency and 
structure, common among systemic constructivists). In turn, theoretical and empirical 
constructivist studies about how agents constitute the structure, and about the domestic 
forces that shape the interests and preferences of those agents in the first place, have 
remained relatively scarce (Carlsnaes 1992, 248–50; Doty 1997, 372; Hopf 2002; J. K. 
Jacobsen 2003, 55). Additionally, Jutta Weldes argues that “Wendt´s anthropomorphized 
understanding of the state continues to treat states, in typical realist fashion, as unitary 
actors with a single identity and a single set of interests.” (Weldes 1996) 
As a consequence, there is a relative lack of theorization in constructivist IR theory 
about processes of identity and interest formation, and a lack of understanding about how 
agents affect social arrangements at the systemic level. All of the above has somehow 
obscured the role of agency in the constructivist understanding of international politics 
(Checkel 1998). Even the seminal research on the life cycle of norms developed by Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) suffers of this problem, forgetting almost entirely 
about agents in the second (cascading) and third (internalization) stages of the norm 
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diffusion process (Bucher 2014), and limiting the role of domestic politics to a quest for 
legitimacy that denies any constitutive power to this level of analysis (Hopf 2002). 
The main problem that these approaches present is one of conflation of analytical 
levels. They obliterate the analytical independency that constructivist theory should grant 
actors if it is serious about properly evaluating the two-way interplay between social 
structure and agency that it claims is central to understand international politics. To be 
sure, Constructivists do acknowledge that a theory about the social constitution of agents 
and the structure-changing effects of their actions should be an essential aspect in the 
theory´s research agenda (Wendt 1987, 366) to open up the black box and understand the 
construction of interests, perceptions, practices, and agendas. However, by favouring an 
approach in which agents are presented as mere “instantiators” that grant “causal 
significance” to social structures, agents and their influence on the systemic social 
environment are placed in a subordinate position (Archer 1995, 81–84).  Wendt´s theory 
presents a case of central conflation46, annulling the independent standing of agents and 
structure, turning them almost indistinguishable from each other. 
Klotz´s normative constructivist approach, on the other hand, masks agency by focusing 
almost exclusively on the effects international social arrangements have on agents, 
combining the language of norms with that of agency much like norm diffusion literature: 
“[…] norms are often narratively given the place of acting persons or actions, thereby 
facilitating an illusion of agency, while violating the deeper ontological commitments of 
constructivist thinking.” (Bucher 2014, 752).  
                                                        
46 “[Central conflation], which enjoys a certain vogue at the moment as 'structuration theory', interprets 
neither structure nor agency as epiphenomena of one another. […] Instead, what happens is that autonomy 
is withheld from both levels and this has exactly the same result of precluding any examination of their 
interplay. Here, structural properties and social interaction are conflated because they are presented as 
being so tightly constitutive of one another.” (Archer 1995, 81) 
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Though Wendt´s systemic constructivist perspective does acknowledge more widely 
the recursive aspect of the intersubjective meanings involved in the mutual constitution 
of agents and structure (Wendt 1992, 396–97), in both cases theorization and empirical 
studies fail to understand the two levels of analysis autonomously. With few notable 
exceptions  (Hopf 2002; Weldes 1996), this has led to a generalized understanding of 
agency that, in practice, treats many of the characteristics of actors (including their 
identities, interests, and preferences) as intrinsic to them or exogenously given (Doty 
1997, 373; Hopf 2002; Weldes 1996). 
Walter Carlsnaes (1992) attempted a solution to the problem of central conflation in 
Wendtian constructivism, substituting structuration theory with Margaret Archer´s 
“morphogenesis”47. Given its roots in realist social theory, this approach should be 
ontologically and epistemologically compatible with Constructivism, accounting for the 
interplay between the structural and the agency levels of analysis that incorporates 
temporality and avoids the problem of directional conflation. However, this attempt to 
“solve” the agent-structure “problem” by merely adding the diachronic morphogenetic 
analysis was not seen as a real solution to the problem of level conflation (Doty 1997, 
373–74; Hollis and Smith 1994, 243–47). 
Evaluating the feasibility and implications of fully incorporating morphogenesis to the 
constructivist theoretical framework is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, though 
                                                        
47 Its key contribution is the incorporation of temporality in the mutual relation between agents and 
structure, which Archer analyses sequentially. Culture provides a context for the actions of agents, steering 
their behaviour and interactions by providing different meanings, constrains, and incentives. In turn, the 
actions of and interactions between agents reproduce or transform the initial social structure. Structures 
shape action due to the presence of emergent properties and causal powers that are not entirely reducible 
to the intentions or purposeful action of the agents involved in their construction (Hodgson 2002, 166). 
Archer emphasises the need to understand social process as made of an endless loop of such sequences, 
where structure and agents mutually constitute each other. According to the morphogenic approach, only 
in this way can researchers grasp the causal relations involved in the two-way interplay that make agents 
and structures interdependent while also maintaining their autonomy (Archer 1995). 
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a better formulation of the relationship between agent-structure is certainly necessary to 
account for the autonomy of each level of analysis and their interdependence, this does 
not immediately mean that we should get rid of research agendas that give explanatory 
primacy to one side or the other. As long as the analyst acknowledges the limitations and 
potential problems of level conflation, and (partially) remedies them by incorporating 
considerations about structure-agent dynamics, I would argue that the aspects of 
international politics that these perspectives bring to light are still valuable. Ted Hopf 
(2002) argues that only if an IR theory was to stipulate the total independence of identity 
formation and its impact on foreign policy, completely independent from the dynamics 
the external, could it be considered reductionist. 
The following subsection discusses how a social constructivist perspective can 
complement the understandings of international politics advanced by authors like Wendt 
and Klotz. Though this is in no way a fix to the problem of conflation, a combination of the 
insights provided by the three research agendas could provide a fairly complete (if 
compartmentalized) image of the two-way social processes by which the international 
structure and the agents affect each other.  
 
Agency: Domestic roots and effects on structure. A bottom-up approach 
The previous subsection had the aim of introducing the limitation that constructivist 
approaches have had in dealing with the agency of international actors. The goal of this 
research is to understand how the domestic environment informed the interest formation 
and the motivations for action of states, and how this was consequential in the 
construction of regional social arrangements. More specifically, I am looking to analyse 
the domestic cultural structures that help explain processes of interest formation and 
143 
 
foreign Policy decision-making in Argentina, Chile and Colombia, aiming to understand 
the roots and social orientation of their respective agendas and actions during the SADC 
negotiations. Hence, it is now necessary to identify and discuss some of the key aspects 
about how the notion of agency will be understood. 
In order to fulfil the above goals, international agency will be understood as: 
 
Meaningful and purposeful behaviour of actors. 
 
The simplicity of this definition might be misleading. Its underpinnings lie with 
Weberian interpretive sociology. The meaningfulness aspect of agency is related both 
with the social and cultural structures that influence the decision-making process behind 
the actors´ behaviour, as well as with the expected relational consequences of the action48. 
These actions are not “rational” in the sense rational choice theory would expect, but can 
instead be understood as being informed by the dominant socio-cultural framework, 
providing grounds to justify and interpret behaviour, as well as its intended impact 
(purpose) on other actors and on the social structures shared with them  (Weber 1981, 
152–53). Adopting this approach to “agency” and “meaningful behaviour” means that the 
actions are not primarily analysed as individually motivated, but rather as having a social 
purpose (Tucker 1965, 158–59). It is also important to remember that “Only occasionally 
do some individuals raise the meanings of their actions to full consciousness. It is 
therefore often the sociologists, rather than the agents they seek to understand, who 
                                                        
48 “Action specifically significant for interpretive sociology is […], behavior that: (1) in terms of the 
subjectively intended meaning of the actor, is related to the behavior of others, (2) is codetermined in its 
course through this relatedness, and thus (3) can be intelligibly explained in terms of this (subjectively) 
intended meaning.” (Weber 1981, 152) 
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conceptualize behaviors by classifying them in terms of ´possibly intended meanings.´” 
(Ringer 2002, 177). Hence, the above definition implies that agency is a culturally-rooted, 
socially-oriented type of behaviour that can be analysed through in-depth studies of the 
meanings and purposes associated with the action, even if the agent is not consciously 
aware of these. 
Moreover, an account of agency within the constructivist tradition should not presume 
to demonstrate causal (mechanistic) relations, as rationalist and materialist theories in 
the Social Sciences would. A language of “soft” causality related to terms like “influence” 
and “inform”, which can be associated with Hidemi Suganami’s use of the notion of 
intelligibility (Suganami 1999), is hard to escape and does permeate the discussion. 
However, as Hollis and Smith point out, “Interpretative accounts can certainly use words 
such as 'cause' and 'because', but one should not assume that these mean the same things 
as when the words are used to invoke notions of causal forces or pressures.” (Hollis and 
Smith 1994, 249). The type of causation that interpretivists49 refer to establishes a 
plausible logical chain where shared ideational factors (culture) create conditions of 
possibility (norms) for particular outcomes (behaviour) (Finnemore 2003, 14–15). 
It is also important to clarify one point. Though the terms “state” and “actor” will be 
used almost interchangeably, I do not intend to convey the idea that states are the only 
relevant actors in international politics. However, given the empirical focus of this 
research on the behaviour of the defence and foreign policy elites of three states in the 
context of regional inter-state negotiations, for the most part I will not be engaging with 
other types of international actors. 
                                                        
49 Particularly modernist constructivists like Peter Katzenstein (1996), Jeffrey Checkel (Checkel 1998), 
Martha Finnemore (Finnemore 2003), and Emanuel Adler (2013) 
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As has been made clear in the previous subsection, state agency is not only influenced, 
constrained, or steered by external structures, but also informed by a domestic socio-
cultural environment that provides a network of meanings where actions are embedded, 
both subjectively and socially. This is a notion that a part of constructivist research (that 
which exhibits either central or downwards conflation) tends to acknowledge, but rarely 
engages with. Yet, giving more consideration to the role of the prevailing domestic 
cultural context and to the social processes involved in shaping interests, perceptions, 
policy preferences, and political agendas at the domestic level should be an unavoidable 
aspect of any sociologically-inspired theory of international politics. In other words, 
historically contingent culture and norms at the domestic level affect states´ agency as 
much as (if not more) than international norms. As a result, it is impossible to properly 
study the motivations behind the behaviour of states in the international arena without a 
clearer understanding of the relationship between domestic culture and actions. 
This is by no means a ground-breaking insight, as evidenced by the existing literature 
touching on this topic in the fields of Foreign Policy Analysis (Hudson 2014, 117–39; 
Lacina and Lee 2013; Malici 2006; Sjöstedt 2007), the social constructivist research 
agenda described by Hopf, and the concept of Strategic Culture itself. However, it remains 
an important point to make in the face of a large proportion of systemic approaches 
dominating IR constructivism. 
Alternative ways to understand agency have been proposed by post-structuralist 
approaches (Doty 1997, 1999), Lacanian symbolic/discursive analysis (Epstein 2013), 
Neo-Gramscian theory (Bieler and Morton 2001; Joseph 2008), and narrative analysis 
(Bucher 2014; Suganami 1999). Bucher’s understanding of agency is particularly 
interesting, relying on Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall´s (2005) discussion about 
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the different types and effects of power50 in international politics to define agency within 
the boundaries of norm politics (Bucher 2014). This approach strongly associates the 
notion of agency with the productive dimension of power, defined as “[…] the constitution 
of all social subjects with various social powers through systems of knowledge and 
discursive practices of broad and general social scope.” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 55). 
Bucher argues that by focusing on the different types of power to study the politics of 
norms, instead of their intrinsic characteristics, it is possible to identify more clearly the 
multi-dimensional power relations and political practices at play between structure and 
agency throughout the norm cycle. 
Bucher’s approach does, indeed, shed light on aspects of the behaviour of and 
interactions between actors that other approaches fail to recognize, stripping norms from 
their seeming neutrality and bringing them back to the field of the political. It also 
emphasizes aspects that could be related to the concepts of “meaningful” and “purposeful” 
actions through an understanding of power relations rooted in post-structuralism that 
incorporates insights about the role of “knowledge and discursive practices” of “social 
scope”. However, there are two limitation to this way of approaching agency that are 
worth mentioning. On the one hand, as the author himself points out, there is an array of 
relevant practices that will be left out of any analysis using this conceptualization due to 
its strict focus on power relations  (Bucher 2014, 757). As such, it fails to engage with the 
concept of agency itself, focusing exclusively on a limited subgroup of behaviours and 
interactions. On the other hand, and more importantly so, this approach does not delve 
                                                        
50 “The first type is power as relations of interaction of direct control by one actor over another— 
Compulsory Power; the second is the control actors exercise indirectly over others through diffuse relations 
of interaction—Institutional Power; the third is the constitution of subjects’ capacities in direct structural 
relation to one another— Structural Power; and the fourth is the socially diffuse production of subjectivity 
in systems of meaning and signification—Productive Power+ These different conceptualizations provide 
distinct answers to the fundamental question: in what respects are actors able to determine their fate, and 
how is that ability limited or enhanced through social relations with others?” (Barnett and Duvall 2005) 
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into the reasons behind the deployment of productive power by the different actors, 
avoiding any reference to whether interests and motivations are understood as intrinsic 
to the actor or if there is any sort of socio-cultural process involved in their formation. 
Arguments to incorporate a stronger theory about how social constructions at the state 
level affects actors’ interest and agenda formation, and in turn influence the international 
environment, are not uncommon. In an attempt to establish a dialogue between 
Neorealism and Historical Sociology, Stephen Hobden maintains that 
“Through considering the state form, the balance of its activities, and the two-way 
relation between system and units, the possibility of explaining change becomes 
much more feasible than in Neorealism […]. The impact of the international system 
on the form the state takes at any historical period can be considered, whilst the 
impact of changes in state formations on the international system can also be 
analysed.” (Hobden 1998, 181) 
 
In fact, explaining the “causal” relations that exist between different forms of state 
institutions with particular types of external action has been one of the central 
contributions of Historical Sociology to IR thinking (Hobden 1998, 1–3; Mann 1996). 
Similarly, Democratic Peace Theory (Doyle 2005; Russett et al. 1995) draws conclusions 
about the international behaviour of states based on their domestic political organization. 
As discussed, Neoclassical Realists have also attempted to reconcile the role of domestic 
political institutions in influencing the actions of states in the international system. 
However, what these theories lack is a clearer understanding of the relation between a 
larger set of social constructs (not just the form of domestic political organization) with 
state agency. This is, precisely, the gap that the Weberian understanding of agency comes 
to fill in this Thesis, identifying and theorizing the link between agency and the meaning-
creating domestic cultural-normative context. Moreover, building upon this, the concept 
148 
 
of Strategic Culture will help tackle this relation specifically in relation with the cultural 
aspects informing a society’s understanding of the resort to the defence apparatus, and 
how it informs its agency in the deployment of foreign and defence policy preferences. It 




Having defined agency as meaningful and purposive (i.e. culturally-rooted and socially-
oriented) action, I will now engage with the key conceptual tool to be used in the analysis 
of the three case studies: Strategic Culture. 
As already discussed, Strategic Culture literature is by no means the only approach 
interested in how idiosyncratic domestic factors inform behaviour. The concept was 
coined roughly at the same time as two seminal books on similar topics were being 
published: Robert Jervis´  Perception and misperception in international politics  (1976); 
and, Ken Booth´s Strategy and ethnocentrism (1979). But, while Jervis´ approach 
understands the influence of the domestic onto foreign policy in broad terms (including 
an array of cultural, institutional, legal, social and political factors) and Booth´s addresses 
the issue specifically in relation to how cultural51 ethnocentrism affects the actors´ 
strategic thinking and behaviour, Strategic Culture provides a different focus. It is 
specifically interested in understanding how cultural constructions specifically built 
                                                        
51 Booth provides a vague definition, claiming that culture is a “[…] set of patterns, of and for behaviour, 
prevalent among a group of human beings at a specified time period […]. Within the sense of this definition, 
culture embraces different modes of thought, implicit and explicit behavioural patterns and social habits, 
identifiable symbols and signals for acquiring and transmitting knowledge, distinctive achievements, well-
established ideas and values, particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems, and 
significant discontinuities in all these respects as between one group and another. Culture is one of the key 
factors determining who is whom in the social universe.” (Booth 1979) 
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around the understanding and use of the defence apparatus mediate between the stimuli 
coming from the security environment, the perceptions defence elites have of them, and 
the strategic actions that are considered viable and legitimate as responses. 
This last point is crucial, since it broadly defines how the relation that exists between 
culture and action is understood within this conceptual framework. Ann Swidler (1986), 
a cultural sociologist that defined the currently dominant understanding of that relation 
basing her arguments on Cliffort Geertz´s definition of culture (see page 160), argues that 
culture works as a “toolkit” where actors find an array of path dependent meanings that 
allow them to interpret inputs, but also works as a “repertoire” of legitimized forms of 
behaviour actors can choose from in order to build particular lines or chains of action. In 
other words, culture is a set of lenses that filter incoming incentives, translate them into 
meaningful and rooted bits of information, and distil a relatively limited variety of options 
actors can choose from. In addition, Swidler states that 
“Strategies of action incorporate, and thus depend on, habits, moods, sensibilities and 
views of the world. People do not build lines of action from scratch, choosing actions 
one at a time as efficient means to given ends. Instead, they construct chains of action 
beginning with at least some pre-fabricated links. Culture influences action through the 
shape and organization of those links.” (Swidler 1986, 277) 
 
This caveat is important, since Swidler understands actions to be not only culturaly-
informed in the sense discussed above, but also path dependent in that they tend not to 
be chosen independently but as a string/chain/line of more or less coherent actions. 
 
Moving forward, Kerry Longhurst (2000, 18) lists two key assumptions that largely 
define the starting point for Strategic Culture literature. I would contend that the first 
assumption is actually made up of two analytically distinct assumptions, namely one 
regarding the origin of Strategic Cultures and a second one referring to their stability. 
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With that modification in mind, the central assumptions of Strategic Culture literature can 
be described as: 
1. Collective actors (primarily states) develop strategic cultures as the result of beliefs, 
values, and attitudes towards the use of force52, which emerge or are shaped in historical 
junctions and result in shifts that redefine the collective. 
2. Once instated, a new historical juncture could certainly modify them, and they may even 
change as the result of long-term social learning processes or accumulative change. 
However, Strategic Cultures tend to conform elements of “inertia”, showing remarkable 
stability over time. 
3. A Strategic Culture is intimately related to a dominant framework of reference or network 
of meanings, which establish criteria of legitimacy favouring specific actions while 
discarding others. These set the path for most of the key policy decisions and actions of 
the collective, working as normative priors for international behaviour. 
 
Definition and key debates 
The existing literature on Strategic Culture is rich in theorization and debate, but 
sparse, has not reached an agreement about some central concepts, and has been 
relatively limited in terms of its empirical application (though this seems to be changing). 
Jack Snyder (1977) coined the concept of Strategic Culture in a report for the Rand 
Corporation that already contained insights into some central topics of contention that 
would define the theoretical debate for decades. He defined Strategic Culture as 
                                                        
52 The concept focuses primarily on how defence elites and society at large define the key social norms 
regarding the use of force. However, I would argue that engaging with the local Strategic Cultures of the 
case studies is crucial not only to engage with the instances in which those states would justify going to war, 
but also to understand their predisposition to deal with international security issues in non-violent ways. 
In other words, properly understanding the limits set by a society to the use of military force also reveals 
the instances in which said society shows a cultural preference for the peaceful resolutions of international 
tensions and, by extension, the areas they are willing to open for cooperative approaches. 
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“[…] the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of 
habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired 
through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to nuclear 
strategy” (Snyder 1977, 8)53 
 
Definitions loosely resembling that of Snyder´s54 have dominated the literature (Ball 
1993; Gray 1981; Jones 1990; Longhurst 2004; Lord 1985; 1990). One of the key problems 
with them is that they risk being tautological. Strategic culture literature conceives culture 
as a heuristic device that underpins and provides meaning to the behaviour of states, but 
the above definition also includes “patterns of habitual behaviour” as a constitutive 
element of this cultural framework. Analytically, conceiving behaviour as both a 
component part and the result of culture at the same time is problematic55. This means 
that, in order to make the concept of Strategic Culture work for the analysis of interest 
formation and state agency, a different way to define culture is necessary. 
Different generations of authors have conceived the concept differently, each helping 
identify different types of relations between culture and agency. 
For Snyder, for example, the strategic cultural context of a country imposes cognitive 
biases on its elites, which influence the interpretation of and reaction to external stimuli. 
Because decision-makers are not “culture-free, preconception-free game theorists” 
                                                        
53 The restriction to the realm of nuclear strategy is related to the empirical goal of the report. This, however, 
should not pose limitations for the concept to be used in the study of a broader scope of military- and 
defence-related topics. Arguably, all policy areas related to the use of force against an external adversary 
should be permeated by the Strategic Culture of the country. A confirmation of this stance can be seen in 
the volume edited by Carl Jacobsen, Strategic Power: USA/USSR (1990), in which various authors (including 
Jack Snyder himself) published research on a broad variety of defence-related topics affected by the 
Strategic Culture of each Super Power. 
54 Colin Gray defines Strategic Culture as “[…] modes of thought and action with respect to force, derive[d] 
from perception of the national historical experience, aspiration for self-characterization […], and from all 
of the many distinctively [national] experiences […] that characterize an [national] citizen” (Gray 1981, 22); 
while Carnes Lord maintains it is “[…] traditional practices and habits of thought by which military force is 
organized and employed by a society in the service of its political goals.” (Lord 1985, 271).  
55 Anthropologists do understand ritualistic behaviour as a key expression of culture, but studies on political 
culture still question whether it is possible to extrapolate culture from state behaviour (and how to do it). 
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(Snyder 1977, v), but politicians and bureaucrats embedded in a particular cultural 
context, the Strategic Culture they share will be determinant of state behaviour. Strategic 
culture is understood here as a historically contingent context that both informs the 
perceptions and actions of decision-makers, and provides a key with which to decode the 
meanings underlying in the data (documents, military doctrines, speeches, negotiating 
positions, alliances, deployment, etc.). In this way, exploring the characteristics of a 
country’s Strategic Culture helps reduce ambiguity and the risk of misinterpretation. 
It is worth mentioning that the term culture is also used “[…] to suggest that these 
beliefs tend to be perpetuated by the socialization of individuals into a distinctive mode 
of thinking.” (Snyder 1977, 38), which raises another problem with Snyder´s 
conceptualization. If culture is both historically contingent and “perpetuated”, without the 
theory clearly identifying under which circumstances the strategic cultural features of a 
state will remain stable and when they will change. Though this is by no means an 
unsolvable problem, Snyder fails to provide more details about his thinking on the topic.  
Ken Booth has aptly summarized how authors adhering to this line of 
conceptualization tend to resolve this issue, stating that 
“A Strategic Culture is persistent over time, but neither particular elements nor a 
particular culture as a whole are immutable. Nevertheless, those elements together 
or in part deserving to be called ‘cultural’ do tend to outlast all but major changes in 
military technology, domestic arrangements or the international environment.” 
(Booth 2005, 25)  
 
This understanding is common to other lines of inquiry in political sciences and in IR 
that refer on socially constructed, historically contingent elements of any given collective 
actor or aggregation of actors. This explanation is particularly prominent in theoretical 
approaches that understand Strategic Culture as a non-falsifiable concept, as a context 
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that informs perceptions, preferences, interests and behaviour alike, and outside of which 
there is nothing. However, Darryl Howlett has pointed out that for Strategic Culture 
literature to move forward, it is necessary to theorize the processes involved in cultural 
continuity and change in more detail  (Howlett 2006, 5–6). 
Another problem with this line of theorizing is that, pretty much as with Booth´s 
definition of culture, Snyder and his followers resort to such a large set of inputs to define 
Strategic Culture that the concept becomes vague and over-determined. Moreover, a lack 
of deeper consideration into the relation between culture and behaviour insinuates an 
extremely strong path dependence, even resembling a deterministic relation where states 
cannot escape behaving in ways similar to how they have behaved before (Johnston 1995, 
33–34). In fact, Alastair Johnston identified the combination of the two points above as 
the main problem with the first generation of Strategic Culture authors, claiming that  
“If ´Strategic Culture´ is said to be the product of nearly all relevant explanatory 
variables, then there is little conceptual space for a non-Strategic Culture 
explanation of strategic choice. This makes valid tests of a Strategic Culture-based 
model of choice extremely difficult.” (Johnston 1995, 37) 
 
Johnston’s insinuation that there could be non-cultural explanations for strategic 
choice has been widely rejected based on the above discussed understanding of Strategic 
Culture as an un-falsifiable, unescapable context filtering information, shaping 
preferences, influencing interests formation, and informing agency  (Gray 1999; 
Longhurst 2004; Poore 2003). However, more consideration should be given to the 




Another line of inquiry into the concept of Strategic Culture, identified by Johnston as 
the “second generation” of theorizing, is related almost exclusively to the work of Bradley 
Klein. I disagree with the labelling used by Johnston, not because Klein´s work does not 
show sufficient differences with both previous and later authors, but precisely for the 
opposite reason. He understands the concept in a Neogramscian fashion, as an element of 
the hegemonic ideology (Klein 1988, 1989). Strategic culture is seen as a symbolic 
discourse used instrumentally by ruling elites to maintain their hegemonic position, 
granting a monopoly over the legitimate use of force to specific state agents and 
identifying the enemies that need to be fought  (Klein 1988). In this version of the concept, 
Strategic Culture works merely as a post facto discursive justification for pre-existing, 
class-related preferences and interests regarding the use of force. This also means that 
elites are not constrained in their behaviour by any sort of cultural framework, which 
challenges the entire research agenda of this line of thought. Hence, despite using the 
same term, the research agenda Klein follows, the phenomena and actors he identifies, 
and the causal relations that interest him show such little relation with all other authors 
in the Strategic Culture tradition that it is hard to see any relevant points of contact 
between them. It might be best, then, to consider Klein´s work as something else than 
Strategic Culture as understood here. 
 
Finally, Johnston self-identifies with the “third generation” of Strategic Culture 
thinking, described as “[…] more rigorous and eclectic in its conceptualization of 
ideational independent variables, and more narrowly focused on particular strategic 
decisions as dependent variables.” (Johnston 1995, 41). The eclecticism mentioned means 
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that it is difficult to provide a unique definition for what these authors understand by 
Strategic Culture, but Johnston´s provides a good starting point for discussion: 
“[…] an integrated system of symbols (i.e., causal axioms, languages, analogies, 
metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic 
preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in 
interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of 
factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.” 
(Johnston 1996, 222) 
 
This definition identifies two basic mechanisms by which culture affects the strategic 
preferences of states. On the one hand, it constitutes a cognitive sieve, filtering the wide 
array of possible strategic options in any given case so that only those that conform to the 
cultural framework are seen as “realistic and efficacious”. On the other hand, culture is 
attributed productive abilities with regards to the norms (“concepts”, in Johnston´s 
definition) guiding long-term preferences for the use of force. Johnston´s goal is to device 
an approach that can “explain” behaviour by clearly identifying independent variables 
(ideational aspects of Strategic Culture) from dependent variables (strategic behaviour 
itself), separating him from first generation authors that sought to “understand” strategic 
behaviour by tapping into the meanings embedded in them through the concept of 
Strategic Culture (Meyer 2005, 527). 
Grounding norms and cognitive biases about strategic preferences exclusively on a 
"system of symbols"56 has the effect of eliminating the reliance on behavioural 
observations. This does not mean, however, that patterns of ritualized behaviour do not 
constitute cultural elements, broadly conceived. But, keeping behaviour out of the 
                                                        
56 Clifford Geertz, on whose concept of religion Johnston based his definition of Strategic Culture,  
understands symbols as “[…] any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a 
conception -the conception is the symbol's ´meaning´” (Geertz 1973, 91) 
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definition and focusing only on its ideational dimension prevents falling in the tautological 
trap mentioned before. This move also helps authors using this approach identify 
behaviour more clearly as the dependent variable in the relation  (Johnston 1995, 44). 
What this definition makes more explicit than Snyder´s is that the menu of valid options 
available in any given Strategic Culture includes a variety of possible paths to follow, 
rather than establishing a deterministic relation between the two. However, this may 
make Johnston´s goal of “explaining” behaviour based on the independent variable of 
Strategic Culture more difficult.  
However, combining the conceptualization of first generation authors with this insight 
might help break the tautology and strengthen their ability to “understand” the meanings 
and reasons motivating strategic behaviour  (Meyer 2005). This step requires an 
operationalization of the concept that establishes a concise methodological approach to 
understand how Strategic Culture: a. Filters the external environment and guides the 
interpretation of stimuli; and, b. Shapes the Strategic Norms guiding behaviour and the 
menu of preferred strategic options.  
Moreover, leaders and decision-makers are not only socialized into a Strategic Culture, 
but also participate in other cultural environments and bring their own sets of normative 
and behavioural preferences with them (Weldes 1996). These also affect the world-view 
of defence elites and can, then, have an effect on strategic behaviour, albeit more indirectly 
and less prominently. Though this could certainly bring an extra layer of complexity to the 
empirical study of the effects Strategic Culture has on behaviour, there is no point in 
denying the potential for crossed pollination between cultural constructions in different 
areas. This should not mean that the notion of engaging with the cultural features specific 
to the defence sector and their effects on behaviour should be abandoned, though. A 
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compromise could be that the operationalization of the concept leaves room for domestic 
contestation, either originating in the same Strategic Culture but reaching different 
conclusions due to interfering webs of meaning or emerging from subaltern Strategic 
Cultures. This aspect of the theory will be further covered in the following subsection. 
 
Finally, a bifurcation has taken place recently in the research agendas followed by 
different authors. A large proportion still use the concept to tap into the national level of 
analysis, studying the influence of Strategic Culture on the agency of the state and its 
impact on the systemic level57 (sharing the bottom-up perspective and upward conflation 
problems of social constructivism). But, an increasing number of scholars have started to 
also use it to discuss the construction of a collective Strategic Culture at the sub-global 
level, particularly in the European context and in Transatlantic relations58. 
Both groups bring relevant insights to the discussion, but their degree of aggregation 
of actors, processes, and variables is significantly different. The former, as already 
discussed, engages exclusively with the impact of the domestic Strategic Culture on the 
perceptions and behaviour of individual states. The latter, in contrast, requires that we 
not only take the domestic into consideration, but that we also consider the interaction 
between a multiplicity of distinct (and, converging?) domestic Strategic Cultures, focusing 
on the processes of interaction and negotiation required to develop a shared Strategic 
Culture at the regional level, and exploring as well what the effects of this might be for the 
global level of analysis. 
                                                        
57 See (Biehl, Giegerich, and Jonas 2013; Bitencourt and Costa Vaz 2009; Gray 1981; Johnston 1996; Jones 
1990; Longhurst 2000, 2004; Lord 1985; Macmillan 1995; O’Reilly 2013; Snyder 1977; Trinkunas 2009) 
58 See (Cornish and Edwards 2001, 2005; Heiselberg 2003; Margaras 2004, 2009, Martinsen 2004, 2010, 
Meyer 2005, 2006; Rynning 2003; Sweeney 2013) 
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I am of the impression that using the concept of Strategic Culture to engage with the 
latter type of analysis is problematic, since the conceptualization does not accommodate 
well enough for such kind of complex inter-level dynamics. Moreover, using this approach 
for sub-global/regional studies does not add much to the theoretical nor to the empirical 
debates that already exist. Similar insights regarding the construction of shared 
understandings about the use of force and about in-group/out-group dynamics can be 
obtained using other, better established theoretical traditions, such as Security 
Communities (Acharya 2001; Adler and Barnett 1998b; Adler and Greve 2009; Bellamy 
2004; Flemes 2005; Gegout 2002; Nathan 2006; Pouliot 2008) and the analysis of sub-
global international societies using the English School approach (Buzan 2012; Kacowicz 
2005b; Merke 2011, 2014; Quayle 2013; Schulz 2014). 
 
Having reviewed different definitions for Strategic Culture and analysed some of their 
key implications, I believe that the most clear and unproblematic way to combine the 
strengths of each “generation” is to define this concept loosely borrowing from Cliffort 
Geertz´s understanding of culture59 (rather than from his definition of religion, as 
Johnston does, which entails a more direct and dogmatic relation between beliefs, values 
and behavious). In this way, Strategic Culture can be defined as: 
 
Historically contingent and socially constructed web of meanings that informs the 
perception of and reaction to inputs from the strategic environment among relevant 
domestic actors in the defence sector. 
                                                        
59  “Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, 
I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search 




This fits tightly with the culturally-rooted definition of agency as meaningful and 
purposeful action. The fact that Strategic Culture is historically contingent and socially 
constructed means that, while stability and relative consistency are to be expected, no 
part of it is immutable  (Booth 2005), leaving room to explain processes of cultural change 
resulting from either historical junctures or societal pressure, social learning or 
adaptation to disruptive inputs. 
The “relevant domestic actors of the defence sector” mentioned can be equated with 
what Snyder refers to as the “national strategic community”, though this wording allows 
for a broader set of actors to be involved60. Also important is the fact that the Strategic 
Culture of a country is not necessarily a “national” culture, in the sense that a large 
proportion of the population is not socialized into it and it still needs to relate to the 
constrains of the broader cultural constructions. This is not to say that the Strategic 
Culture cannot be publicly discussed beyond the members of the defence sector, but to 
point out that it need not be the case.  
It is also important to mention that this definition does not limit the scope of strategic 
action merely to how a society relates to the use of force. Instead, all behaviour related 
with the area of defence and international security can be said to be under the influence 
of Strategic Culture. In this respect, this definition is perhaps the least restrictive of all 
those reviewed in this chapter. 
Finally, this definition implies taking a middle ground of sorts between understanding 
Strategic Culture as a contextual framework and Johnston´s strict methodological 
                                                        
60 The related epistemic community, policy-makers, bureaucrats, politicians, military officials, and everyone 




separation of cultural and non-cultural variables. On the one hand, I follow Johnston in 
taking behaviour out of the constituent parts of culture. This is neither because I fail to 
acknowledge the cultural dimension of (ritualistic) behaviour, nor because I adhere to 
Johnston’s strict division of the ideational (independent variable) and behaviour 
(dependent variable), but rather to simplify the analysis of the relations that link Strategic 
Culture and strategic behaviour. On the other side, and related to what I just said, I take 
Poore´s side in thinking that Strategic Culture is not reducible to a set of neatly identified 
independent variables, but rather a framework that contextualizes the perceptions, 
preferences, and decisions of the defence elites (Poore 2003). This means that Johnston´s 
identification of non-cultural variables is an oxymoron. All aspects affecting the strategic 
behaviour of states, material and ideational, are filtered and interpreted using the lens 
provided by the dominating Strategic Culture. 
Having provided a general overview of the debates surrounding Strategic Culture, I will 
briefly turn now to how this concept can be operationalized to conduct empirical studies. 
 
Operationalization: Strategic culture, norms, and the domestic context 
Authors working with Strategic Culture have devised different ways to operationalize 
the concept. Iain Johnston follows the strategy of identifying ranked preferences “[…] 
about the role of war in human affairs […], about the nature of the adversary and the 
threat it poses […], and about the efficacy of the use of force […].”(Johnston 1996, 221). 
He seeks to test for consistency within the same country, identifying potential pockets of 
contestation, but also allowing for cross case comparisons using similar parameters to 
identify core characteristics of the respective Strategic Cultures (Johnston 1996). 
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Kerry Longhurst (2004) provides an alternative strategy, identifying three key 
elements in Strategic Cultures with distinct functions: foundational elements; security 
policy standpoints; and, regulatory practices. Foundational elements represent the core 
characteristics of a Strategic Culture, deeply-rooted beliefs and meanings that shape the 
development of the other two but that are not immediately evident. Security policy 
standpoints and regulatory practices, on the other hand, are described as “observable 
manifestations of the Strategic Culture”, and can be largely equated to what other authors 
call social norms. In breaking social norms into two distinct fields, Longhurst 
differentiates the resilient standards of appropriateness used to translate foundational 
elements into more concrete interests and preferences for policy choices (security policy 
standpoints), and the far more malleable practices that translate “higher order” norms 
into behaviour (regulatory practices).  
The key problem with this distinction is that it does not seem to contribute much to the 
existing debate, and might even confound readers already used to the more established 
language of norms without adding substantial analytical power. For example, including 
regulatory practices as a constitutive element of Strategic Culture (a direct consequence 
of her definition of the concept61) may only obscure the border between the Strategic 
Culture, per se, and its observable consequences, risking the possibility of falling again for 
tautological understandings in which behaviour is both a constitutive part of the culture 
and a result of it at the same time. This is precisely the reason why practices have been 
excluded from the definition used here. I believe it is more productive and clear to keep 
                                                        
61 “A Strategic Culture is a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, held 
by a collective and arising gradually over time through a unique protracted historical process.” (Longhurst 
2004. Italics added) 
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the distinction between Strategic Culture (web of meanings), social norms (standards of 
appropriateness; reasons for behaviour), and policies and behaviour (outcomes). 
Finally, Christoph Meyer (2005, 2006) takes Johnston´s approach a step further, 
structuring it around Peter Katzenstein´s understanding of social norms62. Understood in 
this way, Strategic Norms are a pertinent proxy to approach the “web of meanings” that 
constitutes the Strategic Culture of a state. They translate the ideational factors and 
meanings that constitute the culture into social rules and conventions that establish what 
is considered to be appropriate behaviour and what is not, influencing the process of 
interest formation and providing reasons for the states to behave in particular ways63. As 
a result, though culture should not be confounded with the aggregation of norms, the 
impossibility to engage with the former in its “pure state” means that it can only be 
analysed via a proxy. This makes engaging with the more easily identifiable norms a 
pertinent solution to analyse the effects cultural frameworks have on behaviour. In 
addition, I would argue that Strategic Norms are in their more crystalized and accessible 
state when expressed as legal and institutional frameworks for the defence sector. 
 
Norms are social constructs, defined by shared understandings about standards of 
appropriate behaviour within a particular society and in a particular moment in history 
                                                        
62 “[…] social rules and conventions that constitute [the state´s] identity and the reasons for the interests 
that motivate actors.” and as “standards of appropriateness” (Katzenstein 1996). The latter definition 
largely coincides with the perspectives of other relevant constructivist authors (Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998; Kratochwil 1989, 59) 
63 Martha Finnemore provides a clear example of how this causal relation can be established: “[…] new 
beliefs make possible (and in that sense cause) new intervention behavior by creating new norms of 
behavior and new reasons for action. Reasons for action are not the same as causes of action as understood 
by utilitarian theories. […] But new beliefs about who is human provide reasons to intervene and make 
intervention possible in ways it was not previously. By creating new social realities -new norms about 
interventions, new desirata of publics and decision makers- new beliefs create new policy choices, even 
policy imperatives for intervenors. Thus understanding beliefs about the legitimate purposes of 
intervention is not ‘mere description,’ since beliefs about legitimate intervention constitute certain 
behavioral possibilities and, in that sense, cause them.” (Finnemore 2003, 15) 
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(Elster 1989, 99; Klotz 1995). Since norms are an essential part of the cultural 
environment, understanding the historical processes within which they emerge, spread, 
and become institutionalized is essential to approach the question of how culture relates 
with behaviour  (Elster 1989). An in-depth study of the existing norms referring to the 
areas of defence and international security should allow to position them along an axis 
that scales them in a spectrum going from low or high preference for activism in the use 
of force (i.e. when it is considered appropriate behaviour to use military force). Meyer 
identifies a discreet set of such scalable Strategic Norms whose analysis is expected to 
expose the basic characteristics of a state’s Strategic Culture and help understand the 
interests that motivate behaviour in the realms of defence and international security 
(Meyer 2005, 529–31): 1. the conditions that justify the use of force; 2. the way in which 
force is to be used; 3. preferrences with regards to cooperation with other actors; and, 4. 
the domestic and external thresholds for authorization to use force. 
This set of norms seems pertinent to evaluate the characteristics of a country’s 
Strategic Culture, but also to analyse how it mediates the impact that the external 
environment (both structural features and specific developments) has on the actions of 
agents. Strategic Culture understood in this way represents the social constructions and 
normative priors that help agents interpret the international context, thus simplifying the 
selection of available responses by presenting specific forms of action as legitimate while 
discarding others. In this way, Strategic Culture becomes the social context that enables 
legitimate action, reinforcing the constructivist perspective informing the present 
research by showing that the material and structural characteristics of the region are of 
little consequence to understand behaviour if devoid of the domestic social constructions 
that infer meaning in international pressures and give meaning to the actions put forward 
as a response. 
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Also, not only does Meyer´s operationalization address the classic concern of the 
literature with the way a society relates to the use of force, but also incorporates the 
Strategic Norm related to forms of cooperation. By this, Meyer is referring to whether a 
state prefers to “work” unilaterally, be neutral, or participate in international alliances 
when undertaking military actions. However, and this is crucial for this Thesis, this could 
also be understood in the sense of not just cooperating in the use of military force, but 
also in the construction of security governance arrangements as the SADC. 
One of the problems with Meyer’s approach, however, is that it lacks clarity regarding 
how to identify the Strategic Norms he refers to. I suggest that analysing the legal and 
policy framework that regulates the defence and international security activities of the 
state is an appropriate way to tap into its Strategic Norms. The argument to do so is that, 
while social norms certainly have a strong regulatory effect on the behaviour of actors 
due to their legitimacy, legal norms tend to be perceived as being a more powerful 
(Finnemore 2000) and hence the preferred way in which states express their preferences 
and interests, particularly in a policy area like defence.  
In order to properly obtain insights into the Strategic Norms of a state through its legal 
framework, it is necessary for the analysis to look for the underlying meanings and 
ideational commitments that inspired the laws and policies in the first place. One way to 
do this is with the assistance of support sources like interviews with defence elites, 
academic literature on the topic, official archives, and the diachronic analysis of state 
behaviour, all of which can help interpret the core preferences expressed by the Strategic 
Norms (their position in Meyer’s scale of activism). Through them, the researcher can 
have a clearer idea of the ideational components constituting the “web of meanings” in 
the Strategic Culture. 
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Though the relation between social norms and legal norms is not always linear64, the 
above discussion implies that changes in the legal framework and public policies do not 
always reflect changes in the Strategic Norms of a country, but a cultural and normative 
change will most likely elicit modifications to the legal and policy framework. The 




To sum up, the aim of this chapter was to engage with the key concepts that will be 
necessary to undertake the empirical analysis of the Argentine, Chilean, and Colombian 
cases, discussing definitions for Strategic Culture, norms, and agency; establishing the 
causal relations that exist between them; and, explaining how they can be studied. As a 
result, it should now be possible to engage in the analysis of the empirical cases that follow 
with a strong conceptual apparatus. 
Positioned within the research agenda of social constructivism, I nevertheless break 
with Ted Hopf’s approach to agency and identity on a crucial aspect. As discussed above, 
he seeks to inductively find USSR/Russia´s identity and study its effects on Foreign Policy, 
rejecting all forms of normative analysis due to the potential masking effect norms can 
have on state identity. Instead, he resorts to discourse analysis to better recognise the 
latter (Hopf 2002). In contrast, following Meyer, I will leave identity largely as a residual 
category, focusing instead on (strategic) culture and (strategic) norms as social 
constructions that embody the ideational commitments (normative priors) of a given 
                                                        
64 Social norms usually inform legal production and help interpret the legal framework, but they can also be 
altered by the law (Posner 2000, 4). It is not uncommon that during the critical junctures modifications to 
the legal framework precede the legitimization of new normative parameters. Still, what causes the social 
norm to change is not the legal innovation, but the changes caused by the critical juncture. 
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state at a particular time in history, mediating and interpreting stimuli, and imbuing 
action with meaning and coherence. 
The payoff for following Meyer in this regard is reducing the degree of speculative 
abstraction, grounding the interpretivist analysis on slightly more tangible aspects of the 
state´s ideational commitments or normative priors. Inasmuch this research on the effect 
of agency on regional social arrangements seeks to unveil the cultural causes for how 
states interpret and react to a particular stimulus (the SADC initiative), and not to identify 
the full scope of these countries´ identity, the limitations imposed by this approach are a 
reasonable compromise when the analytical payoff is considered. 
More importantly, it has been argued that what constructivism refers to as state 
“identity” is, in fact, “a reformulation of the older concept of political culture which, for 
comparative political scientists, sought to identify the underlying norms of national 
societies which produced specific orientations of political phenomena.” (Lawson 2006, 
23). It follows, then, that Hopf´s epistemological concern about identifying the key 
features of a state´s identity deductively via the empirical analysis of norms is misplaced, 
since state identity can be defined as the aggregation of normative priors. In other words, 
following Lawson´s understanding of identity, there is no part of a state´s identity that 
would remain “masked” in the analysis of norms, since norms are the building blocks of 




Chapter 5. Argentina 










The present chapter discusses the Argentine case, which showed the highest degree of 
coincidence between local ideational commitments and the declared objectives behind 
the SADC initiative among the three cases analysed. Yet, given the geopolitical rivalry that 
defined the bilateral relation between Argentina and Brazil during most of their history 
(Moniz Bandeira 2014; Oelsner 2005b, 135–38; Russell and Tokatlian 2003; Schenoni 
2014, 139–40), that the former joined a regional security governance organization 
fostered by the latter should not be taken for granted. Additionally, this decision should 
neither be attributed exclusively to material conditions, i.e. the unipolar condition of the 
South American region (Schenoni 2017).  
Discussing Argentina’s open and vocal opposition to the Brazilian bid for a permanent 
sit at the UNSC (one of its more ambitious and long-term foreign policy goals), Andrés 
Malamud rightly points out that “Though not a surprise, the fact that the Brazilian main 
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regional partner was, at the same time, one of its staunchest opponents was a heavy blow 
to its image as regional leader” (Malamud 2011b). Similarly, it´s been argued that 
Argentine elites remained sceptical about the possibility the Brazil could perform a 
hegemonic leadership in the UNASUR and SADC, or that it could use these organizations 
as a trampoline to be perceived as a global player (Flemes, Nolte, and Wehner 2011, 116). 
In other words, the South American unipolarity notwithstanding, secondary powers like 
Argentina have been able to exercise their agency with relative freedom, even in 
contradiction of core foreign policy objectives of the regional pole. 
Despite Argentina´s discursive adhesion to the notion of a distinct South American 
regionalism (Jenne and Schenoni 2015, 5) and decades of successful bilateral 
rapprochement with Brazil  (Darnton 2012; Resende-Santos 2002), the first response of 
the Argentine government to the SADC initiative was underwhelming. Distrust about 
Brazilian intentions and resistance to change informed this initial reaction, particularly in 
the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMFA hereon)65. Yet, this seems to contradict 
the impact on mutual perceptions attributed to the changes in the international insertion 
strategies of both sides since the return of democracy (Tavares 2014, 88–92). The 
arguments and debates discussed in this chapter should help square this circle, providing 
a better understanding of the reach and effects recent domestic cultural changes have had 
on the Argentine understanding of its own role in South American regional dynamics, as 
well as on the forms of behaviour perceived as legitimate.  
                                                        
65 Though no official documents nor journalistic articles mention this, the reluctant position of the AMFA 
regarding the SADC initiative was consistently brought up by different interviewees. This is a rather 
surprising reaction, considering deep commitment this bureaucratic actor has had to bilateral 
rapprochement and broader processes of regional cooperation over the last three decades, but further 
research into the topic is necessary to better understand its causes. 
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Also, focusing exclusively on the presence of coincidences between the ideational 
commitments of the Argentine elites and the regional cooperation agenda of the early-
2000s does not provide sufficient understanding of the complex domestic processes that 
led this country’s agency during the SADC negotiations. Tracing the reasons that led 
President Cristina Fernández´s administration (2007-2011, 2011-2015) to embrace the 
creation of this regional organization requires a good understanding of the interaction 
between the Strategic Norms dominant until 1983, the social learning and cultural change 
processes that started with the democratic transition, and the perception of the regional 
security environment described in Chapter 3. The lens provided by the concept of 
Strategic Culture provides relevant insights to tackle this question, highlighting the 
tensions between continuity and change, and allowing an analysis of how the cultural 
dimension informs the motivations and agenda of a country’s defence sector. 
One of the key arguments this chapter seeks to advance is that some of the most 
relevant changes in Argentina’s Strategic Norms since 1983 are concerned with the 
preferred modes of cooperation, as well as with the degree of activism normative priors 
would deem acceptable. The reasons behind this will be discussed in detail throughout 
the chapter, but recent changes in the perception of and relationship with neighbouring 
countries could not be understood without engaging with the meanings attached to the 
re-defintion of these norms66. 
This chapter further argues that such changes at the domestic level can not only help 
explain alterations in the Argentine Strategic Culture and policy preferences, but can also 
have a lasting effect in shaping regional arrangements as a result of their influence on the 
agency of state actors  (Bélanger and Mace 1997, 173). Arguably, the current Argentine 
                                                        
66 For purposes of economy of language, I use the term “norm” interchangeably with the concept “Strategic 
Norm”, as well as “culture” as a substitute for “Strategic Culture”. 
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Strategic Culture, largely shaped by defence elites that emerged after 1983 (Vitelli 2015a, 
8–9), is one of the conditions of possibility to understand the wide-reaching 
desecuritization process seen in South America over the last decades, setting up a regional 
context permeable for the SADC initiative as an extension of MERCOSUR´s security agenda 
to the entire region. Similarly, the working propositions informing the present research 
point to the Strategic Culture of secondary powers like Argentina to have had a significant 
role in the definition of objectives, norms, and mutual confidence mechanisms included 
in the SADC statute, influencing via this path the socially constructed elements of the 
regional security environment. 
The above does not mean that either the Argentine interest in the SADC initiative, nor 
the outcome of the negotiations, were guaranteed from the outset. However, had the 
mentioned mutually reinforcing processes at the domestic and regional levels not taken 
place, it would have been almost impossible to even think about Argentina agreeing to 
join this organization. 
 
In order to advance the above arguments, this chapter is structured in two sections, 
each divided in two sub-sections. The first section engages with the make-up of the 
country´s Strategic Culture, with its first sub-section providing necessary historical 
background and discussing some of the central characteristics of the previous Strategic 
Culture, while the second sub-section focuses on the country´s current Strategic Culture 
per se, discussing in detail the normative, legal, and policy framework that informed the 
Argentine government during the SADC negotiations. 
The second section engages directly with the role and agenda assumed by Argentina 
during the SADC Working Group meetings. This section identifies and highlights the 
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influence of the country´s Strategic Culture in defining its perception of the regional 
security environment, as well as its negotiating position, and the impact these had on the 
regional social arrangements related to the defence sector. The first sub-section analyses 
how Argentina´s defence elites perceived the regional context, the SADC initiative, and the 
country´s role in the region. The second sub-section presents a detailed analysis of how 
these perceptions influenced the country´s negotiating agenda and influence in the 
organization´s statute. 
As a result, this chapter answers relevant questions that have not been addressed in 
such detail by the existing literature: Why did the Argentine government join the Brazilian 
initiative? What goals did Argentina have for the SADC? What was its negotiating strategy? 
How did it expect this organization could affect the regional security environment? And, 
how was all of the above informed by the domestic Strategic Culture? 
Identical chapter structures will be used in the other two case studies as well, aiming 
to produce consistent analyses for the three cases and facilitate any necessary 
comparisons between them. 
 
The evolution of Argentina´s Strategic Culture 
 
This section deals with the history, recent evolution, and current characteristics of the 
Argentine Strategic Culture. As previously discussed, tapping into these aspects provides 
context to interpret the effect culture and norms have had on the country’s behaviour. 
Also, the historical review included in the first subsection provides relevant background 
to evaluate the evolution of the meanings embedded in country´s defence sector (an 
essential aspect in the Strategic Culture, as defined in the conceptual framework chapter). 
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Once the key historical, social, and political events that have shaped the way Argentina 
perceives and relates with its military apparatus are covered, the analysis of the meanings 
and norms associated with the current Strategic Culture will become easier to grasp. 
 
Historical context: The Argentine defence sector pre-1983 
Argentina´s foreign policy has often been described as erratic and lacking coherence  
(Busso 2014, 11–12; Diamint 2003, 14; Malamud 2011b; Rapoport and Spiguel 2005, 1–
2; Schenoni 2015, 13–14), characteristics often attributed to political divisions among 
sectors of the elites and to domestic instability. Yet, some regular preferences and 
behaviours across time can also be identified. 
Similarly, despite some inconsistencies, the Argentine Strategic Culture has maintained 
some stable features that, though challenged in different occasions, have successfully 
shaped the agency of the country for the defence sector. Understanding these regularities, 
which due to the corporatist nature of the Argentine Armed Forces  (Nino 1989, 134–38) 
become more evident than in other policy sectors, is essential to better grasp what exactly 
characterizes the webs of meanings (the Strategic Culture) informing the perception of 
and reaction to inputs from the strategic environment. 
 
Geopolitical thinking and the negative perception of the regional environment 
Projecting a distinctly “Europeanized” identity that allegedly differentiated Argentina 
from its “lesser” Latin American neighbours was consistently among the country´s foreign 
policy goals for most of the 19th and 20th centuries (Corigliano 2013, 15–16; Deciancio and 
Tussie 2015, 2). The Social Darwinist and positivist perspectives that underlie this agenda 
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(García Fanlo 2011, 10–12) also led local elites to construct the myth of Argentina being 
under constant threat from and vulnerable to the aggressive behaviour of its neighbours 
(Child 1985; Oelsner 2005b). This myth was reinforced with a narrative presenting 
Argentina as the victim of numerous instances of expansionist behaviour by neighbouring 
states, who allegedly robbed the country of parts of its rightful territories during the 
period of state consolidation (Dodds 2000, 155–58); an idea cemented in the Argentine 
psyche by the official maps produced by National Geographic Institute, which until this 
day is part of the Argentine Ministry of Defence (AMoD hereon) (Lois 2006). 
Carlos Escudé  (1988) relates the development of this myth and its pervasiveness to 
strong nationalist traits in the Hispanic-American culture. These national constructions, 
reproduced through the public education system, the military academies, and the Foreign 
Service institute (Dodds 2000; Escudé 1992), became an essential part of the self-
perception of the Argentine peoples. Moreover, with a dominant strategic paradigm based 
on an ad hoc combination of “cepalian”67 dependency theory, a realist perspective on 
power politics, and German geopolitical theories, “territory, military balances, state 
power, and ‘autonomy’ [were identified] as the ultimate goals of a country’s foreign and 
security policies.” (Escudé and Fontana 1998). 
Similarly to other South American countries, this discourse permeated in the Argentine 
Strategic Culture, imbuing it with strong geopolitical views drawing inspiration mostly 
from German (until the 1950s) and French (from the 1950 onwards) traditions in the field  
(Dodds 2000; Rivarola Puntigliano 2011). During the frequent instances of military 
involvement in domestic politics, this helped further reinforce feelings of mutual distrust 
                                                        
67 In reference to the centre-periphery approach developed at the ECLAC (or CEPAL, in Spanish). 
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and rivalry that marked the relationships with Chile and Brazil (Buzan and Waever 2003, 
313–14; Calvert 1994, 146; Oelsner 2005b).  
Two journals (Estrategia and Geopolitica) served as fora for local geopolitical debates. 
The former, founded and edited by General Juan Guglialmelli, was particularly influential 
spreading nationalistic views and negative perspectives on any Brazilian actions, Chile, 
and the United States. The latter, spearheaded by Alfonso Bravo and Colonel Augusto 
Rattenbach, advanced less confrontational perspectives on regional geopolitics  (Child 
1985). The former was dominant among defence elites until 198368, while the latter 
gained momentum after the democratic transition. 
The bilateral rivalry with Brazil started brewing since colonial times, and intensified 
with the bilateral dispute over the Rio de la Plata basin (which led to the creation of 
Uruguay as a buffer state, in 1828). However, it wasn’t until the consolidation of both 
states around the 1880s that the mutual perception as competitors became crystalized in 
the respective national identities (Carasales 1992, 72; de la Fuente 1997, 38). 
Interestingly, other than occasional controversies normal between neighbouring 
countries, there is no record of sustained confrontations to justify such mutually negative 
perception. Instead, the rivalry based primarily on cultural constructions of the other as 
a rival and a threat  (Oelsner 2005b), as well as on the competition for influence in the 
region. This was fuelled by strong geopolitical views that informed defence and foreign 
policy elites on both sides, setting them on a path of competition for regional leadership 
(Hurrell 1998; Kacowicz 2000; Kelly 1997). 
The effect of these geopolitical views is also crucial to understand the bilateral relation 
with Chile. Despite having signed a bilateral Treaty on Borders in 1881 to put an end to 
                                                        
68 See footnote 26, page 94. 
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border delimitation controversies69, as well as several protocols amending its ambiguities 
later on, “[…] until the 1980s bilateral relations underwent a gradual but steady process 
that reinforced negative mutual visions and consolidated a culture of antagonism” 
(Oelsner 2005b).  
Graph 2. “Operación Soberanía” and disputed area during the Beagle Channel conflict 
 
Sources: Servicio Hidrográfico y Oceanográfico de la Armada de Chile (SHOA) and Wikicommons 
In 1978, the Beagle Channel dispute70 led to an escalation that was barely contained 
before the break of a war. The military action planned by Argentina, code name 
“Operación Soberanía” or Operation Sovereignty, shows relevant aspects of the way the 
                                                        
69 Since the Spanish empire had never taken control over Patagonia, which represents roughly half of the 
mutual border, the principle of uti possidetis juri used throughout Latin America (Kacowicz 2005a, 2) was 
of little use. Due to lack of knowledge about the geography and hydrography of the Southern Andes, the 
1881 bilateral treaty established two criteria to demarcate the border under the mistaken assumption that 
they would always coincide: the principle of “highest summits”, and the separation of the hydrographic 
basins (rivers flowing to the Pacific Ocean, for Chile, and rivers flowing towards the Atlantic Ocean, for 
Argentina) (Escudé and Cisneros 1998a Ch. 34). The failure to agree on which of the two took precedent led 
to over a century of unresolved border controversies ended only in the 1990s. 
70 An Arbitral tribunal headed by Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom proposed a solution to the 
conflict in 1977 (http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf). The arbitral laud was immediately 
accepted by Chile, but Argentina rejected it arguing that it ruled on matters not submitted to arbitration. 
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country understood the Chilean geopolitical position, but also its awareness and concern 
over the checkerboard alliance it held with Brazil (Villar Gertner 2016). As the map below 
shows, the Argentine plan to seize the disputed islands took advantage of the lack of 
geostrategic depth that the Chilean geography imposed (see Chapter 6, page 226), but was 
also concerned with the possibility of a Brazilian retaliation in defence of the Chilean 
interests due to the crossed-alliances system in place. 
Core features of the pre-1983 Strategic Culture of the country decoded the regional 
environment in extremely negative terms, . More importantly, though this views were 
radically altered from 1983 onwards, elements of the dominant cultural structure have 
had the ability and the tendency to outlast changes in their environment (Booth 2005), 
even in the presence of “cultural fault lines” disrupting all other dominant social 
constructions. This may help explain the relative resistance of the AMFA to the SADC 
initiative, in contrast with the full and open support received from the defence elites, and 
specifically by the defence epistemic community71. Nevertheless, it is also worth 
mentioning that, for all the nationalistic rhetoric, geopolitical views, and negative 
perceptions associated with its neighbouring countries, Argentina has not been involved 
in a war against Brazil since the end of the Argentine-Brazilian War, in 182872; and never 
actually fought Chile. This seems to imply that the negative perceptions of the regional 
environment fostered by defence elites did not necessarily seek to increase the degree of 
                                                        
71 In April 2010, for example, academics and practitioners of the defence epistemic community signed a 
document to be sent to the Minister of Defence of Ecuador (Pro Tempore president of the SADC), Javier 
Ponce Ceballos. In it, they reiterated their full support for the organization, and proposed a series of steps 
that should be taken for it to achieve its full potential, including the creation of a permanent representative 
of the SADC; extending the engagement bureaucratic actors of member states had; and fully 
institutionalizing the CEED. (Comunidad Académica, 2010). 
72 Brazilian forces participated in the conflict supporting the provinces against Buenos Aires, which is 
known to Brazilian historians as the “Platine War” while Argentina sees it as a domestic conflict. 
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activism in the country’s Strategic Norms, which remained fairly low throughout its 
history, but rather reassert Argentina’s own identity by othering its neighbours. 
 
Regional governance, norms and status 
In spite of the prevalence of negative perceptions of the region, Argentina also 
consistently invested itself in the construction of different forms of governance and in the 
development of norms73 (Deciancio 2008), mostly seeking to build a regional normative 
framework that reinforced the principle of equality among states (crucial to defend its 
claim to equal standing with regard to European powers). This also reflects the country’s 
efforts to be seen as a regional leader, acquire the international status associated with 
being a rule-maker, and stabilize an immediate security environment perceived as 
threatening (Tavares 2014, 87–88). Juan Pablo Scarfi explains how this effort was not 
exclusively driven by state institutions, but also by political and academic figures like 
Vicente Quesada, Roque Saenz Peña and Manuel Ugarte, who fostered the creation of 
stronger Latin-Americanist ties against the expansionist strategies of the United States  
(Scarfi 2014, 97). The trajectory of Foreign Minister Carlos Saavedra Lamas74 provides 
another excellent example of the leading role the country and its political elite sought to 
play in the stabilization of the region in the first half of the 20th century, not only balancing 
against its neighbouring rivals, but also advancing the development of international 
                                                        
73 A good example being the Drago doctrine (1907), advanced in 1902 by Argentine jurist Luis María Drago 
as a response to military actions started by England, Germany and Italy against Venezuela to collect unpaid 
debts. This doctrine became part of the corpus of Latin American International Law, and was eventually 
incorporated into the principles of International Law in the Second Hague Convention by US jurist Horace 
Porter (Vagts 2006, 772). 
74 Minister of Foreign Affairs (1932-1938) and President of the Assembly of the League of Nations (1936-
1937). Saavedra Lamas successfully advanced the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, 
reinforcing the normative and legal framework that sustained the regional institution of peaceful resolution 
of conflicts. He also mediated the Bolivian-Paraguayan conflict, helping end to the Chaco War (1932-1935). 
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norms to soft balance against interventionist attempts of the US (Friedman and Long 
2015, 135). Even if attenuated by the decline experienced in the last decades, this agenda 
continues to drive the Argentine behaviour in many aspects, and was part of the rationale 
behind the active role adopted during the SADC negotiations  (Flemes, Nolte, and Wehner 
2011, 116–17). 
Argentina´s expectation to play an ordering role in the region can also be seen in the 
attempts to institutionalize the ABC group (Argentina, Brazil and Chile), which 
momentarily put a halt to the tensions between the three regional powers. The potential 
influence on South American security dynamics of such regional governance arrangement 
are undeniable, as seen in the region-wide impact of the successful rapprochement of the 
1980s and 1990s. But, though the project did originally gain some traction (Palmer 1997, 
109; Small 2009), the three countries ultimately had overlapping and contradictory 
expectations about it, which created major obstacles to the consolidation of a more stable 
alliance  (Garay Vera 2012, 49). The geopolitical views discussed above also put a limit to 
any attempts to institutionalize security governance mechanisms, as seen in the 
suspicions of Brazilian imperialism raised among Argentine elites by the proposal to 
create a “Zone of Peace” in the South Atlantic  (Rogerio Gonsalves 1999, 58–59). 
 
Nevertheless, a consistent commitment to norms of non-intervention, peaceful 
resolution of controversies, and neutrality can be observed in the Argentine case  (Alcañiz 
2013, 258), both due to a strong commitment with a legalistic approach to international 
politics and to a vested interest in reasserting the principle of equality among nations. 
This would explain the country’s consistent preference for Strategic Norms showing a low 
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degree of (international) activism in the use of force despite the already discussed 
geopolitical rivalries and regional threat perception.  
The firm adherence to neutrality is of particular relevance in the analysis of Argentina’s 
Strategic Culture, since it represents the lowest possible degree of activism in Meyer´s 
model of scalable norms. Indeed, for most of the 20th century, Argentina sought to remain 
outside of all major international conflicts, arguing that it was not in its interest to engage 
in the struggle for power among extra-regional actors. This was the case during both 
World Wars75; the Cold War, when the country flirted with the Non-Aligned Movement 
without really committing to it  (Serrat 1991); and, in the minimal commitment shown to 
UN-sanctioned Peacekeeping Operations in the 1945-1991 period, despite the country’s 
efforts to be elected as temporary member of the UNSC (Norden 1995, 331–33). 
Having developed a Strategic Culture centred on the principles of neutrality and non-
intervention, the domestic threshold of authorization for the use of force was high. The 
country refrained from using its military apparatus in international conflicts between the 
end of the Triple Alliance War (1864-1870) and the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982). Even 
in the context of widespread military rule across the region and after a decade-long arms 
race between the early-1960s and the mid-1970s  (Frederiksen and Looney 1989; Selcher 
1985), the sustained Argentine decline vis a vis Brazil led to no armed conflict, contrary to 
the expectations of Power Transition Theory (Organski 1968). This low degree of activism 
also explains why the military Junta had to organize media campaigns throughout 1978 
to justify the escalation of hostilities with Chile  (Passarelli 1998), despite the already 
dominating negative view of the neighbouring country among the general population. 
Moreover, the take-over by the Argentine Armed Forces of the Malvinas/Falklands 
                                                        




Islands was done in secret and securing that there were no casualties on the British side, 
following the unfounded expectation that under those conditions the UK could accept a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict and avoid a military confrontation. 
 
The domestic enemy: Counter-insurgency and high internal activism 
Ever since the military seized power from President Hipólito Yrigoyen´s government 
(1916-1922; 1928-1930), the Armed Forces have been involved in six coups against 
democratically elected presidents (1930-1932; 1943-1946; 1955-1958; 1962-1963; 
1966-1973; 1976-1983). This marked an evident politicization of the Armed Forces, who 
had previously resented being used as security-enforcing forces in domestic affairs, but 
were starting to see themselves as “legal guardians of the political system” (Mani 2015, 
3). As a result, “Between 1930 and 1989, no elected government completed its term 
without some sort of intervention […]. Civilian control over the military was, for much of 
this time, problematic […].”(Diamint and Watson 1996, 1).  
Not only did the politicization of the Armed Forces increase in this period, but their 
willingness to face contestation with the use of military force also grew exponentially. The 
first open and sizeable example of an increased degree of activism in the use of force for 
domestic purposes can be seen in the June, 1955, military rebellion against President Juan 
D. Perón, when elements of the Air Force, the Naval Aviation, and the Naval Infantry 
attacked various targets across the country (both military and civilian) killing at least 308 
people and injuring over 700 (Portugheis 2015). 
This trend became particularly dominant since the 1950s onwards, when French 
counter-insurgency doctrines became a popular topic of debate among military circles, 
and peaked in the 1960s-1970s thanks to the training in military counter-insurgency 
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strategies provided by US institutions (the School of the Americas and the Inter-American 
Defence College) following the 1959 Cuban revolution  (Dodds 2000; Pion-Berlin 1989b, 
99). However, unlike the intra-elite disputes that triggered the 1955 attacks, the military 
activism of the following decades used increasing amounts of force against social and 
political groups vaguely branded as “communists” or “subversives”, presented as threats 
to the elites’ Western, Christian self-perception  (Diamint and Watson 1996; Loveman 
1999). In the words of Klaus Dodds, “Armed with the doctrine of national security and the 
organic metaphor of the state, military figures employed geopolitical discourses to 
geographically locate these dangers and thereafter to ‘purify’ these contaminated spaces.” 
(Dodds 2000). Though there are no exact figures of the number of people murdered, 
tortured, or “disappeared” by the Armed Forces and its para-military Grupos de Tareas 
during the 1976-1983 dictatorship, the numbers are well within the thousands, with 
Human Rights organizations and family members of the victims estimating it close to the 
symbolically-adopted number of 30,000. 
The above comes to inform the notion that the Argentine Strategic Culture had a low 
degree of activism in the use of force. Though the Armed Forces consistently avoided 
inter-state military confrontations for over a century, the use of military force to establish 
domestic “order” became not only common but also indiscriminate. Meyer’s scalable 
norms are less effective in appraising this type phenomena, particularly so with regards 
to the threshold of legitimization and the accepted goals for the use of force, given the 
dictatorial nature of the regimes and the secrecy surrounding the majority of the actions 
undertaken. However, it is important to highlight that the Armed Forces were by no 
means alone in their quest to rid the country of “political extremism”, since due to the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian nature of the regime they counted with the support of civilian 
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actors, including sectors of the conservative political, economic and religious elites; 
bureaucratic actors; and even sectors of the general population  (G. O’Donnell 1978, 6–9). 
 
The above discussions sought to highlight key inconsistencies, continuities and 
contradictions in the Argentine foreign and defence policies pre-1983, used as proxies to 
tap into some of the central normative features that shaped the country´s Strategic 
Culture for most of the 20th century. All planning for the defence sector in this period saw 
both the international and the domestic (particularly since the incorporation of French 
doctrines, in the 1950s) as potential threat sources. This meant that, while acquisitions of 
military hardware were made with an inter-state war in mind, the AMoD devoted a large 
part of its operational budget to domestic intelligence and security (Sibilla 2010, 26–27). 
However, the last military dictatorship constituted such a traumatic event for the 
Argentine society that it ostensibly affected the Argentine Strategic Culture in the long 
run. This was not because its policies necessarily broke with previous tendencies, but 
rather due to the reactions they elicited once democratic rule was restored, opening a 
window of opportunity for the post-1983 democratic governments to redefine some of 
the key normative commitments at the core of Argentina´s Strategic Culture.  
 
Evolution of the Argentine Strategic Culture since 1983 
This sub-section engages with the Strategic Culture developed in Argentina since the 
re-democratization process started, in 1983. Its goal is to analyse different elements that 
allow tapping into the key characteristics of the Strategic Norms informing Argentina´s 
agenda in the SADC negotiations. Specifically, I seek to distil the essential normative 
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commitments that make up this country´s Strategic Culture from the narratives identified 
in interviews and the domestic legal framework. 
 
The Defence sector after the transition 
Coming out of the dictatorship, the Armed Forces only managed to impose a weak self-
armistice law that was speedily repealed by the National Congress in the first months of 
President Raul Alfonsín’s administration (1983-1989). Aided by the strong activism of 
different third-sector organizations that pressured domestically and internationally for 
the implementation of truth and justice measures (González-Ocantos 2016, 71–74), the 
Alfonsín administration and other political elites imposed penalty measures to the Armed 
Forces, including a dramatic cut to the defence budget; a reduction to the number of 
conscripts; and, a de-centralization of military dependencies and institutes (Tedesco 
1996, 25). This was done to make sure that any remaining political leverage in the hands 
of the “military party” was taken from its power. 
There was continuity in this measures. The weight of the defence budget on the annual 
GDP was reduced by almost two thirds in barely ten years, going from 4.4%, in 1980, to 
1.45%, in 1990, and was maintained at 1.56%-1.24% for at least another decade  (Scheetz 
2002, 63). Though there have been minor increases in the total amounts allocated, they 
are largely related to peaks in the national GDP and not to a re-definition of the approach 
to the issue. Morever, in the wake of one of the country’s most devastating political and 
economic crisis, all post-2002 governments have given primacy to securing funding for 




Graph 3. Evolution of the Argentine Defence budget and national GDP (1980-2000). In 
constant 2010 US$ billion 
 
Source: Based on data obtained from (Scheetz 2002) and the World Bank 
 
Political context and goals for the defence sector post-1983 
The main concerns Argentina had with regards to its defence sector in the aftermath of 
the dictatorship were related to: the re-definition of the role and doctrine of the Armed 
Forces in a democratic context; disarticulating any remainders of the “military party”; 
and, establishing a strong civilian/political control over the process of defence planning 
(Battaglino 2013b; Diamint 2013; Martínez 2002; Sibilla 2010). 
With this agenda in mind, the renewal of the Argentine Strategic Culture post-1983 
responds to a series of political and contextual conditions. On the one hand, the surfacing 
evidence of blatant Human Rights violations, the defeat in an unnecessary war, and a poor 
economic performance meant that the loss of social prestige76 of the Armed Forces gave 
                                                        
76 A survey conducted by Ruth Fuchs in 2002 shows that, even twenty years after the end of the dictatorship, 
only 30% of the political elites trusted the Armed Forces (Fuchs 2005). Moreover, a 2005 survey also shows 
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the government the mandate to revamp the whole defence sector and the Strategic Norms 
(Escudé and Fontana 1998; Fuchs 2005; Tavares 2014; Tello 2008). Though remainders 
of the “military party” eventually managed to leverage President Alfonsín’s 
administration77 by staging uprisings, the generalized support for the democratically 
elected government prevented this from escalating into a coup d´Êtat.  
In this context, a growing number of lawmakers, academics, jurists and experts in the 
area came together to form what Marina Vitelli (Vitelli 2015a) identifies as a novel 
epistemic community around the defence sector. The influence of such communities on 
threat perceptions and defence policies has been widely discussed (Adler 1992; Haas 
1992; Howorth 2004; Sebenius 1992), and the institutional role given to them in Latin 
America has been proven to be increasingly relevant  (Weiffen et al. 2011, 404). Among 
the more salient names in the first generation of academics and political aids with 
expertise in the defence sector include Luis Tibiletti, Rut Diamint, José Manuel Ugarte, 
Marcela Donadio, Ernesto López, Héctor Luis Saint-Pierre (based in Brazil), Gustavo 
Adolfo Druetta, and Ángel Tello, just to name a few. In institutional terms, SER en el 2000, 
and later RESDAL, helped congregate a wide variety of individuals involved in the debates 
regarding the re-creation of the Armed Forces and their social role in democracy  (Vitelli 
2015c, 77–79). The high level of internationalization of this epistemic community and its 
fluid relations with similar communities in Chile, Brazil, and the US meant that these 
academics and expert advisors were significantly more open to support the adoption of a 
cooperative defence agenda than previous generations ever were. 
                                                        
77 President Alfonsín advocated for two armistice laws as a way to secure governability in a context of 
economic crisis and social instability (Tedesco 1996): The “Due Obedience law” (Law 23.521), exonerated 
mid- and low-rank personnel of Human Rights violations, considering that they were following orders; and, 
the “Full Stop law” (Law 23.492), limiting the scope of time within which new cases could be brought to 
justice. Both laws were repealed by the National Congress in 2003, and the Supreme Court declared them 
unconstitutional in 2005 (Lessa and Levey 2015). 
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Vitelli has looked at the influence that the Argentine defence epistemic community has 
had on the development of the country´s defence and foreign policies, concluding that it 
was with them that the idea of creating a South American organization devoted to policy 
coordination and cooperation in the area of defence first emerged (Vitelli 2015b, 51–53). 
Moreover, in the interviews conducted in Buenos Aires, both Luis Tibiletti and Jorge 
Battaglino agreed in that this group of experts had not only influenced the decision of the 
government to join the SADC negotiations, but also informed the negotiation agenda more 
broadly by presenting letters of support, organizing workshops on the topic, and thanks 
to its institutional presence among the expert advisors of the AMoD. This is something 
that can also be confirmed by looking at the composition of the Argentine negotiating 
team, which did not include any member of the Armed Forces and was instead integrated 
by civil expert advisors with relevant academic backgrounds on the field. 
 
On the other hand, the Alfonsín administration not only had the political priority of 
reducing the ability of the military to influence foreign and defence policy decisions 
(Norden and Russell 2002, 50; Tavares 2014), but also inherited a situation of incipient 
rapprochement with Brazil78 (Escudé and Cisneros 1998b, Chap. 68). The foreign and 
defence policies of the Alfonsín administration combined elements of both continuity and 
change to maximize the impact of these processes. Though it sought to reassert the 
Western condition of the country and its culture, it rejected taking sides in the 
confrontation between superpowers; returned to the Non-Aligned Movement; gave 
                                                        
78 As would be expected, General Guglialmelli reacted negatively to the Corpus-Itaipú agreement that 
facilitated this rapprochement, publishing an op-ed in the journal Estrategia (Issue 61/62, pp. 7-29) entitled 
“Corpus-Itaipú. Tres batallas perdidas por la Argentina y, ahora peligrosas perspectivas: el papel de socio 
menor del Brasil” (Corpus-Itaipú. Three lost battles for Argentina and, now, dangerous perspectives: The 
role of being Brazil’s smaller partner). However, the Junta under Jorge Rafael Videla’s leadership favoured 
the rapprochement process. 
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priority to regional cooperation (participating in the creation of regional governance and 
policy coordination groupings such as the Contadora Support Group, the Cartagena 
Consensus, the Rio Group); and, signed a number of economic integration agreements 
with Brazil  (Escudé and Cisneros 1998b; Oelsner 2005b). The norm of peaceful resolution 
of controversies also regained strength, a good example being the decision to submit the 
arbitration laud on the Beagle Channel controversy with Chile to a referendum, given the 
lack of political support from the opposition in the National Congress. This not only had 
the goal of starting a process of desecuritization in the relationship with Chile, but also 
sought to limit the ability of the military to influence future foreign policy decisions 
(Norden and Russell 2002, 59–60; Tavares 2014). 
 
Some of these measures continued with subsequent governments. For example, 
President Carlos Menem (1989-1995; 1995-1999) actively raised the stakes for regional 
integration, participating in the creation of the MERCOSUR with his Brazilian, Paraguayan, 
and Uruguayan counterparts. He also continued desecuritizing the bilateral relations with 
Chile, with whom Argentina currently shares its longest-lasting and more fruitful defence 
cooperation scheme. As will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs, the 
Menem administration expressed its interest in institutionalizing (sub)regional defence 
cooperation in repeated occasions. In addition, to these measures, the Armed Forces were 
further stripped of role and power after conscript Omar Carrasco was murdered during a 
rotation at the Zapala military base, in 1994. The political repercussions of this case led 
to the Congress repealing the conscription system altogether. 
If judged in terms of the political and social influence of the more interventionist 
sectors of Armed Forces and old defence elites, these measures seem to have worked. The 
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Argentine democracy has become more established and the military has not threatened 
the continuity of nor the transition between democratically elected governments. 
However, as Jorge Battaglino argues, the reforms have also led to a substantial reduction 
of the military´s mobilization capabilities, constituting a pyrrhic victory at best, practically 
decimating the Armed Forces in the long term and hindering their ability to fulfil their 
most basic tasks (Battaglino 2013b, 267). 
 
Finally, the construction of strong cooperative partnerships got the defence policy in 
line with the requirements of the foreign policy  (Battaglino 2013b; Martínez 2002; Sain 
1999). In the context of the immediate post-Cold War order, President Menem´s foreign 
policy priorities were centred on the consolidation of trade regionalism in the form of 
MERCOSUR, on the one hand, and with the establishment of a preferential relationship 
with the US, on the other. The country received a “Major Non-NATO ally” status from the 
Department of State after sending a naval force to collaborate in the Desert Storm/Desert 
Shield operations. After this, participating in Peacekeeping operations became one of the 
most salient “power projection” policies adopted during the Menem administration 
(Huser 1998, 57–60). This was not only in line with the interests of the US (as 
commentators hurried to point out), but also provided the Armed Forces with a new 
purpose. Also, the UN covered a number of operative expenses incurred by the countries 
involved, which meant that the military got the chance to mobilize and provide 
operational experience to its units at relatively low cost, which was by no means a minor 




In addition to all the above, the political and economic crisis that shook Argentina in 
2001 led almost immediately to the securitization of the systemic level, in the sense that 
the society and sectors of the political elites came to perceive the US and the IMF as key 
threats to the country´s interests  (Simonoff 2015, 6–7). Given the presence of a number 
of left-of-centre governments with autonomist agendas in power throughout the region79, 
the Argentine government felt comfortable adopting a Latin-Americanist discourse, 
expected to produce higher levels of solidarity and shared interests with regional 
partners. This process created further incentives for regional cooperation, reinforcing the 
already existing Strategic Norms on the matter. Hence, South America became a refuge 
during the Kirchner (2003-2007) and Fernández (2007-2011; 2011-2015) 
administrations, which meant that the balance between “autonomist”80 and 
“dependentist”81 sectors of the local defence elites  (Simonoff 2008, 27) accentuated its 
turn in favour of the former. 
 
Crafting a new Strategic Culture: Legislation, meanings and normative commitments 
The 1976-1983 dictatorship represented an impasse in the common state of affairs, 
breaking with normative commitments such as the principle of peaceful resolution of 
conflicts and low degree of international military activism. However, the social discredit 
of the Armed Forces allowed subsequent democratic governments to seek one of the most 
                                                        
79 Alternatively referred to as the “Pink Tide” (Moraña 2008) or “Latin American turn to the left” (Beasley-
Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg 2009; Levitsky and Roberts 2011). 
80 Members of the foreign policy elites and academics who privilege relations with the Latin American 
region and other peripheral countries with the objectives of maximizing the country´s ability to define an 
autonomous foreign policy agenda and minimizing the constraints resulting from the asymmetrical 
relations with bigger partners. 
81 Members of the foreign policy elites and academics who seek to establish preferential relationships with 
bigger powers with the goal of securing higher gains as a result and perhaps even some influence in relevant 
negotiations tables, even if this requires falling into a bandwagoning strategy. 
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far-reaching institutional, doctrinal and political transformations of the defence sector in 
the region  (Diamint 2008; Mani 2015). One of the often overseen effects that the military 
uprisings of the 1980s had over the political system was to facilitate the negotiations at 
the National Congress to reach a basic consensus about the new National Defence Law, 
turning it into the epicentre of the conceptual and political discussions about the new 
Strategic Culture (Follietti 2005; Laleff Ilieff 2012). The resulting body of legislation has 
been in continuous development and evolution, and currently includes: 
- National Defence Law – Law Nº 23.554 (1988); 
- Domestic Security Law - Law Nº 24.059 (1992); 
- Armed Forces Restructuration Law – Law Nº 24.948 (1998); 
- National Intelligence Law - Law Nº 25.520 (2001); 
- National Defence Law Regulatory Decree – Decree Nº727 (2006); and, 
- Repeal of the Military Justice Code – Law Noº26.394 (2008) 
 
The 1988 National Defence Law established key conceptual, political, normative, and 
institutional definitions that would become the cornerstone of the defence sector in 
democracy (Sibilla 2010). It imposes strict limits to the participation of the Armed Forces 
in domestic affairs, built on a rigid conceptual and legal differentiation between “security” 
and “defence”82 (Congreso de la Nación Argentina 1988 Art. 4), thus producing a clear 
break with the principles of the National Security Doctrine incorporated into the previous 
                                                        
82 Understanding the latter as the only area of competence for the Armed Forces, defined as the creation of 
a deterrence to aggressive behaviour by other states (Frenkel and Comini 2017). This distinction at the 
domestic level may become confusing when engaging with matters of regional or international security, 
since the mechanisms for cooperation in the Defence sector (understood as protection against external 
aggression) that the SADC put in place are, when seen from a structural IR perspective, contributing factors 
to the governance of regional security. Whether the text is referring to domestic or regional/international 




National Defence Law to legitimize the intervention of the Armed Forces in domestic 
affairs (Congreso de la Nación Argentina 1966). 
In order to avoid ambiguities and further reduce the size of the Armed Forces, the 
Gendarmería Nacional Argentina and the Prefectura Naval Argentina83 were taken away 
from the aegis of the Army and the Navy, respectively, placing them under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Domestic Security (Congreso de la Nación Argentina 1988 Art. 7). 
Moreover, congressional and social consensus supporting the clear distinction between 
domestic security and defence was strong enough as to block all attempts to incorporate 
the “new threats”84 agenda to the military doctrine despite repeated attempts in that 
sense by President Menem, high-ranking military officers, and US diplomats (Sain 2001, 
14–28).  
This would become a crucial aspect in the SADC negotiating agenda, not only because 
of the domestic legal requirements to separate the two areas, but more importantly due 
to how this differentiation has been incorporated into the Argentine post-1983 culture, 
acting as a meaning-making concept that has heavily influenced policy preferences. 
 
The National Defence Law also states that the Armed Forces can address any threats to 
the country using their means “in dissuasive and in effective” ways (Congreso de la Nación 
Argentina 1988 Art. 2). Unlike Chile, dissuasion is understood here in its most traditional 
                                                        
83 Two “intermediate” forces with capabilities, training and doctrines that allow them to participate both in 
defence and security activities (Battaglino 2013b, 267). While the Gendarmería was inspired in the French 
Gendarmerie Nationale and is tasked with handling law enforcement in areas such as borders and national 
roads, the Prefectura is a body similar to the US Coast Guard but tasked with law enforcement, patrolling, 
and support only in Argentine territorial waters. 
84 Though this concept had years in the making, it was forcefully advanced by the US to Latin American 
countries during the First Conference of Ministers of Defence of the Americas, held in Williamsburg, in 1995. 
Under this umbrella term, challenges of transnational nature such as terrorism, drug traffic, and 




meaning, i.e. the accumulation and implementation of sufficient resources that an 
aggression would be too costly  (Kugler 2002, 1). This is in line with the defensive military 
doctrine that has characterized Argentina since 1870, rooted in the commitment to the 
principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts, but is however in conflict with the meagre 
budgetary allocation that the Armed Forces currently receive.  
Strategic norms concerning the goals and ways of using military force recovered a low 
degree of domestic activism unseen since the 1930s, while the norms that define and 
shape the preferred forms of cooperation suffered significant alterations. One of the key 
argument of this section is, precisely, that the changes suffered by the latter are essential 
to understand the seemingly paradoxical increase in the degree of international activism 
in Argentina’s current Strategic Culture. 
A brief clarification is necessary before continuing. As explained in the conceptual 
chapter, Meyer’s definition of activism focuses exclusively on the use of military force, 
which I find unnecessarily limiting. The high degree of international activism to which I 
make reference here also includes the willingness to engage in cooperative security 
initiatives and to deploy the military in Peacekeeping Operations. 
 There is a widespread consensus among the members of the defence elite interviewed 
in Buenos Aires regarding the stability and absence of threats to Argentine interests 
coming from the regional security environment. The redefinition of the Strategic Norms 
related to preferred forms of cooperation is largely understood and explained under this 
light, and seen as the result of a slow and incremental social learning process that has 
shaped the meaning given to increasingly complex and intrusive defence coordination 
initiatives (interviews with Battaglino; Comini; Rodríguez; Tibiletti). It is interesting to 
see that the dominating narrative among members of defence elites places Argentina at 
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the very centre of the initiative, treating the SADC almost as an expansion of Southern 
Cone security dynamics to the rest of the region. Moreover, since it emphasizes the 
“leading” role exercised during the 1990s proposing similar initiatives (which will be 
discussed in detail further down), this narrative seems to imply that Argentina is as 
responsible for the SADC initiative as Brazil. 
One of the forms of international cooperation favoured by the legislative framework is 
related to the participation of the country in UN-sanctioned Peacekeeping Operations. The 
AMoD identifies this as one of the cornerstones of Argentina´s defence and foreign 
policies, and as one of the central elements of the country´s current Strategic Culture 
(Ministerio de Defensa de la República Argentina 2008, 8). President Menem´s decision to 
incorporate the participation in UN Peacekeeping missions onto the key functions of the 
Armed Forces (Congreso de la Nación Argentina 1998) succeeded in boosting the 
country´s international image, linking the defence sector with international cooperation 
initiatives, and redefining the country´s Strategic Culture. For the Armed Forces, 
participating in high-profile, UN-sanctioned, multilateral activities insinuated that their 
public image could start to recover and that their role in a democratic society was starting 
to take shape  (Hirst 2007, 4). By June 1995, Argentina had created the CAECOPAZ, the 
first centre in the region specifically conceived to train troops to participate in this type 
of multilateral operations  (Castro n.d., 58), and by 2004 it was coordinating with Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay (among others) their participation in the first UN Peacekeeping 
mission manned almost entirely by South American countries, the MINUSTAH. 
However, the incorporation of this cooperative element to the Argentine Strategic 
Culture challenged the long-held commitment of the country with the principle of non-
intervention, creating contention from sectors that saw Peacekeeping Operations as new 
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ways of legitimized intervention, particularly so in the case of the MINUSTAH  (Escudé 
and Fontana 1998; Follietti 2005; Llenderrozas 2006). Sectors of the Argentine academia 
argued against participating in the MINUSTAH, based precisely on the understanding that 
there was a real risk of it turning into an international intervention  (Hirst 2007). Given 
that the legal framework gave the National Congress the responsibility to make decisions 
about the movement of troops to other countries, the debate that took place in its 
chambers reaffirmed the essential role of the legislative body in defining the central 
commitments and norms that made up the country´s Strategic Culture (Follietti 2005).  
Despite some problems faced by the MINUSTAH, the participation of the country in 
Peacekeeping Operations has become such a central aspect of the role of the Armed Forces 
in democracy that very few members of the defence epistemic community would 
currently question its worth, and no voices were raised against the decision to create the 
binational Peacekeeping Forces “Cruz del Sur” with Chile, put at disposition of the United 
Nations since 2011 for deployment in its Peacekeeping Operations under the UNSAS. 
 
The other form of cooperation favoured by the legislative framework is the 
participation in cooperative security efforts. The post-1983 period saw an expansion of 
increasingly intrusive cooperation schemes of this type with former rivals, also rising the 
degree of activism. The already mentioned 1979 Corpus-Itaipú agreement and the well-
known 1985 Iguazú Declaration constitute the first steps in the trust-building process 
between Argentina and Brazil. In 1986, the two countries signed a protocol agreeing to 
exchange information on each other´s nuclear programmes and assist each other should 
a nuclear accident take place in either country. The bilateral nuclear cooperation, with all 
its strategic and mutual confidence implications  (Mallea, Spektor, and Wheeler 2015), 
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eventually grew into the creation ABACC, one of the foremost examples of cooperation 
and policy coordination in the region  (Brigagao and Valle Fonrouge 1999; Gardini 2010, 
97; Oelsner 2005a, 16; Tokatlian 2013). 
In more concrete military terms, Argentine and Brazilian defence elites established the 
Annual Symposium of Strategic Studies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1987. Other South 
American countries joined the initiative in subsequent years, turning it into the first 
regular meeting between high-ranking military officers (and civilian experts) of all 
Southern Cone countries, which had the effect of increasing mutual confidence, reducing 
information costs, discussing issues of mutual interest on regional security and defence, 
and discussing potential collaborative efforts  (Vitelli 2015a, 14–15). 
The 1997 MoU85 also remains crucial for the arguments presented in this chapter, since 
this was the first instance in which the respective MoDs became permanently entangled, 
establishing a Permanent Mechanism of Consultation and Coordination, with a subsidiary 
Permanent Mechanism of Strategic Analysis. In direct response to the increasing degrees 
of mutual trust, Brazil withdrew all its battalions stationed in the vicinity of the border 
with Argentina in July 1997 (Sain 1999, 136). 
With regards to Chile, the 1995 MoU86 became one of the cornerstones of the bilateral 
relation, together with the more renowned 1984 “Peace and Friendship Treaty” and the 
1991 “Presidential Declaration on the Borders between the Argentine Republic and the 
Republic of Chile”. These agreements provided the context to deactivate controversies 
and sources of distrust. The MoU formalized a protocol for the exchange of information 
related to military manoeuvres, and promoted academic efforts to strengthen 
                                                        
85 “Memorándum de Entendimiento de Consulta y Coordinación”, 22nd Apr. 1997. 
86 “Memorándum de Entendimiento para el Fortalecimiento de la Cooperación en Materias de Seguridad de 
Interés Mutuo”, 8th Nov. 1995 
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cooperation. More importantly, it created the joint Permanent Security Committee 
(COMPERSEG), crucial in fostering a stronger cooperation in defence and security 
(Claudio Fuentes and Alvarez 2011, 528–29; Rojas Aravena 2008, 40–42; Runza 2004).  
The COMPERSEG was instrumental in the inception of the first ever joint military 
exercise between the two countries, in August 1998  (Sain 1999, 135–36), and in the 
advancement of the most ambitious series of bilateral mutual confidence measures put in 
place in the region to date (Battaglino 2012, 89; Lt.Col. Arancibia-Clavel 2007), including 
the development of a control mechanism for military expenditures87. In 1997, Argentina 
invited Chilean officers to join its peacekeeping forces during their tour in Cyprus, 
providing specialized training for them at CAECOPAZ (Huser 1998, 67). It could be argued 
that, while unsuspected at the time, this invitation was the embryo for the Binational 
Peacekeeping Force “Cruz del Sur”, put at disposition of the UN in 2011, and suggested as 
a possible model for a regional peacekeeping force  (Ugarte 2014, 540). 
 
Finally, local defence elites see the different Argentine proposals of the 1990s to create 
a regional defence organization as one of the main antecedents to the SADC. Reports of 
calls by Argentina to form a South American / Southern Cone defence coordination 
organization can be found since the early-1990s  (Hirst and Russell 2001; Tavares 2014; 
Tibiletti 2014, 18), but there is no evidence that any proposal was ever seriously 
considered by Brazilian authorities. The first record of any high-ranking Argentine official 
publicly discussing this took place in 1996, when Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrés 
Cisneros maintained that the creation of an Argentine-Brazilian military force with a joint 
                                                        
87 The design of this instrument was commissioned to the ECLAC, and is the base on which the region-wide 
military expenditures comparison programme conducted by the CEED is built (Interview with Forti). 
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command was a concrete possibility  (Escudé and Fontana 1998). Later, during the 1997 
Annual Camaraderie Dinner, President Menem told members of his cabinet, high-ranking 
officers of the Armed Forces, and lawmakers that the creation of a regional defence 
organization was among his goals. Despite not explaining in detail what the 
characteristics of such organization would be, nor if negotiations with Brazil or Chile were 
already underway, President Menem claimed that advances were being made to create a 
“regional defence system” within MERCOSUR (Nación 1997). Later reports on the issue 
maintained that discreet bilateral meetings were to be held between Argentine and 
Brazilian officials that same month  (O´Donnell 1997), but no official declarations nor 
journalistic articles followed up on this information. 
An entire year passed before the topic was brought back to the public sphere, again by 
Argentina, during the XI Strategic Studies Symposium held in Buenos Aires on 20th July 
1998. Argentine Head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Carlos Zabala, proposed 
advancing towards the creation of regional defence policy coordination organization. This 
proposal was based on the perception that each member state had vulnerabilities that 
endangered the group as a whole and that should be addressed collectively  (Castro 
Olivera 1998). But, yet again, no official response was made public by the other states. 
This shows that the Argentine interest in institutionalizing this type of relationship was 
as consistent as the lack of interest in it from its regional partners  (Escudé and Fontana 
1998). 
According to Luis Tibiletti, the initiative was indeed an honest proposal on the 
Argentine side, but it failed to move forward due to the “lack of enthusiasm” on the 
Brazilian side (Interview with Tibiletti). Jorge Battaglino goes beyond that, suggesting 
that despite the successful bilateral rapprochement and cooperation, Brazilian defence 
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elites had not yet fully gotten rid of suspicions about the intentions behind their former 
rival´s actions (interview with Battaglino). 
In terms of the country´s Strategic Culture, the initiative shows the full extent of the 
changes undergone in the years after the democratic transition. In an attempt to exorcize 
its traumatic past, punish the Armed Forces, and create a defence policy for the newly 
established democracy, Argentina went ahead with a deep revision of its Strategic Norms 
related to the preferred modes of cooperation. A low level of activism in terms of the 
legitimate goals for and ways to use military force internationally regained its traditional 
position in the Argentine Strategic Culture after 1983, while policy coordination 
experiences with regional partners and an international identity shaped by the 
participation in Peacekeeping Operations meant that Argentina altered its preferred 
forms of cooperation by lowering the domestic authorization threshold for this type of 
initiatives. Furthermore, the defence policy has been re-designed in such way that 
international cooperation activities are now at the centre of the country´s Strategic 
Culture, providing a new meaning and purpose to the military and the defence policy. 
In addition to these legal and normative framework, Alejandro Frenkel and Nicolás 
Comini (2017, 10–14) provide a detailed analysis of further restrictions to the Argentine 
position regarding the SADC emanating from a “polygamous” international insertion 
strategy and the country´s dependence on extra-regional defence suppliers. Having now 
a better understanding of the cultural, normative, material, and institutional context with 
which Argentina faced the proposal by Brazil to create the SADC, it is possible to interpret 




The Argentine position in the SADC negotiations 
 
The developments discussed above should provide relevant insights into the way 
Argentina re-defined the role of its Armed Forces, the way it has come to think about 
defence matters, and ultimately about the characteristics of its Strategic Culture. The 
reasons behind Argentina´s adoption of a more active cooperative agenda, deactivating 
old rivalries, and demilitarizing security dynamics are multiple and cannot be simply 
reduced to controlling the military. The characteristics of the “New World Order” in the 
immediate post-Cold War era, a receptive regional security environment, a learning 
process facilitating coordination and cooperation with regional partners, budgetary 
restrictions, the need to re-define the role of the Armed Forces in democracy, and the 
presence of an epistemic community advocating for more intrusive regional cooperation 
initiatives help understand, the changes introduced to Argentina’s Strategic Norms and, 
hence, the meanings informing its position in the SADC negotiations. 
 
Inter-Ministerial disagreements in the perception of South America 
In the context of increasing political coincidences with other South American countries, 
and considering the exponential growth in the relevance of cooperative efforts as part of 
the country´s own Strategic Culture, it would be expected that Argentina jumped on the 
SADC initiative without hesitating. However, the testimony of various interviewees shows 
that the first reaction to this initiative was not entirely positive. According to Alfredo Forti, 
this was due to mid- and high-ranking members of the diplomatic service, as well as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge Taiana himself, being suspicious of the Brazilian initiative 
(Interview Forti). The fact that the main (and, most times, only) representative of the 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the SADC negotiations, Ambassador Rafael Grossi, was 
unavailable to be interviewed makes it difficult to have a clear idea as to why the ministry 
might have held such initial position. Securing an interview with former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Jorge Taiana, also proved impossible. 
According to Forti, the position assumed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs might be 
explained due to a number of reasons: 
- A persistent distrust about Brazilian intentions (a view shared by Rut Diamint); 
- Resentment that Brazil was proposing a regional organization of this nature, when 
similar ideas presented by Argentina during the 1990s had been snubbed (a view 
shared by Leonardo Hekimian; Luis Tibiletti; and, Jorge Battaglino); and, 
- High-ranking diplomats having undergone training in historical contexts different 
to the new regional environment, which allegedly would have made them more 
cautious of hidden agendas. 
Though the desecuritization strategy was successful in deactivating the mutual rivalry, 
that did not necessarily mean that a culture of friendship had fully consolidated between 
the two states  (Russell and Tokatlian 2003, 32). Moreover, one of the foremost 
representatives of the “old guard” in the foreign policy elites, former Argentine 
Ambassador to the UN and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Fernando Petrella, has 
claimed that Argentina´s best interest is in maintaining and strengthening hemispheric 
institutions like the OAS instead of committing with the South American institutional 
framework fostered by Brazil  (Petrella 2013). His argument is that, contrary to what the 
“autonimist” sectors would say with regards to the OAS being an instrument of US 
hegemony in the region, Argentina had had an active and leading role in shaping the 
objectives and principles that the hemispheric institution defends. As such, his argument 
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continues, the OAS is better suited to defend Argentine interests and counter the Brazilian 
seemingly ubiquitous presence in South American politics. 
Whatever the reason, the AMFA did see with suspicion the Brazilian attempt to create 
a South American grouping, and convinced President Fernández that the delegation sent 
to the first round of negotiations should not include any high-ranking members of the 
national administration (Interviews with Comini; Forti; Hekimian). Moreover, during this 
first meeting Argentina proposed inviting Mexico to join the SADC, knowing full well that 
the proposal would not hold88, but trying to nevertheless make evident that it preferred 
a Latin American arrangement rather than a South American one (Interviews with 
Comini; Diamint). Though no information in the archives reflects these concerns, 
interviews to both Argentine and Chilean negotiators show that Argentina´s original 
stance was one of “cautious expectation”, rather than ease with the proposal or even an 
attempt to deploy regional leadership in the negotiations (as insinuated by different 
interviewees). 
In part, the fundamental contradictions between the AMFA and the AMoD may have 
been associated with the fact that the respective Ministers represented different power 
coalitions (Diamint 2016, 17), each with different perspectives, interests and agendas. 
Moreover, the Strategic Norms about the role of cooperative arrangements within the 
Argentine defence policy certainly had a more direct and decisive effect on the defence 
epistemic community than on the foreign policy sector. This may also help explain the 
inter-ministerial disagreement with regard to the SADC. In this sense, the role of President 
                                                        
88 The explicitly South American membership of UNASUR prevented the possibility of having Mexico joining 
the SADC. This was by design. According to José Antonio Sanahuja, the Brazilian decision to circumscribe 
the new organization to South America was related to two constants in its foreign policy: the quest for 
autonomy and regional leadership. More autonomy was to be achieved by isolating the region from the US 
geopolitical area, and regional leadership would be more easily accomplished by eliminating potential 
rivals. Both objectives were attainable with a redefinition of “the Latin American regionalism in a South 
American frame and narrative”, taking Mexico and the US out of the picture (Sanahuja 2012, 9). 
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Fernández in deciding which position would guide the Argentine participation in the 
discussions was essential, as is usually the case in the decision-making processes of 
delegative democracies  (G. O’Donnell 1994, 66). 
 
The Argentine negotiating agenda 
Goals and expectations of the AMoD negotiating team 
The assessment that these expert advisors made of the regional security environment 
led them to the conclusion that a South American defence cooperation organization was 
in the best interest of the country, since it aligned with its goals of de-militarizing regional 
security dynamics and stabilizing the security complex at no significant cost for the 
country (interviews with Codiani; Hekimian; Rodríguez). Moreover, it was perceived that 
this initiative could further work in Argentina´s interests, should it be able to propagate 
the country’s ideas, discourses, and Strategic Norms across the region. The goal was to 
use this South American organization to facilitate Argentine leadership in the realm of 
shared ideas about defence and cooperation, thus compensating for the lack of material 
and economic resources (interview with Comini). 
The expectation of the defence elites was that, if member states of the SADC voluntarily 
decided to join the cooperative efforts, then the regional security dynamics could be 
further demilitarized without the need of investing resources to it. Such was the 
conviction on the positive outcomes this plan could deliver that the Office of International 
Affairs of the AMoD was assigned the responsibility to lead the negotiations for Argentina. 
This was the first instance since the return of democratic rule in which the AMoD took 
over from the AMFA in a multilateral negotiation of this nature, with the latter limiting its 
participation to providing legal advice. 
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According to the interviewees, the mandate given by President Fenández to the AMoD 
to negotiate the creation of the Defence Council was broad. It was up to the Minister to 
define the strategy, the agenda, and the lines the country would not cross (Interview with 
Forti). In turn, Minister Nilda Garré passed most of the responsibility to conduct the 
negotiations to Deputy Minister Forti and the team of advisors working at the Office of 
International Affairs. The agenda this work group put together can be directly traced back 
to a Strategic Culture centred on fostering more activist cooperative actions and 
expanding confidence-building efforts to help further demilitarize regional relations. 
From the perspective adopted by the Argentine delegation, the central objectives of the 
SADC should be to: 
- Help further desecuritize regional relations;  
- Extend the stable Zone of Peace from the Southern Cone to the rest of the regional security 
complex;  
- Multilateralize efforts to build mutual confidence measures; and,  
- Enable a rapprochement process between countries whose relations still remained 
confrontational. 
In Forti´s view, institutionalizing and strengthening regional cooperation in the field of 
defence also allowed to secure more autonomy from extra-regional pressures. This is not 
to say that the creation of the SADC followed an anti-US logic, as some commentators have 
suggested was the case. On the contrary, the proposal by the Venezuelan delegation to 
include in the SADC statute an explicit condemnation to the activities conducted by the US 
IV Fleet in the region was vocally opposed by most delegations (including Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Colombia), which led to its immediate rejection (Grupo de Trabajo del 
CDS 2009, 79). Moreover, during a trip to Washington in March 2008, Brazilian Minister 
of Defence Nelson Jobim reassured his US counterpart, Robert Gates, that the aim of the 
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SADC was in no way to foster anti-US sentiments in the region (Comini 2015, 112–13). 
Nevertheless, the SADC proposal was certainly informed by Brazilian goal to achieve more 
autonomy from extra-regional actors (COHA 2008), an objective with which the 
“autonomist” sectors of the Argentine defence elites could certainly empathize. 
The AMoD´s civilian expert advisors, all of whom are either members of or closely 
related to the local defence epistemic community, were the first to express interest in the 
project. They recall the negotiations as a relatively expedite process, in which Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile constituted a cluster that set the agenda and led the discussions. The 
relevance given in their accounts to the joint agenda advanced with Chile, as well as to the 
proposals made in the 1990s to create a similar organization, evidences an underlying 
narrative related to the status Argentina had as regional stabilizer in the early-20th 
century. In their view, Argentina approached the negotiations expecting to demonstrate 
pro-activeness, a propositive agenda, and leadership abilities. 
 
The negotiating agenda 
In terms of a more concrete negotiating agenda, all interviewees agreed that Argentina 
was aiming to reproduce at the regional level the agenda that already existed in the 
bilateral relationship with Chile. This required, first, that the areas in which policy 
coordination and cooperation were going to be introduced agreed with the conceptual 
distinction between defence and security, on top of which Argentina and Chile had built 
their respective defence policies and mutual cooperation agendas. This was accepted 
without major opposition, despite the Colombian delegation’s initial request to include 
the fight against terrorism in the statute. Once this goal was achieved, the Argentine 
negotiating agenda focused on: 
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- Mutual Confidence Measures 
- Educational and research bodies 
- Common doctrine 
- Military industries 
Firstly, in order to advance the goals of desecuritizing and demilitarizing regional 
relations, it was proposed that the region could adopt some of the more successful 
confidence-building measures that already existed between Argentina and Chile. This has 
been identified by interviewees in Argentina and in Chile as the main interest both 
countries had in the creation of the SADC, and it is precisely in this agenda that the 
organization worked most decisively and efficiently during its first years of existence 
(Consejo de Defensa Suramericano 2009, 2010; Vitelli 2016), creating a joint register of 
defence expenditures, disclosing military inventories, and organizing joint military 
exercises, among others. Moreover, though it was only informally discussed after the 
negotiations, the idea of creating a regional Peacekeeping force put at disposition of the 
UN also stems from the experience of the Argentine-Chilean Joint Force. 
Secondly, the Argentine negotiators were particularly adamant in trying to advance 
with the creation of shared understandings regarding regional defence, particularly in the 
form of a regional doctrine that incorporated the Strategic Norms related to international 
cooperation that already informed Argentine defence policies. In order to achieve this 
goal, Argentina proposed the creation of two permanent bodies: the Centre of Strategic 
Defence Studies (CEED), working as a “think tank” from its Buenos Aires headquarters to 
provide basic research necessary for the development of a joint doctrine and cooperative 
activities; and, the South American Defence School (ESUDE), which would provide courses 
and academic exchange opportunities for officials from the different member countries. 
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Despite Brazilian objections to the creation of permanent bodies within the SADC 
(interviews with Battaglino; Diamint), the CEED was quickly formed, and almost 
immediately started producing reports on topics of interest for regional security 
purposes89. The Argentine commitment with the creation of this research centre becomes 
evident upon realization that it had been part of the AMoD´s primary objectives even 
before the SADC initiative was even announced  (Simonoff 2012, 8). 
The reason why this was such a central concern for the Argentine position is twofold. 
On the one hand, knowing that it is in no position to exercise regional leadership on the 
grounds of its military or economic strength, Argentina´s perception was that it had an 
advantage over other regional powers in terms of the conceptualization and study of the 
defence sector as a result of the extensive work done by the local epistemic community 
after the democratization (Vitelli 2015b). It expected that the CEED would lead the way 
in the creation of the concepts and analytical frameworks on top of which common 
regional positions could later be built, while the ESUDE would help disseminate them 
among military personnel (interview with Tibiletti). As already stated, these were not 
new objectives for the Argentine defence elites, with projects to create a similar research 
centre within the MERCOSUR being advanced since the mid-1990s (Garreta 1995). 
On the other hand, the CEED was to be given the responsibility to monitor the 
implementation of many of the mutual confidence measures included in the SADC Action 
Plans, particularly those relating to transparency and sharing of information. Hence, 
                                                        
89 Among others, the CEED has produced the following reports and publications: Procedimientos de 
aplicación para las medidas de foment de la confienza y seguridad (2010); An official report on the 
distinction between security and defence issues (2011); Informe Acerca del Crimen Organizado 
Transnacional y Otras Nuevas Amenazas a la Seguridad Regional (2012); Three editions of the Joint South 
American Military Expenditures Record (2014, 2016, 2017); Estudio Prospectivo: Sudamerica 2025 (2015); 
Institucionalidad de la Defensa en Sudamérica (2015); The triannual journal “Observatorio Sudamericano 




Argentina considered that the creation of the CEED would give it the ability to secure that 
these measures were promptly implemented, instead of becoming dead letter. Aside from 
the positive impact that the CEED and the ESUDE could have by themselves by the very 
fact of being privileged spaces for the exchange of ideas and information, the Argentine 
expectation was that they would facilitate the spread of normative commitments in line 
with its own. 
 
Another of Argentina´s objectives, this time in line with the Brazilian position, was to 
enable the development of a stronger and more integrated regional military industry. 
Brazil had particular interest in this (interviews with Diamint; Hekimian; Tibiletti), but 
Argentina also reasons of its own to advance this idea, given the need to revitalize its 
languishing military industry with projects that could be of interest for the regional 
market. Also, the initiative was directly in line with the developmentalist policies 
advanced by the Fernández administration, relating it not only to the country´s Strategic 
Culture, but also to a wider interest in promoting a re-industrialization of the economy 
(Battaglino 2013a, 35–36). Finally this initiative would have also allowed Argentina to 
reduce its dependency on imported material, which had become harder to acquire for the 
Argentine Armed Forces due to the budgetary restrictions and as a result of the embargo 
that the UK could enforce on sales to Argentina from its NATO partners after the 
Malvinas/Falklands war. 
Though the interviewees somehow minimized the relevance of this point in their 
negotiating agenda, some very concrete actions taken by the Argentine government in this 
sense after the creation of the SADC suggest that this indeed was a point of great interest. 
For example, after the re-nationalization of FAdeA, in 2009, the administration showed 
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immediate interest in taking advantage of a regionalized market. The lack of funding for 
the Armed Forces meant that FAdeA would have a rough start taking construction 
projects off the ground, as has been the case with the development of modernized 
versions of the IA-63 Pampa (an advanced trainer aircraft originally developed in the 
1980s) and the re-motorization of the IA-58 Pucará (a COIN aircraft developed in the 
1960s). Hence, it joined the Brazilian Embraer in the design and construction of a military 
cargo plane, the KC-390, and “kickstarted” a project to build a basic trainer for the Air 
Forces in the region, the UNASUR I. A preliminary design for this light aircraft was already 
completed by 2010, based on lengthy discussions held by a SADC committee to compile 
the needs and demands of all South American partners, and to identify the contributions 
that the industries of each country could make to the construction of the aircrafts. 
However, subsequent political difficulties, lack of commitment, and complications finding 
a suitable provider for the engines meant that the project has been frozen ever since 
(interview with Forti). 
 
It is important to also highlight the “red lines” that the negotiators would not cross. The 
first was related to containing the more extreme expectations about the SADC, 
represented in the proposals brought by Venezuela. In this task, the Argentine delegation 
was in close coordination with Brazil and Chile, but also with Colombia and Peru. As 
already mentioned, the call made by President Hugo Chávez to make the SADC a “NATO 
of the South”, providing it with military resources and operational forces that would 
behave as a collective security arrangement, was quickly and decisively dismissed by 
Brazil and all of the region’s secondary powers. 
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The Venezuelan delegation brought up two other contentious points during the 
negotiation rounds, which also had to be contained. On the one hand, it proposed going 
against the regional tradition and incorporate a decision-making process based on 
majoritarian vote, instead of the usual norm of consensus. It is interesting that 
interviewees in the three countries under study claim that defending the consensus 
principle was, in fact, one of the main contributions made by their own delegations. On 
the other hand, Venezuela attempted to incorporate into the SADC statute the claim that 
the IV Fleet of the US Navy (tasked with the “Western hemisphere”, i.e. the Americas) was 
a threat to the region. Deputy Minister Forti emphasized that the Argentine view on this 
matter was that the SADC was “not against anyone”, and that therefore this element would 
have been out of place in the statute. Here, again, members of the Argentine delegation 
have claimed that opposing this proposal was mainly their doing, though similar accounts 
were also found in Chile and Colombia. 
Finally, as already explained, the Argentine delegation would not accept mixing 
domestic and external matters. The strong consensus among policy-makers, politicians, 
academics, and the society in general on creating a strong conceptual divide between 
security (domestic) and defence (external) activities made it deeply ingrained in the 
country´s Strategic Culture, and therefore non-negotiable. In order to be compatible with 
the local understanding of the distinctive roles that the Armed Forces and the security 
forces should have, a South American Defence Council could by no means make reference 
to the internal affairs of the member states. Chile, Uruguay, and to a lesser extent Brazil, 
all share a similar conceptualization and, hence, the division of labour between their 
armed and security forces is compatible with Argentina’s. As will be discussed in Chapter 
7, due to the involvement of its Armed Forces in the fight against the FARC and drug 
cartels, Colombia did in fact try to incorporate the domestic security agenda to the 
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negotiations. The corollary of this disagreement ended up being the exclusion of security 
concerns from the SADC, and the agreement to create a separate sectorial council within 
the UNASUR to tackle shared domestic security experiences, concerns and 
coordination/cooperation actions. Colombia only managed to have a rather ambiguous 
rejection to the actions of “illicit armed groups” included among the organization´s main 
principles, instead of a more robust commitment by its neighbours to include the fight 
against “terrorism” (discourse within which Colombia frames its domestic fight against 




This chapter sought to identify the key features of the Argentine Strategic Culture 
(norms, meanings, normative priors) informing the country’s positioning during the SADC 
negotiations. In doing so, it shows how historic processes have affected the way in which 
the country understands the use of its defence apparatus and approaches regional 
security as a result. This is not to say that the unipolar condition of current South 
American relations was not taken into consideration at all. In fact, Alfredo Forti clearly 
stated that “when Brazil calls, we listen” (interview with Forti). Instead, the goal of this 
chapter is to show how domestic elements also played a crucial role in informing the 
agency of secondary regional powers when faced with the proposal to create a regional 
organization like the SADC and, more importantly, their contributions to the regional 
social arrangements that resulted from its creation. 
This chapter has identified a number of continuities (preference for peaceful resolution 
of controversies; equality among states; low international activism in the use of force; a 
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quest for regional leadership; etc.) and new developments (incorporation of the 
Peacekeeping agenda into the defence policy; defence coordination and cooperation; 
demilitarization of regional relations; etc.) in the post-1983 period.  
For example, though not without problems, the preference for peaceful resolution of 
conflicts has indeed shown a strong continuity. This would indicate that crucial norms 
that makes up a country´s Strategic Culture and inform how it relates to the defence sector 
broadly speaking (namely, a rather high domestic threshold of legitimization for the use 
of military force; and, a low degree of activism) have not been significantly affected in the 
almost 150 years since the consolidation of the current Argentine territory. It is also 
important to highlight that having incorporated a strong commitment to cooperative 
security efforts to the Argentine Strategic Culture is the most consequential normative 
and cultural change experienced by the country in the last three decades. 
On the other hand, given that the Argentine political system and the society identified 
the Armed Forces as the prime culprits of the atrocities and mistakes committed during 
the 1976-1983 dictatorship, the AMoD (and not the AMFA, nor any other bureaucratic 
actor) was the only target of institutional, doctrinal, and cultural reform. As a result, 
though the Strategic Culture of the country was indeed substantially affected and re-
shaped to conform to new webs of meanings constructed post-1983, aspects of its 
previous iterations may have remained dormant in other branches of the state. As already 
mentioned, despite having had an active participation in the foreign policy of the 1976-
1983 dictatorship, the AMFA and its body of professionalized diplomats entered the post-
dictatorial era largely unscathed. Though the foreign policy of the country was reshaped 
by subsequent civil administrations, the AMFA maintained a relatively high degree 
autonomy, allowing some sectors within it to maintain entrenched views about the region. 
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The transition to democracy opened the door for a new negotiation of the Strategic 
Norms, and the defence sector was subject to substantial changes by subsequent civil 
leaderships. This resulted in the Argentine Strategic Culture, normative priors, and legal 
framework for the sector seeing relevant changes in the period. These experiences 
reinforced the preference for pacific resolution of conflicts, fostered a higher degree of 
international activism in terms of cooperation efforts, reduced the degree of domestic 
activism, and created a more permeable environment for the development of ambitious 
regional defence cooperation mechanisms. In other words, the critical juncture created 
by this traumatic experience contributed heavily to creating the conditions of possibility 
for a thorough re-definition of the relation between the society and its defence apparatus. 
As a consequence, between 1983 and 2008 the country successfully desecuritized its 
relationships with Brazil and Chile (Oelsner 2005a), demilitarized domestic politics  
(Escudé and Fontana 1998), and developed an agenda of cooperative security, all of which 
had a direct relation with the cultural developments that led to the substantial alteration 
of its Strategic Norms. As Escudé and Fontana clearly explain, 
“The Argentine government [was] particularly interested in developing a new concept 
of regional security that privileges transparency, cooperation, and the abandonment of 
arms races of all sorts. […] [as well as] in fully implementing the concept of cooperative 
security and in modifying accordingly the system of collective security, thus 
overcoming the older conceptions of security based on defensive capabilities of states 
and power-balancing alliances” (Escudé and Fontana 1998). 
 
This would, perhaps paradoxically, render the Argentine defence elite more permeable 
to the idea of establishing a regional security governance organization in close 
cooperation with the country´s most traditional rival. More interestingly, the fact that the 
AMoD could take responsibility for international negotiations without any part of society 
resenting it may also evidence that the healing process between the Argentine society and 
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its defence elites might be coming to completion, largely thanks to the now undisputed 
civilian control over the Armed Forces. A further testimony to this is that, for the first time 
in decades, the country has resumed public discussions about the need to increase its 
defence budget to upgrade obsolete material capabilities without opposing voices. 
Given the process of unilateral demilitarization started post-1983 (Escudé 2010), 
Argentina has shown consistent interest in fostering issue-linkage strategies between 
regional security and other areas of cooperation/integration (Hirst and Russell 2001, 
150). The calculation has been that, if politics and diplomacy could strip the Armed Forces 
from their most traditional raison d´être, then there would be incentives for a new 
definition of their role in democracy (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2007, 84–85). Precisely 
for this same reason, Presidents Alfonsín and Menem sought to create rapprochement 
processes with Brazil and Chile by resolving long-standing controversies via peaceful 
negotiations, and expanding the areas in which coordination and cooperation were 
possible. This created further incentives to reiterate the commitment with norms of non-
intervention (slightly debilitated after the country gave Peacekeeping Operations a 
central role in its foreign and defence policies); peaceful resolution of conflicts; and 
neutrality. All of these were seen as essential normative and legal stances to aid the 
country defend itself from potential “imperial” or “neo-colonial” attempts by extra-
regional powers. 
As a consequence of all the above, and due to the meagre funding available for the 
defence sector, the Argentine delegation approached the question of creating the SADC 
with a clearly defined agenda of fostering further regional cooperation in the area of 
defence. This agenda included incentivizing the desecuritization of regional relations; 
extending the experiences of rapprochement, confidence-building, and cooperation 
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developed with Brazil and Chile; promoting the development of shared concepts and 
doctrines to advance a common understanding of the security concerns that affect the 
region, and how to tackle them; and, taking advantage of a potential regional market for 
the output of its languishing military industry. Arguably, this negotiating agenda so 
intimately related to the evolution of domestic norms about the role of the defence 
apparatus, had a significant impact on the objectives and principles included in the SADC 
statute. 
The above discussions evidence a few important aspects about the current Argentine 
Strategic Culture. On the one hand, the goal of becoming a political leader in the region 
and the expectation of being recognized as one remains at the forefront of the identity and 
international insertion strategy of the country. On the other hand, by 2008, the more 
activist Strategic Norms regarding cooperation had become so entrenched in the local 
defence elite´s perspectives that the more detached pre-1990s norms about Peacekeeping 
Operations and the negative geopolitical views about the region were entirely absent 
from all conversations. In other words, the alteration of these cultural elements in the 
defence policy preferences of the country has been so thorough and successful that no 
traces of previously held preferences were found in any of the interviews. Finally, the role 
of the Armed Forces has been redefined to such extent that the higher degrees of 
international activism shown and its now increasing relevance in the implementation of 
the Argentine foreign policy are no longer seen as a threat to the domestic political system, 
nor to its neighbours. 
 
These insights provide a necessary understanding of the situation, thus 
complementing and informing the systemic-level explanations to the creation of the SADC 
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discussed in Chapter 2. It is worth highlighting again that, though the creation of the SADC 
might not have been in the immediate agenda of the Kirchner/Fernández administrations, 
Argentina had in fact proposed in numerous occasions the formation of a similar regional 
arrangement. It is possible that the enthusiasm over the rapprochement experienced in 
the mid-1990s, the first-hand participation on multilateral cooperative security activities, 
the demilitarization of the defence policy, and the effective alignment achieved between 
foreign and defence policy objectives (Sain 1999, 140–44) encouraged President Menem 
to publicly discuss a regional defence arrangement without having previously made the 
pertinent consultations with regional partners  (Huser 1998, 67–68). This partly explains 
the negative responses obtained at the time, and perhaps even the fact that Argentina 
dropped this from its agenda. However, the prompt positive response that the SADC 







Chapter 6. Chile 









The aim of this chapter is to analyse Chile´s negotiating agenda in the SADC Working 
Group meetings through the lens Strategic Culture, which can provide sufficient 
conceptual leverage to elucidate the purpose underlying this country’s behaviour as well 
as its impact on the social arrangements that define the regional security environment. In 
doing so, it first needs to shed light on the seeming contradiction between the country´s 
long-held preference for a foreign policy based on bilateral interactions, partnerships 
with extra-regional powers, and focused on economic and trade agreements, on the one 
hand, and its decision to actively participate in an ambitious region-wide multilateral 
cooperation and policy coordination initiative such as the SADC, on the other. 
The seeming lack of agreement between Chile’s consolidated role as “global trader” and 
preference for commercial relations with extra-regional partners (Wehner 2016, 64; 
Wehner and Thies 2014, 422–23), and the regionalist agenda behind the SADC initiative 
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make this case a particularly interesting one to analyse. It is important to remember that, 
even in the heyday of trade integration in South America, in the 1990s, Chile was among 
the regional powers more reluctant to commit to any regional arrangements beyond full 
trade liberalization and conflict resolution schemes. And, even when it did join regional 
governance agreements in other areas, its foreign policy preferences leaned more 
towards bilateral or mini-lateral regimes than to region-wide institutions, establishing a 
clear distance with the integrationist projects advanced by some of its neighbours. This is 
not to say that the country was entirely absent from such arrangements, as its 
participation in groupings like the Rio Group, the Andean Pact and the MERCOSUR (as 
associated member) shows. However, that Chile decided not only to accept the UNASUR’s 
pro tempore presidency ahead of schedule, but also to take such a prominent leading role 
in the negotiations may constitute a puzzle to observers. 
A first step to obtain a better understanding of this case is by tapping into the driving 
forces behind Chile´s agenda and actions. Since Chile´s prominent institutional 
responsibilities during the negotiations (pro tempore president of UNASUR; organizer and 
coordinator of the SADC Working Group meetings) came as a surprise to its diplomacy90, 
aspects of its performance could respond to “automated” reactions, based more on deep-
rooted cultural structures than on “rational choice” type decisions. If this is in fact the 
case, then identifying and analysing these commitments could help unveil the Strategic 
Norms that guided defence and foreign policy elites in their decision-making process, 
informing how they perceived the regional environment and Chile´s role in it, and 
influencing its approach to the SADC initiative as a result. 
                                                        
90 The country assumed its shift as UNASUR Pro Tempore president one year ahead of schedule, in 2008, 
after Colombia decided in the last minute that it was unfit to assume the responsibility itself given the 




As will be shown in this chapter, one of Chile’s first concerns during its tenure as 
president of UNASUR was to remain faithful to its long-cultivated image as a “reliable 
partner” (Bernal-Meza 2005). All interviewees agreed that, put to the task of presiding 
over this organization in such a complicated context, the Chilean diplomacy saw this as an 
opportunity to display its dependability. This was usually presented in direct opposition 
to the more rhetorical and less consistent attitude seen in other regional powers (mainly 
Venezuela, but also Argentina and Brazil), of whom Chilean elites think are unable to 
create truly effective institutional mechanisms to move forward with the regional projects 
they advocate (Gamboa Valenzuela 2011, 13). 
But, it is also true that dependability was not the only contribution made by Chile to 
the negotiations. The Chilean delegation approached the SADC initiative with a 
propositive agenda, seeking to foster region-wide coordination and cooperation in a 
policy area outside of its usual “zone of comfort”. The question is, then, how does this 
approach to the creation of the SADC relate to Chile’s broader foreign policy and defence 
strategy, and how can we make sense of the apparent contradiction between the two 
using the concept of Strategic Culture as a key analytical tool. 
The role adopted during the negotiations seems to indicate that relevant changes have 
taken place in the country´s international insertion strategy in the decade or so leading to 
the creation of the SADC. My argument is that these changes in its approach to regional 
politics and security are indicative of relevant alterations to its Strategic Culture, slowly 
becoming more open to cooperative efforts with regional partners in areas in which it was 
not comfortable with only a few years before. Such change follows from a consistent, if 
slow, evolution of the domestic norms regarding the use of the defence apparatus and the 
limits they impose to defence cooperation. The argument that this chapter seeks to 
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advance is that the prominent role assumed during the SADC Working Group meetings 
and the negotiating agenda advanced by the Chilean delegation are in line with the 
normative commitments that the country has developed since the return of democratic 
rule, but also that Michelle Bachelet´s administration (2006-2010) took advantage of the 
opportunity to re-insert the country into South American politics with a concrete role 
after decades turning its back against it. More importantly, by analysing this country´s 
negotiating agenda under the light of Strategic Culture and its effects on action, this 
chapter advances the argument that any innovations introduced to the SADC statute due 
to Chilean pressure are intimately related to the meanings and normative priors related 
to the role given to the defence sector. If this is proven to be right, then a strong argument 
could be made about the transforming (constitutive) effects agency can have on the social 
arrangements ruling the regional security environment. 
 
I argue that the outcome of protracted and tense negotiation over civil-military 
relations, a slow process of dense and complex confidence building in defence 
cooperation with Argentina  (Ruz 2011b), and changes in the perception of the country´s 
place in the region, all contributed to altering the Chilean Strategic Culture. Similarly to 
what happened in Argentina, the 1973-1990 dictatorship led by General Augusto Pinochet 
caused profound changes in Chile’s Strategic Norms and culture. However, unlike the case 
of its neighbour, these changes were less abrupt, resembling more a case of a prolonged 
social learning process than a situation in which a traumatic event elicited relatively 
sudden changes. Discussing the characteristics of this process is relevant to obtain a 




In developing the above arguments, I also tackle a set of related questions: What can 
we deduce about the evolution of the country´s Strategic Culture in the light of this policy 
shift? How may Chile´s new commitments to regional governance affect the regional 
security environment? And, in return, what was the role of contextual pressures in 
reshaping Chile´s defence preferences and Strategic Culture? 
In order to answer these questions, explain the reasons behind Chile´s leading role 
during the SADC negotiations, understand the narratives used by the government to 
justify (to itself and to others) this apparent policy shift, and provide insights into the role 
played by norm and culture in defining the country’s agency, this chapter will be divided 
into two main sections, both equivalent to the divisions used to analyse the Argentine 
case. The first section, itself divided into two sub-sections for purposes of clarity, engages 
with the recent evolution and current characteristics of the country´s Strategic Culture. 
The first sub-section engages with aspects of the pre-1990 Strategic Culture, deemed 
relevant both because of the continuity shown in some norms after the democratization 
process and because of the demand for change they provoked among sectors of the 
political elite after 1990. The second sub-section analyses the subsequent current 
characteristics of the country’s Strategic Culture, emphasizing their recent evolution and 
the meanings attached to the different Strategic Norms. 
The second section discusses in detail how Chile´s Strategic Culture and foreign policy 
traditions affected perspectives on the goals and expected outcomes of the SADC 
initiative, and the motives behind its approach to the negotiations. This section contains 
the main empirical contribution of the chapter, highlighting the role of Chile´s agency in 
its decision to join the SADC and an analysis of its negotiating agenda. Unlike in the 
Argentine case, this section will not be divided into subsections. This is because matters 
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relating to the perception of regional affairs among defence and foreign policy elites show 
such a degree of continuity between the formative years of the country´s Strategic Culture 
and the SADC negotiations, that further clarification on this topic would be redundant. 
Hence, the entire section is devoted to address in detail the design and implementation of 
the country’s agenda in the negotiations. 
 
The evolution of Chile’s Strategic Culture 
 
As explained above, this section deals with both the continuities and the innovations 
that make up Chile’s current Strategic Culture. In order to do so, two broad subsections 
will discuss the characteristics of Chile’s understanding of the defence-related issues 
during the 17 years that Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship ruled the country (1973-1990) 
and the evolution of the country’s Strategic Norms since the democratization process 
started, respectively. 
 
Historical context: The Chilean defence sector pre-1990 
During the years leading to the coup that brought General Augusto Pinochet to power, 
President Salvador Allende´s government (1970-1973) had started to subvert many of 
the traditional commitments of the traditional Chilean foreign and defence policy 
preferences  (Fermandois 1991, 437–38). His policies represented clear departures from 
previous traditions, bringing for the first time to power what Manfred Wilhelmy has 
labelled the “revolutionary subculture of Chilean Foreign Policy” (1979, 445–46). Though 
not exclusively associated with Allende, this subculture involved a preference for “third-
worldism”, anti-imperialism and revisionism that did define his tenure as President and 
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contrasted with the more conservative diplomatic tradition centred on Chile’s “Western” 
relations (Wilhelmy 1979, 456–57). 
Nevertheless, Allende’s administration did not entirely uproot pre-existing traditions 
in these policy areas either, allowing for an array of normative commitments and 
traditions to have continuity during his administration. Good examples of this were the 
Chilean long-held preferences for multilateral political fora, internationalism, and 
regional governance mechanisms (Portales 2011b, 11; Wilhelmy and Durán 2003), a 
realist strategy seeking to maximize its international influence and stabilize regional 
affairs through higher degrees of institutionalization of its relations with neighbouring 
countries. Perhaps one of the more extreme versions of this tradition to ever make it to 
power can be identified during the administration of President Eduardo Frei Montalva 
(1964-1970), who actively advocated for the creation of supranational instances to 
govern Latin American integration  (Fermandois 1991; Wilhelmy 1977, 68). 
Though relevant cultural changes did take place during the Allende administration, 
they did not represent a complete break from the past tradition of supporting multilateral 
governance initiatives at the regional level, nor did they survive the 17-year rule of the 
Pinochet dictatorship. The long-term eradication of this tradition from the Chilean set of 
defence and foreign policy preferences was, paradoxically, the work of the conservative 
“restauration” led by General Pinochet after deposing the socialist government of Allende 
on 11th September, 1973  (Durán 1996, 196). A published geopolitical author himself, and 
hence highly suspicious of the relations with neighbouring countries, Pinochet received 
support from an emerging domestic coalition of neoliberal technocrats known as the 
“Chicago Boys”91, who gave the dictatorship the economic justification to reduce its 
                                                        
91 A group of economists formed at the University of Chicago under the supervision of Milton Friedman and 
Arnold Harberger. They provided the blueprint for the economic policies of the military regime (Letelier 
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perceived vulnerability by advancing foreign and defence policies that incentivized the 
Chilean “withdrawal” from regional affairs. Instead of its traditional multilateralism and 
support for regional institutions, the new approach inaugurated post-1973 was 
dominated by the liberalization of trade and economic relations (Wilhelmy 1982, 
249)(Child 1985), and the quest to secure Chile’s autonomy in the face of a regional 
environment perceived as intrinsically hostile (Child 1985). As a result, it is in the 1973-
1990 period that we must look for any normative commitments and social constructions 
that would either become permanent characteristics of the Chilean Strategic Culture, or 
prompt such negative responses that they drove the reforms agenda of democratic 
governments that followed. 
Carlos Portales challenges the notion that Chile has been absent from the region 
altogether, arguing that the country in fact devoted significant diplomatic efforts to 
negotiate bilateral trade agreements, solve border disputes, and participate in political 
cooperation frameworks with other Latin American countries through the 1990s 
(Portales 2011a, 174–80). The points raised by Portales are relevant, and his arguments 
certainly provide nuance to the “regional withdrawal” narrative. The development of 
increasingly intrusive and ambitious mutual confidence measures with Argentina, which 
have led to the creation of bilateral cooperative security arrangements, is perhaps the 
clearest example in that regard. More importantly so, as has already been discussed in the 
previous chapter, a large proportion of the confidence building strategies included in the 
SADC agreement and in its Action Plans are in fact an attempt to regionalize the Argentine-
Chilean experience. Chile has also managed to establish increasingly prosperous bilateral 
                                                        
1976, 45–46). Embracing the neoliberal agenda put forward by Friedman, the “Chicago boys” occupied key 
economic policy-making positions throughout the dictatorship, reforming entirely the country’s economic 
model in the process. 
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relations with partners like Brazil and Colombia, despite looking with some concern the 
aspirations to regional leadership  (Flisfisch 2011, 20) and willingness to come through 
with promised regional common goods  (Gamboa Valenzuela 2011, 14) of the former. 
However, it is still true that, having sorted the more conflictive questions with its 
immediate neighbours, very few high-profile foreign and defence policy strategies in the 
decades leading to the SADC negotiations had involved multilateral partnerships with 
South American countries, with the Argentine case being the most salient exception to 
that rule. 
 
Geopolitical thinking: Hostile neighbours and the theory of “discontinuous borders” 
Chile´s threat perception has historically been constructed on top of deeply entrenched 
perceptions of its geo-strategic conditions. Stretching North-South for 6,339 km, and 
having an average East-West extension of 180 km, Chile shares with Argentina the third 
largest mutual border in the world (5,300 km), plus 860 km of borders with Bolivia and 
171 km of borders with Peru. In addition to this, Chile shows patterns of population and 
economic concentration around only two regions, the central region around the capital 
city and the northern region rich in mining resources. In the meantime, the large majority 
of the country´s territory is composed of vast areas of scarcely populated land. This has 
been traditionally perceived as increasing the country´s vulnerability, threatening its 
ability to remain a unity in case of a hypothetic attack/invasion/occupation. 
Bolivia and Peru have historically had revisionist positions regarding the current 
border, drawn after Chile´s victory against them in the 1879-1883 War of the Pacific, a 




Graph 4. Chilean borders with northern neighbours before the War of the Pacific (1879-
1884) and after the 1929 Treaty of Lima92 
 
Source: Modified version from the map available in Wikicommons. 
 
However, considering the increasing economic and military gap between Chile and its 
northern neighbours, together with the fact that the borders settled in 1929 pushed their 
threat away from major population and economic centres, local geostrategic thinkers 
have perceived Chile’s geographical situation as providing “vertical strategic depth”. In 
contrast, their main concern has been the severe lack of “horizontal strategic depth”, 
crucial in planning against any potential Argentine aggression  (Leyton 2000, 61). As 
already explained in the previous chapter, despite no direct military confrontation taking 
                                                        
92 Also known as the Tacna-Arica Compromise, this treaty settled the territorial disputes that remained 
unsolved between Chile and Peru since the end of the War of the Pacific. 
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place, the relationship with Argentina was also a historically conflictive one until the 
1990s  (Fermandois 2010, 18). 
The dominant social constructions and meanings around these contextual conditions 
greatly influenced Chilean strategic planning. Arguably, they drove the emphasis local 
defence elites put on the alliance with Brazil and Ecuador, expected to work as deterrents 
against hostile neighbours surrounding Chile with the risk of becoming encircled 
themselves93. These bilateral relations came to be associated with the concept of 
“discontinuous borders”94 (Child 1985), central to explain the preferences and behaviour 
of Chilean defence elites at least until the mid-1990s and a contributing factor to the 
region-defining checkerboard alliances (Kelly 1997). Yet, the bilateral rapprochement 
between Argentina and Brazil forced the Chile to re-consider this strategy, which 
significantly lost all prominence thanks to the improvement in Argentine-Chilean 
relations after the return of democracy in 1990. 
The above evolution is a particularly good example of the mutual constitution that 
exists between the social arrangements present at the regional level and those that 
dominate the domestic strategic culture. Firstly, it is interesting to see that, in a context of 
perceived encirclement, Chilean actions defied what Barry Posen´s hypothesis about 
doctrinal choices between offence-defence-deterrence (1984, 78–79). Not even at the 
brink of an Argentine invasion did Chile opt for an offensive strategy, further proving that 
material conditions alone fail to properly grasp the drivers of strategic behaviour. 
Secondly, changes in the regional distribution of capabilities were slow and relatively 
inconsequential throughout the 1980s, weakening the hypothesis that a shifting balance 
                                                        
93 See, for example, Argentina´s Operación Soberanía, Graph 2, page 175 
94 This concept refers to the strategic proximity with countries like Brazil and Ecuador, considered to be 
close and dependable allies despite not actually sharing borders with Chile. 
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of power prompted such strategic and behavioural changes in the two major powers. 
Rather, it seems likely that the return of democracy and the securitization of domestic 
authoritarian factions brought Argentina and Brazil closer together, slowly but surely 
redefining their mutual perceptions and the associated webs of meanings. In this context 
of changing regional social constructions, Chile lost its major deterrent against Argentina, 
forcing defence elites to adapt and opening the door for political elites to establish a more 
positive bilateral agenda with the neighbouring country. This, in turn, served the cause of 
reducing the domestic allure geopolitical discourses presented about regional affairs and 
paved the way for growingly ambitious cooperation initiatives. 
Still, much like Israel in the Middle East, due to its lack of “strategic depth” Chile 
evaluated its geopolitical situation as a threatening one, risking territorial, economic and 
human losses to any of its immediate enemies should it fail to act preventively. Hence, its 
Strategic Norms and doctrines establish, to this date, that any enemy showing “abnormal” 
concentration and movement of troops near the border, or any other behaviour rendered 
“threatening” by Chile, will justify the legitimate use of force by its Armed Forces. 
Members of geostrategic-leaning sectors still perceive these factors as central 
determinants of Chile´s defence policy, affecting everything from troop deployment to 
tactics and strategic planning. In other words, though the terms used to define Chile´s 
military doctrine are “defence” and “dissuasion” (Leyton 2000, 70) they do not conform 
with the traditional understanding of the term (see Chapter 5, page 191), but rather are 
given a meaning close to the doctrine of preventive attacks. The geographical and socio-
economic characteristics of the country, together with the entrenched views of its defence 
elites, mean that this orientation will most likely remain non-negotiable in the foreseeable 
future, regardless of how good the relations with the neighbouring countries have become 




Goodbye to Latin America 
The 1973 coup against President Allende inaugurated a radical shift in Chile´s 
commitment to regional governance, changing its insertion strategy and international 
identity dramatically. The dictatorship broke with the above mentioned consensus shared 
by “revolutionary” and “conservative” subcultures in at least two crucial aspects: bilateral 
trade negotiations displaced multilateralism and internationalism as the preferred means 
for the country to advance its international agenda and interests (Wilhelmy and Durán 
2003, 276); and, the narrative of Chile being an “island country”95, isolated and distinct 
from the rest of the region, became prominent in the public discourse and in the mind-set 
of Chilean defence and foreign policy elites. 
Though the origins of the narrative representing Chile as qualitatively different from 
Latin America can be traced back earlier in the 20th century, it only became a feature of 
the “national myth” with the dictatorship  (Hamilton and Centellas 2015; Larrain 2006; 
Loveman 2004). Moreover, while in earlier versions the arguments were centred on 
Chile´s political and institutional stability (something that was ostensibly lost in the 1973-
1990 period), the arguments to back this discourse during the dictatorship were almost 
exclusively economic96. In a sense, the only elements that both iterations of the narrative 
                                                        
95 The concept of the “island” country also adds a particular understanding of the geographical situation of 
the country, highlighting that the Atacama desert (north), the Andes mountain range (East), the Pacific 
Ocean (West), and the Southern seas (South) have are among the “deep forces” that have determined the 
Chilean self-perception and foreign policy (Cristián Fuentes 2014) 
96 In the 1984-1989 period, Chile´s economic output saw an average inter-annual growth of 6,2%. 
Comparing it with the -4,8% average economic performance that resulted from the Debt crisis in the rest of 
the region during the same period (Durán 1996), Chilean political and economic elites perceived this as a 
confirmation of the neoliberal policies adopted since the 1970s , but also as a demonstration that the rest 
of Latin America was hopelessly backwards and irredeemable. 
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share are the backdrop of racial and social Darwinism on which they build, widely shared 
by members of the conservative (white) political elites. 
One of the most significant examples of this position is an op-ed written by Joaquin 
Lavín Infante97, entitled “Chile: Goodbye to Latin America”98 (1988). Published by El 
Mercurio (the country´s most influential conservative newspaper), this article would 
become one of the most iconic points of reference in the discussions about Chile´s 
relations with the region. In a nutshell, the author´s argument is that the success of the 
neoliberal “economic modernization” that the dictatorship started had left neighbouring 
countries lagging behind, sunk in their endemic political, social, and economic conflicts. 
Chile, on the contrary, did no longer suffer from these ailments, and was bound to seek for 
better opportunities and more promising partnerships in the Pacific Ocean basin. Hence, 
the argument went, it was not in Chile´s best interest to continue to tie its fate to South 
America, and should advance more decisively in establishing closer ties with developed 
extra-regional partners. In Lavín´s own words, 
“For decades, we were told that Chile had to recover the leadership of Latin America. It 
already has. Many times fold. […] Chile has become a ´giant´ with regards to the Latin 
American countries, but is still a ´dwarf´ in comparison to the other countries in our 
new region: the countries in the Pacific. We no longer look to Argentina and Brazil as 
examples worthy imitating. Our goal now is to reach the living standards of countries 
like Australia or New Zealand, or perhaps what the ´four dragons´ are achieving: 
Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapur, all of them countries that are applying a 
market economy model.”99 (Lavín Infante 1988 translation by the author)  
                                                        
97 A Chicago-educated economist, Lavín Infante was Economic editor of El Mercurio during the late 1980s. 
He would later become a salient right-wing political figure in Chile through the 1990s and 2000s, being the 
presidential candidate for the Unión Democrática Independiente (UDI) in the 1999 national elections, in 
which he lost against the centre-left Coalición candidate, Ricardo Lagos, by merely 200.000 votes. He later 
became Mayor of Santiago (2000-2004), and held ministerial office during President Sebastián Piñera´s 
administration (2010-2014), including the Ministry of Social Development. 
98 Translation by the author. Original title in Spanish: “Chile: Adiós a Latinoamérica” 
99 Original in Spanish: “Durante décadas se nos dijo que Chile debía recuperar el liderazgo en América 
Latina. Ya lo recuperó. Y con creces. […] Chile se ha transformado en un ‘gigante’ con respecto a los países 
de Latinoamérica, pero es todavía un “enano” si nos comparamos con nuestra nueva región: los países del 
Pacífico. Ya no miramos a Argentina o Brasil como ejemplos dignos de imitar. Nuestra meta ahora es 




Together with the economic and trade liberalization policies, this diagnosis would 
become part of a cross-partisan “common sense” for the best part of the two decades that 
followed the article (interview with Boris Yopo Herrera), establishing clear limits to the 
country´s foreign policy options. Many conservative voices have insisted on Lavín 
Infante´s argument over the years (Barros 2004; Quintana 1995; Rohter 2004), arguing 
that the country´s “isolation” from the region was not only the result of its development 
and successful economic policies  (España and Rothery 2004, 85–86), but also a necessary 
and successful policy decision. As such, this narrative has also added to the pre-existent 
“Chilean exceptionalism” culture in development since the time of independence (Cristián 
Fuentes 2014, 138), 
“Chileans begin to believe that they share in an exceptional character that separates 
them from Latin America. The entrepreneurial public version of Chilean identity 
compounds this belief by insisting very much on the idea that Chile is different, a 
winner country that has become a model for Latin America.” (Larrain 2006, 332)  
 
This exceptionalism was not only fuelled by a positive self-appraisal, but also by a 
strong negative perception of the regional environment, and particularly of the 
neighbouring states, in relation to their poor economic performance and to the prevalence 
among defence elites of the above discussed geopolitical perspectives. As a result, though 
the Chilean military doctrine has historically been essentially defensive, its Armed Forces 
have been organized and trained to be operationally dissuasive  (Leyton 2000), and even 
ready to participate in preventive actions. This means that the threshold of domestic 
authorization for the use of force has been lower in Chile than in most other South 
                                                        
dragones” del Asia: Taiwán, Corea, Hong Kong y Singapur, países que están aplicando un esquema de 
economía de mercado.” 
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American countries, and particularly so during the dictatorial rule of General Pinochet. 
Having said that, it is important to highlight that no such preventive actions were taken 
during the 1978 tensions with Argentina, which were defused only hours before 
Argentine forces invaded Chilean territory en masse  (Laudy 2000). This can either mean 
that Chile preferred to play defence in this case (being the status quo player, having the 
arbitral award in its favour, and expecting to receive international support after an 
unwarranted Argentine aggression), or that the doctrine would be applied differently 
whether the threat came from Argentina (the largest and best equipped of the three 
neighbours) or from Bolivia and Peru. 
This is a point that will be further explored in the coming subsection, but what is 
interesting to highlight at this point is that the relationship Chile developed with its 
regional security environment during the Pinochet years was one of extreme rivalry, if 
not even enmity. Tensions in the Chile-Bolivia border never really ceased, particularly due 
to the latter´s revisionism  (van der Ree 2010, 116), and Argentina was perceived in such 
negative terms that the Chilean government decided to forego all cooperation agreements 
in place (the TIAR being the prime example) and provided intelligence and logistical 
support to the British Task Force during the Malvinas/Falklands war  (Alexander 2014). 
Chile´s Strategic Culture in this period was highly reactive to any forms of cooperation, 
preferring instead a neutral stance with regards to any conflicts that did not affect its 
interests directly, or a unilateral form of action if such measure was required. 
As a result of this threat perception, in 1975 Pinochet modified a crucial piece of 
legislation known as the Reserved Copper Law (Law N°13.196), originally passed in 1958. 
Pinochet´s modification gave 10% of all income derived from copper exports100 directly 
                                                        
100 Chile has 36% of the known reserves of copper in the world, and has been the biggest exported of this 
metal for several years now. Between 1999 and 2008, its share in the global trade of copper fluctuated 
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to the Armed Forces. The exact wording and detailed contents of the law remain 
confidential, and even members of the National Congress can only access them under very 
strict conditions of secrecy. However, some details are publicly known. For example, the 
law establishes an annual floor of allocated resources indexed to the US Producer Price 
Index, estimated to be worth between US$ 90m and US$ 290m and guaranteed by the 
National Treasury, with no cap stipulated. Moreover, the law stipulates these funds are 
considered assets of the Armed Forces, which makes them exempt from congressional 
scrutiny and taxation (Milet 2008). Also, the funding provided under this law is in excess 
of the annual defence budget, which is expected to cover all operational costs, salaries, 
and pensions of the Armed Forces and the Chilean Ministry of Defence (ChMoD hereon), 
and even contemplates resources for acquisitions. This means that the funds resulting 
from the Reserved Copper law are used exclusively to purchase new equipment or for the 
modernization/upgrade of existing capabilities. 
It is also relevant to reiterate that the Chilean Strategic Culture suffered few alterations 
during and immediately after democratization due to the need of political elites to secure 
governability. This was done by establishing a relatively rigid intra- and inter-elite 
consensus that allowed for the transition to take place  (Cristián Fuentes 2014), while also 
giving guaranties to the military and conservative elites that supported its regime that 
they would not be subject to transitional justice processes. One of the key aspects that 
made this transition more difficult was the constitutional autonomy self-granted by the 
Armed Forces during the Pinochet regime. This refers to the lack of regulation and 
institutional control over the activities of the Armed Forces (Rojas Aravena 2001, 156). 
                                                        
between 37.8%T (2001) and 44.3% (2004). More importantly so, this metal represents 50% of the 
country´s total exports, thus incorporating US$ 33 billion to the Chilean economy in 2010 alone (Meller and 
Simpasa 2011, 9–12). 
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Unlike what has happened with the Reserved Copper Law, relevant advances have been 
made in this aspect over the years. However, the pockets of power that remained in the 
hands of the Armed Forces after 1990 made this process more arduous and slow than in 
the Argentine case. 
 
Domestic activism of the Armed Forces 
Though comparatively less prominent than in the Argentine case, the activism shown 
by the Armed Forces in the use of force against the “domestic enemy” was significant. The 
violent intervention of the military in domestic affairs was justified, like in many other 
Latin American countries after the 1959 Cuban Revolution, by a hard-line interpretation 
of the National Defence Doctrine (Pion-Berlin 1989a, 413–14) inspired in French and US 
writings, and actively propagated among mid- and high-ranking officers of the region by 
the School of the Americas and the Inter-American Defence College  (Pion-Berlin 1989b). 
Given the similarities with the Argentine case on this aspect, I will not go into much detail 
about the reach and implications of this doctrinal approach for the country’s Strategic 
Culture, but some specific considerations are worth discussing. 
A particularly relevant testimony of the view that drove the Chilean Armed Forces to 
break their traditional respect for the democratically elected officials and political 
institutions can be found in the words of General Gustavo Leigh when addressing a full 
auditorium at the School of Law of the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, 
“Marxism […] represents a truly malignant tumour, which has created a painful 
situation for us all. It is, perhaps, a paradox that the responsibility of extirpating this 
tumour has fallen on the Armed Forces, whom have not had in generations any political 
responsibility. But, there is one thing you can be certain of: we are determined to 




And so they did. Despite the secretism around the events and the social prestige the 
Chilean Armed Forces managed to maintain101, a 2011 report by the National Commission 
on Political Imprisonment and Torture commonly known as the Valech Report (the fourth 
report of its kind produced since 1990) established that the overall number of victims 
exceeds 40.000, with 3.065 of them having been murdered or “disappeared” by the 
military or state-sponsored para-military groups (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión 
Política y Tortura, 2011). 
This shows that, while Chile can indeed claim to not have participated in any inter-state 
military confrontation since the end of the War of the Pacific, and even that it has never 
put its preventive attack doctrine into use, the Strategic Norms related to the use of force 
during the 1973-1990 dictatorship did conceive the “domestic enemy” as a legitimate 
target for the Armed Forces, showed a relatively high degree of activism, and presented a 
relatively low threshold for domestic authorization. 
 
Evolution of Chile´s Strategic Culture since 1990 
Chile´s military doctrine is described as strictly defensive, but operationally dissuasive. 
There are at least two implications of this operational stance. On the one hand, one of the 
strategic goals of the Chilean defence policy is to accumulate sufficient material 
capabilities so that any enemy would have to seriously consider the potential risks of 
attacking, reducing the likeliness of such an attack taking place. On the other hand, given 
the geographical and socio-economic conditions described above (together with the 
                                                        
101 According to the II Human Rights Poll, published in 2013 by the National Institute of Human Rights, 39% 
of the Chilean population does not condemn the Human Rights violations of the 1973-1990 period (Instituto 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2013, 41). 
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dominant geopolitical views among the defence elites), a dissuasive operational attitude 
has been equated with the possibility of resoting to preventive strikes. 
The continuity of these doctrinal definitions reflects the leverage and power that 
remains with the traditional defence elites, who have consistently blocked attempts to re-
define civil-military relations in the country. This has not hindered, however, the 
evolution of the domestic Strategic Culture in other crucial aspects. 
Considering, for example, that threat perception is an intrinsically sociological issue 
based on shared understandings about and interpretations of sustained patterns of 
behaviour and interaction, these relationships are subject to alterations over time (even 
in the absence of legal innovations, for which some degree of consensus among local 
defence elites would be necessary). The best example of this is the bilateral relation with 
Argentina, marked by mutual suspicion until the mid-1980s (Battaglino 2008, 29; Varas 
1985), but radically altered during the 1990s despite the continuity of the Chilean legal 
framework for the defence sector. Similarly, available survey data from the project Las 
Américas y el Mundo 2008102 also helps create a more complete and nuanced image of the 
socio-political conditions affecting the development of the Chilean Strategic Culture. 
According to this survey, state actors are not perceived by Chileans as threats. Instead, 
food shortage (93%), climate change (92%), poverty in the world (92%), drug trafficking 
and organized crime (89%), and nuclear weapons (87%) conform the top-five choices in 
this category. Different situations may explain this particular pattern of threat perception, 
and the answers may very easily change if old tensions with neighbouring countries were 
to resume. More importantly, there may not be a direct correlation between the survey 
                                                        
102 Survey coordinated in Latin America by the International Studies Division of the Centre of Investigation 
and Teaching in Economy (CIDE), Mexico. The survey in Chile was conducted between November and 
December 2008, taking a probabilistic sample of 1575 people (93,8% representative of the national 
population). The survey has a 95% confidence interval (+/-2,9% maximum error). (Garay Vera 2009, 48) 
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results and Chile´s defence policy and military planning. However, what these results do 
show is that, at the time of the SADC negotiations, the Chilean population no longer 
perceived any of its neighbours and regional partners as threats. 
According to Joaquín Fermandois, the post-1990 Chilean foreign policy has been 
informed by six intertwined sources: a critique of Pinochet´s regime track record on 
Human Rights (which created tensions with Western allies); a consensus between the 
Right and the Left about the relevance of democracy; a centrist set of principles about 
policy and the economy; the emerging pressures (domestic and international) to couple 
market economics and democratic rule; the re-democratization of the region; and, the 
influence of an internationalized political and intellectual elite, who shaped their view for 
a re-democratized Chile around the experiences of centrist European social democracies  
(Fermandois 2011, 37–38)  
 
Intra-elite disputes in the defence sector 
In light of the legacies from the period discussed in the previous sub-section, and 
despite the emerging consensus around the Foreign Policy identified by Fermandois, the 
norms that shape Chile´s Strategic Culture had a relatively slow evolution in the years 
after the democratic transition. According to Carlos Gutierrez Palacios, it is important to 
consider three intertwined and central features of Chile´s transition to democracy in 
order to fully understand the “slow and feeble” changes undergone in the country´s 
security and defence policies (Gutiérrez Palacios 2005, 1–4): 
a) It was the result of a pact that, among other things, demanded that the Political 
Constitution (approved in 1980, whilst Pinochet was in power) could not be reformed. 
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b) Despite losing a continuity referendum, Pinochet remained a political force to be 
reckoned with103. 
c) Despite losing all Presidential elections between 1990 and 2009, right-wing parties 
closely associated with Pro-Pinochet political and economic elite groups remained 
strong. Not made responsible for their role during the dictatorship, conservative elites 
made it their aim to preserve the “legacy of the Military government”, defending its 
social, economic and political models, and protecting “constitutional autonomy” of the 
Armed Forces. 
As a result, the Armed Forces and the defence elites that supported them remained 
veto players in many policy areas long after the transition to democracy, delaying a much 
needed modernization of the defence sector. The redefinition of civil-military relations 
took up the best part of the two decades after Pinochet left power104  (Gutiérrez Palacios 
2005; Radseck 2005). This meant that relevant norms that define the country´s Strategic 
Culture evolved more slowly than in other South American countries.  
Probably the best example of the leverage that the Armed Forces still have is related to 
the definition and control of the defence budget. In 2007, the Chilean defence budget 
represented 2,63% the country´s GDP, doubling the regional average of 1,32% (Castro 
n.d., 48) despite not facing any realistic threat. More importantly, the Reserved Copper 
Law mentioned before is still pretty much in place, despite relevant figures from all 
sectors of the political spectrum arguing that the lack of transparency surrounding this 
situation is highly irregular. Further to this, academics tend to agree that this law has 
                                                        
103 He remained to be Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army until March 1998, closely controlling all 
policy-making, planning, and implementation processes related to the Defence sector. Moreover, after 
retiring from the Armed Forces, he was named “Senator for life”. Not even his indictment and arrest in 
London for violations of Human Rights, between October 1998 and March 2000, debilitated his public image 
(Sugarman 2008). He voluntarily resigned to his senatorial position in July 2002. 
104 Crucial norms mandating and organizing the civil governance of Defence matters, such as the first ever 
Organic Statute for the Ministry of National Defence, only managed to pass through Congress as late as 2010 
(Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010). 
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made the military budget disproportionate with the country´s needs and interests, 
introducing a distortion to the regional security environment and creating concerns in 
neighbouring countries (Calle 2007; Flemes and Nolte 2010). Several interviewees shared 
this view, maintaining that the elimination of the Reserved Copper Law was a crucial step 
to hold the Armed Forces accountable and to reduce potential sources of tension with 
regional partners (Interviews with García Pino; Flisfisch; and Durán). However, despite 
public pronouncements by members of the elites at both sides of the political spectrum 
(including President Michelle Bachelet and President Sebastián Piñera) supporting the 
derogation/modification of the Law, it has been so far impossible to reach an agreement 
regarding the new defence funding system that should take its place. Strong resistance 
from the conservative defence and political elites have made this reform even more 
difficult to achieve (Saez 2016). 
In addition to the complications generated by the resistance to change on the side of 
the old defence elites, it is also important to highlight that the political elites that came to 
power in the 1990s were highly refractory of regional multilateral arrangements. While 
most South American countries experienced a renewed interest in regional governance 
schemes from the late-1980s on, Chile preferred to stay at the margins of these processes 
and called for a more “pragmatic” regional agenda  (Fermandois 2011). It developed an 
agenda known as “open regionalism”, understood in Chile as a middle ground between 
the free trade policies advocated for by economic advisors of the dictatorship, on the one 
hand, and the regional integration defended by pre-1973 foreign policy elites, on the other 
(Fermandois 2011; Fermandois and Henríquez 2005, 61). Crafted by moderate 
governmental elites, open regionalism presented a counter-narrative that was to become 
one of the cornerstones of Chile´s foreign, economic, and development policies from the 
1990s onwards, likely constituting one of the strongest elements of cross-party consensus  
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(Wehner and Thies 2014, 423; Weskamp 2013, 66). At its core, open regionalism consists 
of regional free trade agreements that, unlike previous sub-global trading blocs, avoid 
creating a heavily protected intra-bloc market by maintaining low tariffs and trade 
barriers. The goal is to allow for a broad liberalization of trade between regional partners, 
while creating incentives for the bloc to remain competitive globally  (Burki and Perry 
1998, 3–5; Iglesias 1998; Sanahuja 2012, 3). 
Joaquín Fermandois and María José Henríquez point out that the seeming contradiction 
between a discourse consistently prioritizing Latin America and a pattern of behaviour 
focused mostly on increasing trade arrangements with extra-regional partners only 
makes sense seen under the light of the consensus around open regionalism  (Fermandois 
and Henríquez 2005). However, in searching for a balance between the regional 
integrator and the global free-trader roles, Chile consistently focused more on the 
“openness” than on the “regionalism” (Wehner 2016). In Alberto van Klaveren´s view  
(2000, 128), three core aspects inform the way Chile understands open regionalism: 
1. Regional integration frameworks that demanded exclusivity from its members pose 
excessive limitations to their autonomy; 
2. Regional integration agreements must be open to the incorporation of new members; 
3. Trade blocs and policy coordination projects that require raising tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to trade impose unacceptable constrains to global trade liberalization. 
So strong is the elite consensus around these principles that even the centre-left 
Concertación has incorporated them into its ethos. In fact, Alex Fernández Jilberto 
attributes the electoral success of the Concertación precisely to its ability to abandon the 
elements of economic nationalism that characterized the left wing parties within the 
coalition and accommodate for the neoliberal agenda inherited from the dictatorship, 
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forming what in his words is “their formulation of an alternative strategy of ́ neoliberalism 
in democracy´” (Fernández Jilberto 1996, 72). 
As would be expected, all the above came at the expense of Chile´s relations with the 
region. Despite all Concertación governments declaring that one of their foreign policy 
priorities was the country´s relation with Latin America  (Fermandois and Henríquez 
2005), having unilaterally liberalized domestic trade regulations in the mid-1970s lead to 
its withdrawal from the Andean Pact105, in 1976; and to repeatedly turning down offers 
to join the MERCOSUR (Heine 1999, 113–14). Bilateral relations with neighbouring 
countries were largely reduced to pragmatic ties  (Wilhelmy and Durán 2003, 275), and 
local elites started to develop a strong resistance to thinking in regional terms (interview 
with Maldonado). Even today, and despite having shown that the country is able to 
successfully take on relevant roles articulating regional initiatives, top-ranking officials at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continue to talk about Chile´s insular condition (interview 
with Labbé). As a result, by the turn of the century, the chances of having an active Chilean 
participation in fora like the UNASUR and the SADC was reduced, at best. 
In this context, the democratic transition required sustained efforts by subsequent 
governments to take the remaining pockets of political and economic leverage away from 
the Armed Forces, slowly gaining civilian/political oversight over planning and 
implementation of the National Defence policy. The modification of the legal framework 
determining the objectives, governance, and decision-making processes related to the 
armed branch of the state has been slow, but ultimately tipped the balance in the internal 
                                                        
105 A regional trade bloc of which it was a founding member and that included all Andean countries, from 
Colombia in the North to Chile in the South. 
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struggles between the military and the civilian members of the defence elites. In parallel 
to this process, the Strategic Culture of the country has also been re-shaped. 
 
The redefinition of the legal framework for the defence sector 
Aside from the above, which remains a debt of the Chilean re-democratization, some 
relevant changes have been possible in the country´s Strategic Norms. The dramatic 
changes in the bilateral relation with Argentina, for example, lead to a lower threat 
perception of the neighbouring country, allowing reformers to advance changes in 
military doctrines and create the conditions to participate in defence cooperation 
schemes that would become crucial to facilitate the inclusion of a strong cooperation 
agenda to the missions and objectives of the Chilean Armed Forces  (Lt.Col. Arancibia-
Clavel 2007, 104–5). As a result, the country has developed a new defence agenda, centred 
on the normative commitment to cooperation as a pillar of the defence strategy. This 
normative change took away the relevance of the Armed Forces in the planning and 
implementation of crucial aspects of the defence policy, disarticulating their ability to 
resort to believable fear-mongering strategies. In a sense, these measures are related to 
the fact that some sectors of the political elite and of the Chilean society still perceive the 
Armed Forces with suspicion  (The Economist 2008). 
Considering the difficult context for defence reform, the Concertación106 governments 
attempted the path of least resistance. Instead of seeking to modify all the overall 
regulatory framework, the first important legal innovations introduced focused on a 
                                                        
106 Formally known as Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Concert of Parties for Democracy), was 
originally formed with a number of unlikely partners (including socialists, radicals, humanists, the greens, 
and the Christian Democrats) coming together with the only goal of ousting Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite 
(which they did with 54% of the votes). However, fearing that Pro-Pinochet sectors could manage to win 
the 1989 presidential election, the Concertación remained together as a political coalition, eventually 
becoming the largest political force of the last decades in Chile (Ymayo Tartakoff 2013, 70). 
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largely unexplored area: the participation of the Armed Forces in Peace Operations107. In 
the context of a decaying relevance of the traditional conflict hypotheses on top of which 
defence planning was structured, a path to redefine the role of the Armed Forces opened. 
Chile´s participation in UN-sanctioned Peacekeeping Operations grew in complexity and 
involvement since the 1990s  (Gutiérrez 2010, 700–701), a strategy that has been 
associated with prestige-seeking actions among Western middle powers  (Neack 1995). 
In the Chilean case, pretty much like in Argentina, this was also related to a domestic 
political strategy seeking to redefine the mission of the Armed Forces, tie them to the 
democratic rule of law and to international regulations, and reiterate the supremacy of 
the President over the definition of the national defence policy (Presidencia de la 
República de Chile, 1999). 
In addition, the Concertación commissioned the creation of the region´s first ever White 
Book of the National Defence, in 1997 (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile, 1997). 
Though still imbued of the dominant conservative discourses, this was the first concrete 
attempt to foster a collaboration between military and civilian experts in which a 
discussion on reform proposals was held. In order to achieve such goal, the participants 
identified the basic interests, understandings, norms and plans for the near future that 
should guide Chile´s defence sector, seeking to construct a shared perception of its 
security environment and allowing to analyse the defence sector as a public policy area 
equivalent to any other for the first time in decades (García Pino and Montes 2009, 82). In 
doing this, the 1997 White Book managed to un-root some of the more sectarian and anti-
                                                        
107 Law 19.067 – Regulating the entry of foreign armed corps to Chilean territory and the norms for 
deployment of Chilean armed corps abroad (Promulgated on 26 June, 1991). Decree 94 – Establishing a 
National Policy for the Chilean participation in Peacekeeping Operations (Promulgated on 6 November, 
1996). Modified by Decree 68 (Promulgated on 10 October 1999) and by Law 20.297 (Promulgated 13 
December 2008). Decree 75 – Creating the inter-ministerial Commission for Peace Operations 
(Promulgated on 5 May 2009) 
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democratic practices upheld by the Armed Forces in terms of defence planning. It also 
represented a landmark in the redefinition of the dominant understanding about the 
interaction between the defence and foreign policy sectors in the region, incentivizing the 
publication of similar instruments in other South American countries and increasing the 
transparency of their respective defence planning processes  (Battaglino 2012, 89). 
However, it was only with the second White Book, in 2002, that the situation turned 
noticeably more permeable for an advancement of a renewed defence strategy. In this 
second attempt, international cooperation was incorporated for the first time as one of 
the pillars of the national defence strategy, along with dissuasion, contributing to national 
security by fostering mutual confidence with other states (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional 
de Chile, 2002, p. 24). 
This last step, which arguably was only possible due to Chile´s increasing participation 
in Peacekeeping Operations and to the positive experience in the bilateral relation with 
Argentina, was one of the key pre-conditions that facilitated the decision to join the SADC 
negotiations. I will return to this point later on, but suffice it to say at this point that by 
placing international cooperation as one of the two legs of the country´s defence strategy, 
the domestic structural conditions were ripe for a more decisive participation in 
international defence cooperation schemes. Moreover, embedding the country in a 
regional defence cooperation and policy coordination framework would help cement the 
agenda of defence reformers, who in 2008 still faced resistance to intended structural 
modifications to the ChMoD and to the funding of the Armed Forces. For example, it wasn´t 
until 2010 and through a protracted negotiation that the role of the Minister of Defence 
was explicitly upgraded, placing it explicitly above the Armed Forces in the line of 
command for the first time in Chilean history (Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010). This 
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allowed the civil authorities in the Ministry to fulfil the entire public policy cycle108 for the 
sector  (García Pino and Montes 2009; Montes 2010, 157–59). Before this reform, the 
Armed Forces largely perceived the Minister as an intermediary with the President, at 
best, or as a mere “manager”, at worst  (Radseck 2005, 184). 
In this context, many of the Strategic Norms in place at the moment of the SADC 
negotiations had not really been affected by the transition to democracy. The legitimate 
goals for the use of force is probably the norm that suffered the least variations in the 
1990-2008 period, even accounting for the conceptual distinction between security and 
defence that the new legal framework incorporated. The more evident formulation of this 
norm is included in the 1997 and the 2002 White Books, in the subsection listing the role 
of the defence sector with relation with the “Permanent National Objectives” (Ministerio 
de Defensa Nacional de Chile, 1997, pp. 22-24; 2002, pp. 23-24). The list of missions calls 
for the Armed Forces to defend the independence, sovereignty and territory of the 
country; contribute to its development and international projection; and, contribute to 
international peace and stability. But, there are other aspects that are also worth 
highlighting. The White Book establishes Armed Forces are not to be used in the 
international promotion of any particular set of beliefs nor values, thus adhering to the 
principle of non-intervention. As Leslie Wehner points out, Chile´s authoritarian past has 
led the country to become an active and vocal promoter of democracy and human rights 
(Wehner 2016), but the use of military force has been explicitly excluded from the 
legitimate means to fulfil this goal. This places Chile´s Strategic Culture at the lower degree 
of activism. 
                                                        




More surprising, perhaps, is that two elements related to the organic understanding of 
the state and the domestic activism of the Armed Forces continue to be listed: Contribute 
to the maintenance of the domestic institutional framework and the rule of law; and, keep, 
strengthen and renew the historical and cultural identity of the country. This seems to 
contradict the unambiguous distinction in the doctrine between security (non-state 
domestic and transnational actors; regular criminality; radicalized political opposition; 
etc.) and defence (dissuasion of and cooperation with state actors), incorporated 
precisely to prevent interventions of the Armed Forces in domestic politics. Nevertheless, 
though this position continues to be contested by a minority group of the local defence 
elite (Griffiths Spielman 2009), it remains highly consensual and explains relevant aspects 
of the Chilean position during the SADC negotiations. Moreover, this is one of the main 
reasons why, despite constant and strong pressure on the contrary by the US (Youngers 
and Rosin 2005, 3–4), issues such as drug traffic and organized crime have not been 
militarized in the country. 
This strong doctrinal distinction (shared by Argentina, Uruguay and, to a lesser extent, 
Brazil) was incorporated in the institutional arrangement of the UNASUR, which explicitly 
excludes drug traffic, terrorism and organized crime from SADC´s sphere of influence by 
placing them under the responsibility of specialized councils. This is one of the most 
evident examples of how Chile´s Strategic Culture affected regional structures during the 
negotiations. 
 
A return to the old consensus? 
As explained before, the norm that probably changed the most during the decades 
leading to the SADC negotiations is the one referring to preferred modes of cooperation. 
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It is possible that political and defence elites chose to develop a consistent policy around 
Peacekeeping Operations to widen the country´s approach to defence, avoiding 
controversies and stalemates at the National Congress resulting from questions about the 
democratic transition and civil-military relations. In this way, Chile´s basic Strategic 
Norms incorporated international cooperation as one of its pillars without the need for 
the government to engage in high-stake negotiations with the Pinochetist opposition. 
However, it´s worth noting that Chile´s approach to multilateralism, cooperation and 
governance in the sector of defence was not limited to the bilateral rapprochements and 
the inclusion of the term “cooperation” in its doctrine along with “deterrence”. The 
country also tried to show a higher level of involvement in different international peace 
and governance mechanisms (Portales 2011b), insinuating a return to the long-lost 
foreign policy tradition of having an active role in multilateral governance bodies. In the 
lapse of few years, Chile 
• Obtained a non-permanent seat at the UNSC in the 1996-1997 Sessions´ Period.109 
• Became part of a regional coalition coordinating efforts in the UN-sanctioned 
MINUSTAH.110 
                                                        
109 Put forward by President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000), this initiative represented a relevant 
shift in the country´s international strategy post-1973, “re-inserting” Chile in the international security 
governance system for the first time in over 30 years (its previous bid for a seat at this body had been the 
1961-1962 Sessions). Regularly securing a position at the UNSC has since become a stable diplomatic 
priority for the country. Chile has been voted to take the seat in two other occasions (2002-2003, under 
President Ricardo Lagos, and 2014-2015, under President Michele Bachelet). An important caveat is that 
these recent participations in the UNSC all took place under Concertación governments, making it difficult 
to say whether the right-wing opposition also considers this to be a priority. See: 
http://www.minrel.gob.cl/chile-en-el-consejo-de-seguridad-de-la-onu/minrel/2013-11-22/164524.html 
110 With this, 2004 marks the year in which Chile upped its game in Peacekeeping Operations for the first 
time, designating and training specialized units put at disposition of the UN to handle complex operational 
duties in constant cooperation and coordination with other countries (Péndola Brondi 2005, 74–79) 
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• Got José Miguel Insulza elected as Secretary General of the OAS, the single most important 
governance and stability mechanism at the hemispheric level.111 
The activism shown in multilateral forums between 1996-2015 makes this period one 
of the most active the country has seen in terms of commitment to international 
governance and cooperation mechanisms. To top all this, the central development 
analysed in this research (the creation of the SADC) also positions Chile at the epicentre 
of relevant events in the development of regional cooperation and policy coordination 
mechanisms. 
 
Finally, it is important to mention Chile´s position in terms of the threshold of domestic 
and international authorization for the use of force, the last of the key norms that give 
shape to the country´s Strategic Culture. One of the key goals that Chilean leaders were 
chasing was magnifying an increasingly distinctive, respected and democratic voice 
regarding the handling international security matters.  
Given that reforming the domestic legal framework to explicitly elevate the domestic 
authorization threshold proved difficult, this task was tacitly left to the slow but 
consistent effects of the increasing democratization and institutionalization of the society 
(Doyle 2005; Russett et al. 1995). Instead, the reformers among the defence elites sought 
to elevate the threshold internationally. For example, in the UNSC meeting of 6 May, 2003, 
Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés expressed 
“We know that, in a globalized world, the fate of each of our countries is that of all 
peoples. Therefore, the fight against terrorism is not only a matter for Governments, 
but must involve our civil societies. It must be developed within a framework of 
                                                        
111 With the explicit support of Presidents Lagos and Bachelet, Insulza would hold the position for two full 




legitimacy and clear respect for human rights and international law.” (United Nations 
Security Council, 2003, p. 13) 
 
This quote evidences one of the key aspects of Chile´s foreign policy tradition, namely, 
its strong attachment to international legality and legitimate procedures, also identified 
as one of the central features of the South American Society of States  (Kacowicz 2005b; 
Merke 2011). However, what this fails to convey is the degree of assertiveness with which 
Chile defended its (relatively weak) position during those turbulent sessions at the UNSC, 
defending the rule of international law against the US attempt to obtain legitimization to 
invade Iraq  (Fermandois 2011). 
Being a relatively minor player in a UNSC marked by the division and stalemate 
between the US and French positions, Chile could have easily chosen to take a back seat 
and let the negotiations between the permanent members develop  (Errázuriz Correa 
2003). It could have even decided to side with the US, one of its closest commercial and 
political allies in the hemisphere, and nobody would have been surprised by it. Instead, it 
remained fixated in brokering a compromise resolution, despite the barely disguised 
threats coming from the Bush administration with regard to potentially negative effects 
that insisting on this could have in terms of passing the bilateral FTA through Congress  
(Bywaters 2014, 67–69; Ulloa Castillo 2015, 230). This assertiveness in the face of highly 
contentious international security issues, even putting at risk one of the country´s long-
time foreign policy goals, is evidence not only of a political decision by President Lagos, 
but also of a particular understanding of the high threshold necessary for the 
international legitimization of the use of force. 
The evidence shows that Chile´s position in terms of the international threshold of 
authorization suffered relevant alterations since the transition to democracy, arguably 
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informing and qualifying the otherwise unchanged norm regarding the legitimate goals 
for the use of military force. 
 
Chile in the SADC negotiations: agendas and narrative 
 
Like in the Argentine case, the SADC negotiations were the first relevant instance in 
which ChMoD deployed an active “defence foreign policy”. Civilian staff from the Ministry 
led substantive aspects of an international negotiation, relegating the ChMFA to advisory 
and organizing roles (interview with García Pino). However, given the stakes attached by 
Chile to these negotiations, President Bachelet instructed Under-Secretary García Pino to 
personally coordinate the interactions between the different bureaucratic actors that 
participated in the organization of the SADC Working Group, thus becoming the 
coordination of inter-ministerial relations. To a certain extent, this gave the last word on 
the definition of Chile´s negotiating agenda to the ChMoD. 
Despite profound changes having taken place in the last decades, the normative and 
cultural continuities with the dictatorial period are also important. A good example of this 
is Chile’s perception of the region, and its effects on the country’s self-perception. Though 
in a lighter version than the one advanced by Lavín Infante, and despite the positive 
experiences of cooperation seen in the last decades, the view that Chile is qualitatively 
better than its neighbouring states continues to be relevant to the country´s self-
perception and understanding of it place in the world even until today (Colacrai and 
Lorenzini 2005, 46; Larrain 2006), particularly among some political elites. This cultural 
context is essential to better understand the domestic impact expected when President 
Bachelet decided to join and actively lead the SADC negotiations. It could be argued that 
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this decision was seeking to foster the country to move closer to its abandoned 
multilateralist tradition, doing so from a position of active contributor to the development 
of regional norms that sited well with the “exceptionalist” view of Chile that dominated 
among conservative elites. A number of interviewees, and particularly those working at 
the ChMFA, showed reluctance to talk about regional leadership in the Chilean case, and 
instead preferred framing the Chilean contribution to the process of negotiation in terms 
of it being an effective and efficient “administrator”, a reliable partner, and a propositive 
actor. The avoidance of the concept of “Chilean leadership” also reflects a long-held 
preference of Chilean defence and foreign policy elites, aiming to avoid the “isolation” that 
such projects have historically brought to their respective promoters in South America  
(Fermandois 1991). 
From the point of view of Chilean defence and foreign policy elites, the above 
çdefinitions not only meant fulfilling the role of pro tempore President of UNASUR 
“correctly”, but also proposing an efficient and transparent mechanism to advance 
proposals regarding the items to be included in SADC´s statute having a concrete idea of 
the goals being followed. According to Ángel Flishfisch, one of Chile´s goals in this sense 
was making sure that the resulting agreement was not merely a rhetoric exercise, but a 
realistic piece that could lead to actual cooperation among governments with very 
different political inclinations (interview with Flisfisch). This also relates to the 
understanding that the main challenge South America presents to Chilean defence and 
foreign policy-makers attempting to engage in cooperation schemes with the region is, 
precisely, the absence of a coherent regional project (Flisfisch 2011). 
This can be seen in the fact that President Bachelet was who proposed the creation of 
a SADC Working Group (Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2009) so that the countries could 
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discuss their different positions through a series of meetings to be held in Santiago, each 
involving teams of experts and policy-makers from each country and with a clearly 
defined discussions agenda. 
On the other hand, Chile sought to advance a cooperation agenda in whose 
implementation it already had experience, and whose results had already proven 
successful (interview with Portales). For this reason, the Bachelet administration decided 
to advance an agenda largely based in the experience accumulated during the process of 
rapprochement with Argentina (involving numerous Confidence Building measures and 
increasingly ambitious cooperation initiatives). In this sense, According to Under-
Secretary García Pino, this had enormous implications for the construction of the SADC, 
“[…] it is also clear that the type of relationship that had been built between Chile and 
Argentina around Defence issues helps understand a lot of the dynamics in the 
construction of the South American Defence Council. I think that, in this sense, the 
mutual experience we had is really useful. […] and I have no doubt that the ideological 
build of the South American Defence Council is Chilean-Argentine, because it´s based 
in 12 years of common work. […] and, every time there was the need for someone to 
explain what we were talking about, we raised our hands.” (Interview with García Pino, 
translation by the author)112 
 
Moreover, the SADC Working Group produced a detailed Institutional Report of the 
negotiations (Grupo de Trabajo del CDS, 2009) to be circulated among member states and 
made available to the public. The ChMFA, on the other hand, put together a memoir of the 
main events and debates that took place during Chile´s Presidency of UNASUR (UNASUR, 
2009). Though less widely circulated, the latter shares with the former in a three-fold 
                                                        
112 Original in Spanish: “[…] pero también es claro que el tipo de relación que había construido Chile con 
Argentina en los temas de Defensa ayuda a entender mucho las dinámicas de la construcción del Consejo de 
Defensa Sudamericano. Creo que en ese sentido es muy útil la experiencia que nosotros tuvimos en común. 
[…] y yo no tengo ninguna duda que la construcción ideológica del Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano es 
Chileno-Argentina, porque está basado en el trabajo común de 12 años que se había desarrollado hasta ese 
momento. […] y cada vez que había necesidad de que alguien explicitara de qué estábamos hablando, 
levantábamos la mano.” 
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purpose: providing information about the negotiations to member states; crafting an 
“official narrative” about the negotiations and regional cooperation efforts; and, making 
evident the crucial role played by Chile as Pro-Tempore President of the UNASUR. 
Considering that reports of this nature are by no means common practice in the region, 
their mere existence points to an intentionality that feeds into the recurring idea of Chile 
wanting to show its ability to articulate and coordinate regional efforts in an effective way, 
without abandoning the traditional moderation and efficiency of its diplomacy. 
Discarding what was understood as “empty rhetoric” and “overly ambitious objectives”, 
Chile favoured a more pragmatic discourse about regional cooperation, centred on the 
“lowest common denominators”113 as a way to move forward with the negotiations. This 
strategy focused on setting achievable goals (interviews with Flisfisch; García Pino; 
Labbé; Portales). The success of this strategy was expected to signal that the country had 
returned to the region in its own terms, providing an alternative to solve the problem of 
low density of effective integration in a context of proliferation of regional organizations 
(Rojas Aravena 2010). 
 
Chile´s Strategic Culture, its strong preference for cooperative approaches and 
authoritative (legitimate) decision-making processes, heavily marked the work done by 
this group. The way in which these Strategic Norms affect the country´s behaviour can be 
perceived in a secret memo regarding an issue unrelated to the SADC sent by the ChMFA 
                                                        
113 Though interviewees, documents, and academics (UNASUR, 2009, p. 208; Sanahuja, 2012, p. 11) use this 
formula, it is my understanding that this is a mistake. Using the “lowest common denominator” as a base for 
an agreement would mean that, existing a number of areas on which all the countries involved shared equal 
positions (and would, therefore, find no problem incorporating them into the agreement), they actually 
choose to go for a less ambitious alternative and discard higher shared understandings. If this is true, then 
the mantra is in fact mistaken, and the principle that actually guided the behaviour of states is that of seeking 
the “highest common denominator” instead. 
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to its Embassy in Colombia. In reference to a previous suggestion by the Ambassador in 
Bogota, Gabriel Gaspar, along the lines of increasing Chilean involvement in the helping 
resolve the conflicts in Colombia, the Ministry answered the following: 
“Though it is true that our country is ready to collaborate in the quest for a solution to 
the complex Colombian problem, for the time being it is estimated preferable to 
channel it through existing regional bodies, strongly ´betting´ on continental 
integration and solidarity, without hurting our bilateral approach with the different 
countries in the subcontinent, whom could see with suspicion that Chile would be 
seeking leadership in the back of regional instances and mandates.”114 (Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores, 2008a - translation by the author) 
 
This respect for the “legality” of the process, the authority of regional bodies over the 
matter, and the eagerness to avoid being in the spotlight are all important aspects of the 
Chilean narrative. Different interviewees repeated the notion that Chile had to be realist 
and prudent about its behaviour, acting in accordance with its size (interviews with Boris 
Yopo Herrera; Labbé; Flisfich). 
Nevertheless, Chilean politicians and defence experts interpreted the task of 
coordinating and steering the SADC negotiations as an opportunity to show the country´s 
capacity, efficiency and reliability. In an interesting turn of events, Chile´s position took 
inspiration from the old narrative of “Chilean Exceptionalism”, but built a narrative 
around its concepts that led to opposite conclusions. Now, these “exceptional” 
characteristics could allow Chile to contribute actively and positively to South American 
politics, instead of simply staying at the margins. 
                                                        
114 Original in Spanish: “Si bien es cierto que nuestro país está presto a colaborar en la búsqueda de una 
solución al complejo problema colombiano, por ahora, se estima preferente encauzarla a través los 
organismos regionales existentes, que permita ´apostar´ fuertemente a la integración y solidaridad 
continental, sin  lesionar nuestra aproximación bilateral con los diferentes países del subcontinente, que 





Does all of the above mean that the Bachelet government prompted a shift in the 
balance between the global free trader and the regional integrator roles? The answer to 
this question is categorically “No”. The global free trader role remained the stronger 
feature of Chile´s international identity. Chile hasn´t engaged in any major regional 
initiative since the SADC, nor has it entered into any regional trade/integration scheme. 
Its behaviour indicates that open regionalism remains a strong feature of its international 
identity. In recent years, it has signed and ratified FTAs with five different countries and 
established a mini-lateral alliance called the Pacific Alliance with Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru (Nolte 2016, 1). In the view of the Bachelet administration, participating in the 
creation of the SADC needn´t mean adopting the integrationist rhetoric and practice. 
Instead, the leading role adopted during the SADC negotiations would allow the country 
to display new aspects of the diplomatic capabilities acquired by expanding the open 
regionalist approach to new areas (interview with García Pino). Moreover, according to 
Ángel Flisfisch, the country would not have feared facing the costs of being left out of the 
SADC, had the project not been compatible with its long term interests, such as happened 
with MERCOSUR and the “Banco del Sur” (interview with Flisfisch) 
 
However, and unlike the ongoing commitment to open regionalism, there are strong 
arguments that this disdain for the region might in fact be fading. The pro-active 
performance shown by Chile as Pro-Tempore President of the UNASUR was underpinned 
by two resounding success stories: the SADC negotiations, and the coordination of the 
response to the internal crisis in Bolivia, in September 2008. As mentioned before, it is 
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possible to understand Chile´s commitment to these processes as clear attempts to 
“return to the region”.  
Roberto Durán argues that Chile´s central objective in joining the UNASUR/SADC was 
precisely to convince neighbouring countries of its “South American vocation” (interview 
with Durán). Both Durán and Ángel Flisfisch agree that it was central for Chile´s strategy 
that the SADC regionalized the methodology developed by ECLAC to standardize and 
compare military expenditures between Argentina and Chile (see Footnote 87, page 196), 
together with other confidence building measures that were already in place between 
these two countries (interviews with Flisfisch; Durán) and made the Argentine-Chilean 
case one of the most ambitious and advanced cases of desecuritization, demilitarization, 
and cooperation in the defence sectors of the entire region (Battaglino 2012, 89). 
Chile was particularly interested in advancing ECLAC´s transparency mechanism to the 
regional level. Not necessarily because it wanted to know about other countries´ 
expenditures, but rather out of the concern that others would feel threatened by Chile. 
Unable to over-turn the Reserved Copper Law nor conservative geopolitical thinking from 
the defence elites, the Bachelet administration expected this mechanism to help reduce 
uncertainties around its military build-up. In the mind of Bachelet and her advisors, 
exchanging information regarding military catalogues, budgets, and activities would help 
desecuritize the Chilean expenditure in this area, while also showing its intentions to act 
as an active and committed promoter of peace in the region. 
It is of particular interest to pay attention to what Ambassador in Brasilia, Alvaro Díaz, 
reported regarding the visit of the Foreign Affairs Commission of Senate to Brazil. The 
Chilean commission and its Brazilian counterparts agreed on the following during a visit 
to Brazil in July, 
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“Regarding the SADC, both delegations highlighted the relevance of this initiative as an 
instance of high-level specific political dialogue, noticing the relevance that this new 
institutionality could have on issues like Peacekeeping, academic exchanges, the 
integration of the military industries, and continental defence policies, etc.”115 
(Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 2008b - translation by the author) 
With the “Cruz del Sur” Joint Peacekeeping Force as the most ambitious example in the 
region for cooperation and policy coordination in the defence sector, Chile apparently had 
expectations about exporting this model to the rest of the region. This evidences how 
successful a policy the joint force had become, as well as how entrenched in the country´s 
Strategic Culture Peacekeeping Operations were. 
More broadly, with the deactivation of checkerboard alliances described in the chapter 
on the South American security complex, the Chilean government perceived that the 
moment was ripe for the regionalization of an array of mutual confidence measures it had 
already tried and tested in its bilateral rapprochement with Argentina (interview with 
Mladen Yopo Herrera). Hence, the initiative to create the SADC was seen as an opportunity 
and a vehicle to put this region-wide scheme into practice. 
 
Brazil116 and Venezuela117 were the only two countries to put forward full-fledged (if 
still rough) proposals for the SADC statute. The former proposed a Cooperative Security 
arrangement based on policy coordination and cooperation, while the latter sought a 
more ambitious agreement, with supranational attributes and a Collective Security 
                                                        
115 Original in Spanish: “En torno al Consejo de Defensa Sudamericano, ambas delegaciones resaltaron la 
importancia de esta iniciativa como una instancia de diálogo político específico de alto nivel, haciendo notar 
además la relevancia que podría adquirir esta nueva institucionalidad en temas tales como Operaciones de 
Paz, ayuda humanitaria en situaciones de desastre, intercambios e integración de las industrias bélicas, 
políticas de defensa continental, etc.” 
116 “Consejo Suramericano de Defensa. Marco Político Estratégico”, or South American Defence Council. 
Political-Strategic Framework 
117 “Estructura propuesta por la República Bolivariana de Venezuela para la conformación del Grupo de 
Trabajo sobre el Consejo de Defensa Suramericano en el marco de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas 
(Unasur)”, or Structure proposed by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the creation of the Working 
Group for the SADC within the context of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) 
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arrangement  (Comini 2015). The latter, as already explained in the general introduction, 
called for the creation of a Collective Security arrangement usually referred to as the 
“NATO of the South”. 
Chile, as well as the majority of other South American states, was adamant that 
Venezuela´s proposal was not acceptable, given its departure such initiative would 
represent from the “pragmatic” foreign and defence policy consensus post-1990 and the 
ideological distance between the Concertación government and President Chavez´s 
Bolivarian agenda (Fermandois 2011; Flemes, Nolte, and Wehner 2011, 117). In order to 
reassure all other South American countries, Brazilian Minister of Defence, Nelson Jobim, 
met with President Chávez and discussed the topic in advance of the negotiations. The 
Chilean Embassy in Brasilia informed in April that an understanding had been reached 
between the two to eliminate a Collective Security arrangement from the agenda 
(Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 2008b). This was also explicitly highlighted 
during the first meeting of the SADC Working Group (UNASUR, 2009, p. 206). 
However, two further issues proposed by Venezuela also represented red lines that 
Chile was not willing to cross. The first one was the attempt to change the decision-making 
mechanism within the SADC from the traditionally preferred “consensus norm” (which 
implies unanimity, whether explicit or by abstention) to a majority rule. This suggestion 
was quickly rejected by all Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) 
and by Colombia. It is interesting to see that in the three cases studied in this research, 
interviewees highlighted how it was their own country´s determination that put a stop to 
Venezuela´s ambition on this topic. The refusal to this supra-national decision-making 
process was strongly associated with a strong attachment to rigid understandings of what 
sovereignty is and how it must be defended. However, in Chile´s case, the preference for 
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open regionalism also provides an important insight into this position, since the 
negotiators would not have accepted any rule with the potential to limit the country´s 
ability to deal with other (extra-regional) powers (interviews with García Pino; Flisfich). 
The second Chilean objection to the Venezuelan project was against a request 
presented during the third SADC Working Group meeting, on 26 August, to include the 
following formula: 
“Condemn the threats and actions in the area of Defence that hover over the peaceful 
coexistence of our peoples and their democratic systems of government, and reject the 
presence or action of illegal armed groups and the IV Fleet, which exercise or promote 
violence, whichever its origin.”118 (UNASUR, 2009, p.227 underlining in the original, 
translation by the author) 
 
This last-minute proposal meant that the approval of the draft statute was delayed by 
around four months, since a fourth (unexpected) meeting of the Working Group had to be 
organized when a consensus could not be reached during the August meeting. The 
Venezuelan proposal far beyond from a distant threat to Chile´s ability to conduct its 
foreign policy with an open regionalist mind-set. It actually antagonized one of the 
country´s most important extra-regional allies, and one that had made clear that it “liked 
the idea” of the SADC, but also expected Chile not to “loose the voice that makes them 
unique in the US´ eyes” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 2008c). Chile was 
not willing to have such thing happen over the SADC.  
Most likely, Venezuela´s proposal was only a bluff, destined to be discarded from the 
outset. President Chávez could not have expected anything different, having countries so 
                                                        
118 Original in Spanish: “Condenar las amenazas y acciones que en materia de defensa se ciernen sobre la 
convivencia pacífica de nuestros pueblos y sus sistemas democráticos de gobierno y rechazar la presencia 




strongly connected to the US as Chile and Colombia in front of himself. Nevertheless, it 
took a big diplomatic effort for the Chilean diplomacy to go back to the original 
arrangement, which was “not meant against anyone” (interview with Labbé). 
 
To sum up, Chile´s agenda included a number of central elements that were deeply 
intertwined with its narrative regarding its participation in the SADC negotiations and its 
role as a regional power. Among the main features of this agenda, perhaps the most 
relevant are: signalling the country´s “return to the region”; protecting its commitment to 
open regionalism while engaging in ambitious regional negotiations; showing that it could 
be a reliable partner for its neighbours, putting its own “exceptional” characteristics at 
the service of the region; the mutual confidence measures developed with Argentina were 
to be regionalized, particularly the cooperative and coordinated participation in 




One of the key questions this chapter addressed was whether the long-term policy 
preference for extra-regional political and trade relations over regional partnerships had 
permeated the country´s Strategic Culture. The conclusion was that, indeed, Chile´s 
“withdrawal” acted as a reinforcement to the exceptionalist self-perception and the strong 
geopolitical views entrenched among defence elites. The resulting negative perception of 
regional affairs, in general, and of its immediate neighbours, in particular, meant that Chile 
saw its situation as one of vulnerability and constant threat. Securitizing its relations with 
potential regional partners in this way has meant that the military doctrine and defence 
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policy of the country incorporated norms like the possibility of launching preventive 
strikes, showing a high degree of activism and a low threshold of domestic legitimization 
for the violent use of its military apparatus. 
Understanding the direct and continuing influence of the 1973-1990 dictatorship is as 
important to properly comprehend the recent evolution of this country´s Strategic Culture 
as is accounting for the persistent intra-elite tensions between Conservative/Pinochetist 
and reformists sectors. This tension, itself related to unresolved divisions that can be 
traced back to the dictatorial period, has created a stalemate in terms of modernizing and 
demilitarizing the country´s defence policy and Strategic Culture. As a result, defence 
elites associated with subsequent Concertación administrations have had a hard time 
advancing any normative, institutional, or doctrinal reforms. 
The political elites that came to power since 1990 have tried to revert, or at least 
mitigate, this situation, but only mildly in the beginning. Chile focused most of its 
diplomatic efforts between the early-1990s and the late-2000s to negotiate bilateral FTAs, 
effectively turning trade negotiations into the cornerstone of its foreign policy, and 
putting significant diplomatic efforts into becoming member of the OECD119. This showed 
a strong continuity with the economic policies put in place by the “Chicago Boys” and 
other economic elites during the dictatorship. Only after signing FTAs with actors like 
Canada (1996), the EU (2002), the US (2003), China (2005), Japan (2007) and Australia 
(2008), among others, did mini-lateral initiatives with like-minded Latin American 
countries120 not related to trade liberalization come into its agenda. 
                                                        
119 The application was officially presented to the organization in November 2003, while membership was 
granted in May 2010. Chile remains South America´s only OECD-member country to date. 
120 Particularly, the Pacific Alliance, an initiative between Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru created in 2012 
to reduce trade barriers, integrate stock markets, and eventually share diplomatic missions in countries in 
which none of the four members have diplomatic representation. 
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In the defence sector, on the other hand, the veto power that the Armed Forces and old 
defence elites retained after the democratic transition meant that new defence elites 
coming to power had to seek normative innovation in areas that were perceived as 
secondary and faced less resistance. Engaging in UN-sanctioned Peacekeeping Operations 
and “returning” to multilateral governance mechanisms like the UNSC became important 
avenues from which reforms to the dominant Strategic Culture could be conceived. They 
also had direct effects in terms of crystalizing the country´s position with regards to the 
international legitimization for the use of force, adopting a position defending a high 
threshold of legitimization at the UNSC. Similarly, UN-sanctioned interventions in the 
form of Peacekeeping Operations came to be seen by the country as legitimate goals for 
the use of its military apparatus outside Chilean national borders. 
The Strategic Culture and military doctrine still include atavistic geopolitical views 
informing negative perceptions of regional affairs. Nevertheless, this element seems to be 
receding as younger generations start to take leading roles among the defence elites and 
as the epistemic community becomes more active in policy-making processes. 
The most important landmark in that quest to modify the Strategic Culture of the 
country, however, was the political decision to start a ground-breaking rapprochement 
process with Argentina, explained in more detail in the previous chapter. The 1984 Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship, and the peaceful agreements over border disputed during the 
1990s, helped start an unprecedented process of rapprochement cemented by the 
creation of wide-reaching Confidence Building schemes  (Caro 1995; Lt.Col. Arancibia-
Clavel 2007). The positive bilateral relation built in the last two decades means that 
traditional geopolitical thinkers have been “robbed” of the single biggest threat they 
perceived in the regional environment, effectively helping demilitarize Chile´s approach 
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to regional affairs. Equally important, the relationship with Argentina gave birth to an 
array of Confidence Building measures that have become the blueprint for other 
rapprochement processes in Latin America, and that both countries have actively tried to 
regionalize through their influence in shaping the SADC. As has been argued elsewhere, 
the re-definition of this bilateral relation has not only been fundamental to the recent 
evolution of the Strategic Cultures and normative priors of these countries, but also to the 
region as a whole. The agenda brought by Chile to the SADC negotiations, as well as its 
entire attitude towards the possibility of regional defence cooperation and policy 
coordination, are directly related to the way its bilateral relation with Argentina evolved 
in the past three decades, affecting the webs of meanings that inform the country´s 
perception of the regional security environment and the selection of responses to it. This 
builds up on the argument that a socially constructed Strategic Culture decodes regional 
incentives and constraints to inform action (agency), which in turn has the ability to 
transform the social structure. In this case, the effects of the Chilean Strategic Culture on 
the social arrangements related to the regional security environment come with the 
decisive role the country had in shaping the SADC statute, setting up a framework whose 
objectives circled around the idea of expanding of the zone of positive peace present in 
the Southern Cone to the rest of the region. 
Another staple of Chile´s foreign policy that helps explain its position in the 
negotiations is the long-held objective of being perceived as a reliable and trustworthy 
partner  (Bernal-Meza 2005). This meant that failing to assume the pro tempore 
Presidency of the UNASUR was out of the question. But assuming a protagonist role in 
coordinating and leading the SADC negotiations also responds to the above mentioned 
idea that multilateral fora like the SADC could help turn South America into a positive 
zone of peace. This goal breeds directly from the Strategic Norms developed since the 
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1990s in relation to the role of holding cooperative relations as a means to achieve higher 
levels of international security, complementing (and usually entirely replacing) the role 
formerly given to that end to military preparation. 
All of the above does not mean that the traditional geopolitical views and negative 
perceptions of regional affairs that defined how defence elites understood Chile´s relation 
with the region have lost all relevance. They remain influential, and groups still adhering 
to them hold the keys to block significant pieces of legislation aiming to further reform 
the defence sector, particularly in relation to the funding of the Armed Forces. However, 
contestation to the dominant cooperative Strategic Culture has faced relevant blows in 
the past two decades, and the success story that the rapprochement with Argentina has 
been further debilitated their chances of fear-mongering, necessary to make a highly 
confrontational rhetoric such as the one they advanced stick. 
Had Chile´s “detachment” strategy remained strong with the Concertación 
governments, as it did through the 1990s, the only way to understand the decision to join 
the SADC would have been as an anomaly related to the political preferences of President 
Bachelet. Rather, I argue that Chile´s shift of behaviour can be explained as the result of a 
long-term process that re-defined domestic normative priors that structure the country´s 
relation with its defence apparatus. According to Ambassador Labbé, in addition to the 
meanings attached to the defence sector that informed the country´s agency, Chile also 
attached such relevance to the successful conclusion of these negotiations because it 
perceived them as an opportunity to project a renewed international image. The objective 
was to re-define the degree of involvement and role of the country in the region, 
presenting it as an efficient, effective, and reliable partner (interview with Labbé). 
Furthermore, this decision shows that the cross-party consensus over the regional 
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multilateral governance organizations characteristic of Chilean foreign policy before 
1973 might be making a return after spending decades vanquished from power. 
 
As a result of all of the arguments discussed above, it is safe to conclude that Chile´s 
agreement to join the SADC negotiations had little, if anything, to do with Brazilian 
leadership/hegemony over regional affairs. As García Pino pointed out, Chile did not have 
in its immediate agenda to participate in the creation of an institution of this nature. 
However, forcing a discussion on the topic by putting the SADC in the agenda seems to be 
the entire extent of the Brazilian influence on Chilean actions. The domestic Strategic 
Culture had gone through a series of developments since 1990 that made the country not 
only permeable to the possibility of the SADC, but also eager to actively instil the new 
organization with its Strategic Norms, proving that it was the interaction between 
structure and agents that gave shape to this regional arrangement. 
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Chapter 7. Colombia 









The goal of this chapter is to analyse the cultural causes behind Colombia´s decision to 
join the SADC negotiations, how the key points in its negotiating agenda relate to its 
Strategic Culture, and what that means in terms of the redefinition of social arrangements 
defining the regional security environment. Arguably, based both on the country´s 
security practices and foreign policy preferences, Colombia represents the most puzzling 
of the three cases discussed in this research. 
A priori, key characteristics of the Colombian case make it seem like the most 
improvable candidate to join the SADC, or any regional security cooperation initiative 
circumscribed to this region for that matter. Indeed, a Memorandum sent from Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Chile to its embassy in Bogota maintains that, as early as February 
2008, the Colombian government expressed concerns over the gestation of the UNASUR. 
According to Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fernando Araújo Perdomo (2007-
2008), his country was concerned over the influence President Hugo Chávez was allegedly 
268 
 
acquiring in the nascent grouping121. As a result, Minister Araújo suggested his Chilean 
counterpart that the responsibility to coordinate the 2008 Presidential Summit should be 
swapped from Colombia to Brazil, due to growing tensions between that country and 
Venezuela (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 2008d). Indeed, immediately 
after the Angostura bombings took place, in March 2008, the government of Colombia 
decided to excuse itself from assuming UNASUR´s Pro Tempore Presidency (which would 
have entailed not only organizing the UNASUR Presidential Summit, but also coordinating 
the creation of the SADC), a role swiftly passed to Chile. 
Moreover, the first instinct of President Álvaro Uribe´s administration was to reject the 
SADC initiative  (AFP 2008b), which he did in two different occasions on the grounds that 
his country had to deal with its domestic “terrorism” problem before engaging in any form 
of defence cooperation  (The Washington Times 2008). This reaction forced Brazilian 
President, Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva, to travel to Bogota exclusively to convince Uribe of 
the opposite (AFP 2008a). Not a week after Colombia agreed to join the negotiations, 
Minister of Defence Juan Manuel Santos maintained that he was still cautious since the 
goals the organization pursued were not clear (C-SPAN 2008), showing that the country´s 
participation was by no means a sign of total agreement nor a carte blanche to Brazil. 
 
The central argument of this chapter is that Colombia´s reserves about the creation of 
the SADC are deeply embedded into the particular characteristics of its political and social 
history, which have permeated into the country´s Strategic Culture and caused the 
country to grow apart from the rest of South America in aspects relating to its foreign and 
                                                        
121 The blatant “defeat” of the Venezuelan position during the negotiations to create the SADC shows the 
inability of the Chavist agenda to actually influence institutional outcomes in South America. This seems to 
point either towards an exaggerated perception of President Chavez´s influence over regional affairs, or to 
a more generalized lack of trust for regional political initiatives (or both) on the Colombian side. 
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defence policies; preferred ways and goals for international cooperation; legitimate goals 
for the use of force; and, domestic and international threshold of authorization. 
Yet, the puzzle lies in that Colombia not only participated in the discussions, but did so 
adopting a highly active profile. It presented a set of demands and a negotiating agenda 
that evidenced the many points of divergence between its defence concerns and those of 
other countries in the region. The strong departure that the Colombian Strategic Culture 
shows with other South American countries, and particularly with the basic consensus 
that seemed to exist among the members of the ABC axis, makes this case is particularly 
interesting in terms of unveiling the role (sub)systemic context and domestic conditions 
have in informing the agency of regional actors. Moreover, given that Colombia managed 
to get some of its demands included in the SADC statute, this chapter will show the 
relation between domestic cultural features and normative priors with international 
action and, through it, the constitution of the regional social structure. Hence, the starting 
point for this chapter is to unveil the characteristics of the Colombian Strategic Culture, 
seeking to understand the reach and implications of the Strategic Norms that sustain it by 
looking at the political and social conditions that contributed in their development. 
As shown at some length in the Argentine and Chilean cases, the pendulum between 
constitutional and dictatorial regimes has affected the understanding of the roles and 
legitimacy of the Armed Forces in many South American countries. The ability of the 
defence elites emerged of the recent democratization processes to re-negotiate the 
cultural, normative, and legal frameworks that define the meanings attached to the 
defence sector has been largely dependent on the levels of legitimacy the Armed Forces 
retained after the transition. In other words, the critical junction that democratic 
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transition was in the two cases analysed before provided momentum and incentives, but 
also constraints, for the renegotiation of Strategic Cultures and normative priors. 
Colombia went through none of the above in recent decades, having had an 
uninterrupted constitutional order since 1958 (Taylor 2009, 19). However, holding 
regular elections does not imply that the meanings attached to the defence sector, the 
debates about defence and security policies, the decision-making mechanisms related to 
them, nor their implementation and control have been handled democratically. Although 
the incorporation of more civilian experts to the process of defence planning and policy-
making has been in the agenda since the 1991 Constitutional Reform and with the 
designation of a civilian Minister of Defence in 1992 (Jaramillo Caro 2010, 66), recent 
changes to Strategic Culture and norms did not take away the near monopoly military 
elites have had over the definition of threats, strategic planning, and normative priors 
broadly speaking. The legal and institutional modifications introduced by the 
administrations of President Andrés Pastrana Arango (1998-2002) and President Álvaro 
Uribe Vélez (2002-2006; 2006-2010) heavily reinforced the attributions and autonomy 
of the Armed Forces, advancing an expansion of the legitimized uses of force; helping 
lower the threshold of authorization; maintaining negative perceptions of the region and 
defence cooperation with regional partners; and, actively working to attract US security 
and defence cooperation. Moreover, former Vice-Minister for Political and International 
Affairs at the Ministry of Defence (and Head of Colombia´s SADC negotiating team), put 
into question the need to establish a clear civilian/political leadership over the military 
apparatus, stating that 
“I personally dislike the concept of a civilian Ministry of Defence. That is erroneous. 
There needs to be a civilian Minister of Defence, answering politically for what the 
Ministry does and steering its actions; but, beyond the civilian minister, there are 
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different types of solutions [sic], and what is necessary is the joint work of civilians and 
military”122 (Jaramillo Caro 2010)  
 
The above quote highlights a recurrent rejection towards processes of modernization 
in the defence sector. In countries like Argentina and Chile, in which establishing a civilian 
control over the Armed Forces became tantamount to stabilizing the democratic rule, 
processes like planning, policy-making, and implementation have increasingly 
incorporated civilian public servants and academics. This has not meant, however, that 
military experts were excluded altogether. Yet, Vice-Minister Jaramillo seems to imply 
that that is precisely what happened, rejecting such possibility. Something similar 
happened with the proposed regionalization of the Argentine-Chilean model for military 
expenditures information exchange, introduced in the Actions Plans of the SADC. Despite 
it being a confidence building and transparency tool123, Colombian defence elites saw this 
as a means to control and restrict Colombian expenditures (interview with Moreno). This 
is quite telling of the deeply entrenched constructions that define Colombia´s threat 
perceptions and definition of its defensive approach towards regional affairs. 
Since the main driver of recent normative changes was not renouncing and rectifying 
previous practices of the defence sector (as in the Southern Cone), but freeing it to tackle 
the domestic conflict unconstrained, the resulting Strategic Culture of the country is in 
many aspects diametrically opposite to those discussed in the two previous cases. I argue 
                                                        
122 Original in Spanish: “A mí personalmente no me gusta el concepto de que el Ministerio de Defensa sea 
civil. Ésa es una concepción equivocada. Hay que tener un ministro de Defensa civil que responde 
políticamente por todo lo que hace el ministerio y le da un direccionamiento, pero más allá de ese ministro 
civil, hay diferentes tipos de soluciones y lo que se requiere es un trabajo mancomunado entre civiles y 
militares.” 
123 Detlef Nolte and Leslie Wehner (2013) have suggested that regionalizing this instrument could also be 
part of an Argentine-Chilean agenda to have a closer knowledge of Brazilian military doctrines and 
expenditure, but there is little (if any) concrete evidence in that sense other than the claim that defence 
elites are constantly concerned with Brazilian military expansion plans. Moreover, this is precisely why 
such a transparency mechanism works as a confidence building tool. 
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that the history of domestic conflicts and their re-labelling (articulated between the late-
1990s and the early-2000s) are key to understand the web of meanings that make up the 
dominant understanding of the defence sector, which became evident at the time of the 
SADC negotiations. The negotiating agenda brought by Colombia to the negotiations 
reflects a highly activist Strategic Culture, with low thresholds of authorization, and limits 
between the realms of security and defence that are almost non-existent. Hence, the 
contributions made by this country to the regional security environment through the 
SADC closely reflect its high threat perception (particularly regarding Venezuela and its 
closer allies) and an interest to obtain regional legitimization for its militarized approach 
to dealing with domestic conflicts. 
This makes a brief discussion about the conditions of violence and instability that 
prompted such response essential to properly understand how Colombia´s Strategic 
Culture came to be what it is today. The prolonged domestic conflict that has shaped 
Colombian society and politics for decades is at the core of how its Strategic Norms have 
been constructed, and hence play a big role in shaping these country´s perception of its 
regional security environment. Understanding them in some detail is key to provide a 
nuanced analysis of the intentions and agendas behind its participation in the SADC. 
Of the three case studies, Colombia is the only one in which the defence elites 
interviewed shared a decisively negative image of South American politics and security 
environment, which they largely perceived as hostile, unstable, lacking leadership, 
ideologically-motivated, and unreliable. In both other case studies, there was at least 
some degree of ideational, cultural and/or institutional preparedness to welcome an 
initiative related to regional defence cooperation. Colombia, on the other hand, lacked this 
initial permeability. Even having achieved many of its objectives during the negotiations, 
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the creation of the SADC was seen as a sub-optimal development in itself (interviews with 
Lugari; Bermúdez). This, again, begs the question as to what led the country to join the 
organization. My argument is that, feeling isolated from and not comprehended by other 
regional powers, Colombia joined the negotiations for two main reasons: defence elites 
thought it was up to them to contain a “left-wing overtake of regional discourses and 
practices”; and, there was the expectation that the SADC might help obtain some support, 
understanding, solidarity, or cooperation from regional partners for Colombia´s 
militarized approach to its domestic conflict. 
In order to address the issues briefly described above, identify the defining elements 
of Colombia´s Strategic Culture, and find a plausible relation between them and 
Colombia´s stance during the SADC negotiations, the present chapter is organized in two 
sections, each including two sub-sections. The first of these sections discussed, as in the 
previous chapters, the historical backdrop and the social processes that shaped 
Colombia´s Strategic Culture at the time of the SADC Working Group meetings. In order to 
do so, the first sub-section will engage more explicitly with the historical context and how 
it drove the country´s understanding about the appropriate roles and uses of its military 
apparatus. The second subsection, on the other hand, identifies more specifically the 
building blocks of the country´s Strategic Culture, relating them to the legal and 
institutional instruments on which these Strategic Norms rest. 
The second section discusses more explicitly and directly the Colombian position 
during the negotiations, as well as how it was influenced by the normative commitments 
associated to its Strategic Culture. To do this, a first sub-section discusses the view local 
defence elites had of the regional security environment, in order to later associate that 
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culturally constructed perception wit the specific negotiating agenda brought by the 
Colombian delegation. 
 
The evolution of Colombia´s Strategic Culture 
 
As briefly mentioned above, Colombia sis not experience an event comparable to the 
democratization processes seen in Argentina and Chile that could explain alterations to 
its Strategic Culture in recent years. Yet, this country has experienced a protracted 
domestic conflict between the state and non-state armed groups for over 50 years. 
Moreover, since the cocaine business exploded in the mid-1980s, the contribution of 
funds and incentives for domestic violence grew exponentially. It is precisely this process 
of aggravation of the domestic conflict, with the according state response to it that led the 
way of normative and cultural innovation with regards to the defence sector. For motives 
that will become evident in the coming pages, I identify the 2001 re-framing of the 
domestic conflict in terms of the then global “War on Terror” (newly launched by the US 
after the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington) as the breaking point for Colombia´s 
Strategic Culture. 
 
Historical context: The Colombian defence sector pre-2001 
Brief introduction to Colombia´s domestic conflict 
Victor Uribe provides an apt summary of the long, complex, and intertwined domestic 
conflicts that have marked Colombian history (Uribe 2017, 37). Though there was a 
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period of relative peace and stability during the first half of the 20th century124, domestic 
violence has been present, almost uninterrupted, since the 1950s onwards125. The FARC, 
the most relevant of all rural guerrilla groups that emerged from La Violencia, is a major 
actor to understand the violence engulfing Colombia´s recent history. Having endured 
almost four decades of low intensity, quasi-military confrontation with the Colombian 
security and defence forces, this guerrilla group reached its peak membership and 
territorial control by the early-2000s. 
 
Graph 5. Evolution of FARC´s manpower, 1990-2003 
 
Source: (Arnson 2004, 5)  
                                                        
124 The 19th century was plagued with domestic conflicts, the most violent of which was the “Thousand 
Days War” (1899-1902) with the gruesome record of 100.000 casualties (Uribe 2017). 
125 The assassination of the popular liberal leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, during the 1948 presidential 
campaign, ignited domestic tensions between the leadership and followers of the liberal and conservative 
parties, leading to a ten-year period of exacerbated confrontations known as La Violencia (“the violence”). 
This period claimed the lives of over 250.000 people, mostly from rural areas, and it is precisely from its 
ashes that the different rural guerrilla groups that until recently controlled vast areas of Colombian territory 
would emerge.  
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Graph 6. FARC military activity, 1980-2000 
 
Source: (Sánchez Torres, Diaz, and Formisano 2003, 12)  
 
In addition to this, around 1997, a paramilitary group known as the AUC (Auto-defensas 
Unidas de Colombia, or United Colombian Self-Defences) became politically and militarily 
prominent as well. Initially, the self-assigned mission of this group was to defend the 
interests of land-owners and cattle ranchers affected by the territorial disputes between 
drug cartels and guerrillas. However, having found a shared interest in the status quo with 
the drug cartels, they openly turned against the guerrillas and adopted a more political 
position since the mid-1990s (Vauters and Smith 2006, 168–70). Within a few years, the 
AUC became a relevant para-state player, controlling with an iron fist the territories and 
drug business in their areas of influence (Arnson 2005, 9). By the turn of the century, the 
paramilitary had become a political, military and social project (not so) covertly 
supported by the State  (Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Washington 
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Office on Latin America 2002, 3; Velásquez Rivera 2007, 138). At the moment the AUC 
unilaterally declared a cease fire and started DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration) negotiations with the Uribe administration, in 2002, its membership had 
reached 12.000 people and was identified as the perpetrator of 115 massacres, murdering 
680 people, and forcing the displacement of 424.354 more  (Valencia Agudelo 2007, 49). 
The strengthening of the FARC and the AUC, in parallel with the increasingly 
militarized counter-narcotics policies of the Colombian government, took the domestic 
scenario to a whole new level of violence as drug cartels, guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, 
and state forces fought and cooperated to increase their respective political and economic 
power  (Cornell 2007, 219–20). This built up on a historically weak federal authority, 
which had problem in enforcing the law across the Colombian territory due to the 
geographical fragmentation of the country and to the suspicions of local leaders eager to 
maintain their power (Bagley 2009, 2–3). Until the mid-1990s the federal government 
had barely managed to maintain well-functioning Armed Forces  (Bagley 2009; Orjuela 
Escobar 2000; Uribe 2017; Velez de Berliner 2009). In this context of violent territorial 
disputes between arrays of different actors, state forces decided to follow an “enemy of 
my enemy is my friend” strategy and establish an informal cooperation with the 
paramilitaries. The state security and defence forces willingly ignored the illegal activities 
of the paramilitaries, and the latter got more actively involved in fighting the guerrillas in 
return. As Vauters and Smith put it, “The Colombian military lacks the mandate or means 
to launch a full-scale war against the guerrillas, so they often employ the ruthlessness and 




According to a thorough econometric analysis conducted by Fabio Sánchez Torres and 
María del Mar Palau  (2006, 14, 24–26), the expansion of armed activity by the FARC and 
other paramilitary groups strongly correlates with the decentralization process that 
started in the mid-1980s. The authors attribute this to two factors: the reduced repressive 
capacity of local governments; and, the increased “pot” these governments started to 
receive turned them into more desirable targets. Moreover, they conclude that, though 
decentralization reduced some of the socio-economic conditions that had traditionally 
brought support to left-wing movements, the availability of resources created incentives 
for paramilitary groups to establish a more permanent presence and dispute territorial 
control from civilian authorities. Moreover, Silvia Mantilla Valbuena´s research  (2012, 
38–58) challenges the few allegedly positive socio-economic effects of decentralization 
noted by Sánchez Torres and del Mar Palau. She maintains that the abrupt changes in the 
country´s productive and rural ownership structures caused by neoliberal reforms 
resulted in large numbers of displaced and impoverished people. As a result, these 
reforms created an audience vulnerable to the appeal of para-state actors with the 
capacity to provide some degree of security, governance, and public services. Hence, while 
blaming neoliberalism as the lone cause for negative developments in Colombia is an 
excessively reductionist approach, it is also important not to forget that it was indeed a 
major contributing factor to explain how the FARC and the AUC managed to reach the 21st 
century in a position of economic, territorial and military strength never seen before  
(Arnson 2004; Mantilla Valbuena 2012). 
In addition to the above, an unprecedented amount of funding was obtained by the 
FARC and the AUC since the mid-1990, when they filled the vacuum left in the narcotics 
market by the disarticulation of the Medellín and Cali cartels. Led by a sharp increase of 
in-country cocaine producing facilities and the development of traffic networks into the 
279 
 
US, the consolidation and expansion of drug-related activities in the country since the late-
1970s poured seemingly unlimited economic resources into and already conflictive 
society (Moreano 2010, 242). According to Ricardo Rocha García´s extensive report for 
the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, the equivalent to 3% of 
Colombia´s annual GDP was repatriated yearly by traffickers between 1982 and 1998 
(Rocha García 2000, 28). The availability of these economic resources in the hands of drug 
cartels would bring the levels of domestic violence to an all-time high, as criminal 
organizations tried to keep control over territories, traffic routes, and market positions. 
Perhaps the best known and most brutal example of this is the Medellin cartel (Pablo 
Escobar´s criminal organization), whose resort to brutal violence reached almost 
mythical proportions (Reuter 2009, 277). 
However, it was actually the fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels, the two largest 
criminal organizations in the country, which brought the domestic situation to a tipping 
point. The FARC and the AUC became the only organizations with enough organizational 
structure and territorial control to properly fill the vacuum (Peceny and Durnan 2006, 
101–10). But, unlike the profit-driven, pragmatic drug cartels, these two organizations 
also had strong ideological and political agendas that benefited from the new stream of 
funding (Bagley 2000, 14–17; Mantilla Valbuena 2012; Thoumi 2010, 39). Though it is 
impossible to obtain accurate figures about the revenue flow into either group from these 
illegal activities, rough estimates put the amount well within the hundreds of millions of 
US dollars per year (Bagley 2000). As a result, and for the first time in decades, the 
guerrilla had sufficient resources to inflict “major defeats” on Colombian Armed Forces 
(Uribe 2017). According to data gathered by Thomas Bruneau, 
“In 2001, more than 2000 unarmed civilians were assassinated […]. 200,000 civilians 
were forced from their land due to threats and terrorism. In the first nine months of 
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2002, 121 politicians or public officials were assassinated […]. Many roads, even 
between major towns, are unsafe due to guerrilla roadblocks. In 2001 the petroleum 
infrastructure suffered 170 attacks, costing the country $520 million. […] The average 
per year of homicide in Colombia is 25,000. […] In 2001 more than 2000 Colombians 
were kidnapped by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries (1923 and 262 respectively). 
Kidnapping is used not only for finance but also to intimidate the government in that 
those kidnapped include 145 political leaders and public officials…”  (Bruneau 2003, 
1–2)  
 
Despite having used the Armed Forces and federal security forces to intervene in 
specific cases before, the seemingly uncontrollable escalation of violence seen in the mid-
1990s justified in the eyes of the Pastrana and Uribe administrations the decision to 
militarize the conflict. This required meaningful changes to the Strategic Norms of the 
country, which in time would come to inform the Colombian position with regards to the 
SADC. 
 
Internationalization of the conflict 
Another element to understand the reasons behind the modification introduced to the 
Colombian Strategic Culture has been extensively studied by Sandra Borda (2012, 62–78), 
who analyses the process of internationalization of the domestic conflict. According to 
Borda, this process cannot be understood merely in terms of a hegemonic adventure by 
the US seeking to stabilize its “backyard”. Instead, her research points to a strong element 
of Colombian agency involved since the 1990s, and more particularly during the Pastrana 
and Uribe administrations. In nurturing this process, Colombian political elites made a 
decision that would alter the dynamics of the conflict entirely, not only because of the 
material and doctrinal input brought into the situation by foreign powers, but also 
because of the legal and normative changes that this would require. 
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The involvement of the US in Colombia´s domestic problems had started as a counter-
narcotics operation headed by the Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) in the 1980s, and for 
most part refrained from (openly) participating in counter-insurgency activities carried 
out by the Colombian authorities against guerrilla and paramilitary actors  (Feickert 2005, 
16–17; Tokatlian 1988). This only started to change when President Pastrana invited the 
US government to take part in the San Vicente del Caguán peace negotiations with the 
FARC (1998-2002) and in the oversight of the demilitarized zones that would be created 
through them. However, quickly after the peace talks proved to be unsuccessful, the 
Colombian government started lobbying for increased military cooperation to deal with 
the domestic conflict. Given the Post-Vietnam trauma, selling this military intervention to 
the US public and political elites was not quite the same as inviting them to participate in 
peace talks  (Pfaff 2001; Szulc 2000). Instead, President Clinton accepted to increase 
counter-narcotics cooperation, which could be sold to US voters as an effort to revert 
domestic drug-abuse by cutting the supply, while also helping cut one of the main sources 
of funding paramilitary and guerrilla groups had at their disposal. 
Plan Colombia was approved in 2000, after over a year of debates in Washington and 
Bogota. The Clinton administration committed to provide over U$S 1.3 billion over a 
three-year period, 70% of which ended up being devoted to “military cooperation” of 
different sorts (Vaicius and Isacson 2003). After the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration 
entirely refocused its aid and military cooperation strategies towards the “War on 
Terror”, lifting many restrictions on military aid in order to fund anti-terrorist efforts by 
partner states, regardless of their track record  (Sullivan, Tessman, and Li 2011, 276). 
Quick action was necessary by the Colombian government to secure US commitment 
remained intact or, ideally, increased. A recently elected Álvaro Uribe deployed a re-
framing strategy that managed to sell US involvement in Colombia as part of the “Global 
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War on Terror”, despite how outrageous the alleged link between the two seemed to local 
and foreign analysts (interview with Borda). The links between the FARC and terrorist 
organizations abroad were limited to an informal (though fluid) relation with the Irish 
IRA and Basque ETA, who provided advice and training over the years  (Millett 2002). 
Colombian authorities had referred to the domestic conflict with the guerrilla in terms of 
“anti-terrorism” with goal of delegitimizing para-state armed actors, but experts agree 
that the inclusion of Colombia in the US global anti-terrorist crusade was but a discursive 
fabrication by the Uribe administration to attract the interest of the US. And it worked. 
The original budgetary and cooperation commitment was expanded to reach a total of 
over U$S 7.3 billion for the 2000-2010 period (Isacson 2010) as a result of Colombian 
ingenuity to exploit the redefinition of US macro-securitization and priorities. 
Arlene Tickner´s notion of “intervention by invitation” (Tickner 2007) highlights 
precisely the Colombian agency in this process. As a result, the US redefined its 
involvement in the country, aiming its cooperation and efforts against “terrorists”, 
actively and openly providing support in the counter-insurgency efforts of the Colombian 
government. Hence, while former US Ambassador to Colombia Anne W. Patterson (2000–
2003) had once remarked that “the main goal of the [Plan Colombia] is combating illegal 
drugs” (Vauters and Smith 2006), the successful re-framing strategy led her to claim that 
“The Plan Colombia continues to be the most effective anti-terrorist strategy we could 
have ever designed. The Plan Colombia will prevent the guerrilla and the AUC from 
obtaining the vast resources of drug traffic.”126 (Revista Semana 2001 translation by 
the author) 
 
                                                        
126 Original in Spanish: “El Plan Colombia sigue siendo la estrategia antiterrorista más efectiva que podíamos 




As a result, Colombia can be identified as one of the few South American countries, and 
the only one included in this research, that fully incorporated to its policy and normatively 
embraced the US-sponsored militarization of the response to the “new threats” agenda, 
first accepting its policy preferences with regards to drug-trafficking under the umbrella 
of the “War on Drugs” and later eagerly calling for military cooperation under the label of 
the “War on Terror”. It is important to highlight at this point that this was not just a case 
of passive accommodation to US interests, but rather the slow development of coinciding 
cultural and normative positions that became fully amalgamated with the US agenda 
under President Uribe´s mandate. 
 
Colombia´s regional stance 
A final element that is worth mentioning before discussing Colombia´s Strategic 
Culture evolution is the country´s position in the South American Security Complex. 
President Uribe´s strategy was to sell the Colombian conflict as a crucial part in both the 
US counter-narcotics and counter-terrorist strategies, hinting at the notion that the 
country shared enough security ties with the US so as to consider it a part of the North 
American Security complex  (Carranza 2009, 292). Such situation would not be 
problematic in analytical terms for the RSCT framework, since Colombia fulfils the 
geographical criterion of contiguity and has developed strong security interactions with 
different actors of the North American region (interview with Lugari).  
Even if one was to doubt Colombia´s full membership to the North American Security 
Complex, it would still be possible to consider it an “insulator state”. Buzan and Waever´s 
theory argues that if a state does not fully belong with the security dynamics of any 
complex, but rather sits between two complexes with which it shares borders, then it 
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should be labelled an “insulator state”. Unlike buffer states, which are at the centre of a 
region´s security relations and “mediate” the border between two rival regional powers, 
insulators are at the edges of two different regions and belong to none. 
The above are, however, problematic ideas. On the one hand, Colombia´s domestic 
conflict has not spilled over into the US, other than in the form of creating some concern 
among defence elites regarding potential contagion in neighbouring countries and the 
overall instability of the region (Millett 2002). On the other hand, the transnational 
security concerns created by the interaction between drug production and traffic, politics, 
impoverished societies, and a lack of sufficient enforcement capabilities by the local 
government have created dynamics that are shared by an increasing number of South 
American countries. While Peru and Bolivia have traditionally been the other two big 
cocaine producers in the region, countries like Argentina and Brazil that had traditionally 
served as logistical hubs to triangulate illegal drugs to Africa, Asia, and Europe (Belton 
2016; Gomis 2014) have now also become providers of chemical precursors, mature 
markets for these products, and disputed territories for local and regional players that 
have driven a substantial escalation in violence levels  (Derghougassian, Evans, and 
Kuzniecki 2013; LaSusa 2016; Miraglia 2016, 3–4). Moreover, the FARC has not only 
created a (weakening) support network among the left-leaning parties of the region, but 
its trans-border activities have caused the Colombian conflict to spill over the region in 
the form of tensions with Venezuela and the bombing in the Ecuadorian region of 
Angostura127, which is often cited as a key factor that accelerated the creation of the SADC. 
                                                        
127 A military attack by the Colombian Armed Forces took place in the Angostura region (Ecuador) on 1st 
March, 2008, targeting FARC´s Second in Command, known by the alias of Raúl Reyes. Ecuadorian President, 
Rafael Correa, denounced the violation of his country´s sovereignty (Grupo de Trabajo del CDS, 2009, p. 
117) and broke bilateral diplomatic relations within few days of the event. Colombian authorities defended 
their right to conduct the attack on the grounds of lack of cooperation to deal with the FARC campsite by 
Ecuador. Secret documents sent from the Chilean embassy in Bogota to Santiago reports that Brazilian 
Ambassador in Colombia, Valdemar Carneiro Leao, was certain that the military operation had been directly 
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Though Colombia has indeed militarized and securitized its domestic conflict to levels 
that neither of its neighbours see appropriate, there seems to be an increasing openness 
towards this type of approaches in various other South American countries in recent 
years  (Gagne 2015; Woody 2015). This has given strength to the idea that Colombia could 
in fact cooperate with regional partners providing its expertise in counter-
narcotics/counter-insurgency strategies and thus become a “net security exporter” 
(Lukacs 2012; Tickner 2014, 4–5). Also, traditional South American security dynamics 
such as militarized bargaining (Mares 2001) and crossed alliances  (Kelly 1997) continue 
to play a role in Colombia´s repertoire and Strategic Culture. 
This points to the conclusion that Colombia still shares stronger security concerns and 
practices with South America than it does with the North American region, and hence that 
its membership to the South American Security Complex cannot yet be put completely in 
doubt. Buzan and Waever make another relevant point about the nature of the Colombia-
US relations, stating that they consider themselves to be “inter-regional”: 
“Does the link become more global than interregional with a potential redefinition of 
the US effort in and around Colombia as part of ‘the war on terrorism’ (a global effort) 
rather than ‘the war on drugs’ (de facto hemispheric)? So far this has not been the case, 
because the activities are not tightly integrated into a coherent ‘war’ that structures in 
                                                        
ordered by President Uribe (Ambassador Gaspar, March 2008 No.126; Ambassador Gaspar, October 2008 
No. 582). 
Colombia claimed that diplomatic notes and intelligence data confirming Reyes´ location in Ecuadorian 
territory had been sent to President Correa´s administration, with no satisfactory cooperation provided in 
response. In their eyes, this everything but confirmed the Ecuadorian connivance with and support to the 
guerrillas (interviews with Bermúdez; Moreno). Data gathered from computers recovered from the 
bombing site seem to confirm some degree of interaction between the FARC and members of the Ecuadorian 
government. Ecuador, however, rejected the accusations. Bilateral tensions started to de-escalate only after 
the respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with the mediation of the Carter Centre and other interested 
actors, agreed to resume diplomatic relations in September 2009. 
Hernán Moreano points out in his ethnographic approach to the trans-border traffic of illegal goods between 
the two countries that the security forces of Ecuador had, in fact, been relatively successful in identifying 
FARC campsites in their territory (45 bases/campsites in 2006; 47 in 2007, and 182 in 2008). Moreover, 
despite an increase in the number of security personnel in the border region during Uribe´s first mandate, 
the resources assigned by Colombia to police the area remain insufficient due to the complex geographical 
conditions of the mountainous terrain (Moreano 2010; Ramírez 2006). This led Ecuadorian Minister of 
Defence, Wellignton Sandoval, to claim in 2007 that his country´s northern border was with the FARC, not 
with Colombia, echoing a similar phrase uttered two years prior by Minister Mauricio Gándara (AFP 2007). 
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any systematic way. It is mostly a re-labelling and a legitimisation of conducting the 
war on drugs as a counterinsurgency operation, as several actors had wanted for a 
while.” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 328)  
 
This is not to say that Colombia could not, in the future, “migrate” to the North 
American Security Complex, but rather to explain why it is not yet there. One of the key 
implications of understanding Colombia as a full member of the South American Security 
Complex is that the strong US involvement in its domestic conflict has to be explained as 
a form of penetration by an extra-regional power, which is yet another characteristic that 
has defined security dynamics in the South American region since the independence of its 
member countries. 
 
Evolution of the Colombian Strategic Culture at the turn of the century 
The described situation illustrates the turmoil created by the domestic conflict, and 
some of the international implications it has had, which I argue are a central part in re-
shaping Colombian norms about and degree of social legitimization for the use of force, as 
well as its preferences in terms of international cooperation in the area of defence and 
security. 
As can be seen in the above discussion, in contrast to what happened in the Argentine 
and Chilean cases, the key historical determinants of Colombia´s Strategic Culture do not 
derive from conflictive civil-military relations in need of re-definition, but from a 
protracted domestic conflict and its ramifications. As a result, the negative perception of 
the region is not so much defined by dominant geopolitical views, nor by inter-state 
rivalries nor even territorial disputes, but rather by an evident lack of mutual 
understanding and ideological tensions between Colombia and its regional neighbours. 
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Hence, a large part of this perception of a hostile regional security environment on the 
Colombian side derived mostly from the ideological confrontation that existed between 
President Uribe and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (1999-2001; 2001-2007; 2007-
2013), as well as Uribe´s clear discomfort with the more general “turn to the left” that had 
taken place in the region since the early-2000s. This generated a mutual distrust, which 
heavily affected Colombia´s position in the region. 
The aggravation of the domestic violence in the late-1990s reinforced the sense of 
urgency attached to the reforms to the country´s military doctrines and practices that 
started with President Pastrana´s administration and continued through President 
Uribe´s. The latter inaugurated an increasingly aggressive and militarized approach to 
facing the domestic conflict  (Marks 2006). The slow but steady militarization of the drugs 
issue through the 1990s was accompanied by a re-framing strategy deployed by President 
Álvaro Uribe´s administration, artificially conflating the domestic conflict with the “war 
on terror” that the Bush administration had launched after the September 11 attacks  
(Echevarría 2010, 32–33). This re-framing was a major diplomatic success, with Colombia 
becoming the largest recipient of US military cooperation in Latin America (over US$ 6 
billion in 2000-2008), and one of the top ten in the world  (Tickner 2014, 2). This led to 
alterations to the Colombian Strategic Culture in at least three distinct ways: 
- Modified the country´s understandings about the legitimate goals and ways for the use of 
force; 
- Facilitated deeper security and defence cooperation ties with the US; and, 
- Lowered the international threshold of authorization for the use of force. 
Two central pieces of legislation reflect the development of the country´s Strategic 
Culture towards an increasingly activist and militarized approach to the domestic conflict, 
supported by the security cooperation provided by extra-regional powers. In 2001, 
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President Pastrana´s “National Security and Defence Law” (Congreso de la República de 
Colombia, 2001), became the first substantial modification to Colombia´s Defence and 
Security policies in decades, coming as a direct response to the advances made by para-
state groups. Two years later, President Uribe introduced the “Defence and Democratic 
Security Policy” (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2003), better known as the Democratic 
Security Policy (DSP). Among other things, this law sought to legitimize a more openly 
militarized strategy against the FARC, further conflating the means and doctrines of 
domestic security with those of external defence, and putting forward an international 
cooperation strategy permeable to the direct military presence from extra-regional 
powers. 
In addition to the militarization of the domestic conflict, the DSP required a substantial 
expansion of the territorial presence of Colombia´s Armed and Security Forces. However, 
with 92% of the defence budget allocated to wages, pensions and other ongoing 
operational expenses, barely 8% of the budget was left for capital expenditures and new 
missions. Starting in 2002, the Colombian government introduced a number of temporary 
“war taxes” to help fund the escalation of military actions. According to Gustavo Flores-
Macías, the funds provided by these taxes 
“[…] created 2 divisions, 18 brigades, 15 battalions, 13 urban antiterrorist units, and 
598 town guard (Soldados de mi Pueblo) platoons, among other units […] armed forces 
personnel increased by about 36% and combat forces by 45% during Uribe's first term 
in office.” (Flores-Macías 2014, 479)  
 
By President Uribe´s second term, the war taxes had expanded, allowing the Colombian 
Ministry of Defence (CoMoD) to increase its capital acquisitions. In the 2007-2010 alone, 
US$ 3,9 billion were added to the Defence budget through the tax, with which weapons, 
airplanes, helicopters, submarines, and frigates were purchased  (Flores-Macías 2014). In 
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this sense, the funds provided by the US through Plan Colombia were also crucial in 
allowing the Colombian government implement the DSP. 
 
The characteristics of the above discussed pieces of legislation respond not only to the 
political and ideological inclinations of the incumbent governments, but also to the large 
degrees of autonomy in the definition and implementation of military doctrines and 
norms that the CoMoD has. Among defence elites, almost entirely formed by professional 
military officers, the region is still perceived as a competitive sub-system, marked by 
crossed alliances, in which the use of militarized bargaining strategies remain legitimate 
forms of behaviour, and (particularly during the Uribe administration) are perceived to 
be shaped by ideological divides between governments. 
President Pastrana´s Security and Defence Law introduced a number of legal and 
institutional innovations of relevance to this study. Articles 3 and 6 of the law introduce 
two crucial concepts to the Colombian legal system: National Power128 and National 
Defence129. Though neither of the two were technically part of the constitutional order, 
their joint effect was nonetheless a substantial increment to the extraordinary powers 
granted to the federal authority in a state of exception130.  
                                                        
128 The accumulation of the Colombian state´s capabilities to answer to situations in which the rights, 
independence, integrity, autonomy and sovereignty of the country are at stake (Congreso de la República 
de Colombia, 2001, Art. 3) 
129 The integration and coordination of the National Power to pursue, confront and counter any threat or 
aggression, domestic or external, which jeopardizes the sovereignty, independence, territory and 
constitution of the country (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2001, Art. 6)  
130 According to Carl Schmitt, a state of exception is a situation in which extraordinary powers are granted 
to the competent authority (the sovereign, in Schmitt´s work) to implement the necessary measures to 
remedy severe disturbances to the political, social or economic orders, momentarily suspending the 
limitations to the use of force imposed by the law. In liberal orders, the law establishes who is to decide 
when extraordinary measures are necessary and what extraordinary powers are granted, but the fact that 
the legal order is (momentarily) suspended implies that increasing levels of activism and violence are to be 
used by the state. Moreover, in Schmitt´s view, “The precondition as well as the content of jurisdictional 
competence in such a case must necessarily be unlimited. From the liberal constitutional point of view, there 
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The National Constitution states that the Armed Forces are only to be deployed in case 
of external aggression (Art. 212) or internal commotion (Art. 213). However, 
constitutionalists Juan Montaña and Marcos Criado de Diego argue that articles 54, 55 and 
56 of Pastrana´s Defence Law introduce a new (unconstitutional and illegal131) state of 
exception, the “material exception”, which renders all constrains to the use of violence 
almost totally irrelevant  (Montaña and Criado de Diego 2001, 85). The law does this by 
circumventing constitutional conditions and constraints to the ability of the federal 
government to declare a state of exception. It also blurs the line between Defence and 
Security, legitimizing a more militarist approach to the domestic conflict and widening 
the range of possible extraordinary measures that could be adopted. For the above 
reasons, Montaña and Criado de Diego maintain that the law goes against the liberal legal 
order in three ways  (Montaña and Criado de Diego 2001): it weakens the republican 
distribution of power, going against the control attributions of the Judiciary; it creates a 
new state of exception, reforming de facto the National Constitution without undergoing 
the adequate institutional procedures; and, it reduces the fundamental rights of citizens. 
Yet, these institutional and normative changes introduced by Pastrana´s Defence law 
were paralleled by an approach to the conflict that favoured dialogue and negotiations 
with the para-state actors, and particularly with the guerrillas. This shows that Strategic 
Norms are not merely the result of a particular legal framework, but rely on the will and 
ability of the ruling elites to enact the provisions of the law. It may very well be that 
Pastrana was not immediately seeking to escalate military engagement against the 
                                                        
would be no jurisdictional competence at all. The most guidance the constitution can provide is to indicate 
who can act in such a case.” (Schmitt 1985, 6–7) 
131 In a state with a written constitution, no normal law can go against or modify the articles of the 
Constitution. Hence, the inclusion of a third state of exception to the list contemplated by the National 
Constitution is, in practice, a constitutional reform (albeit one that fails to comply with institutional and 
political the procedures necessary for such task). 
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guerrillas, but introduced the new legislation as a measure to dissuade them from opening 
new fronts. It is also possible that the Pastrana administration felt compelled to introduce 
this legislative innovations (despite not being inclined to actually enforce them) as a result 
of mounting domestic pressures from political outsiders. The victory of Álvaro Uribe in 
the 2002 Presidential elections, running outside of the traditional Colombian party 
system, seems to indicate the latter could constitute a source of concern for Pastrana. 
Between 1998 and 2002, the Colombian government and the guerrillas tried different 
formulas to stabilize the domestic situation, including prisoner exchanges, designated 
demilitarized areas, and a de facto recognition by the state of the guerrilla´s (momentary) 
territorial control, which arguably failed due to the government conceding to the FARC´s 
demands without producing real improvements in return  (Borda 2012; Echevarría 2010; 
Sanin 2001, 417–19). The failure of this attempt to achieve a stable peace through a 
negotiations process was one of the key points in Uribe´s 2002 presidential campaign.  
Having had his father kidnapped and murdered by the guerrillas, Uribe´s personal 
approach to the conflict was amongst the most radical in the Colombian political 
spectrum. He was adamant that a militarized approach was necessary  (Buitrago 2006, 8), 
since in his and his collaborators´ understanding of the conflict the main reason the 
situation had escalated to such extents was the weakness of the state, and not its excessive 
coercive power as happened in other countries of Latin America (Ministerio de Defensa 
Nacional, 2003, pp. 14-15).  
Uribe attempted declaring the state of exception by Presidential decree in two 
occasions, one only four days into his mandate (decree 1837/2002) and the second one 
in the first months of 2003 (decree 245/2003), justifying them with the concept of 
internal commotion (instead of the controversial “material exception”). However, in both 
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occasions the Constitutional Court rejected the move, denying President Uribe the ability 
to expand the attributions and lessen the constraints of the Armed Forces regarding the 
use of military force in the country´s territory (El Tiempo 2003). This, again, shows that 
Strategic Norms can be contested, and that legal innovations are not sufficient to modify 
the way the state apparatus and the society understands its relation with the use of force. 
During its first year in power, Uribe´s administration run into several instances of 
domestic contestation by the traditional political establishment, which had its initiatives 
blocked by the judiciary and legislative powers. Only after the political and judicial elites 
became convinced of Uribe’s plan, and a majority of the population swayed, could Uribe´s 
new Strategic Norms be formally introduced in a new piece of legislation and enforced. 
The DSP came to embody Uribe´s belligerent approach, expanding the attributions and 
autonomy given to the military in the conduct of domestic security activities even further 
than Pastrana´s Defence law did. Thomas Marks argues that this law reoriented the official 
position of the Colombian state from a posture of negotiation to one of open confrontation  
(Marks 2006). More importantly so, the DSP incorporated a sort of permanent state of 
exception into the Colombian legislation, in which extraordinary measures by the 
Colombian society (and not merely its security forces) would be justified in the fight 
against terrorism. In Josefina Echevarría´s words, 
“[…] the DSP aims for the normalcy of governmental war practices. It pretends to 
disrupt the so-called traditional liberal politics of democracy and accountability and to 
make exceptional measures an integral part of politics.” (Echevarría 2010) 
 
In the context of this call to an all-out war against the illegal groups that threatened 
Colombian society, the DSP lists six sources of threat for the Colombian society: 
Terrorism; Illicit drugs; Illicit finance; Arms traffic; Extortive kidnappings; and, Homicide 
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(Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2003, p.24). However, the breakdown of each of these 
makes it evident that the government was in fact consistently using the vague and ad hoc 
conceptualization of “terrorism” devised to incorporate Colombia into the global “War on 
Terror” as its point of reference to conceptualize the other threats. This move obscured 
the boundaries between each of the identified threats, making it difficult to properly 
identify cases of terrorist threats from cases of any other form of threats, and hence 
legitimizing the normalization of the use of the extreme measures propitiated by the DSP. 
The framing of the domestic conflict in terms of the “War on Terror” meant that 
military actions against the FARC and other para-state actors became legitimized in the 
eyes of the coalition of states following the US lead on the issue, effectively lowering the 
international threshold of authorization. Moreover, the wording and framing of the DSP 
make a consistent effort to relate the above listed threats with the civilian population, 
instead of just focusing on the survival of the state and the actions of the security forces. 
Arguably, the aim of this rhetorical device was to strengthen the representation of a link 
between the threats to state institutions and the security of the population, which was in 
turn a means to lower the domestic authorization threshold. 
By altering the Strategic Norms relating to these two topics, and with the legalized state 
of exception provided by the DSP, the goals for and ways of using military force were also 
altered. The DSP listed “maintaining a dissuasive capacity […] to secure the respect to the 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity, within a defensive strategic posture” 
(Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2003, p. 20) as one of the central objectives of the Armed 
Forces, and indeed the Colombian Armed Forces relied on their dissuasive capacity while 
maintaining a defensive stance when President Chávez ordered 10 battalions to the 
mutual border in support of his Ecuadorian ally after the Angostura bombings  (Forero 
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2008). However, the main objective of the Armed Forces in this period was conducting 
COIN operations, in which they engaged directly with domestic sources of threat rather 
than with external ones. Though the domestic activism of the military cannot be 
immediately assumed to translate into more international activism, the overall 
preparedness of the Armed Forces and the incorporation of the “War on Terror” agenda 
into their doctrines mean that the Colombian defence elite has indeed been more open 
than any of its regional counterparts to resort to the use of military force in the territory 
of another country (though not necessarily against the forces of the country itself), as the 
case of the Angostura bombings show. More interestingly, other South American 
countries perceived this as the effective arrival to the region of the pre-emptive strikes 
doctrine advocated for by the George W. Bush administration  (Battaglino 2012; Briceño-
Ruiz and Ribeiro Hoffmann 2015; Emerson 2010). 
Finally, a crucial aspect of the Colombian Strategic Culture that is important to tackle 
in order to better understand this country´s position during the SADC negotiations is its 
perspectives on cooperation. According to the DSP, cooperation with neighbouring 
countries is seen as an essential element in order to properly contain terrorist threats and 
control borders (Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, 2003, p. 44). However, anti-terrorist 
cooperation being the only interest of the Colombian defence elites, and considering the 
deep political differences between Colombia and its neighbours with regards to this issue, 
no relevant cooperative actions with regional partners were conducted throughout 
Uribe´s mandates (Bell et al. 2010, viii). Colombia has also put limits to the very few 
attempts of cooperation by South American states that did come up. Aside from the 
participation of several UNASUR members in an operation brokered by Venezuela to 
rescue FARC hostages, in 2008, Colombia denied all offers to mediate or facilitate a 
resolution to the domestic conflict. Their main reason for doing so being that no South 
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American country agreed to classify the FARC as a terrorist group, a condition sine qua 
non for the Colombian government. 
 
It is quite telling that, while the goal of cooperation with neighbouring states was 
included among other items under the “Consolidation of Control over the National 
Territory” title, the call for enhanced and multilateral international cooperation to fight 
terrorism within the frame of the global War on Terror took a much more prominent 
place, dominating the title on “Multilaterality and Co-responsibility” (Ministerio de 
Defensa Nacional, 2003, p. 20-21). As a result, though not directly mentioned, military 
cooperation from the US under Plan Colombia was given a higher status in the Colombian 
defence policy than any type of potential regional cooperation. Then Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Jaime Bermúdez, provides a pertinent synthesis of how Colombian elites 
understood the available options of international defence cooperation, contrasting the 
“real cooperation” provided by the US against a highly rhetorical, impractical, 
ideologically-driven, and never-materialized cooperation that the region was proposing 
through the SADC (interview with Bermúdez). 
Moreover, the eagerness of Colombian defence elites to further the involvement of the 
US in the conflict with the FARC was not limited to lobbying for increased military aid 
packages. Colombian agency in this regard was made evident again in 2009, when the 
news broke that a bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) had been signed 
between the two countries. Official documents from the US embassy in Bogota leaked by 
Wikileaks reveal that the DCA had been negotiated in secret between August 2008 and 
September 2009, in parallel to the SADC talks. More interestingly, the documents show a 
Colombian government that was eager to welcome and incentivize increasing levels of US 
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military presence in its territory, aiming to prevent the resurgence of old and new para-
state groups, import stability, and deter against Venezuelan rhetorical escalation and 
persistent threat of troop mobilization to the shared border. 
Confidential communications about the DCA negotiations do show that the US Defence 
Department had interest in counting with access to military bases near Colombia´s 
borders, as many countries in the region warned and feared (BBC News 2009). However, 
what is important about these leaked communications in the context of this research is 
not so much that they confirm the suspicions of neighbouring countries about US 
intentions, but rather that they present Colombia as an enthusiastic and eager party 
inviting further US involvement. In a briefing sent by the US Embassy in Bogota to the 
State Department, on 27 July 2009, US Ambassador William Brownfield (Sept 2007 – Aug 
2010) wrote that, 
“From the inception of negotiations on a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with 
Colombia, the Government of Colombia (GOC) has asked for several additional security 
assistance-related issues to be addressed in the same process. […] we also note that the 
GOC has said repeatedly they will not sign the DCA until they have satisfaction on Track 
II issues. […] GOC concerns on Track II have focused on three areas. First, they are 
interested in an air defense system tied into the Cooperative Security Location (CSL) 
structure. Second, they want assurances of access to U.S. arms, systems, or technology 
in case of a national security emergency in the region, whether by stockpile agreement 
or some other process. Third, they want access to all aspects of the CSL once 
operational--including space, intelligence product, and infrastructure.” (US Embassy in 
Bogota, Canonical ID: 09BOGOTA2376_a, p.2) 
 
Moreover, in another communication sent on 6 August 2009, the day after the fourth 
DCA Working Group technical meeting had concluded, Ambassador Brownfield told the 
Department of State that 
“At the end of the meetings, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Clemencia Forero told us 
that her working group delegation had expressed satisfaction about the significant 
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progress achieved by the working group. Still, she probed about the depth of U.S. 
commitment to the talks in light of the charged regional dynamics. She stressed that 
the Colombian delegation remains committed to reaching final agreement during the 
next plenary session.” (US Embassy in Bogota, Canonical ID: 09BOGOTA2505_a, p.2-3) 
 
These quotes, and more specifically the references to “assurances of access to US arms” 
and “charged regional dynamics” makes evident that the Colombian defence elites at the 
time saw regional relations under a particularly negative light. This was not so much due 
to the prevalence of geopolitical thinking (as was the case at some point in Argentina and 
Chile), but to ideological split perceived as irresolvable. This othering of the region, and 
of left-of-centre governments in particular, responded to a variety of factors that go from 
the personalist approach of President Uribe to the need of the local defence elites to 
accentuate in the eyes of domestic and international audiences (mainly the US) the degree 
of isolation and lack of understanding that Colombia had to endure, potentially as a way 
to secure the sympathy of its extra-regional ally, and to reassert its self-perception as an 
independent and self-sufficient state. 
The consistency with which Colombian authorities sought to internationalize the 
domestic conflict, particularly through active US involvement, reflects a well-established 
and long-lasting preference for military cooperation with this country. This certainly 
reflects the Colombian interest in the material and economic resources that such relation 
could provide them with, but also a coincidence between the two countries about the 
legitimate means and goals with which military force could be used in order to tackle the 
Colombian domestic conflict. 
 
The above described processes provide enough backdrop to better understand how 
the development of a new Strategic Culture since the early-2000s, one that incorporated 
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norms and practices more permeable to the use of military force by the state against its 
own citizens, informed Colombia´s negotiating agenda during the SADC negotiations. 
 
The Colombian position in the SADC negotiations 
 
Regional affairs in the view of Colombia´s defence elites 
The incompatibility between this extra-regional military presence (and the new 
Strategic Norms it would give birth to) and long-held institutions of the Latin American 
society of states led to a rather generalized perception of Colombia as an outlier in the 
region. Critics of the Uribe administration within and outside Colombia labelled the 
country a regional “pariah” due to what was seen as an unacceptable use of military force 
against its own population. Uribe´s supporters, on the other hand, were happy to be 
differentiated from what they saw as an unstable and unreliable region, describing 
Colombia as the “Israel of South America”132.  
A consensus seems to exist among the Colombian foreign and defence elites 
interviewed that the key reason behind the negative perception of the country in the 
region is due to a lack of understanding of and empathy towards its domestic situation 
(interviews with Borda; Bermúdez; Montenegro). Borda adds that this lack of 
understanding by neighbours and regional partners has eventually turned into distrust 
towards South America on the Colombian side, thus reinforcing the division and 
increasing the perceived distance between each other´s positons (interview with Borda). 
                                                        
132 Uribe supporters used this analogy in a positive sense, describing Israel as an “oasis” of liberal democracy 
and a prosperous economy surrounded by political, social and economic instability (Halper 2013). 
However, this term was originally popularized by President Chávez, as a synonym of betrayal to the region 
or collaborationism with a hostile extra-regional power, describing Colombia as an “enclave” of Western 
hegemony in South America and a traitor to its neighbouring countries (J. McDermott 2009). 
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As Louise Fawcett puts it, “The controversy over Plan Colombia and reluctance to engage 
with the Colombia conflict […] is testament to continuing difficulties and divergences over 
regional ideas and policy.” (Fawcett 2005, 45).  
As a result of this mutual othering process, negative geopolitical views about regional 
politics persistently informed the attitudes and practices of Colombian foreign policy and 
defence elites with regards to neighbouring countries. Colombian interviewees, both from 
the Ministry of Defence (CoMoD) and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (CoMFA), 
consistently expressed strong suspicions about Venezuela´s “ideological crusade”, the 
goals underlying the South American integration advanced by Brazil, and the very notion 
of the region being able to truly cooperate in the area of Defence. Moreover, a reserved 
cable signed by former Chilean Ambassador in Bogota, Gabriel Gaspar, confirms the 
conflictive relationship with Venezuela. In it, Ambassador Gaspar maintains that, during 
a private meeting held with then-Colombian Minister of Defence Juan Manuel Santos, 
relevant information was received with regards to Venezuela´s direct involvement in 
harbouring and funding the FARC (Ambassador Gaspar, Oct. 2008 No.528). While it is 
possible that Minister Santos was simply pitching the Colombian version of the situation 
to a relatively sympathetic partner, and considering that no concrete evidence is explicitly 
mentioned in the cable, Ambassador Gaspar´s account of the meeting conveys an 
inclination to believe the accusations against the Venezuelan government, and 
particularly against President Chávez. 
Moreover, though the negative perception about Chavez Venezuela is well known, 
when asked about the country´s view of the region most interviewees also spoke at length 




The Colombian negotiating agenda 
Views of the defence elites on the SADC initiative 
Considering that the rolling out of the SADC initiative was rushed precisely due to the 
instability and conflicts created in the Northern Andean region by the Colombian attack 
in Ecuadorian territory, it would be tempting to say that the country felt compelled to join 
the SADC merely because this was the least costly thing to do under the circumstances. 
There may very well be a part of truth in this appraisal, and Minister Bermúdez indeed 
pointed towards this explanation (interview with Bermúdez). However, this still does not 
fully answer why the country would make the diplomatic efforts involved in negotiating 
and participating in a regional defence cooperation initiative like this one, when it was 
actively seeking to distance itself from the region and hadn´t had problems accepting the 
costs of turning its back on South American norms, institutions, and organizations before. 
As already mentioned, Colombian elites have a predominantly negative perception of 
South America, a view only worsened with the ideological confrontation with Venezuela. 
This perception is also reflected in the position of Foreign Policy elites, who during the 
Uribe administrations understood the region almost entirely in terms of this ideological 
divide between “Castro-Chavism” (Latin-Americanist, integrationist, anti-hegemonic, 
anti-US, socialist, and in favour of the State´s active intervention in the economy) and the 
open regionalism of the “neoliberal arch” that created the Alliance of the Pacific133 
(Briceño-Ruiz 2013, 201). As a result, the first reaction of the Uribe administration was to 
reject the creation of a regional defence organization, accepting the compromise to create 
a “working group” only after Brazilian President Lula da Silva travelled to Bogota and 
discussed the issue personally with him  (Saint-Pierre 2012, 26). 
                                                        
133 Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico 
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Deputy Minister Camilo Reyes maintained that, while Colombia had accepted to join 
the UNASUR initiative under the impression that it would be mostly focused on 
integrating the region´s transport infrastructure134, the “ideological tension” introduced 
by the Chavist government broke this “basic agreement” about the goals of the integration 
process and made it increasingly difficult for such project to advance (interview with 
Reyes). Minister Jaime Bermúdez reinforced this idea, arguing that one of the reasons 
President Uribe was persuaded to send Colombian representatives to the SADC 
negotiations was because the country had already agreed to join the UNASUR, and 
withdrawing at such a late stage was not seen as a good option. However, as the 
development of the organization moved into a more politically charged types of 
cooperation and policy coordination, and away from its original emphasis on 
infrastructure, a series of concerns of the Foreign Policy elites became evident: 
“When the possibility of creating a [Defence] Council was presented, well… obviously 
we were similarly suspicious of that as we were from UNASUR, and even more, because 
the topic was way more sensitive. The hard, cold truth is that Colombia is a country 
that for decades has been marginalized internationally (so to speak) in terms of real 
cooperation regarding issues like drug traffic and security […]. Getting into a discussion 
about security or defence with the region, in a circle (let´s say) clearly co-opted 
ideologically, in which the discussions were not going to be symmetric, was a cause for 
strong resistance on our side, strong resistance…”135  (interview with Bermúdez, 
translation by the author)  
 
                                                        
134 The idea of absorbing the pre-existent IIRSA (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure 
of South America) into the UNASUR framework was, indeed, one of the initial points discussed. This was 
swiftly done in the form of the sectorial council COSIPLAN (South American Council of Infrastructure and 
Planning) right after the organization was created (Sanahuja 2012, 15; Silva Barros 2016). 
135 Original in Spanish: “Cuando se planteó la posibilidad de crear el Consejo de [Defensa], pues… 
obviamente todas las suspicacias eran similares a las que teníamos con UNASUR e incrementadas, porque 
era un tema que se volvió mucho más sensible. La verdad simple y pura es que Colombia, [es] un país que 
ha sufrido internacionalmente por décadas de una marginación (digámoslo así) de la cooperación real en el 
tema del narcotráfico y de la seguridad […].Meternos en una discusión de Seguridad o de Defensa en la 
región, en un círculo (digamos) cooptado claramente o ideológicamente, en donde las discusiones no iban 
a ser simétricas, nos generaba mucha resistencia, mucha resistencia...” 
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The negotiating agenda 
Hence, one of the objectives of Colombia´s negotiating agenda that Minister Bermúdez 
emphasized as central was the demand that all decisions within the SADC were to be made 
by consensus (i.e. they had to be unanimously supported or, at least, not objected by any 
member state). Though he acknowledged that this was not a contentious issue at all, the 
focus of the Colombian demand for the consensus rule was different to that of most other 
countries in the region. While Argentina and Chile (and Brazil) also were invested in this 
decision-making mechanism, they supported their positions on the notion that the SADC 
was to be a coordination and cooperation mechanism that had no supranational decision 
powers. This argument relates to a long-held Latin American preference for arrangements 
rooted in the commitment for the principle of sovereign equality and non-intervention. 
Colombia also adheres to these principles, and would agree with a similar line of 
argumentation. However, according to Minister Bermúdez, there was a more concrete 
reason for them to demand that decisions were adopted by consensus and not by 
majority: securing veto power (interview with Bermúdez). This, again, reflects the lack of 
trust and negative perspective Colombian elites had of the regional security environment. 
Though obtaining veto powers is an intrinsic aspect of adopting a consensual decision-
making process, the fact that Colombia was almost exclusively interested in obtaining this 
concession makes evident that this country entered the negotiations with an acute 
perception of threat coming from some of its regional partners. 
Moreover, this view was not limited to countries like Venezuela, with which Colombia 
had an open and vocal confrontation. Admiral David René Moreno voiced similar 
suspicions, but put the focus on the regional dynamics Brazil was trying to shape with the 
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SADC initiative, expanding on the negative views the Colombian Defence elites had of 
Brazilian plans. 
“Brazil, who apparently received the blessing to position itself as an emerging power 
many years ago, […] was seeking a position at the global level, pretending to become a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council. And, to do that, it needed to be an 
emerging power. […] UNASUR, for example, was created and led by Brazil from the 
beginning… Having decided upon the creation of the South American Defence Council, 
at the beginning it looked like supplanting (I would say) the authority of the United 
Nations or the authority that at some point the TIAR would have enjoyed”136 (interview 
with Moreno, translation by the author) 
 
This warped view of what the SADC was, what Brazil (and other countries) wanted out 
of it, and what it could do was repeated in one form or another by all the interviewees, 
showing a high degree of suspicion over the initiative and of processes of regional 
cooperation in general. 
All of this is key in understanding one of the key motivations of the country´s 
participation in the SADC negotiations. According to different interviewees, Colombia saw 
it as its task to bring to a halt the highly ideological and confrontational rhetoric put 
forward by Venezuela, and the only way it found to do so was by actively engaging in the 
negotiations to create a regional organization it did not actually want to belong to. 
Colombia´s inward-looking Defence planning, strong distrust for the regional security 
environment, use of military force for domestic security at levels unique to the region, low 
threshold of legitimization, and preference for extra-regional cooperation, all provide 
                                                        
136 Original in Spanish: “Brasil, que desde hace muchísimos años aparentemente ha tenido la bendición para 
poderse colocar en una potencia emergente, […] lo que buscaba era posicionarse a nivel mundial, donde 
quería entrar en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Y, para eso, requería tener una posición 
como potencia emergente. […] UNASUR, por ejemplo, desde el comienzo fue creada,  también fue liderada 
particularmente por el Brasil… Y, al haberse definido el establecimiento del Consejo de Defensa 
Sudamericano, al principio era como para suplantar (diría yo) la autoridad de las Naciones Unidas y la 
autoridad que podía tener en un momento determinado el TIAR” 
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important insights to explain how the country´s Strategic Culture affected the its 
negotiating agenda during the SADC negotiations.  
Another excellent example of this distrust to regional cooperation initiatives also came 
out of the interview with Admiral Moreno. When referring to the initiative advanced by 
Argentina and Chile to regionalize their bilateral military expenditure transparency 
system, Admiral Moreno expressed his strong disagreement with the idea. The 
mechanism in question is one of many bilateral Confidence Building Measures put in place 
by the two Southern Cone countries in the 1990s with the goal to build mutual trust by 
homogenising their military expenditure accounts, making them comparable, providing 
more transparency to the cooperation efforts, and clearing doubts about the type of 
equipment that each side acquired. Admiral Moreno understood this as an attempt to 
control Colombia´s “disproportionate” expenditures, with the goal of blocking its military 
purchases. Moreover, in his view, the idea of sharing sensible information about 
equipment available and military deployments with countries that had cooperative ties 
with the FARC was entirely out of the question (interview with Moreno). 
Different interviewees also acknowledged that Colombia sought to “take the teeth out 
of UNASUR” (interview with Lugari), by making sure that it was not a closed club 
exclusively designed for South American states. For this reason, it actively advocated for, 
and obtained, a clause claiming that the SADC is an organization open to all states (which, 
incidentally, happened to get started in and for South America). 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Colombia´s agenda was not entirely 
cynical. In fact, one of the central goals of its participation in the negotiations (and one 
that closely relates to its Strategic Culture) was to obtain legitimization for its counter-
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narcotics and “counter-terrorist” strategies from the members of the SADC (interview 
with Reyes). The inclusion of a clause condemning terrorism was a sine qua non condition 
for Colombia´s participation in the negotiations. This is confirmed by the official report on 
the negotiations (Grupo de Trabajo del CDS, 2009, p. 69). In the words of Minister 
Bermúdez, a regional organization working on the areas of defence cooperation and 
coordination that was to help Colombia advance its “national interests” and policy 
objectives could not avoid explicitly condemning terrorism (Interview with Bermúdez). 
The aim of this clause was twofold: introduce elements of a war-on-terror-style 
securitization into the SADC institutional design; and, legitimize Colombia´s militarized 
approach to its domestic conflict. Arguably, by accepting an anti-terrorist clause, South 
American countries would have also implicitly accepted Uribe´s re-framing strategy, 
which would have meant a major diplomatic success for his administration. Though the 
proposed clause faced strong opposition, and the final version of the agreement avoids 
making explicit reference to “terrorism”, Colombia forced a compromise to include a less 
controversial formula condemning “armed groups outside the law” (UNASUR, 2008, Art. 
3, subsection m). Similarly, and as a direct response to the proposal advanced by 
President Chávez to grant the FARC belligerent community status (Hernández 2008), 
Colombia managed to include explicit provisions to recognize the exclusive role that 
“constitutional Armed Forces” have in the defence of the “nation” (UNASUR, 2008, Art. 3, 
subsection h) in the SADC statute. 
The push to include an “anti-terrorist” rhetoric in the SADC relates to two crucial 
objectives of the Colombian Foreign Policy strategy under President Uribe: to get at least 
a minimum degree of regional solidarity with and validation for the Colombian approach 
to its domestic conflicts; and, more importantly so, to find regional legitimization for the 
re-framing of its domestic conflict as part of the “global war on terror”, accepted by the 
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US in the early-2000s. This last point is crucial, since the discursive bridge built between 
the Colombian guerrillas/drug traffic and international terrorism significantly altered the 
Colombian Strategic Culture and its security practices at the domestic level, attracting 
increased volumes of US Defence and Security cooperation in the process but failing to 
generate solidarity from neighbouring states. Moreover, President Uribe´s re-framing 
strategy got to the extreme of avoiding the term “armed conflict” in all official documents, 
and using the term “terrorism” instead (Coronel López 2007, 404; Ramírez 2006, 70). This 
move drove some neighbouring countries away, whom refused to include the FARC in 
their respective lists of terrorist organizations  (Ramírez 2006).  
Colombia also expected to clear the air about its privileged security relation with the 
US. In fact, though the majority of the statute had already been negotiated and agreed 
upon by the third technical meeting of the working group, Venezuela´s request that the 
activities of the US IV Fleet in the region were condemned and banned was unacceptable 
for Colombia. In a reserved document from the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ambassador Gaspar explains that the proposed clause was discussed in private with 
Deputy Minister Reyes and Paola Lugari, whose opinion was adamant that Colombia 
would not join a regional organization with South America if in any way it threatened the 
privileged relationship with the US (Ambassador Gaspar, Aug. 2008 No.478, p.2). 
Still, the overall message obtained from all interviewees that participated in the 
negotiations is that they feared President Chávez and his supporters would somehow co-
opt the organization and try to constrain Colombia´s ability to determine its own Foreign 




Finally, an element that is relevant to highlight is the consensus existing in the two 
incumbent ministries regarding the negotiating position of the Colombian state. Despite 
the lack of coordination and inter-ministerial tensions noted by Sandra Borda with 
regards to the design and implementation of Colombia´s foreign and defence policies in 
both of Uribe´s administrations (C. Paredes 2010), the interviewees from each of these 
dependencies shared an overwhelming degree of agreement regarding their views and 
evaluation of the SADC initiative. Given that Borda´s comments were made in the context 
of the presentation of an in-depth report on the Colombian Foreign Policy commissioned 
to a board of experts by President Uribe  (Bell et al. 2010), it is particularly interesting to 
note that two otherwise un-coordinated bureaucracies shared such a cohesive view 
regarding this particular topic. What this implies is that the Strategic Norms developed 
through the Pastrana and Uribe administrations managed to permeate homogeneously 
on the defence and foreign policy elites, shaping their respective understandings about 







As with the two previous case studies, the main goal pursued in this chapter was to 
evaluate the cultural and normative elements at play in Colombia´s approach to the 
creation of the SADC, as well as their impact on the regional security arrangements 
included in it. In order to do so, I first focused in describing and analysing the elements of  
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the country´s recent history that have had a direct effect in shaping how regional and 
domestic environments are perceived, as well as the webs of meanings defining how the 
defence sector relates to each of them. I then engaged with the elements that constitute 
Colombia´s Strategic Culture, seeking to explain its recent evolution and better 
understand the norms defining the use of the defence apparatus. Finally, I put these 
insights to the service of explaining Colombia´s position with regards to the SADC 
initiative, the meanings underlying its negotiations agenda, and their impact on regional 
level arrangements. 
 
Unique historical experiences have allowed for the emergence of a set of Strategic 
Norms legitimizing military and security practices in Colombia that other countries in the 
region find unacceptable. The bombing of the FARC campsite in Ecuadorian territory and 
its consequences is but one example of the deep differences between the region´s norms 
and the Strategic Culture forged by Colombia. Though the internal threshold of 
authorization for the use of military force was already lower than in the rest of the region, 
President Uribe´s “Democratic Security” strategy lowered it even further, moving the 
perception about the legitimate causes for the use of force to a more active position. This 
drove Colombia further away from regionally acceptable practices, reinforcing the 
representation of the country as the “Israel”, the “pariah”, or the “Cain” of Latin America  
(Carvajal 2012, 1). Arguably, the intense pressure put by the Colombian delegation to 
have a principle condemning the actions of “groups outside the law” included in the SADC 
statute is related to this, seeking to obtain at least some degree of legitimization for its 
approach to defence at the regional level. Interestingly, the inclusion of this article may 
also become important for other regional powers, whose understanding of the spheres of 
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influence reserved for the defence and security sectors are not as rigid as those seen in 
the Southern Cone. In other words, it is possible to say that Colombia´s agency influenced 
regional arrangements and norms relating to the use of force in such way that the use of 
militarized approaches to domestic conflicts is somehow legitimized. 
To be sure, it is possible that no immediate practical effect may come from this in the 
short term, nor will countries like Argentina and Chile immediately start using their 
Armed Forces to fight domestic issues due to the inclusion of this article in the SADC 
statute. However, social legitimization is relevant in shaping the perceptions agents have 
of what is considered a valid, acceptable action and what is not. Should powers like Brazil, 
Peru or Venezuela increase their use of military means to deal with domestic issues, this 
article could provide them with legitimization, and further social arrangements might be 
put in place to frame it within the pluralistic institutions that characterize the South 
American society of states. 
 
The Colombian case is also unique to the region in that the country has not suffered the 
typical pendulum between democracy and dictatorship that has characterized the history 
of other Latin American countries throughout the 20th century. Instead, a protracted and 
multidimensional domestic conflict has marked the country´s relation with the use of 
force and violence. In addition, Colombia did not join the rest of the South American 
countries in their “turn to the left”, nor did it perceive positively the advance of a South 
American regionalism. Moreover, Colombia is possibly the only secondary power in the 
region that not only accepts, but also has incentivizes the presence of US military forces 
and equipment in its territory. Finally, the perception of regional affairs and of regional 
partners was, at least during the Uribe administration, a conclusively negative one. This 
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is more than likely related with the fact that Colombia’s neighbours have shown little 
interest in addressing the domestic conflict and providing the cooperation that Colombia 
was after. According to David Pion-Berlin, Colombia saw “[…] a military solution as the 
only desirable outcome.” (Pion-Berlin 2005, 223), which many other countries considered 
not a viable solution.  
Colombian defence elites interviewed agreed in pointing out that the preferred 
outcome for Colombia´s government was for the SADC (and the entire UNASUR 
institutional framework) not to be created at all. This preference led the negotiating team 
to actively seek to “take the teeth out of the SADC”, always remaining just short of 
completely boycotting the initiative. This is also made evident by Uribe´s two refusals to 
join the organization, as well as by Minister Santos´s remarks in the Washington Q&A 
mentioned above. The reasons for this position are related to this defence elite´s deep 
distrust of other regional actors, particularly Ecuador and Venezuela, but also Brazil. This 
finding, together with the Wikileaks documents discussed, challenges the hypothesis 
advanced by José Antonio Sanahuja that the goal in joining UNASUR was a means to 
diversify the country´s international insertion (making it less vulnerable to its bilateral 
relation with the US) and redefine its relationship with Venezuela  (Sanahuja 2012, 10). 
The combination of a protracted domestic conflict with large amounts of funding 
coming from illegal activities are the factor to explain Colombia’ s changing Strategic 
Norms. In combination with the entrenched views of defence elites, these elements can 
explain a large part of the Strategic Culture developed between the late-1990s and early-
2000s, which shows few points of contact with the rest of South American countries 
during the years prior to the SADC negotiations. 
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The answers to why did Colombia join the SADC and what are the cultural roots to its 
agenda are not simply. On the one hand, there is the systemic-level explanation regarding 
Brazil’s leverage to make sure its desired outcomes move forward. However, this 
explanation leaves a whole array of relevant elements out of the picture, particularly 
those related to agency and contestation. Similarly, claiming that Colombia joined the 
SADC merely because it was the “least costly” option is as myopic. 
Colombia´s activism in the domestic and external realms; its low threshold of domestic 
and international legitimization to which it submits; the low profile given to cooperative 
initiatives; and, the negative perception of the regional security context, all indicate that 
there is no possible compatibility nor point of contact between Colombia and the majority 
of the other South American countries. Yet, it joined the negotiations, influenced the 
resulting organization, and regionalized some of the elements of its Strategic Culture. 
On the one hand, immersed in a long and potentially unstable confrontational rhetoric 
with Venezuela (and, to a lesser extent, with Bolivia and Ecuador), Colombian defence and 
foreign policy elites concluded they needed to be the “first line of defence” to contain this 
country´s “Castro/Chavist” agenda for regional cooperation. On the other hand, Colombia 
sought in the SADC statute a tool to legitimize his own actions under the “War on Terror” 
and the “War on Drugs”, as well as to obtain a higher degree of understanding and 
receptiveness from its regional partners. Finally, Colombia was under the impression that 
it was up to itself to hold firm the regional commitment with decision-making 
mechanisms following the norm of consensus (in which all countries have veto powers). 
This went, yet again, against the Venezuelan proposal of using a decision-making 
approach based on the principle of the majority. 
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As a result, despite the deep differences between the Colombian case and the rest of 
the empirical cases, Colombia converged with other South American countries towards 











The central objective of this research project has been to make a theoretically-informed 
empirical contribution to the available knowledge on the creation of the South American 
Defence Council, focusing specifically on understanding the agency of three regional 
secondary powers in the negotiations, how their agendas were informed by domestic 
Strategic Cultures, and how this had an impact on the construction of regional security 
governance mechanisms. 
The review of the relevant literature makes evident that the large majority of analysts 
used (sub)systemic-level analytical tools to engage with the creation of this organization. 
As a result, the dominant research agendas on the topic have given a more prominent role 
to regional-level elements than to the agency of individual actors. Chapter 2 covers in 
detail the merits and shortcomings of this literature, concluding that neither the current 
distribution of power nor the presence of shared ideational features in the region can 
provide a complete explanation regarding the creation of this organization. 
The condition of Brazil as primus inter pares and its leadership goals surely were 
central in getting the creation of the SADC into the regional agenda, as well as rallying 
reluctant actors to sit at the negotiations table. The Colombian case is an interesting 
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example in that sense. However, it is telling of existing biases in this line of argumentation 
that it focuses exclusively on “Brazilian leadership” goals and the country´s (soft) power 
projection capabilities, while denying Colombia any agency in its own decision to attend 
the negotiations and eventually join the organization. 
The focus on Brazilian alleged attempts to build regional leadership/hegemony also 
forget to acknowledge that this country did not show the will to assume the economic 
costs involved in building regional common goods asymmetrically, nor the political costs 
of imposing them forcefully upon the rest of the region. As a result, though Brazil´s power 
and preferences have undoubtedly been relevant in shaping the perceptions and 
behaviour of other regional powers, explaining the creation of the SADC exclusively in 
terms of this country´s selfish interests provides only a limited and ultimately inaccurate 
understanding of the dynamics at play. 
Similarly, arguments involving the impact of the Post-Hegemonic regionalist agenda do 
provide relevant insights into the socio-political context that allowed for the creation of 
the SADC. Yet, it shares with the Brazil-centred approach the limitation of attributing 
barely any relevance to the agency of individual actors in the process of planning, 
negotiating, and implementing of the UNASUR/SADC institutional framework. 
In spite of these shortcomings, these approaches do have some explanatory power and 
provide key elements that undoubtedly should be taken into consideration when studying 
the development of individual states´ agency. As a matter of fact, the relevance of these 
(sub)systemic approaches became more evident in recent years, with the UNASUR being 
less prominent as a regional governance mechanism since the mid-2010s due to Brazilian 
politics falling into disarray (which severely limited its power-projection abilities and 
curtailed the regional leadership projects of previous administrations) and to a 
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weakening political/ideational consensus across the region. This is yet another good 
reason to have included an entire chapter to discuss these (sub)systemic explanations to 
the creation of the SADC, despite this research´s core empirical concern is with the agency 
of individual states.  
Similarly, Chapter 3 focuses on a detailed, theory-informed description of key 
characteristics found in the South American security environment. This chapter provides 
an understanding of the social structure present in South America. The main argument 
for having included this analysis is that discussing regional social arrangements helps set 
the shared context in which the three states studied have been socialized. Understanding 
the common external inputs that the agents “received” helps shed light on the specificities 
of domestic cultures, and how they influenced the respective interpretations made and 
the repertoire of legitimate responses considered. This follows the understanding that 
there is a constant process of co-constitution between agents and structure. Under the 
Constructivist-Interpretivist epistemological assumptions informing this research, 
properly analysing the social structure of the regional security environment is crucial to 
have a more complete understanding the agency of the actors. 
The two distinct theoretical frameworks chosen to structure this analysis, the English 
School and RSCT, share a constructivist inspiration (at least in the versions discussed 
here). This allows them to discuss different aspects of the social arrangements influencing 
the regional security environment in which the SADC was created. The ES approach 
explains the South American context with strong arguments regarding the existence of a 
distinct regional society, discussing in detail the specific norms and institutions that set 
apart this group of states from the more shallow “global” international society and other 
sub-global groupings. It is put forward here that the defining principles and institutions 
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of South American regional society (sovereignty; non-intervention; multilateralism; 
peaceful resolution of controversies) may originally be of European inspiration, but also 
denote a relevant degree of agency in institutional choice, adaptation, and innovation. As 
a result, the patterns of behaviour that define this regional society are understood as the 
product of interactions between the colonial heritage, the post-colonial struggle, and the 
post-1980s democratization (the most recent critical junction that swept almost the 
entire region). 
RSCT, on the other hand, provides a fitting theoretical framework to analyse the 
specificities of the regional security environment and its dynamics from a constructivist 
perspective, engaging with the defining characteristics of regional interactions. As each of 
the empirical chapters has shown, the ways in which these characteristics have been 
perceived and interpreted, as well as the responses considered “legitimate”, vary greatly. 
Using this approach, the region has been defined as a penetrated, unipolar, standard 
RSC with a number of common security concerns that justify perceiving South America as 
a unified security complex separate from the one engulfing North America, Central 
America and the Caribbean. In fact, characteristics identified by Barry Buzan and Ole 
Waever as potential threats to the unity of this regional complex (the proto-Security 
Community forming around MERCOSUR, and the violence characterizing the Andean 
North) have arguably brought the region closer together rather than breaking it in two. 
Indeed, the UNASUR/SADC framework can be read as an attempt to actively spread the 
stable peace of the Southern Cone to the rest of region, while the spillovers of domestic 
and transnational violence related to the production and distribution of illicit drugs have 
also become an increasingly regionalized problem to which no common answer has yet 
been put forward. In other words, while the internal dynamics of the security complex 
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have strengthened in the last decades, this does not mean that South America has moved 
towards the consolidation of a Security Community. Moreover, despite the potentially 
positive implications related to the creation of the SADC, the inability to find a consensus 
regarding how to approach an issue of violence spillovers is proof of the limitations that 
still exist to the formation of a truly stable peace in the region. 
To reiterate, the key conclusion of Chapter 2 and 3 is that, while (sub)systemic 
perspectives are indeed relevant to the understanding of the context in which the SADC 
was created, an in-depth and systematic analysis of the agency displayed by actors other 
than Brazil remained relatively unexplored. This opens a window of opportunity to make 
a relevant empirical contribution to the literature on the creation of this organization, 
tapping into the agency individual actors showed during the negotiations and creation of 
the SADC. More importantly, this can help bridge the clear disconnect that exists in the 
literature between agency-focused perspectives on foreign and defence policies of South 
American countries, on the one hand, and the vast (sub)systemic-level analyses that 
dominate the study of regional politics and governance in South America, on the other. 
The implication of this research´s contribution is, then, not limited to obtaining a more 
nuanced knowledge about the processes that allowed for the creation of a particular 
regional organization, but rather a wider understanding of the dynamics by which agency 
and structure co-constitute each other in this region. Such insights should be relevant, 
first and foremost, for Latin Americanists studying regional security dynamics. However, 
the approach and conclusions of this research should also contribute to the wider 




Having identified the gap in the currently existing knowledge regarding the creation of 
the SADC, and having analysed in detail the features of South America as a distinct security 
region, the agency of individual countries in the area of defence was defined resorting to 
the concept of Strategic Culture. This facilitates engaging with the historical, social, and 
political processes informing the approach of each country to the defence sector, in 
general, and to regional security in particular. 
The resulting image is one of multiple levels of structure-agency relations at play, 
resembling a game of nesting dolls. Strategic Culture works as a central element defining 
the domestic social arrangements, informing the perceptions, decisions, and behaviour of 
local agents (defence elites, diplomats, and political leaders). In turn, the aggregate of 
these agent-structure relations give shape to the agency each of the countries displayed 
internationally, informing the dominant perception of regional politics; foreign and 
defence policies; international agendas; and negotiating positions. Following the 
constructivist epistemological position, this agency is both influenced by the stimuli 
coming from regional social arrangements and, at the same time, the key element 
constituting said social structure. 
The operationalization of the concept largely followed Christoph Meyer´s grid of 
scalable norms, understood as the more readily identifiable and analysable embodiments 
of the Strategic Culture. These norms include: 1. Conditions that justify the use of force; 
2. Acceptable ways in which force can be used; 3. Preferences with regards to 
cooperation; and, 4. Thresholds for authorization. Crucially, Meyer´s conceptualization of 
these norms was somewhat modified in order to focus more broadly on the meanings, 
norms and legitimate actions associated with the defence sector, rather than exclusively 
focusing on “the use of force”. Perhaps the most evident example in this sense is the norm 
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regarding cooperation, which is conceptualized here not only in terms of the 
predisposition to use force collectively/unilaterally, but rather in relation to the openness 
to handling international security matters cooperatively or not. The domestic legal and 
institutional frameworks for the defence sector were considered the more easily 
accessible expressions of these norms, facilitating a more effective operationalization of 
the concept for the conduct of empirical analysis. It is argued here that, once 
contextualized and analysed with the help of other primary and secondary sources, the 
study of legal frameworks allows tapping into the web of meanings informing the 
country´s Strategic Culture and agency. 
 
Key findings: Agents´ effect on the structure 
 
Though comparisons have been used only as heuristic devices to highlight the 
specificities of each case, the core empirical contribution of this research has been the 
analysis of three independent case studies. Each of them sought to understand how the 
respective Strategic Cultures influenced the perceptions of the regional security 
environment, thus influencing the responses to the SADC initiative and shaping the 
agendas brought to the negotiations. This provided a theory-informed perspective on 
agency in the area of defence and its effect on the constitution of regional security 
governance arrangements. 
This implied identifying and dissecting in the Strategic Norms present in each country 
by analysing the relevant legal frameworks defining the relation between society and the 
defence sector. This was aided by an analysis of official documents and declarations, 
interviews, and secondary sources that allowed contextualizing the development of 
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Strategic Norms and more easily distilling their key characteristics. These chapters also 
paid particular attention to comprehending in depth the historical processes that 
informed the emergence of the dominant Strategic Culture, taking into consideration how 
critical junctures and socio-political pressure conditioned their development. This 
analysis provided key insights into the development of ideational commitments that 
heavily influenced the meanings and roles attributed to the defence sector. More 
importantly, the empirical chapters explore a myriad of instances in which individual 
agents, or the pooled agency a group of them, managed to have an impact on regional 
social arrangements by influencing the development of the understandings, principles, or 
norms underpinning the SADC. 
The analysis shows a significant agreement in the agendas Argentina and Chile brought 
to the negotiations. The support of these countries (with whom Brazil showed strong 
coincidences) to a similar set of principles, understandings, norms, and expectations 
about the working of the SADC meant that theirs became the dominant position in the 
negotiation rounds. Yet, the empirical chapters clearly show how even these countries 
reached their respective starting positions as the result of quite distinct, and at times 
diverging, paths and normative priors. This meant that each focused their efforts 
differently, expecting to affect the regional social structure in diverse ways. 
Colombia, on the other hand, constituted a regional outlier, openly revelling against the 
SADC initiative during its early stages, participating in the multilateral negotiations while 
having an evidently negative perception of the region, and all but publicly stating that it 
would have preferred the organization not to be created. However, the Colombian 
authorities did recognize in the creation of the SADC as a window of opportunity to try 
and shape the regional normative structure in their favour, obtaining some form of 
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legitimization for the utilization of the defence apparatus in the conflict against the FARC. 
Importantly, even this country´s position ended up converging with those of its South 
American counter-parts, regardless of having such a divergent starting position. 
 
For Argentina and Chile, the respective processes of democratic transition constitute 
the most recent critical juncture in which their Strategic Cultures were altered. With some 
relevant differences, the post-dictatorial periods were marked by political and social 
contexts ripe for the relationship between society and the defence sector to be re-visited, 
replacing the webs of meanings inherited from the times of state formation and military 
dictatorships with the creation of new consensus about its role in a democratic society; 
the reach of its authority; its relationship with civilian leadership; the definition of threats 
and openness to cooperative security arrangements; and, the legitimate means by which 
the Armed Forces are to fulfil their defensive role. 
Argentina could advance with the implementation of these changes more swiftly (and 
haphazardly) thanks to the poor reputation with which the Armed Forces emerged from 
the 1976-1983 dictatorial regime. Chilean Armed Forces, on the other hand, retained a 
much stronger social support after leaving power, managing to arrange an armistice 
before the democratic transition and remaining politically relevant well into the 2000s. 
This forced a more pragmatic and paced approach to the redefinition of Strategic Norms 
that democratic political elites consistently sought to achieve.  
Despite the differences in these process, the legislation and doctrines resulting from 
this cultural change shared in emphasizing the indisputable civilian/political control over 
the military, and created a strict doctrinal separation between defence (external threats) 
and security (domestic conflicts). More importantly, both countries promptly 
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incorporated the participation in international cooperation efforts into the DNA of their 
defence sectors, primarily by: a. Incorporating the participation in UN-sanctioned 
Peacekeeping Operations as one of the main instances of military deployment; and, b. 
Thoroughly involving the Armed Forces in the bilateral rapprochement efforts. 
Working in close collaboration throughout the negotiations, Argentina and Chile 
managed to incorporate many of the key features of their bilateral relationship into the 
regional social arrangements. This helped blocking attempts to introduce matters of 
domestic, “inter-mestic”, and transnational security into the SADC, and resulted in some 
of the more ambitious projects within the organization being modelled after their shared 
experience. Interestingly, the strict separation between defence and security 
incorporated into the UNASUR framework via the separate creation of the SADC and other 
councils related to “security issues” (organized crime, drug traffic, etc.) was relevant 
almost exclusively for these Southern Cone countries. The doctrine in the majority of the 
remaining members presented a blurrier limit between the two sectors, with instances of 
wide legitimization for the use of military force at the domestic level. The Colombian case 
is, perhaps, the more salient example of this, showing the almost the diametrically 
opposite doctrinal position to those of Argentina and Chile. But this country was by no 
means an outlier in this sense: Brazil has gradually militarized its approach to the control 
of drug traffic and drug-related violence, particularly in urban settings; the Peruvian 
military has actively engaged with domestic threats posed by guerrilla group Shining 
Path; and, the Venezuelan military significantly increased its security roles since the rise 
to power of President Hugo Chávez (himself a former officer of the Army). Hence, the 
incorporation of this strict distinction between security and defence is perhaps one of the 
clearest examples of how the agenda of a small group of agents (none of which was a 
hegemon, nor a primus inter pares) affected the outcome of regional negotiations, and 
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through it the approach to and agendas of regional security governance mechanisms 
created. 
It remains to be seen whether or not the crystallization of this principle in the UNASUR 
framework will be fully incorporated it into the South American social structure. 
Arguably, this would be a necessary condition for the process to be able to come full circle 
and influence the normative priors and Strategic Cultures of other countries. If such was 
the outcome of the creation of the SADC, it would provide further confirmation to the 
argument that there is a circular nature to the co-constitutive processes described by 
Constructivism. Yet, it is also important to keep in mind that, should this not be the case, 
it would be necessary to look further into the processes of socialization and social learning 
involved, since the effects of agency on the structure (and vice versa) are by no means 
automatic nor do they come undisputed. That the Argentine negotiating team put such 
emphasis on the creation of the CEED and the ESUDE to foster doctrinal debates and 
advancement of shared understandings regarding the defence sector may point to this 
country´s intention to secure the successful development of such dynamics and 
regionalize its own position in these regards. 
 
In addition to the separation between defence and security, the desecuritization and 
demilitarization of mutual relations through mutual confidence measures is another area 
in which the Southern Cone set the agenda regarding what understandings, norms, and 
practices should be incorporated to the security governance mechanisms of the region. In 
fact, looking at the SADC´s first few annual action plans, the majority of the measures 
included are inspired by the experiences of Argentine-Brazilian and Argentine-Chilean 
rapprochement processes, with some of the more ambitious initiatives being the 
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construction of a Joint South American Military Expenditures Record inspired by that 
created by the ECLAC for Argnetina and Chile; and the discussions to eventually move 
forward in the conformation of a Joint South American Task Force for Peacekeeping 
Operations, modelled after the Southern Cross bi-national force. 
The expectation in doing this was to create the conditions to expand the zone of 
positive peace constructed over the last three decades in the Southern Cone to the entire 
region. Though this may have changed in recent years, until the mid-2010s it seemed 
likely that the commitment to the post-hegemonic regional agenda would create 
conditions of possibility for these understandings, norms, and practices to become 
socialized at the regional level with some ease. Moreover, given that in most cases 
incorporating these into the domestic realm would not have necessarily required drastic 
changes to the Strategic Cultures of states, the full circle of co-constitution might have 
been more easily attainable than in the previous example. Political will, investment in 
confidence-building efforts, and the development of shared ideational commitments 
would have still been necessary. But, none of these seemed out of reach for South 
American countries in the years following the creation of the SADC. 
In the Argentine, Chilean and Brazilian cases, these processes were bottom-up, 
resulting in converging strategies inspired by diverse domestic pressures. As will be more 
extensively discussed in the coming section, such bottom-up process is essential for a 
thorough redefinition of a country´s Strategic Culture and, by extension, of its 
international agency in the realm of defence. However, a favourable regional structure 
incentivizing the desecuritization and demilitarization of interactions between countries 
could certainly propagate, reinforce, accelerate or, perhaps, even initiate the necessary 
processes of socialization and social learning even if bottom-up processes are weaker 
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than in the cases discussed here. This reinforcing effect was precisely one of the merits of 
the MERCOSUR, and a role that the SADC was expected to fulfil in the regional arena. The 
success of these efforts still relies on permeable social and political contexts at the 
domestic level, but since many of these confidence building mechanisms require neither 
extensive nor rapid ideational changes on behalf of the states, their accumulative effect 
both on the regional structure and on the constitution of South American agents did not 
seem farfetched. Their impact relies on a slow accumulation of experience over time, 
facilitating the redefinition of domestic Strategic Cultures and normative priors if 
successful. However, as will be more extensively discussed in the coming section, some 
instances of co-constitution may involve different dynamics to have their desired effect. 
 
It is worth reiterating that, though the Argentine and Chilean negotiating agendas had 
so many points in common and that the two countries coordinated their positions 
extensively, each engaged in the negotiations pursuing distinct goals. In particular, each 
had different expectations about the reach an organization like the SADC should be given, 
the impact it would have on the regional social arrangements, the time-frame within 
which these changes should be advanced, and how it would contribute to their standing 
as regional powers. 
For Argentine defence elites, the possibility of regionalizing the market for the 
country´s languishing military industry was particularly attractive, as shown by their 
speedy attempt to capitalize on it developing the UNASUR I basic trainer aircraft project. 
However, it seems accurate to suggest that this goal was secondary to the objectives 
pursued in relation to the SADC, since most efforts went into securing the creation of the 
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CEED and the ESUDE. This highlights the crucial role attributed by this country´s defence 
elites to leading the development of shared ideational commitments in the region. 
On the Chilean side, participation in the UNASUR/SADC framework was never a given. 
Though the country did pursue the goal of breaking with the regional “withdrawal” of the 
Pinochet years, it would only agree to join if the SADC was in line with its pragmatic 
approach to foreign policy. The Bachelet administration saw its position of Pro Tempore 
President of UNASUR as an opportunity to assume a prominent role and steer the results 
closer towards her administration´s foreign policy goals. This was to become a proof of 
the commitment Chile had with regional governance, as well as evidence of its 
dependability as coordinator of collective efforts, and a landmark of Bachelet´s strong 
stances in foreign policy. 
Both countries succeeded in these initial goals. Argentina not only secured the creation 
of the CEED, but has also had a prominent role in its working137, seeking to become a 
regional “thought leader”. Chile not only showed its commitment to advancing 
“responsible” forms of regional cooperation and governance, but also put forward its 
dependability as an international partner able to carry the weight of coordinating 
complex multilateral negotiations. They both shared the goals of promoting a stable, 
positive regional peace beyond the Southern Cone. Crucially, they both engaged with the 
creation of the SADC understanding it as a clear opportunity to exercise their agency in 
such way that it would alter the existing social arrangements, rather than coerced by 
Brazilian power or convinced of that the already existing agreements sufficed to move 
forward with the project. To reiterate the conclusion reached in Chapter 2, neither the 
power asymmetry favouring Brazil, nor the rise of the post-hegemonic regionalist agenda 
                                                        
137 Its headquarters are located in Buenos Aires and funded primarily by Argentina, and the first Director of 
the institution (who served two consecutive mandates) was also Argentine. 
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fully explain the position of these countries with regards to this organization. Rather, seen 
from the long-term historical development of their Strategic Cultures, these two factors 
played relatively tangential roles in defining their negotiating positions. Though counter-
factual, it does not seem farfetched to maintain that Argentina and Chile´s position on the 
creation of a regional organization designed to manage cooperative efforts in the defence 
sector would not have differed substantially had Brazil not held a dominant position or 
had the regional “left turn” not happened. 
 
Among some of the key characteristics that separate Colombia from the other two 
cases, it is worth mentioning: the critical junction shaping its current Strategic Culture 
was related to heightened levels of domestic violence rather than dictatorial processes; 
explicitly opposed to the Post-hegemonic regionalist agenda; showed a consistent pattern 
of distrust towards neighbouring states (including Brazil); had a negative perception of 
regional organizations and their performance; openly rejected the doctrinal separation 
between defence and security; and, had the most right-wing administration in the region 
at the time. In addition, Colombia had been at the centre of a regional crisis in March 2008, 
having unlawfully violated Ecuadorian sovereignty to bomb a FARC campsite. 
Had the Post-hegemonic regionalist agenda not emerged, almost certainly this country 
would not have intensified its relations with South America, let alone participated in the 
creation of a multilateral cooperative defence organization. Similarly, had Brazilian 
authorities not convinced them otherwise, Colombian leaders and defence elites would 
probably not have joined the SADC. In the same vein, Colombia would not have engaged 
in efforts to advance the construction of mutual understandings, doctrinal convergence, 
and policy coordination mechanisms for the defence sector, nor would it have joined an 
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organization explicitly separating the realms of defence and security, if these had not been 
put in the agenda by other countries. 
All interviewees maintained that the optimal outcome for Colombia would have been 
that the SADC was not created in the first place, since the country struggled to find the 
project relevant for its own agenda. It is difficult to say the extent to which the final 
decision was due to mere pragmatism, to the pressure exercised by Brazil, or to different 
reasons altogether. I would argue that this is relatively inconsequential for the purposes 
of this Thesis. What is important is that, despite its rejection of the SADC and its consistent 
claims about allegedly being the only remaining barrier against the regional expansion of 
the “Chavist” agenda, Colombia developed an active role during the negotiation, 
construction, and implementation of this regional security governance mechanism. 
In general terms, the biggest impact the Colombian agenda had in the conformation of 
the SADC was lowering the regional “maximum common denominator”. To be sure, it was 
not alone in its goal to minimize the reach of the agreement, with Chile pivoting between 
its commitment to the process and a cautious attitude towards regionalism, and Peru 
remaining vigilant at the margins. However, only Colombia openly voiced its negative 
perception of regional affairs and its discontent with the SADC. Whether the regional 
commitment would have managed to move further into more ambitious initiatives had 
Colombia not voiced its concerns, is difficult to know. What is possible to see, though, is 
the positive impact the Colombian agenda had on the arrangement reached138. 
Crucially, the understanding local defence elites had of what “cooperation” meant was 
quite different to what most other countries in the region understood. Interviewees 
                                                        
138 By this, I mean its ability to get proposals included in the SADC statute and contribute to shaping the final 
agreement. It is not an evaluation of the qualities of such contributions. 
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consistently referred to “effective cooperation” in terms of actual military support coming 
exclusively from the US. Interestingly, in its attempt to keep any whiff of “Chavism” at bay, 
Colombia sided with those countries that actively opposed including the provision for 
actual military mobilization in support of any member state, thus rejecting the very 
possibility that the SADC could ever provide the “effective cooperation” that Colombian 
defence elites seemingly demanded from the region. 
Perhaps the more salient and evident of the elements Colombia managed to get 
included in the statute is the principle condemning “armed groups outside the law”. Albeit 
a watered down version of the article originally sought, this did allow Colombia to save 
face and maintain its militaristic domestic strategy while also complying with the regional 
normative priors. Despite the clear contrast between Colombia´s approach to its domestic 
conflict and the preferences of many other relevant countries in the region, it succeeded 
in obtaining some degree of legitimization for its militarized anti-terrorist fight against 
the FARC. Moreover, other states conducting militarized anti-insurgent/anti-
terrorist/anti-narcotics actions in the region probably benefited from this legitimization 
as well. In short, considering how hard Colombia had to negotiate in order for this 
principle included, it is undeniable that the agency it displayed during the negotiations 
had the potential to affect the regional normative framework significantly. 
It could be argued that, given the strong commitment to non-intervention and 
pluralism that continues to define the South American society, Colombia´s domestic 
policies would not have faced relevant backlash in the absence of the SADC. Indeed, other 
than some sporadic complaints, Colombia´s war against the FARC was not widely 
questioned by its regional partners before the SADC existed, even at the height of 
hostilities and human rights violations. It is also interesting to note that the Colombian 
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government was confronted with a stronger condemnation for its “invite” to US Armed 
Forces to use its bases than it ever did for the militarized ways used in domestic security 
since the Uribe administration. 
Yet, this is not to say that obtaining legitimization from this new regional security 
governance mechanism was irrelevant for the country (nor for the region as a whole). The 
decision to engage in this effort and fight hard to have this principle included in the statute 
actually implies that some degree of relevance was attributed to finding a framework in 
which Colombian authorities could maintain their chosen path of action while also 
facilitating cooperation (or, at least, a dialogue) in the area of defence. Moreover, once the 
council started to work regularly, Colombia became a remarkably active participant in the 
meetings, not only “containing Chavism” but more importantly proposing initiatives to 
move forward the cooperative agenda, particularly in terms of military industrial projects. 
As already mentioned, another way in which Colombian agency was transformative for 
the region was its adamant opposition to the “Chavist agenda” in South America. This not 
only fuelled the tensions that led to the proposal of the SADC, in the first place, but also 
prompted its defence elites to take part in the negotiations, making sure that Venezuela 
was stopped in its perceived intentions to promote its ideational commitments 
throughout the region. For example, Colombia was a vocal and extreme example of the 
regional commitment to upholding the norm of consensus-driven decision-making, thus 
helping block the Venezuelan proposal to instil the SADC with a supranational majority 
decision-making mechanism. Paradoxically, Colombia´s input in this aspect was not 
strictly necessary, since most members preferred the same outcome, which rested on a 
long-held regional practice that was not facing serious challenges. However, this shows 
that Colombia does share with its regional partners in the working of common 
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institutions, and that its own agency may have been influenced by regional institutions 
despite political differences with centre-of-left governments. 
It is possible that, as common sense would indicate, the likelihood of becoming more 
isolated from the region also played a role convincing local defence and political elites 
about the need to join the SADC. However, this only explains part of the story. 
Understanding the specific forms in which Colombia tried to participate before and during 
the negotiations requires a better understanding of the webs of meanings attached to its 
defence sector and to the use of military force in particular. Hence, while the country was 
unsuccessful in reaching many of its objectives, the agenda defended during the four 
rounds of negotiations can be better understood under the light of a Strategic Culture 
characterized by a high degree of activism in the use of force, low thresholds of domestic 
and international legitimization, and goals for the use of force that far surpasses the 
regional standard. 
 
Implications of this research and contributions to the field 
 
The findings of this research have ramifications into various aspects of how agency is 
studied, avoiding individualistic conceptions of the term and instead approaching it as a 
constitutive part in regional security dynamics and in the development of the regional 
security environment. In this sense, the findings discussed above contribute to different 
fields within the discipline of Interantional Relations, including:  
- The structure-agency debate within Constructivist theory, particularly in relation to the 
use of Strategic Culture literature to engage with the webs of meaning informing agents´ 
behaviour in relation to the defence sector;  
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- The multi-level analysis of regional security dynamics, establishing a dialogue between 
different theoretical approaches to regionalism in order to bring forward different aspects 
of the regional security environment; 
- The existing knowledge on the causes behind the creation of the South American Defence 
Council, complementing existing (sub)systemic approaches with an agent-centred 
perspective focused on the dynamic of mutual constitution between agents and structure; 
- Detailed empirical analysis of three cases, exploring the how their respective Strategic 
Cultures shape agency by mediating between external and domestic stimuli, on one hand, 
and action, on the other hand. 
 
Chapter 3 engaged with the ES and RSCT to try and characterize these, identifying long-
standing institutions, norms, and practices that defined, at least in principle, the main 
features of South America as a distinct international society and as an independent 
security complex. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the conclusion was that 
the South American international society remains strongly committed to intense but 
pluralistic interactions, with states heavily relying on multilateral organizations to 
magnify their voices in the international arena (both independently and collectively) and 
on ad hoc mechanisms to secure the peaceful resolution of controversies. The principles 
of sovereignty and non-intervention remain at the heart of how South American states 
behave internationally. The South American Security Complex, on the other hand, is 
identified as a penetrated, unipolar, standard RSC with shared security concerns, such as 
the spill over of violence related to organized crime, maintaining or even increasing its 
autonomy, and the securitization of democratic stability. 
The case studies show that these characteristics remain central to understand regional 
social arrangements and security dynamics in South America, with the agents studied 
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perceiving the scope of their legitimate behaviour well within the limits mentioned above. 
The generalized commitment to sovereignty, non-intervention, and pluralism define the 
regional context to such extent that even the worst cases of human rights violations in the 
region rarely faced any relevant contestation, and the SADC negotiators explicitly sought 
to avoid involving the organization in any actions that would contradict them. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, even the “democratic clause” incorporated to all regional 
organizations since the 1990s remains strongly within this tradition, showing wide 
consensus for the defence of the incumbent but little to no agreement regarding its use in 
cases of non-democratic or illiberal actions by a democratically elected government. In 
contrast, regional powers had no issue resorting to the UNASUR/SADC to demand 
explanations after the Colombian-US military cooperation deal became public, showing 
that this decision was perceived as potentially allowing an extra-regional power to set 
foot in the region and threat the sovereignty and autonomy of regional powers. 
The implication of these conclusions is that not only is it possible to see these 
institutions, principles, and norms still at play at the inter-state level, but they are also 
very easily identifiable in the perceptions and agendas of individual agents. This means 
that at least one of the legs in the process of co-constitution (the top-down constitution of 
agents by structural incentives) can be confirmed to be at work. 
 
A relevant caveat is necessary here. The process of mutual constitution between agents 
and structure becomes trickier when it comes to the effect the regional environment can 
have the domestic Strategic Cultures and related normative priors. Only in cases where 
profound critical junctures are present does the domestic context become permeable to 
be influenced in this regard by regional pressures, primarily because the initial impulse 
334 
 
for such modification results from domestic processes. This may help explain why the 
governments that emerged from the processes of democratization in the 1980s sought to 
create a regional network of agreements and rapprochement processes, mutually 
reinforcing their stability and securitizing democratic stability. These were developments 
gestated domestically on which the regional environment had an effect only after the 
democratic transition had begun.  
Such critical junctures opened the possibility (and even the necessity) for deep debates 
about the roles of the defence sector in Argentina, Chile, and Colombia. Without them 
creating social, political and/or economic pressure for cultural change domestically, even 
the stronger incentives coming from the regional level would have lacked strength to alter 
Strategic Cultures at agent level in the short and medium terms. Historical instances like 
these give strength and momentum to the re-signification of crucial social arrangements, 
creating more permeable contexts for change and mediating pressures coming from the 
regional level into domestic realm. 
Slow, accumulative effects on the agents´ identities would still be a possibility, working 
through processes like social learning and socialization. But, the shorter the period 
analysed, the more necessary critical junctures seem to become as conditions facilitating 
change. Should this insight be confirmed with further empirical analysis, it would mean 
that the Constructivist notion that the structure constitutes agents should be qualified, at 
least in the case of identity markers related with the defence sector. 
In terms of the opposite leg of the co-constitution process (bottom-up alteration of the 
regional environment by the agents), it could be argued that influence on social 
constructions could be expected to take place even without the presence of regional 
critical junctures. This is due to these ideational commitments being less entrenched than 
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national ones. If such is the case, the modification of the social structure due to the agency 
of specific actors could be expected to materialize as easily through processes of 
accumulative change (social learning; socialization, etc.) as they would in the context of 
an international critical junctures (wars; international crises; drastic shifts in the norms 
and leading actors of the international system; etc.).  
A key implication of this is that a relevant difference should be established by 
Constructivism between the two legs of the mutual constitution, focusing particularly on 
the pace and processes involved in each of them. This would add nuance to the notion of 
temporality Archer incorporated with her morphogenic approach. In this way, it is not 
enough to simply analyse the dynamics of co-constitution sequentially, but it is also 
necessary to theorize better the distinct conditions of possibility and contextual 
incentives expected to be present in each instance. In other words, an element of 
“asymmetry”139 between the two legs of the agent-structure relation has so far remained 
undertheorized in the Constructivism, and needs to be looked further into in order for the 
theory to reflect more closely the actual processes at play in international politics. 
Together with the temporality proposed by Archer and the addition of notions like 
Strategic Culture adding an extra layer of analysis, acknowledging and exploring the 
differences that exist between the top-down and bottom-up relations of constitution 
would further strengthen the Constructivist research program and perhaps even facilitate 
its operationalization. 
 
                                                        
139 By this I don´t mean that there is any form of hierarchy between top-down and bottom-up processes, but 
simply that they are not equal nor do they consume the same amount of time to take hold. 
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The final implication I would like to highlight is related to the working propositions 
and research question presented in the introduction to this Thesis. The former state that 
studying the behaviour of secondary powers is crucial to understand the role agency had 
in the construction of the SADC and its impact on security governance mechanisms. These 
working propositions were later crystalized in the following research question: How did 
the agency of secondary regional powers affect the regional security governance 
mechanisms created with the SADC? A question broad enough to allow for a variety of 
approaches and a multiplicity of sources to be used. Indeed, after an evaluation of the 
main conceptual frameworks contending to seek an answer for this question, Strategic 
Culture literature was deemed the best fitting one. 
Indeed, the present research showed that lacking a proper understanding of the agency 
deployed by agents, explanations regarding the creation of the SADC (or any other 
multilateral organization for that matter) are incomplete, at best, or plainly wrong, at 
worst. The secondary powers studied here affected in a variety of ways the outcome of 
negotiations and, through them, the regional normative structure. With Brazil introducing 
the SADC as an empty shell, opening the game for other regional players to fill in its 
content, secondary powers took to the job of setting agendas and limits for the defence 
cooperation to be fostered through this organization. As discussed in the previous section, 
among other articles and principles central to the organization they introduced: 
conceptual distinctions that influenced not only the SADC but the entire UNASUR; mutual 
confidence measures inspired in their own experience became part of the core of the 
organization and essential elements for it to fulfil its objectives; the creation of the first 
fora in the region for the advancement of shared understandings and doctrinal positions, 
seeking to shape the identity of the South American security complex at large. 
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None of these elements, and hence the nature of the SADC itself, could be properly 
understood if the only interpretative approaches used were (sub)systemic. Explanations 
based exclusively on the dominant position of Brazil or on the emergence of a post-
hegemonic regional agenda related to shared ideational commitments provide relevant 
insights, but they need to be complemented with an agent-centred approach in order to 
understand the fuller story. This confirms the intuitions that led to the working 
propositions presented in the introduction, and highlights the relevance of engaging with 
the full circle in the process of co-constitution of agents and structure. 
All the above qualifies Battaglino´s claim that “Essentially, the establishment of the 
SADC can be traced as the result of a process where South American nations shared new 
understandings of defence based on a genuine regional approach.” (Battaglino 2012, 85). 
Instead, based on the discussions and evidence presented in this Thesis, it seems 
reasonable to argue that shared understandings regarding the possibilities for defence 
cooperation and policy coordination are the result of the creation of the SADC, and not a 
pre-requisite. Finding of “maximum common denominators” for this was the main 
outcome of the negotiations and the necessary condition for shared understandings to 
start developing through the convergence of highly divergent strategic cultures, 
perspectives on regional security, and regional agendas. It is within the limits created by 
the SADC that Colombia found a window to access regional security discussions on 
positive terms; that Chile found a way yo “return to the region” securing a prominent role 
without sacrificing any of its commercial and economic liberalism; and, that Argentina 
found a way to regain some initiative in regional order discussions despite meagre funds 




Final considerations and future research 
 
The goal set for this research at its outset was to contribute to the existing knowledge 
about the process by which the SADC was created in 2008. The central motivation was to 
break with largely one-dimensional explanations that dominate the field, engaging with 
the topic from a perspective not taken into consideration by the majority of previous 
researchers. The argument here is not that the regional power asymmetry or the presence 
of shared ideas and understandings are inconsequential to explain the behaviour of these 
states. Rather, the this research has sought to advance that individual actors, themselves 
constituted as agents by a combination of domestic and regional factors, effectively 
influenced the development of the regional security environment through their 
meaningful and purposeful actions (agency). In order to do this, the conceptual apparatus 
used to analyse the regional (ES and RSCT) and domestic (Strategic Culture) levels were 
inspired by a Constructivist understanding of international relations. In doing this, the 
present research has not only analysed the impact secondary powers had in shaping the 
SADC, but has also explored more general aspects of how agents can affect the social 
structures within which they operate. 
The Strategic Cultures of these secondary powers were identified as a crucial element 
informing their respective perceptions of the region, approach to the SADC initiative, and 
negotiating agenda, providing a theoretically-informed account of the motivations 
underpinning their behaviour. Similarly, having properly contextualized the meanings 
embedded in the principles and norms each sought to have included in the SADC statute, 
it has been possible to evaluate their impact on regional normative structures in a more 




The future lines of inquiry that could emanate from the present research are many. On 
the one hand, the discussions about the Strategic Cultures of the secondary powers 
studied and about how they affected their performance in their interactions with the 
region should be helpful for all researchers seeking to engage on multi-level analysis of 
South American relations in general. In fact, a growing interest in the use of this concept 
can be noticed in the last years. Panels on the role distinct national Strategic Cultures have 
had in Latin American relations have been organized by different research groups in two 
of the most prestigious academic conferences devoted to the region (LASA 2017 and 
ALACIP 2017). Furthermore, the Florida International University has held a number of 
workshops since the late 2000s on the Strategic Culture of different Latin American 
countries that eventually derived in the publication of the edited volume “Culture and 
National Security in the Americas” (Fonseca and Gamarra 2017), some of whose chapters 
have been relevant for the present research. This Thesis should contribute to the growing 
interest around the concept of Strategic Culture seen in the region, as well as on the 
understanding of its impact on policy-making and regional affairs. 
It would be interesting to produce a similar evaluation of the Strategic Cultures and 
participation in the SADC negotiations for the remaining secondary powers. This would, 
for example, allow to explain why Venezuela chose to join the SADC despite almost all of 
its preferences for the organization having been defeated. Moreover, considering that one 
of the case selection criterion worked under the assumption that secondary powers 
should be more capable of resisting the regional power asymmetries and engage more 
freely with the negotiations, it would be worth exploring how minor regional powers 
behaved and their motivations. Should the empirical analysis of those cases show that the 
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Brazilian power asymmetry did not affect their decision-making processes nor their 
negotiating agendas, then the whole notion that the regional balance of power is relevant 
to explain South American relations could be brought into question. 
Considering that the SADC has been in operation for the better part of ten years 
already, it would also be interesting analysing whether or not it has been able to influence 
regional dynamics and the agents that participate in them. This would require doing an 
in-depth performance evaluation of the organization, analysing not only the fulfilled 
projects but also the impact it has had on regional dynamics and the prospects of 
developing more ambitious cooperation/coordination. In addition, the agents themselves 
should be re-evaluated, trying to identify whether or not the way in which they 
understand and relate to their defence sectors has been affected, whether or not their 
perception of the region has changes, and whether or not the goal of extending the stable 
peace of the Southern Cone to the rest of the region has been achieved. Moreover, it would 
be worth looking at whether or not institutional/bureaucratic/professional networks 
emerged between those how handled SADC issues at the national level in each member 
state, whether or not this led to their normative priors to change, and (if the two previous 
conditions prove to be true) whether or not this has had any relevant impact on the 
respective defence elites. 
Finally, though this research sought primarily to make an empirical contribution, 
hopefully the conceptual work done with the Strategic Culture framework and the 
connection established with the wider constructivist research agenda can help advance 
the agent-structure debate within this tradition, looking not only into the general 
abstraction of “co-constitution” but also engaging more explicitly with questions of 
operationalization and empirical work. 
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Appendix 1: SADC Statute 
ESTATUTO DEL CONSEJO DE DEFENSA SURAMERICANO140 
 
I - Naturaleza 
Artículo 1.- Créase el Consejo de Defensa Suramericano como una instancia de consulta, 
cooperación y coordinación en materia de Defensa en armonía con las disposiciones del 
Tratado Constitutivo de UNASUR en sus Artículos 3° letra s, 5° y 6°. 
 
II - Principios 
Artículo 2.- El Consejo se sujetará a los principios y propósitos establecidos en la Carta de 
Naciones Unidas, y en la Carta de la Organización de Estados Americanos, así como en los 
Mandatos y Decisiones del Consejo de Jefas y Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de UNASUR. 
Artículo 3.- El Consejo de Defensa actuará conforme a los siguientes principios: 
a) Respeto de manera irrestricta a la soberanía, integridad e inviolabilidad 
territorial de los Estados, la no intervención en sus asuntos internos y la 
autodeterminación de los pueblos. 
b) Ratifica la plena vigencia de las instituciones democráticas, el respeto irrestricto 
a los derechos humanos y el ejercicio de la no discriminación en el ámbito de la 
defensa, con el fin de reforzar y garantizar el estado de derecho. 
c) Promueve la paz y la solución pacífica de controversias. 
                                                        
140 Despite English being one of the four official languages of the UNASUR, no official version of the present 
Statute was found in that language in any of the official websites of the UNASUR, the SADC, the CEED, nor 
the member countries Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The present version in Spanish was 
retrieved from: http://ceed.unasursg.org/Espanol/09-Downloads/Normativa/Estatuto-CDS.pdf  
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d) Fortalece el diálogo y el consenso en materia de defensa mediante el fomento de 
medidas de confianza y transparencia. 
e) Salvaguarda la plena vigencia del Derecho Internacional en concurrencia con los 
principios y normas de la Carta de Naciones Unidas, la Carta de la Organización de 
Estados Americanos y el Tratado Constitutivo de UNASUR. 
f) Preserva y fortalece Suramérica como un espacio libre de armas nucleares y de 
destrucción masiva, promoviendo el desarme y la cultura de paz en el mundo. 
g) Reconoce la subordinación constitucional de las instituciones de la defensa a la 
autoridad civil legalmente constituida. 
h) Afirma el pleno reconocimiento de las instituciones encargadas de la defensa 
nacional consagradas por las Constituciones de los Estados miembros. 
i) Promueve la reducción de las asimetrías existentes entre los sistemas de defensa 
de los Estado miembros de UNASUR en orden a fortalecer la capacidad de la región 
en el campo de la defensa. 
j) Fomenta la defensa soberana de los recursos naturales de nuestras naciones. 
k) Promueve, de conformidad al ordenamiento constitucional y legal de los Estados 
miembros, la responsabilidad y la participación ciudadana en los temas de la 
defensa, en cuanto bien público que atañe al conjunto de la sociedad. 
l) Tiene presente los principios de gradualidad y flexibilidad en el desarrollo 
institucional de UNASUR y en la promoción de iniciativas de cooperación en el 
campo de la defensa reconociendo las diferentes realidades nacionales. 
m) Reafirma la convivencia pacífica de los pueblos, la vigencia de los sistemas 
democráticos de gobierno y su protección, en materia de defensa, frente a amenazas 
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o acciones externas o internas, en el marco de las normativas nacionales. Asimismo, 
rechaza la presencia o acción de grupos armados al margen de la ley, que ejerzan o 
propicien la violencia cualquiera sea su origen. 
 
III – Objetivos 
Artículo 4.- El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano tiene como objetivos generales los 
siguientes: 
a) Consolidar Suramérica como una zona de paz, base para la estabilidad 
democrática y el desarrollo integral de nuestros pueblos, y como contribución a la 
paz mundial.  
b) Construir una identidad suramericana en materia de defensa, que tome en cuenta 
las características subregionales y nacionales y que contribuya al fortalecimiento de 
la unidad de América Latina y el Caribe.  
c) Generar consensos para fortalecer la cooperación regional en materia de defensa.  
Artículo 5.- Los objetivos específicos del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano son:  
a) Avanzar gradualmente en el análisis y discusión de los elementos comunes de una 
visión conjunta en materia de defensa.  
b) Promover el intercambio de información y análisis sobre la situación regional e 
internacional, con el propósito de identificar los factores de riesgo y amenaza que 
puedan afectar la paz regional y mundial.  
c) Contribuir a la articulación de posiciones conjuntas de la región en foros 
multilaterales sobre defensa, dentro del marco del artículo 14º del Tratado 
Constitutivo de UNASUR.  
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d) Avanzar en la construcción de una visión compartida respecto de las tareas de 
defensa y promover el diálogo y la cooperación preferente con otros países de 
América Latina y el Caribe.  
e) Fortalecer la adopción de medidas de fomento de la confianza y difundir las 
lecciones aprendidas. 
f) Promover el intercambio y la cooperación en el ámbito de la industria de defensa.  
g) Fomentar el intercambio en materia de formación y capacitación militar, facilitar 
procesos de entrenamiento entre las Fuerzas Armadas y promover la cooperación 
académica de los centros de estudio de defensa.  
h) Compartir experiencias y apoyar acciones humanitarias tales como desminado, 
prevención, mitigación y asistencia a las víctimas de los desastres naturales. 
i) Compartir experiencias en operaciones de mantenimiento de la paz de Naciones 
Unidas.  
j) Intercambiar experiencias sobre los procesos de modernización de los Ministerios 
de Defensa y de las Fuerzas Armadas.  
k) Promover la incorporación de la perspectiva de género en el ámbito de la defensa.  
 
IV – Estructura 
Artículo 6.- El Consejo de Defensa Suramericano estará integrado por las Ministras y los 
Ministros de Defensa, o sus equivalentes, de los países miembros de UNASUR.  
Artículo 7.- Las delegaciones nacionales se compondrán por altos representantes de 
Relaciones Exteriores y de Defensa y por los asesores cuya participación sea considerada 
necesaria por los Estados miembros.  
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Artículo 8.- El Consejo tendrá una instancia ejecutiva, encabezada por las Viceministras y 
los Viceministros de Defensa, o sus equivalentes.  
Artículo 9.- La Presidencia del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano corresponderá al mismo 
país que ocupe la Presidencia Pro Tempore de UNASUR. La Presidencia tendrá la 
responsabilidad de coordinar las actividades del Consejo.  
Artículo 10.- El Consejo podrá conformar grupos de trabajo para examinar temas 
específicos y formularle sugerencias o recomendaciones.  
Artículo 11.- Las atribuciones de la Presidencia del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano son 
las siguientes:  
a) Asumir las tareas de secretaría del Consejo y demás instancias de trabajo, 
incluyendo la comunicación con los Estados miembros y el envío de información de 
interés para los trabajos del Consejo.  
b) Elaborar la propuesta de agenda y organización de los trabajos, para las 
reuniones ordinarias y extraordinarias del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, a ser 
sometida a consideración de los demás Estados miembros.  
c) Formular, previa consulta a los Estados miembros, invitaciones a especialistas 
para que participen en reuniones del Consejo de Defensa Suramericano.  
V – Funcionamiento 
Artículo 12.- El Consejo realizará anualmente reuniones ordinarias, según el criterio de 
rotación de la Presidencia Pro Tempore de UNASUR.  
Artículo 13.- Los acuerdos del Consejo se adoptarán por consenso, de acuerdo al artículo 
12° del Tratado Constitutivo de UNASUR.  
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Artículo 14.- La instancia ejecutiva del Consejo sesionará cada seis meses, sin perjuicio de 
reuniones extraordinarias, y elaborará el plan de acción anual.  
Artículo 15.- La Presidencia convocará a reuniones extraordinarias a petición de la mitad 
de sus Estados miembros.  
Artículo 16.- El Consejo y sus Estados miembros darán a los documentos entregados el 
tratamiento establecido por el país de origen.  
Artículo 17.- La incorporación de nuevos Estados al Consejo de Defensa Suramericano se 
hará de acuerdo a lo estipulado en los artículos 19º y 20º del Tratado Constitutivo de 
UNASUR.  
Artículo 18.- En las iniciativas de diálogo y cooperación con otras organizaciones 
regionales o subregionales, el Consejo actuará de conformidad con los artículos 6º, 7º y 
15º del Tratado Constitutivo de UNASUR.  
 
Propuesta de Grupo de trabajo sobre el Consejo de Defensa Suramericano, suscrito en la 
ciudad de Santiago, República de Chile, a 11 días de diciembre del año dos mil ocho. 
Sr. Daniel Rodríguez 
Ministerio de Defensa 
República de Argentina 
Sr Miguel Carvajal 
Ministerio de Defensa 
República de Ecuador 
Sr. Ricardo Bocalandro 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
República de Argentina 
Sr. Germán Ortega 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
República de Ecuador 
Sr. Alfredo Lobo 
Ministerio de Defensa 
República de Bolivia 
Sr Miguel Hermosilla 
Ministerio de Defensa 




Sr. Mauricio Dorfler 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
República de Bolivia 
Sr. José Antonio Bellina 
Ministerio de Defensa 
República de Peru 
Sr Gilberto Antonio S. Burnier 
Ministerio de Defensa 
República de Brasil 
Sr José Boza 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
República de Peru 
Sr Joao Solano Carneiro da Cunha 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
República de Brasil 
Sr Jorge Menéndez 
Ministerio de Defensa 
República de Uruguay 
Sr Boris Yopo 
Ministerio de Defensa 
República de Chile 
Sr Duncan Croci 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
República de Uruguay 
Sr Juan Eduardo Eguiguren 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
República de Chile 
Sr José Fuentes 
Ministerio de Defensa 
República de Venezuela 
Sr Sergio Restrepo 
Ministerio de Defensa 
República de Colombia 
Sra María Lourdes Urbaneja 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
República de Venezuela 
Sra Paola Lugari 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 
República de Colombia 
 
Sr Gonzalo García Pino 








Appendix 2: List of interviewees 
 
Argentina (in alphabetical order) 
 
Battaglino, Jorge. 2015. Interview on 24th June, Buenos Aires 
PhD In Latin American Politics (University of Essex). Assistant Professor of International 
Relations and Latin American Politics (Universidad Nacional de San Martín/CONICET). 
Former Director of the National School of Defence. 
Codianni, Eduardo. 2015. Interview on 25th June, Buenos Aires 
MA in Economic Development (Universidad Nacional de San Martín). Analyst, Office of 
International Affairs – Ministry of Defence (2010-2015). Visiting Lecturer: Latin American 
Geopolitics and Defence (University of Buenos Aires); Public Administration and Defence 
(National Defence School). 
Comini, Nicolás. 2015. Interview on 28th July, Buenos Aires 
PhD in Social Sciences (Universidad de Buenos Aires). Director of the Master´s degree in 
International Relations (Universidad del Salvador). Junior negotiator in the Argentine 
delegation to the SADC Working Group. 
Diamint, Rut. 2015. Interview on 6th August, Buenos Aires 
PhD in International Studies (Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona). Professor of 
International Security (Universidad Torcuato di Tella). Expert advisor at the Argentine 
National Congress. Chief of Staff and expert advisor at the Ministry of Defence (2003-




Forti, Alfredo. 2015. Interview on 22nd June, Buenos Aires 
Deputy Minister of Defence for International Affairs (2007-2013). Head of SADC 
negotiators for Argentina. Director of the Centre for Strategic Defence Studies 
(CEED/SADC) (2011-2015). Special advisor to the Secretary General of the OAS on 
Defence matters (2015- ). 
Hekimian, Leonardo. 2015. Interview on 30th July, Buenos Aires 
Joint degree in Law and Political Science. Lecturer of International Security (Pontificia 
Universidad Católica Argentina). Civil servant at the Ministry of Defence (1992- ). Head of 
Expert Advisors, Office of International Affairs - Ministry of Defence. 
Mendoza, María Cecila. 2015. Interview on 4th August, Buenos Aires 
PhD (c) in Latin American Studies (Universidad de Buenos Aires). Civil servant in different 
branches of the Argentine state. National coordinator on UNASUR-related matters – 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009-2010). Coordinator at the National School of 
Diplomacy– Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011-2012) 
Rodríguez, Daniel. 2015. Interview on 5th August, Buenos Aires 
PgDip in Control and Administration of Public Policies (FLACSO/Argentina). Expert 
advisor at the Office of International Affairs - Ministry of Defence (2006-2012). Senior 
negotiator in the Argentine delegation to the SADC Working Group. Argentine delegate to 
the CEED. 
Tibiletti, Luis. 2015. Interview on 23rd June, Buenos Aires 
Capt. (R) Argentine Army. Advisor to the Argentine Congress on International Relations 
and Defence matters. Founding member of the Regional Strategic Security group (SER) 
and director of the “SER en el 2000” journal. Academic Secretary at the Centre of Strategic 
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Defence Studies (Ministry of Defence). Security Secretary (2005-2007). Professor at the 
National Defence School and at the Universidad del Salvador (USAL). 
 
Chile (in alphabetical order) 
 
Durán, Roberto. 2015. Interview on 10th July. Santiago de Chile 
PhD in Political Science (Institut de Hautes Études Internationales et du Développement, 
Geneva). Professor of International Relations, Department of Political Science and 
International Relations, Universidad Católica de Chile. Expert on Chilean foreign and 
defence policies. 
Flisfisch, Ángel. 2015. Interview on 7th July. Santiago de Chile 
MA in Political Science (University of Michigan). Director of FLACSO-Chile. Professor of 
International Relations. Head of the Special Policies section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Under-Secretary for Foreign Policy (2009-2010). Senior negotiator in the Chilean 
delegation to the SADC Working Group. 
García Pino, Gonzalo. 2015. Interview on 6th July. Santiago de Chile 
Lawyer. Director of the Constitutional Jury. Advisor to the Minister of Defence (1994-
1997). Under-Secretary of Defence for the Navy (2005-2006). Under-Secretary of Defence 
for War (2006-2010). President of the SADC Working Group during the SADC 
negotiations. 
Labbé, Alfredo. 2015. Interview on 9th July. Santiago de Chile 
Senior career diplomat. Director General of Foreign Policy (2014-2016). Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations in Geneva (2010-2014). Director for International 
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and Human Security (2009-2010); Deputy Permanent Representative to the United 
Nations in New York (2005-2008). Head negotiator in the Chilean delegation to the SADC 
Working Group. 
Maldonado, Carlos. 2015. Interview on 9th July. Santiago de Chile 
MA in Defence Policy (Academia de Guerra del Ejército de Chile). Under-Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence. Senior expert advisor on International Affairs to the 
same Ministry. Negotiator in the Chilean delegation to the SADC Working Group. 
Portales, Carlos. 2015. Interview on 6th July. Santiago de Chile 
MA in Political Science (Stanford University). Professor of International Relations at 
FLACSO-Chile. Director of the International Organizations, Law and Diplomacy 
programme at the Washington College of Law, American University (2010-2014). 
Director General of Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003-2008). Director of 
Chile´s diplomacy academy “Andrés Bello” (2000-2001). 
Yopo Herrera, Boris Igor. 2015. Interview on 10th July. Santiago de Chile  
MA in International Relations (Universidad de Chile). Ma IN Political Science 
(FLACSO/Chile). Researcher at the Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS), 
London (1986-1987). Researcher at FLACSO/Chile (1985-1989). Director of studies at the 
Diplomacy Academy “Andrés Bello” (1992-1995). Director of Postgraduate studies at the 
Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad de Chile (2003-2006). Expert advisor 
on international affairs to the Presidency of the Republic (2007-2008). Head of expert 
advisors at the Ministry of Defence (2008-2009). Research Fellow at the Academia 
Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE), Ministry of Defence (2009-2011). 
Director in Chile for Friedrich Ebert Stiftung´s Regional Security programme. 
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Yopo Herrera, Mladen. 2015. Interview on 30th July. Buenos Aires 
PhD in Political Science (University of Leiden). Professor of International Relations 
(Universidad de Santiago de Chile). Expert advisor, Ministry of Defence. Deputy Director 
of the CEED/SADC (2015-2017). Deputy Director at the ANEPE (2017- ). 
 
Colombia (in alphabetical order) 
 
Bermúdez, Jaime. 2015. Interview on 21st July. Bogota. 
DPhil St. Anthony´s College (University of Oxford). Communications adviser to President 
Álvaro Uribe (2002-2006). Colombian Ambassador to Argentina (2006-2008). Minister of 
Foreign Affarais (2008-2010). 
Borda, Sandra. 2015. Interview on 23rd July. Bogota. 
PhD in Political Science (University of Minnesota). Postdoc in Foreign Policy (University 
of Groningen). Head of the School of Social Sciences at Universidad de Bogota “Jorge Tadeo 
Lozano”. Senior Researcher in the Colombian Foreign Policy report requested by the 
Colombian Presidency (2010). Expert in Colombian foreign and security policies. 
Cardona, Diego. 2015. Interview via Skype on 15th October. 
PhD in International Studies (Institut des Hautes Études Internationales – University of 
Geneva). Lecturer of International Relations at Universidad Nacional de Colombia (1988-
1991). Lecturer of International Relations at Universidad de los Andes (1990-1994/1997-
2000). Professor of International Relations at Universidad del Norte. Coordinator of the 
Centre for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Coordinator of political 
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cooperation and common foreign policy at CAN. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Head 
of Staff for International Affairs at UNASUR Secretary General´s Office. 
Lugari, Paola. 2015. Interview on 15th July. Bogota. 
PgDip in Negotiation and International Relations (Universidad de los Andes). Adviser at 
the Americas Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2001-2007). Coordinator of the Regional 
Economic Integration and Political Consultation Mechanisms Office, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (2007-2011). Coordinator of South-South and Triangular Cooperation to Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Colombian Presidential Agency of International Cooperation 
(2012). Junior negotiator for Colombia during the SADC talks. 
Moreno, David René. 2015. Interview on 22nd July. Bogota. 
Admiral (R) Colombian Navy. PhD in Oceanography (University of Bordeaux). Head of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Colombian Military Forces. Deputy Commander of the 
Colombian Navy. Headmaster of the Naval Academy. Senior negotiator for Colombia 
during the SADC talks. 
Reyes, Camilo. 2015. Interview on 17th July. Bogota. 
PgDip in Integration Law (Universitá Prodeo, Rome). Senior career diplomat. Minister of 
Foreign Affair. Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva. Ambassador 




Appendix 3: Interview questions 
 
 
1. What is the history of the project to create the SADC? (Warm-up question) 
 
2. In your opinion, what conditions made the South American context permeable to the 
creation of the SADC in 2008? 
 
3. Why was the South American option preferable to a Latin American or a hemispheric 
one? 
 
4. How did the X administration react to the proposal? 
 
5. Was the local understanding of this project affected in any way by the fact that Brazil 
had promoted this idea? 
 
6. How was the regional context perceived? / What aspects of the regional context were 
its most defining features at the time? 
 
7. Once the SADC initiative is rolled out, how was it decided that the country would join 
the negotiations?  
 
8. How was the negotiations agenda defined? Where there any clearly defined primary 
and secondary objectives? What there any domestic contestation to participating in the 
negotiations? 
 
9. How about “no-go zones”? Was there any outcome that would have been considered 
unacceptable or a deal-breaker? 
 
10. How would you define the key ideas influencing the role of the defence sector in 
society? Where does the prospect of increasing international cooperation/coordination 




11. In your opinion, where principles or understandings about the defence sector 
important in informing this country´s negotiating position? How? 
 
12. Taking into consideration the negotiating agenda agreed at the outset, which would 
you say constitute the biggest successes and defeats for the country in the negotiations?  
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Appendix 4: Regional power distribution 
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores141 
http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities 
               
                                                        
141 Based on information from the National Material Capabilities data set, which contains annual values by 
state for total and urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, and military personnel 
and expenditure. The time frame selected here (1980-2007) covers the latter stages of the military regimes 
widespread in the region until the 1980s and the democratization period, until the year before the UNASUR 
and the SADC were created. 
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Note: “The CINC reflects an average of a state’s share of the system total of each element of capabilities in each year, 
weighting each component equally. In doing so, the CINC will always range between 0 and 1. “0.0” would indicate that 
a state had 0% of the total capabilities present in the system in that year, while “1.0” would indicate that the state had 
100% of the capabilities in a given year” (Greig and Enterline 2017, 7). This means that at no point in the almost 30 






































































































































Percentage of Regional Power by country, 1980-2007 (Source: CINC)
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SIPRI Milex data (Military expenditure by country), 1988-2013 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database  
Figures are in billions of US$, at constant 2011 values and exchange rates, except for the 2013 figure, which 





NOTE: The abrupt increase (and subsequent fall) seen in Brazil´s 1990 military expenditure figures are, in fact, related 












South American military expenditure by country as fraction of regional total, 
1988-2013 (Source: SIPRI)
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Military expenditure by country as % of total regional expenditure, 1988-2013 
(Source: SIPRI)
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Share of the region´s population by 
country, 2013 (Source: World Bank)
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Share of the region´s GDP by country 
(Source: World Bank)
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GDP evolution, 1980-2013 in current 2013 US$ (Source: World Bank)
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South American organizations and summits 
Comunidad Suramericana de Naciones (2006). Declaración de Cochabamba. Colocando la 
Piedra Fundamental para una Unión Sudamericana. Retrieved from: http://www.isags-
unasur.org/uploads/biblioteca/1/bb[611]ling[2]anx[1826].pdf 
 
First South American Presidents´ Summit (2000). Brasilia Communiqué. Retrieved from: 
http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/d00000e1.htm 
 
Grupo de Trabajo del CDS. (2009). Consejo de Defensa Suramericano UNASUR. Crónica de 
su Gestación. Santiago de Chile: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Chile. Retrieved from: 
http://ceed.unasursg.org/Espanol/09-Downloads/Biblioteca/CDS-Cronicas.pdf  
 
SADC (2009). South American Defence Council Action Plan 2009-2010. Retrieved from: 
http://ceed.unasursg.org/Espanol/09-Downloads/Esp-PA/PA-CDS-2009-10.pdf  
 
SADC (2010). South American Defence Council Action Plan 2010-2011. Retrieved from: 
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South American Presidents´ Summit (2004). Declaración de Cusco sobre la Comunidad 
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